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Abstract
Following the 9/11 attacks, concerns about maritime terrorism prompted several international
legal developments. These included amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention introducing
the ISPS Code, and the Long Range Identification and Tracking of ships, with amendments to
the 1958 Seafarers Identity Documents Convention also occurring. 2005 also saw the
finalisation of amendments to the 1988 SUA treaties to better facilitate the interdiction of
suspected terrorist vessels. Additionally, the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative has
prompted critical re-thinks about the interdiction powers of States under the 1982 UN Law of
the Sea Convention, and in exceptional cases, under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
This Study examines the extent to which the above international agreements are likely to
succeed in enabling the prevention of contemporary post-9/11 forms of maritime terrorism. It
formulates the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix to statistically analyse all the ways in which
maritime terrorism incidents have occurred, and might occur in future. The study combines
these findings with analyses of how the ISPS Code and LRIT measures have developed since
their entry into force, and also examines the debate amongst international legal scholars about
the legality of vessel interdictions in the post 9/11 maritime security context.
Through considering how the above international agreements might apply in practice, the Study
highlights the importance of continual and rigorous application of ISPS Code security measures
both by contracting governments and at operational levels within maritime industries. Whilst
it identifies scope for flexible interpretations of UNCLOS (and possibly Article 51 of the UN
Charter) relating to the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels, it argues for increased
ratification of the 2005 SUA Convention to reduce the scope for uncertainty and conflict.
Overall the Study demonstrates that the international legal framework for preventing maritime
terrorism incidents has been improved since 9/11. Going forward, it argues that instead of
further reforms or new instruments, the international community’s focus should be on
continually refining the prospects for the existing instruments to succeed, and outlines
recommendations for how this might be achieved.
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CHAPTER 1

[1.1]

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Over the last two decades, and particularly following the devastating 9/11 attacks in the United
States, contemporary forms of terrorism have been recognised as a very serious threat to
international peace and security. In comparison to older forms of terrorism, proponents of
contemporary forms of terrorism have perpetrated several significant indiscriminate masscasualty attacks, frequently involving suicide tactics, being largely unidentifiable and
unamenable to negotiation, and privately financed without the active support of states. The
vulnerabilities of the maritime domain to targeting and/or utilisation by contemporary terrorist
groups1 have been recognised by States, international organisations and scholarly
commentators. Incidents such as the bombings of the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, the MV
Limburg off Aden in 2002, and Super Ferry 14 in the Philippines in 2004, as well as attacks
on shipping around Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 2 contrast
markedly to incidents such as the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking, and have demonstrated the
capabilities and resolve of contemporary terrorist groups to target vulnerable shipping and
other maritime infrastructure.3 Furthermore, concerns have been widely expressed that terrorist
might seek to utilise vessels to transport weaponry, including both conventional weapons and
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) materiel,4 persons connected with terrorist groups, and
as a means of terrorist fundraising. It has been reasoned that a significant maritime terrorist
attack could have a more disruptive effect on the global economy than the 9/11 attacks; 5 and
that terrorist attacks on land enabled through weaponry or operatives transported by sea could
(and indeed have) been very deadly. Whilst the frequency of maritime terrorist attacks has been
dwarfed by pirate attacks since around 2005, there are no grounds to conclude the threat has
Chapter 2 explains the reasoning for this Study’s use of the terms “contemporary terrorism” and “precontemporary terrorism”
2
Chapters 2 and 3 explain that whilst the LTTE is regarded by many as more of an insurgent group than a terrorist
organisation, as Appendix A shows, the LTTE has been designated as a terrorist organisation by several States
including the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada; and its attacks have been widely recorded as
terrorist incidents
3
For example offshore platforms, submarine cables, ports and navigational facilities
4
Whilst the PSI Interdiction Principles (discussed in [7.2]) use the terms ‘WMD and related materials’, the term
‘WMD materiel’ has been used extensively by international legal scholars, and is used within this Study for the
sake of brevity
5
Given that an major terrorist attack affecting ports or key navigational chokepoints could impact on the real
economy (involving the physical movement of goods) rather than the financial economy (involving the flow of
funds)
1
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entirely disappeared. Recognition of these increased threats prompted several significant
developments to the international legal framework following 9/11 to better enable the
prevention of contemporary forms of maritime terrorism.
On the one hand, amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974 (SOLAS) 6 have
mandated certain “preventative measures”7 to reduce the scope for terrorists to target and/or
utilise vessels in the first instance. First, through amendments to SOLAS Chapter XI-2,8 the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was developed to provide an
internationally consistent maritime security risk management framework. SOLAS Chapter XI2 and the ISPS Code have mandated and recommended physical and organisational security
measures for (at least) “SOLAS vessels”, the port facilities that interface with them, the
shipping companies that operate them, and have also imposed supervisory and oversight
obligations upon SOLAS contracting governments. Second, amendments to SOLAS Chapter
V9 have mandated the fitting of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to certain vessels since
2004, and more recently, the Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of certain larger
vessels engaged on international voyages (which has been progressively implemented since
2006) in order to facilitate the identification and tracking of vessels, and thereby contribute to
improved Maritime Domain Awareness.10 Additionally, the 2003 amendments to the 1958
Seafarers Identity Documents Convention11 (2003 SID Convention) have required state parties
to mandate secure forms of seafarer identification documentation to reduce the scope for
seafarer identification to be fraudulently utilised for nefarious purposes.12

6

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 1184 UNTS 278
(entered into force 25 May 1980)
7
The usage of this term to describe the focus of these amendments is consistent with Natalie Klein Maritime
Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2011), 211 – who uses the term ‘preventative actions’
8
‘Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security’
9
‘Safety of Navigation’
10
The term ‘Maritime Domain Awareness’ has been widely used following 9/11, and was recently defined by the
IMO as ‘the effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime environment that could impact
upon the security, safety, economy or environment’: International Maritime Organisation Amendments to the
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual IMO Doc MSC.1/Circ.1367 24
May 2010
11
Seafarers Identity Documents Convention, opened for signature 13 May 1958, ILO Convention No. 108 (entered
into force 19 February 1961)
12
Including for example the movement of persons connected with terrorist organisations, criminal groups and
illegal immigration
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On the other hand, there have been several developments relating to the interdiction13 of
suspected terrorist vessels. Concerns about the possible maritime trafficking of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) and related materiel (WMD materiel) by terrorists have provided
the most significant (but not sole) impetus for these developments. First, between 2002 and
2005 the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) facilitated negotiations to amend the 1988
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation14
(1988 SUA Convention), and the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf15 (1988 SUA Platforms
Protocol), (collectively the ‘1988 SUA treaties’). Since their entry into force in 1992, the 1988
SUA treaties have enabled state parties to arrest, prosecute or extradite persons who have been
involved in the commission of acts prejudicing the safety of maritime navigation and offshore
platforms respectively. However following 9/11, several limitations of the 1988 SUA treaties
were recognised. These included not addressing the utilisation of ships as weapons, acts of
violence against persons on board vessels that do not compromise the safety of navigation,
deliberate pollution of the marine environment, the dumping of hazardous or nuclear material
or waste, and the maritime smuggling of potential terrorist persons and biological, chemical
and nuclear weapons. These IMO negotiations resulted in the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA
Convention16 (2005 SUA Convention) and the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Platforms
Protocol17 (2005 SUA Platforms Protocol) (collectively the ‘2005 SUA treaties’). The 2005
SUA treaties addressed the above limitations through expanding the range of offences covered
by the SUA treaties, and including new provisions for interdicting suspected terrorist vessels.
However to date the 2005 SUA treaties have only achieved a very marginal level of acceptance
internationally.

Second, following the interdiction of the So San freighter off Yemen in December 2002, in
May 2003 the United States, in partnership with several other states, announced the formation

Chapter 6 explains there are various definitions of the term ‘interdiction’ – including whether it is limited to the
arrest of the vessel, or might also encompass the disabling of the vessel
14
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for
signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 March 1992)
15
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1 March 1992)
16
Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, opened for signature 14 October 2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (entered into force 28 July 2010)
17
Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf opened for signature 14 October 2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/22 (entered
into force 28 July 2010)
13
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of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a cooperative effort to facilitate the interdiction
of suspected shipments of WMD materiel to and from ‘states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern’. The PSI involves “participant” states expressing their political
“support” for the loosely-worded PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles (‘PSI Interdiction
Principles’). Whilst not being a formal instrument creating new forms of jurisdiction, the PSI
Interdiction Principles have come to be regarded as a non-binding, political expression of how
“participants” might consider exercising their jurisdictional rights under the United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention18 (UNCLOS).

The measures alluded to in the PSI Interdiction Principles have prompted debate about their
legality. International legal scholars have been divided on the extent to which key post-9/11
counter-terrorism Security Council Resolutions19 might add further justification to
interdictions of vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel. Several uncertainties
regarding the vaguely-expressed Interdiction Principles have also been highlighted, in
particular the question of what “support” for the PSI actually entails.20

Furthermore, since 2004 the United States has also progressively concluded nine formalised
PSI ship boarding agreements with significant registry states 21 to facilitate the interdiction of
suspected shipments of WMD materiel (PSI ship boarding agreements), 22 with four of these
ship boarding agreements providing for enforcement by (undefined) ‘third states’ by agreement
of the parties, thereby potentially increasing the overall “reach” of the PSI.

Additionally following 9/11 several studies have identified shortcomings in the various
UNCLOS provisions enabling States to protect offshore platforms, submarine cables and
pipelines from terrorist attacks.

18

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3
(entered into force 16 November 1994)
19
As Chapter 2 explains, these UN Security Council Resolutions have affirmed and re-affirmed the seriousness
of the contemporary threat of terrorism as a threat to international peace and security, and both obliged and invited
UN member states to take a range of measures to counter terrorist threats
20
Chapter 7 explains that whilst the United States lists over 100 States as “supporting” or “endorsing” the
Interdiction Principles, the question of what “support” for the PSI actually entails – as States are only indicating
their political support, rather than formally committing to treaty obligations
21
As explained in Chapter 7, these key registry states are (in order of the formalisation of the PSI ship boarding
agreements) Liberia, Panama, the Marshall Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Belize, Malta, Mongolia and the Bahamas
22
As Chapter 7 explains - the US State Department terms these agreements as ‘PSI Bilateral Ship Boarding
Agreements’
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Finally several post-9/11 policy statements have suggested, and international legal scholars
have argued, that in exceptional circumstances where there was no other jurisdictional basis,
States might interdict suspected terrorist vessels through exercising their the ‘inherent’ rights
of self-defence, recognised under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.23 However
since 1945, and particularly following 9/11, opinion has been divided about precisely when an
‘armed attack’ occurs; what degree of force will constitute an ‘armed attack’; whether ‘armed
attacks’ may be perpetrated by non-state actors such as terrorists as well as by States, and what
amounts of force States may use to counter ‘armed attacks’.

[1.2]

THE QUESTION INVESTIGATED BY THIS STUDY

This Study examines the extent to which the international agreements noted in [1.1] above are
likely to be successful in enabling the prevention of contemporary post-9/11 forms of maritime
terrorism. It uses the “umbrella” term ‘maritime terrorism incident’ to encompass both
maritime terrorist attacks, and the utilisation of vessels to enable the perpetration of subsequent
terrorist attacks on land through transporting weaponry, operatives or financing terrorist
activities.

[1.2.1]

Existing literatures

Since 9/11, discrete aspects of the threat of maritime terrorism, and the international
agreements noted in [1.1] that enable States to prevent the occurrence of such threats, have
been studied to various degrees.

On the one hand, studies by terrorism and maritime security specialists have examined the
profiles of terrorist and insurgent groups known to possess maritime attack capabilities. Other
studies have examined the vulnerabilities of particular states, geographical regions and
maritime industry sectors (for example, shipping containers, passenger vessels and cruise ships,
and Liquefied Natural Gas tankers) to terrorist attacks.24 Whilst some of these studies have
formulated insightful scenarios as to how terrorists might target and/or utilise vessels, these
scenarios tend to be specifically focused towards particular maritime industry sectors or
23

Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 59 Stat 1031 (entered into force 24 October
1945)
24
The existing literature on these fields is examined in [3.3] and [3.4]
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geographical regions. None of the studies within this literature as yet provides the foundations
for a generalised framework which allows us to statistically analyse all of the ways in which
maritime terrorism threats have been successfully perpetrated, attempted and planned by
various terrorist groups.

On the other hand, several international legal studies have comprehensively examined discrete
aspects regarding the development and uncertain aspects of the international agreements noted
in [1.1].

Around the time of its entry into force in 2004, several studies examined the negotiating
processes for the ISPS Code, and the economic and operational impacts it was expected to have
on the world’s shipping industries. A number of shorter studies have examined the legislative
and policy arrangements for implementing the ISPS Code by States.25 However since the ISPS
Code’s entry into force, no study has undertaken a detailed examination of how the Code’s
limitations26 have been addressed within the IMO, nor examined how the security measures
mandated and recommended by the Code might enable the prevention of maritime terrorism
incidents. Similarly, whilst a handful of studies have examined the development of the AIS and
LRIT amendments to the SOLAS Convention27 and the 2003 SID Convention28 around the
time of their entry into force, the progress of implementing the LRIT vessel tracking
requirements by States has not at yet been studied comprehensively.

A smaller number of studies have examined the jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS and the
ISPS Code in enabling the protection offshore platforms and submarine cables from terrorist
attacks;29 and the negotiating process for the 2005 SUA treaties has been also been analysed in
detail.30

By far the largest number of international legal studies have focused on analysed the legality
under UNCLOS of the PSI Interdiction Principles as a response to the maritime proliferation
25

These existing literatures are reviewed in [4.2]
The limitations of the ISPS Code include its limited application to the ship-port interface (and not to supply
chains more broadly); its limited application to large SOLAS Ships and the port facilities servicing them;
inconsistencies in the ISPS Code’s application to offshore platforms; and uncertainties regarding the operation of
Ship Security Alert System arrangements mandated by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 6
27
These existing literatures are reviewed in [4.3]
28
These existing literatures are reviewed in [4.4]
29
These existing literatures are reviewed in [6.3]
30
See [6.2.5]
26
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of WMD materiel.31 These studies have been divided in their assessments of the legality of the
vaguely-described PSI Interdiction Principles. They have also highlighted several uncertain
aspects of how the PSI Interdiction Principles might apply in practice, and questioned the long
term viability of the PSI. Some of these studies have briefly noted that in exceptional cases,
interdictions of suspected shipments of WMD materiel might be justified under Article 51 of
the UN Charter, or the doctrine of Necessity – but have not examined this question in detail.
Although these studies have comprehensively examined the legality of the maritime
interdiction of suspected shipments of WMD materiel, these studies have not focused in detail
on the legality of interdicting other utilisations of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks
– including through transporting conventional weaponry, terrorist persons or financing terrorist
activities.

Whilst very thorough and insightful, the existing studies overviewed have tended to be
discretely focused on examining either the specific aspects of the threat of maritime terrorism
on the one hand, or particular aspects of the international agreements on the other. No in-depth
study has yet drawn together these bodies of knowledge to undertake an overall assessment of
the extent to which the international agreements noted in [1.1] are likely to succeed in enabling
the prevention of contemporary post-9/11 maritime terrorism incidents, and the factors that will
determine their success.

[1.2.2]

Thesis Aims

The central research question examined in this Study is “To what extent are the international
agreements noted at [1.1] likely to be successful in enabling the prevention of contemporary
forms of maritime terrorism?”

To investigate the above research question, the chapters of this Study progressively consider
the following sub-questions:
(1) How should the threat of contemporary post-9/11 forms of maritime terrorism be
understood?
(2) What are the limitations of the international agreements, and how have these limitations
been addressed to date?

31

These existing literatures are reviewed in [7.2]
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(3) What factors are likely to influence the prospects of the international agreements being
successful in preventing maritime terrorism incidents?
(4) Considering how maritime terrorism incidents have previously occurred, and might occur
in the future, how might the international agreements apply in practice in preventing maritime
terrorism incidents?
(5) Going forward, what should be done to maximise the prospects for the international
agreements being successful in preventing contemporary post-9/11 maritime terrorism
incidents?

[1.3]

ARGUMENT OF THIS STUDY

This Study argues that the international legal framework enabling the prevention of maritime
terrorism has been expanded and improved following the 9/11 attacks. However, due to the
very low frequency and unpredictability of contemporary post-9/11 forms of maritime
terrorism, and the restricted nature of ISPS Code security measures and details about vessel
interdictions, it is not possible to make an overall assessment of how effective the international
agreements have been. Therefore, through analysing both IMO proceedings and scholarly
analyses relating to various aspects of the international agreements since their entry into force,
it enunciates the factors upon which the prospects for the instruments to succeed in preventing
maritime terrorism incidents will depend. These factors include the rigor of continuous
application of the ISPS Code by contracting governments and the maritime industry, the
flexibility in the interpretation of UNCLOS (and possibly Article 51 of the UN Charter) in
relation to interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels, and the extent of international support for
agreed vessel interdiction procedures – such as those contained in the 2005 SUA Convention.
Then, through taking account of how maritime terrorism incidents have previously occurred,
and might occur in future, the Study shows how these factors could apply in practice to prevent
the occurrence of maritime terrorism incidents. Overall the Study demonstrates that the
international legal framework for preventing maritime terrorism is adequately developed.
Going forward, it argues that instead of further reforms or new instruments, the international
community’s focus should be on continually refining the prospects for the existing instruments
to succeed, and outlines recommendations for how this might be achieved.
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[1.4]

OUTLINE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY

Chapter 232 outlines the threat of post-9/11 contemporary terrorism globally.33 It explains the
challenges of defining terrorism and illustrates the variances in international and national
designations of terrorist groups. It shows how over the last two decades, contemporary forms
of terrorism34 - most significantly evidenced by the 9/11 attacks35 have, in contrast to older,
more restrained and “negotiable” forms of terrorism, come to be characterised by very well
planned and coordinated mass-casualty suicide attacks, driven by extremist, non-negotiable
ideologies, and perpetrated by groups with a globalised focus.36 The chapter explains how
recognition of the serious threat of contemporary terrorism to international peace and security
has resulted in a paradigm shift in post 9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council Resolutions –
which have imposed obligations on States that are neither geographically nor temporally
limited. Chapter 2 concludes that more than ten years after the 9/11 attacks and even following
the 2011 death of Osama bin Laden, the threat of contemporary terrorism remains and must be
continually and proactively prevented.
Chapter 337 analyses the threat of contemporary terrorism in the maritime domain. It shows
how maritime terrorist attacks over the last two decades reflect the global trend articulated in
Chapter 2 towards creative and carefully-planned significant-casualty38 suicide attacks, and
away from older, more restrained and negotiable forms of terrorism. The chapter explains how
the disruptive effect of terrorist attacks on significant port facilities or navigational chokepoints could well be profound, and that terrorist attacks on land enabled through weaponry or
operatives transported by sea, or financed by the terrorist utilisations of vessels, could also be
‘The threat of contemporary terrorism globally’
Chapter 2 provides context for Chapter 3’s analysis of the threat of contemporary terrorism in the maritime
domain - with maritime terrorist attacks only account for around two per cent of all recorded terrorist attacks
since 1968 when terrorism statistics began to be methodically recorded
34
Which have been largely driven by Islamic extremism and the Al Qaeda movement, and also practiced by the
LTTE
35
Chapter 2 explains that the terms ‘contemporary’ and ‘pre-contemporary’ terrorism are used in preference to
‘pre- and ‘post-9/11’ terrorism because terrorism did not suddenly “change overnight” on 9/11. Rather, the 9/11
attacks were the most significant manifestation to date of ‘fourth wave terrorism’ which has progressively
developed since the early 1980s. Chapters 2 and 3 also explain that the term ‘contemporary’ terrorism also enables
us to simultaneously examine terrorist attacks both by Al Qaeda-influenced Islamic groups, and by the (nonIslamic) LTTE – which has perpetrated a significant proportion of maritime terrorist attacks
36
Chapter 2 explains the linkages that have developed between like-minded groups, with significant attacks
occurring in many locations around the world
37
‘The threat of contemporary terrorism in the maritime domain’
38
Chapter 2 explains that this Study uses the term ‘Mass casualty’ to refer to attacks with more than 50 casualties;
and Chapter 3 explains that due to the comparatively lower occurrence of maritime terrorist attacks, it uses the
term ‘Significant casualty’ attack to refer to maritime terrorist attacks resulting in more than ten fatalities
32
33
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(and have been) very devastating. It also notes indications of contemporary terrorist groups
having the intent and capabilities to perpetrate such attacks. Chapter 3 formulates the Maritime
Terrorism Threat Matrix39 – which provides the most structured generic framework to date to
statistically analyse all of the conceivable ways in which terrorists might40 seek to target and/or
utilise vessels.41 The chapter concludes by emphasising the importance of preventing maritime
terrorism incidents, rather than responding after attacks have occurred.

Chapter 4 analyses developments relating to the post-9/11 maritime security and vessel
tracking amendments to the SOLAS Convention (including the ISPS Code under Chapter XI2, and the AIS and LRIT regulations under Chapter V) and the 2003 SID Convention (all of
which have a “preventative” focus)42 since their entry into force.43 The chapter examines how
the identified limitations of these instruments44 have been addressed within the IMO,45 and

39

The Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix is depicted in Table 10 in [3.5.1]. It enables the recording of all previous
instances where maritime terrorism incidents have been successfully perpetrated, attempted, planned by terrorist
groups, and postulated by maritime security specialists. It examines maritime terrorism incidents under five broad
headings. First, ‘the vessel as a target’- encompassing terrorist attacks on vessels from other vessels, from the
land, from beneath the surface, from within the target vessel and from the air. Second, ‘the vessel as a weapon’ –
encompassing the use of vessels either as kinetic “ramming” weapons, or as “weapons launching platforms” to
attack other vessels, land targets, offshore platforms or aircraft. Third, ‘the vessel as a bomb’ – encompassing the
detonation of vessels within proximity to other vessels, land targets, offshore platforms, and also causing the
explosion of offshore platforms. Fourth, ‘the vessel as a disruption tool’ – encompassing the utilisation of vessels
to disrupt to the free flow of maritime traffic through disabling vessels near critical navigational “choke-points”,
laying sea mines, causing deliberate pollution, or causing damage to with submarine cables. Fifth, ‘the vessel as
a means’ – encompassing the use of vessels as a means to enable the perpetration of subsequent terrorist attacks
on land through transporting weaponry, operatives or financing terrorist activities.
40
Given the cunning, innovative and unpredictable operational profile of contemporary terrorist groups
demonstrated in attacks such as 9/11, which contrasts to the more predictable operational profile of pirate groups,
Chapter 3 reasons that it is very important to examine planned and postulated maritime terrorism incidents as well
as successful and attempted ones. Chapter 2 also notes that the 9/11 Commission Report at 339 – 348 cited the
lack of imagination and the failure to “think outside the box” as a contributing factor to the failure to pre-empt the
9/11 attacks
41
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 shows how the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix “captures” all of the maritime terrorism
scenarios that have been postulated by maritime security specialists since 9/11 - thereby demonstrating how it is
the most structured framework developed to date.
42
These instruments have a “preventative” focus because the measures they mandate and recommend are aimed
at preventing maritime terrorism incidents occurring in the first instance – through ship and port security measures,
vessel identification and tracking, and seafarer identification
43
As noted in Chapter 4, the ISPS Code entered into force on 31 July 2004; the AIS requirements under SOLAS
Chapter V, Regulation 19/2.4, para .1 - .4 have applied to all ships over 300 gross tonnes engaged on international
voyages, cargo ships over 500 gross tonnes not engaged on international voyages, and all passenger ships
irrespective of size since 31 December 2004; the LRIT regulations entered into force on 1 January 2008; and the
Revised Seafarers Identity Documents Convention entered into force 9 February 2005)
44
As noted in [1.2.1], the limitations of the ISPS Code include its limited application to the ship-port interface
(and not to supply chains more broadly); its limited application to large SOLAS Ships and the port facilities
servicing them; inconsistencies in the ISPS Code’s application to offshore platforms; and uncertainties regarding
the operation of Ship Security Alert System arrangements mandated by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 6
45
Chapter 4 explains that whilst numerous journal articles and similar studies examined the new measures
introduced by ISPS Code around the time of its entry into force in 2004, and whilst several other studies have
examined its operational and economic impact on specific maritime industry sectors, no major study to date has
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considers the extent to which these amendments have become ingrained throughout the
maritime sector. It shows how contracting governments have preferred to address the
limitations of the ISPS Code through developing non-mandatory guidance rather than
extending its mandatory application, and explains the challenges of assessing how well
ingrained46 ISPS Code security measures have become amongst SOLAS contracting
governments,47 ships and port facilities.48 Chapter 4 articulates the factors likely to influence
whether “best case” or “worst case” scenarios of ISPS Code measures lessening the scope for
the occurrence of maritime terrorism incidents might apply.49 The chapter examines how the
requirements for SOLAS ships to be equipped with AIS and tracked through LRIT have
contributed to increased maritime security levels, and examines how the shortcomings and
uncertainties of AIS50 and LRIT51 have been addressed by the IMO. Finally Chapter 4 considers
the extent to which the 2003 SID Convention has lessened the scope for terrorists to travel
under fraudulent seafarer identification documentation.52
Through undertaking the first major investigation of the “post entry into force status” of the
above instruments, Chapter 4 provides an informed foundation for Chapters 5, 6 and 7 to

examined how its identified limitations have been addressed within the IMO since its entry into force on 31 July
2004
46
Chapter 4 explains how details of ISPS Code security arrangements and compliance are kept confidential for
commercial and national security reasons
47
Chapter 4 discusses how the IMO has noted with concern significant delays in the provision of information by
SOLAS Contracting Governments regarding their implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code,
and low response rates from SOLAS contracting governments to voluntary IMO surveys about national maritime
security arrangements
48
Chapter 4 explains how the ISPS Code is a security risk management framework applicable (through various
national implementing laws and regulations) to States, shipping companies, port facilities and ships, any
assessment of the likely success of the ISPS Code must also consider how it is applied at operational levels by
operators of ships and port facilities
49
These factors include the size and type of vessels involved in maritime terrorism incidents; whether terrorists
controlled the vessel involved in a maritime terrorism incident in the first instance; the rigour of the continual
application of the ISPS Code security measures by ships and entities interfacing with them (including port facility
operators and government authorities); whether a maritime terrorism incident involved an entity subject to the
ISPS Code such as a security-regulated port facility or offshore platform; the form of a maritime terrorist attacks;
and the effectiveness of government oversight and response capabilities
50
Chapter 4 explains the improvements achieved through AIS include reduced collision risks and improved
situational awareness for ships’ bridge teams; and that the shortcomings include risks of unauthorised access to
AIS transmissions for nefarious purposes; and the lack of uniform coverage of AIS within certain parts of the
world.
51
Chapter 4 explains that in the short time since becoming operational in early 2011, LRIT arrangements have
been shown to function as required, and LRIT information has proven to be very valuable in counter-piracy
operations around the Gulf of Aden. However it also explains that uncertainties still remain regarding the
enforcement actions that States might take based on LRIT information
52
Whilst Chapter 4 explains how the 2003 SID Convention has lessened the scope for terrorists to travel under
fraudulent seafarer identification, and has been ratified by States from which significant numbers of seafarers
originate; Chapter 7 explains these improved identification measures would be of less preventative security value
if terrorists sought to access to land territories through clandestine landings rather than at major ports
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examine how these instruments might apply in practice in preventing maritime terrorism
incidents. These chapters examine how different forms of maritime terrorism incidents have
previously occurred, been attempted or planned, and postulated by maritime security specialists
in order to establish the “threat context” – that is, the types of maritime terrorism threats that
might have to be prevented.
Chapter 553 analyses the prospects for the ISPS Code and other SOLAS maritime security and
vessel identification measures to succeed in preventing terrorist targeting of vessels (that is,
attacks on vessels)54 from the five sources noted in the Threat Matrix.55 The contrasts between
contemporary and pre-contemporary forms of terrorism articulated in Chapters 2 and 3 are
highlighted, with the chapter reasoning that the prevention of terrorist attacks on vessels will
very much depend on the rigour with which ISPS Code security measures are continually
applied within ships, port facilities and by contracting governments. The effectiveness of
rigorously-applied preventative security measures in deterring (comparatively far more
prevalent and predictable) vessel-based attacks on commercial vessels by pirates since 2005 is
also shown.56 However the chapter reasons that it would be erroneous to uncritically assume
fanatical terrorists prepared to martyr themselves (as in the USS Cole and MV Limburg attacks)
would be deterred by the prospects of apprehension to the same extent as economicallymotivated pirates,57 and argues there are both positive and negative inferences that can be
drawn from the international community’s experience in countering pirate attacks around the
Gulf of Aden since 2005. Chapter 5 concludes by emphasising the importance of the continual
rigorous application of ISPS Code measures by contracting governments, ships and port
facilities.

‘Countering terrorist targeting of vessels’
Chapter 5 explains that terrorist attacks on vessels have accounted for at least 85 per cent of all maritime
terrorism incidents recorded since 1968
55
That is, from other vessels, from the land, from beneath the surface, from within the vessel and from the air
56
Chapter 5 explains that whilst the ISPS Code was introduced following the 9/11 attacks with the aim of lessening
the scope for terrorists to target or utilise vessels, the IMO has acknowledged ISPS Code security measures are
equally applicable to preventing attacks on vessels by pirates and armed robbers. Also, whilst the focus of this
Study is on maritime terrorism, it significantly is the first to undertake a methodical assessment of the effectiveness
of the SOLAS Chapter XI-2 (ISPS Code) and other preventative security arrangements in preventing attacks on
commercial vessels to by pirates since the ISPS Code’s entry into force in July 2004
57
Chapter 5 explains that because vessel-based attacks by pirates around the Gulf of Aden since around 2005 have
been far more prevalent and predictable than vessel-based attacks by terrorists, they provide a useful point of
comparison to maritime terrorist attacks
53
54
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Chapter 658 analyses the prospects for the international agreements to succeed in preventing
terrorists from utilising vessels in an offensive manner.59 This could involve the perpetration
of dangerous acts through using vessels as “weapons” (either as launching platforms or as
kinetic ramming weapons) or as “floating bombs” against other vessels, land targets and
offshore platforms; or the perpetration of other disruptive acts.60 In addition to examining how
the ISPS Code and other SOLAS maritime security and vessel identification measures might
succeed in preventing such offensive acts, Chapter 6 analyses the extent to which UNCLOS
and the SUA treaties would enable States interdict vessels suspected of being about to
perpetrate offensive acts. This analysis highlights the jurisdictional gaps in the provisions of
UNCLOS enabling States to protect offshore platforms and submarine cables from terrorist
attacks, the limitations of 1988 SUA treaties, and the consequences of the current low
ratification of the 2005 SUA treaties. The chapter concludes by arguing for greater ratification
of 2005 SUA Convention, and for more IMO guidance on ensuring the security of offshore
platforms and submarine cables.
Chapter 761 analyses the prospects for the international agreements to succeed in preventing
terrorists from utilising vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks on land through
transporting weaponry (conventional and WMD materiel) or terrorist operatives to a land
location to perpetrate attacks, or utilising vessels to finance terrorist activities. As well as
examining how the ISPS Code and other SOLAS maritime security and vessel identification
measures might lessen the scope for vessels to be so utilised,62 the chapter also examines the
extent to which UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA Convention might enable States to interdict
vessels suspected of being utilised for such purposes. Whereas Chapter 6 examines the
interdiction of vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate offensive terrorist acts within
maritime zones, Chapter 7 examines the interdiction of “laterally transiting” vessels passing
through maritime zones. It explains how the WMD interdiction measures described in the PSI

‘Countering offensive terrorist utilisations of vessels’
Although Chapter 6 notes that in comparison to terrorist targeting of vessels, there are far fewer examples of
terrorists utilising vessels in an offensive manner, because contemporary forms of terrorism (such as those
demonstrated in the 9/11 attacks) have proven to be extremely innovative and deadly, it is very important to
examine both “routine” attack types and also the extraordinary and unconventional ones
60
Including through disabling the vessel near critical navigational chokepoints, causing deliberate pollution,
facilitating the laying of sea mines, and interfering with submarine cables
61
‘Countering the utilisation of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks’
62
Chapter 7 notes several reported instances of rigorously-applied ISPS Code and other maritime security
measures preventing weaponry and operatives being transported aboard vessels
58
59
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Interdiction Principles63 have prompted considerable debate about the legality of interdicting
“laterally transiting” vessels under UNCLOS. From its analysis of this scholarly debate,
Chapter 7 is the first study to articulate the “restrictive” and “liberal” views about the legality
of interdicting laterally transiting vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel,
with these two views diverging on assessments of the influence that UN Security Council
resolutions64 have on the interdiction powers of States under UNCLOS.65 Whilst it reasons the
liberal view better enables States to (unilaterally) interdict suspected WMD shipments,66 it
argues in favour of formalising specific agreements between States to facilitate vessel
interdictions,67 and reduce the scope for disagreement and conflict.68 Chapter 7 also explains
that whilst the legality of interdicting vessels suspected of transport transporting conventional
weaponry or terrorist operatives to enable attacks on land, and utilising vessels to finance
terrorist activities69 has not received as much scholarly analysis as interdicting suspected
shipments of WMD materiel, there is similar scope for restrictive and liberal views of States’
interdiction powers under UNCLOS albeit with other Security Council resolutions being
involved.70 It notes several reports of States interdicting terrorist shipments of conventional
weaponry outside their territorial seas without protest about the legality of such actions.
The ordering of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is structured according to two criteria – first the decreasing
imminence of the forms of maritime terrorism incidents, and second, the increasing “lead
warning time” in which the maritime terrorism incidents would typically become apparent.
Vessel targeting by terrorists (examined in Chapter 5) would be the most imminent threat to
maritime security (that is, an attack about to occur), and involve the shortest “lead warning
time” of minutes or even seconds (for example an explosives-packed speedboat approach a
63

Whilst the PSI is not a formal international agreement conferring jurisdiction, Chapter 7 explains that as an
informal political expression of how ‘participants’ indicate they might consider exercising their jurisdictional
rights under UNCLOS, the PSI has prompted considerable debate about States’ interdiction powers under
UNCLOS. Chapter 7 also discusses the uncertainties about how the PSI interdiction measures might be applied
against vessels of non-consenting states; how many states “support” the PSI; and what “support” for the PSI
actually entails
64
Particularly Security Council Resolution 1540
65
Chapter 7 explains that although the very small number of publicised WMD interdictions have all been carried
out in a compliant and cooperative manner, it is still necessary need to consider less straight forward hypothetical
scenarios where a vessel might not consent to interdiction
66
Following recent arguments by scholars for greater flexibility in understanding the law of the sea as a balancing
mechanism between inclusive and exclusive uses of oceans – particularly Natalie Klein Maritime Security and
the Law of the Sea Oxford Monographs in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011)
67
Chapter 7 explains that specific agreements between States regarding vessel interdictions can reduce the scope
for disagreement and conflict through specifying standards and procedures
68
Chapter 9 discusses possible options for achieving such agreements between States
69
Chapter 7 terms such activities as “Other than WMD transporting” terrorist utilisations of vessels
70
Particularly UN Security Council Resolution 1390

15

target vessel at high speed). The offensive utilisation of vessels by terrorists (examined in
Chapter 6) would constitute a less imminent threat to maritime security after terrorist targeting
of vessels, and could involve a longer “lead warning time” in terms of hours (for example a
hijacked merchant vessel travelling at abnormally high speeds towards a target such as a port
facility or offshore platform). The utilisation of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks
on land (examined in Chapter 7) would not involve an imminent threat to the security of the
maritime areas the vessel was transiting through – with subsequent terrorist attacks on land
enabled through the provision of weaponry, operatives or funding on land possibly occurring
months or even years after being transported to a land location by the vessel.71 Additionally,
the utilisation of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks could well involve lengthy “lead
warning times” of several days or even weeks – for example the So San freighter was tracked
by the US Navy for several weeks before its interdiction.
Chapter 872 examines the international legal options available to States in exceptional
circumstances73 where neither UNCLOS nor the 2005 SUA Treaties (or other specific
international agreements) would enable the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels. These
options include interdicting such vessels on the basis of States’ ‘inherent’ rights of self-defence
recognised under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and somewhat less clearly, the doctrine of
Necessity. Chapter 8 examines the development of the meaning of ‘armed attack’, 74 and
explains that while the Article 51 self-defence rights of States have traditionally been
understood in the context of “State vs State” conflicts, since 9/11 Article 51 has been
increasingly invoked75 to justify self-defence measures against non-state terrorists, including
the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels. Through focusing on three questions - the
materiality threshold for an ‘armed attack’; the temporal threshold (at what point in time an
‘armed attack’ occurs); and whether an ‘armed attack’ may originate from non-state actors as
Although subsequent terrorist attacks on land which have been “enabled” through the provision of weaponry
could, and have indeed been, deadly. Chapter 7 notes that the explosives used for the 1998 US embassy bombings
in East Africa and the 2002 Bali bombings were both reported to have been transported by sea
72
‘Countering maritime terrorism in exceptional circumstances under UN Charter Article 51 and the doctrine of
Necessity’
73
Chapters 6 and 7 identify the circumstances in which neither UNCLOS or the 2005 SUA treaties would enable
the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels
74
Including the Caroline criteria; the foundational academic writings on the temporal aspects of Article 51 (the
debate between Ian Brownlie and Derek Bowett); pre-9/11 State Practice and the 1974 UNGA Definition of
Aggression; ICJ Jurisprudence (including Nicaragua v United States of America (1986), Oil Platforms (2003),
Palestinian Walls (2003) and DRC v Uganda (2003)); post-9/11 state practice and reactions; the 2004 UN High
Level Report on Threats, Challenges and Changes, and post-9/11 scholarly arguments about how the Caroline
Principles should be understood in the context of countering contemporary terrorism.
75
However Chapter 8 also notes the application of Article 51 against non-state actors has been criticised
71
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well as states - Chapter 8 enunciates restrictive and liberal views on how Article 51 might apply
in relation to the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels. Significantly, Chapter 8 is the first
study to articulate these two possible interpretations of Article 51 in the maritime terrorism
context. Similarly to Chapter 7, it reasons that a liberal view of Article 51 would better enable
States to interdict suspected terrorist vessels; but also argues that the invocation of self-defence
rights should be an absolute last resort option. Chapter 8 also examines the possibility of States
interdicting suspected terrorist vessels on the basis of the doctrine of Necessity.
Chapter 976 summarises the findings of the above chapters and outlines proposals for further
refinement of the international agreements. In relation to the ISPS Code, these include the
continual rigorous application of security measures, timely reporting by contracting
governments about maritime security arrangements to the IMO, and the development of further
IMO guidance on the protection of offshore platforms and submarine cables. The scope for the
IMO to facilitate increased coordination between States in responding to Ship Security Alert
System activations, and to facilitate international efforts to increase security of AIS information
is also discussed. In relation to vessel interdictions, Chapter 9 argues for increased ratification
of the 2005 SUA Convention as a first preference,77 for the further development of bilateral
ship-boarding agreements similar to the PSI bilateral ship-boarding agreements as a second
preference, for increased formal institutionalisation of the PSI (which has been called for by
several scholars, and by President Obama) as a third preference, and for developing greater
support for liberal views of UNCLOS and Article 51 of the UN Charter as a fourth preference.
The chapter concludes by outlining directions for future research based on the conclusions of
this Study.

[1.5]

SCOPE OF THIS STUDY

The scope of how this Study examines the threat of maritime terrorism, and the likely success
of the international agreements in enabling the prevention of maritime terrorism incidents, is
deliberately limited in several respects.

‘Conclusion and Proposals for Reform’
Chapter 7 explains how the 2005 SUA Convention objectively defines key terms, and clearly specifies
interdiction procedures – including appropriate safeguards
76
77
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[1.5.1] Scope of analysis of maritime terrorism threats: This

Study

is

confined

to

analysing the maritime threats posed by non-state actor terrorist groups. Chapter 2 explains that
contemporary forms of terrorism are far less, if at all, attributable to States,78 so this Study does
not examine state responsibility for the actions of terrorist groups. The Maritime Terrorism
Threat Matrix focuses on conceptualising all the conceivable ways in which terrorists might
seek to target and/or utilise vessels. Whilst some of the maritime terrorism incidents considered
in this Study might sound melodramatic or far-fetched, this Study does not seek to rank the
likelihood of certain maritime terrorism incidents actually occurring, as other maritime security
specialists have undertaken such inquiries.79 Finally, its focus is on the contemporary threat of
terrorism in the maritime domain. Whilst port facilities and their supply chains are significant
components of maritime trade, the Study only examines attacks on land targets (such as port
facilities) executed from the maritime side (through the use of vessels), as opposed to the
landward side (for example through explosives-laden vehicles), as this would involve
considerations of terrestrial, as opposed to maritime, security.

[1.5.2] Scope of analysis of the international agreements: As [1.2] explained, numerous
studies have comprehensively examined the negotiating processes involved in developing
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, the LRIT amendments to SOLAS Chapter V and the
2005 SUA treaties at around the time of their entry into force. Therefore, this Study instead
focuses on analysing developments relating to these instruments since their entry into force,
which [1.7] explains has not yet been studied comprehensively. Secondly, Chapters 6 and 7
only analyse the likely success of UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA treaties in enabling States to
interdict suspected terrorist vessels – they do not examine national laws and processes relating
to the subsequent prosecution of persons aboard interdicted vessels; nor the confiscation of
materials found aboard. Nor does this Study examine the liability of States for wrongful
interdiction, or loss, damage or delay to cargoes aboard interdicted vessels. 80 Furthermore,
Chapter 2 explains the consensus amongst terrorism specialists that the “controlling minds” of contemporary
terrorist groups such as the late Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders are essentially “invisible”. This
Study proceeds on the assumption that it is fanatical, irrational and non-law-abiding persons that are involved in
the planning and perpetration of terrorist acts within the maritime domain that are acting outside of the direct or
indirect control of states.
79
Sam Bateman ‘Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region’ (October 2006) 2(3) Kokoda
Foundation Security Challenges 77 - 91 provides a very insightful analysis of the likelihood of “less likely” and
“more likely” categories of maritime terrorist attacks. Peter Lehr ‘Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors and
Capabilities’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyds MIU Handbook of Maritime
Security (CRC Press, 2009) also makes similar observations
80
For comprehensive analyses on these points, see Craig Allen Maritime Counter-proliferation Operations and
the Rule of Law (London: Praeger Security International, 2007); Douglas Guilfoyle Shipping Interdiction and the
78
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apart from some illustrative references to provide context, this Study does not focus on
examining the domestic legislative and institutional arrangements that have implemented the
requirements of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, AIS, LRIT and the 2003
Amendments to the 1958 Seafarers Identity Documents Convention. As Chapter 9 explains, it
is hoped the findings of this Study will stimulate other shorter studies to undertake such
inquiries. For similar reasons, this Study does not examine the political influences on the
positions of States regarding UNCLOS or Article 51 of the UN Charter.81 Finally, Chapter 7
focuses on examining counter-proliferation measures, rather than non-proliferation
measures;82 and although several of the post 9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council
resolutions examined in Chapter 2 have obliged and invited States to implement various
measures to counter terrorism within their territories, this Study does not examine the domestic
implementation of such measures.

[1.6]

[1.6.1]

METHODOLOGY, INFORMATION SOURCES AND THEIR RELIABILITY

Regarding maritime terrorism incidents

As Chapters 2 and 3 explain, terrorism is an inherently unpredictable “low frequency / high
impact” phenomenon – with the contemporary post-9/11 forms of terrorism being extremely
irregular, unpredictable and innovative. Chapter 3 explains that although maritime terrorist
attacks are very infrequent (accounting for around only 2 per cent of all recorded terrorist
attacks since 1968),83 the disruptive effect of such attacks could well be very profound. It
therefore draws on the widest possible range of information sources to develop the “threat
Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Phillip Wendel State Responsibility for Interferences
with the Freedom of Navigation in Public International Law Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs (Springer,
2007)
81
For example, Mark Valencia The Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves in Asia Adelphi Papers
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005) analyses the political motives that have been alleged to be
behind the US lead PSI – and the reactions of certain states to it; See also Chris Rahman ‘The International Politics
of Combating Piracy in South East Asia’ in Peter Lehr (ed) Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism
(Lloyds Marine Intelligence Unit, 2007)
82
And so the Study does not focus on examining instruments such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, and arrangements such as the Wassaner
Agreement, and the Australia Group – which impose various obligations on states to implement appropriate
preventative measures to safeguard against unauthorized transfers of WMD materiel. As Chapter 7 explains, these
international agreements do not focus specifically towards the maritime domain. For a succinct explanation as to
the differences between non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, see Craig Allen Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law (London: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 27-29 and
Daniel Joyner ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: Non-proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and International
Law’ (2005) 30 Yale Journal of International Law 512 - 521
83
Chapter 2 explains that the continuous recording of terrorism statistics commenced in 1968
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context”84 described in [1.4] – including terrorism databases,85 journal and book articles and
media reports.86 These information sources vary in terms of the detail reported about previous
maritime terrorism incidents, with several sources being quite generalised (for example
‘terrorist group xxx launched an armed assault aboard ship xxx on date xxx’). Whilst every
effort was made to ascertain further details about all maritime terrorism incidents, this was not
possible in all cases.87 It is also possible that terrorists may have attempted or planned other
maritime attacks, with these attempts and plans either failing, being abandoned or being
disrupted by authorities and not publicised. As this Study examines many statistics about
terrorist attacks, statistical trends and notable case studies are discussed in the chapters to
illustrate the arguments of the Study, with complete details being recorded in the appendices.

[1.6.2]

Regarding the international agreements

Because official intelligence about terrorist activities, and the details of arrangements that
States and maritime industries have in place to address terrorist threats are almost entirely
classified and confidential, this Study has been limited to publicly-available secondary
information sources. For example, Chapter 7 notes several international legal scholars pointing
out that interdictions by PSI participants of vessels suspected illicitly transporting WMD
materiel might not be publicised for national security reasons. Similarly, Chapter 4’s analysis
of how the identified limitations of the ISPS Code have been addressed following its entry into
force, and how international LRIT arrangements have functioned since progressively becoming
operational from early 2011 onwards, is based the analysis of publicly-available reports of IMO
proceedings.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 explain that many reports of previous interdictions of suspected terrorist
vessels, have also tended to be quite vague and generalised (for example, ‘Ship xxx was
interdicted in international waters off State xxx carrying explosives’). Whilst every effort was
made to ascertain further details about previous interdictions, this was not possible in all cases.

84

As [1.4] explained, the threat contexts examine the range of ways in which the relevant maritime terrorism
incidents have previously occurred, been attempted or planned, or postulated by maritime security specialists
85
Chapter 2 explains the terrorism databases that were utilised
86
As [1.2] noted, because discrete aspects of the threat of maritime terrorism, and the international agreements
that enable States to counter such threats have to varying degrees been studied in considerable detail, this Study
generally utilises more journal and book articles than media reports as information sources
87
In some cases, individual studies were the only source of information about particular maritime terrorism
incidents
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Given the vagueness and ambiguity of many provisions of UNCLOS, and of Article 51 of the
UN Charter, this Study reasons that states would be unlikely to specifically publicise their
interpretations of, or policy in relation to, those instruments in order to maintain maximum
flexibility in their response options.88 Furthermore, since 9/11 there have not been any
international disputes about the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels heard in either the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice providing
authoritative guidance on the legality of interdicting suspected terrorist vessels.89 As a result,
assessments of the likely success of the international agreements in enabling the prevention of
maritime terrorism incidents involve the making of suppositions and the drawing of inferences
from hypothetical scenarios based on scholarly arguments, and inferences drawn from the most
relevant international legal cases.

[1.7]

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY

As [1.2] noted, since 9/11 discrete aspects of both the contemporary threat of maritime
terrorism, and the international agreements that enable the prevention of such threats, have
been studied to varying extents. This is the first major study to undertake an overall assessment
of the extent to which the international agreements are likely to succeed in enabling the
prevention of contemporary post-9/11 maritime terrorism incidents.

Through developing the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix in Chapter 3, this Study provides
the most structured general framework to date for statistically analysing all of the conceivable
ways in which contemporary maritime terrorism incidents might occur. The Threat Matrix
provides the foundations for a structured database on maritime terrorism that can be regularly
updated database over future years. Additionally, the successful, attempted, planned and
postulated (“SAPP”) approach used in the Threat Matrix to record statistics about maritime
terrorism statistics is likely to be of relevance to terrorism studies more generally.

88

For example, Chapters 6 and 7 reason that it would be unlikely that States would specify their interpretations
of what might and might not be involved with ‘taking the necessary steps ... to prevent non-innocent passage’
under UNCLOS Article 25
89
Donald Rothwell ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: Amending the Convention on the Law of the Sea by
Stealth?’ in David Caron and Harry Scheiber (eds) Oceans in the Nuclear Age: Legacies and Risks (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2010), 286
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As explained in [1.4], the Threat Matrix enables the evaluation of the international agreements
to proceed from the most informed threat context, through firstly considering ‘How have
terrorists successfully perpetrated such actions, attempted and planned to do so, and how have
maritime security specialist postulated they might do so?’; and then considering ‘Given this
threat context, how might the international agreements succeed in preventing the occurrence
of maritime terrorism incidents?’
As Chapter 2 explains, this Study is the first to develop the terms “contemporary terrorism”
and “pre-contemporary terrorism” to distinguish the dominant forms of terrorism that have
been perpetrated by both Al Qaeda-influenced groups, and the LTTE over the last two decades
from “older”, more restrained forms of terrorism.

As Chapter 4 explains, this Study is the first to undertake a detailed analysis of how the
recognised limitations of the ISPS Code (being the first line of defence against maritime
terrorism) have been addressed within the IMO since its entry into force in 2004. It is also the
first to enunciate the factors likely to influence the prospects for ISPS Code security measures
to prevent maritime terrorism incidents through developing the “best case / worst case”
scenarios. It is also the first study to examine how international LRIT arrangements have
functioned since progressively becoming operational from early 2011 onwards.

As Chapter 7 explains, this Study is the first to specifically articulate the contending
“restrictive” and “liberal” views on the legality of WMD interdictions under UNCLOS that
have been made by international legal scholars. It is also the first study to apply these
contending views firstly to the analysis of the legality of interdicting other terrorist utilisations
of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks. It is also the first study to undertake a detailed
analysis of the legality of interdicting suspected terrorist vessels under Article 51 of the UN
Charter, through articulating “restrictive” and “liberal” views of the meaning of ‘armed attack’
in the contemporary maritime terrorism context. As [9.4] explains, it is also expected this Study
will provide the foundations of further analyses on these issues.

CHAPTER 2
THE THREAT OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM GLOBALLY

[2.1]

INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the contemporary threat of post-9/11 terrorism globally.1 It firstly
discusses the challenges of defining terrorism and the variances in the designations of terrorist
groups between the UN and selected States. The chapter then explains how since the mid-1990s
and particularly following the 9/11 attacks, the most serious forms of terrorism have moved
away from restrained tactics such as targeted assassinations and “negotiable” hostage takings
perpetrated by identifiable groups with defined political motives, and towards the perpetration
of carefully planned and coordinated mass casualty attacks, frequently involving the suicide of
the attackers, driven by extremist non-negotiable ideologies. Through this process, the chapter
shows that terrorism did not suddenly change overnight on 9/11, nor were the 9/11 attacks an
aberration; but rather that such religiously-driven forms of terrorism have come to be the nowmore-dominant forms of terrorism globally. Lastly, the chapter explains how the UN Security
Council has recognised the serious threat of contemporary terrorism to international peace and
security in several post- 9/11 counter-terrorism resolutions, which have imposed obligations
on States that are neither geographically nor temporally limited.2 The chapter concludes that
more than ten years after the 9/11 attacks and even following the 2011 death of Osama bin
Laden, the threat of contemporary terrorism remains and that it must be continually prevented.3

‘Globally’ means all terrorist attacks perpetrated on land, sea and air. This chapter provides context for Chapter
3 to address the first of the sub-questions posed in [1.2.2] – namely ‘(1) How should the threat of contemporary
post-9/11 forms of maritime terrorism be understood?’ As Chapter 1 noted, because maritime terrorist attacks
only account for around two per cent of all recorded terrorist attacks since 1968, it is important to view the
potential threat of maritime terrorism from the basis of its global context
2
As [1.4] explained, Chapter 7 analyses the assessments that have been made by international legal scholars about
the implications of these Security Council resolutions on the powers of States under UNCLOS to interdict laterally
transiting vessels suspected of transporting WMD materiel
3
In particular, this chapter outlines the increasing prevalence of mass casualty attacks, frequently involving the
suicide of the perpetrators – thereby highlighting the importance of preventing such attacks from occurring in the
first instance – rather than responding after attacks have been perpetrated
1
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[2.2]

THE CHALLENGES OF DEFINING TERRORISM

Although more than a thousand definitions of terrorism have been explored, proposed and/or
adopted by States, international bodies and scholars, there is no universally agreed definition
of terrorism.4 Indeed some scholars have concluding that a universally agreed definition of
terrorism may be unattainable.5 After reviewing the variances in the definitions of terrorism at
international law and by scholars, and the variances in the designation of terrorist organisations,
[2.2.4] explains why this Study utilises the broad definition of terrorism set out 2011 Revised
Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism.

[2.2.1]

International legal definitions

International counter-terrorism conventions have generally taken a “sectoral” approach
through proscribing and dealing with the apprehension, prosecution or extradition in relation
to specific acts of terrorism - as opposed to proscribing (or defining) ‘terrorism’ per se.6 These
conventions proscribe terrorist acts7 including the hijacking and acts of violence involving
aircraft and international airports;8 crimes against internationally protected persons such as
diplomatic agents;9 the taking of hostages;10 unlawful acts involving nuclear materials;11 the

On the challenges of defining terrorism, see Boaz Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another
Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ (2002) 3(4) Police Practice and Research 287 – 304 and Alex Schmid (ed) The
Routledge Handbook on Terrorism Research (Routledge, 2011), 43 – 44
5
Omar Malik Enough of the Definition of Terrorism (Royal Institute of International Affairs, December 2002),
cited in Schmid et al, above n 4, 42
6
Schmid et al, above n 4, 50 provides an overview of the historical development of these sectoral counterterrorism conventions
7
Schmid et al, above n 4, 58 – 59; Terrorism and International Law: Accountability, Remedies and Reform A
Report of the International Bar Association Taskforce on Terrorism (2011), 1
8
These include the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, open for
signature 14 September 1963, 704 UNTS 219 (entered into force 4 December 1969); Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature 16 December 1970, 860 UNTS 105 (entered
into force 14 October 1971); Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, opened for signature 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 177 (entered into force 26 January 1973);
and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened
for signature 24 February 1988, 1589 UNTS 474 (entered into force 6 August 1989)
9
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature December 1973, 1035 UNTS 15410 (entered into force 20 February
1977)
10
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature 17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS
205 (entered into force 3 June 1983)
11
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature 3 March 1980, 1456 UNTS
101 (entered into force 8 February 1987); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, opened for signature 13 April 2005, 2445 UNTS 89 (entered into force 7 July 2007)
4
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marking of plastic explosives for the purposes of detection;12 the illegal bombing of public
places and critical infrastructure;13 the financing of terrorism;14 and illegal interference with
maritime navigation and offshore platforms.15 Of these sixteen globally-focused sectoral
conventions and protocols, only the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism proffers a generalised definition of terrorism, with Article 2(1)(b)
proscribing: ‘any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when
the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’.16

Following the 9/11 attacks, the Ad Hoc Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly
attempted to formulate a comprehensive general definition of terrorism. Article 2(1) of the
Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism provides that ‘Any person
commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means,
unlawfully and intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b)
Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the
environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph
1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of
the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government
or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act’.17

12

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, opened for signature 1 March
1991, 2122 UNTS 359 (entered into force 21 June 1998)
13
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature 15 December 1997,
2149 UNTS 284 (entered into force 23 May 2001)
14
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 9 December
1999, 39 ILM 270 (entered into force 10 April 2002)
15
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for
signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 March 1992); Protocol of 2005 to the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (opened for signature 14 October
2005, entered into force 28 July 2010) IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature 10 March 1988,
1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1 March 1992); and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (opened for signature 14
October 2005, entered into force 28 July 2010) IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/22
16
Schmid et al, above n 4, 55 - 56
17
Ben Golder and George Williams ‘What is “Terrorism”? Problems of Legal Definition’ in VB Malleswari (ed),
Anti-Terrorism Laws: Global Scenario (Amicus Books, 2008), 1 - 37; Schmid et al, above n 4, 51
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As at 1 October 2013, whilst this Draft Comprehensive Convention has been the subject of
continuous discussion within the UN, it remains finalised.18 The key points of contention
preventing States from reaching a consensus on the definition of terrorism include the
application of the term ‘terrorism’ to the actions of governments and states (and their armed
forces) in the same way it applies to non-State actors, and the question of whether it should
differentiate between violent actions taken by certain peoples engaged in self-determination
struggles and/or the combating of foreign occupation.19

In addition to the above sectoral counter-terrorism treaties, several UN declarations, resolutions
and reports by the UN have come close to proffering generalised definitions of terrorism. On
17 December 1996, the non-binding UN Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, which was annexed to UN General Assembly
Resolution 51/210, condemned terrorist activities by declaring in the following broad terms,
inter alia that: ‘3. Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general
public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them’.20 On 4 October 2004,
following several bombings attributed to Al Qaeda-linked groups, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1566, which in operative paragraph 3, whilst not specifically defining terrorism,
noted that: ‘ ... criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of
terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a
population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar
nature’.21 Also in 2004, the UN High Level Report on Threats, Challenges and Changes
proposed that a definition of terrorism for a future comprehensive international convention on

18

United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17
December 1996 Sixteenth Session (8 to 12 April 2013) UN Doc A/68/37; United Nations ‘Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism: Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December
1996, http://www.un.org/law/terrorism/ Last updated 15 April 2013, Accessed 1 October 2013
19
Schmid et al, above n 4, 51 – 58
20
United Nations ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism’ UN Doc A/RES/51/210 88 th plenary meeting
17 December 1996
21
UNSC Res 1566, (4 October 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1566, para 3
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terrorism should include, inter alia: ‘Description of terrorism as any action, in addition to
actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva
Conventions and Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or
serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’.22 Similarly to the lack of consensus on the
definition of terrorism at international levels, there are also variations between national
definitions of the term.23

[2.2.2] Designated terrorist organisations: International and National Approaches

Similar to the lack of international consensus on defining terrorism, there are also significant
variations in the designation of terrorist organisations between the UN and amongst States. At
the UN level, in 1999 Security Council Resolution 126724 mandated a wide range of sanctions25
against designated individuals and groups associated with Al Qaeda, the late Osama bin Laden
and the former Taliban government of Afghanistan. As [2.7] explains, since 1999 this sanctions
regime has been re-affirmed in nine further resolutions, with the ‘1267 List’ of designated
terrorist groups and individuals having been progressively updated. As [2.7] explains, the
Security Council’s counter-terrorism activities expanded significantly following 9/11, with
Resolution 1373 in 200126 establishing of a Counter Terrorism Committee, and Resolution
1535 in 2004 establishing a Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to monitor
the implementation of Resolution 1373 and to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to

22

United Nations A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Report of the Secretary-General High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change GA 59th session, Agenda Item 55 UN Doc A/59/565 (2 December 2004)
at [164]
23
Examples of studies that have comprehensively examined national definitions of terrorism include Schmid et
al, above n 4, 44 – 49; Ben Golder and George Williams ‘What is Terrorism? Problems of Legal Definition’ in
V. B. Malleswari (ed) Anti-Terrorism Laws: Global Scenario (ICFAI Amicus Books, 2008), 1 - 37; Kent Roach
The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Kent Roach (ed)
Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy 2nd edition (Cambridge University Press, 2012)
24
UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267
25
These UNSC Resolutions have obliged States to freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or
economic resources, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly; prevent the
entry into or the transit through their territories; and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of arms
and related material, including military and paramilitary equipment, technical advice, assistance or training related
to military activities, with regard to the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities placed on the Al-Qaida
Sanctions List
26
Which obliges Member States to take a number of measures to prevent terrorist activities and to criminalize
various forms of terrorist actions, as well as to take measures that assist and promote cooperation among countries
including adherence to international counter-terrorism instruments
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Member states. As at 1 October 2013, the UN’s Al Qaeda Sanctions List designates 63 entities
and 220 individuals27 - with Appendix A28 listing these entities.

There are significant variations amongst States in the designation of terrorist organisations, in
addition to the 63 entities designated in the UN’s Al Qaeda Sanctions List. 29 Appendix A lists
the groups which as at 1 October 2013 were designated as terrorist organisations by the UN
under the Al Qaeda Sanctions List, and by Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom
and Canada – showing considerable variations amongst between the UN and amongst these
four States. However, as [2.6.4] explains, since around 2005, significant terrorist attacks have
been perpetrated by “home grown” terrorist groups which might not as yet have been formally
designated as terrorist organisations.

[2.2.3]

Academic definitions of terrorism

Given the inconsistencies in the definition of terrorism and the designation of terrorist
organisations, academic definitions of terrorism are also helpful to examine for several reasons.
First, they may be both more objective and candid, and less constrained by political
considerations. Second, and following on from the first point, they may be more thoroughly
reasoned and based on many years of consistent observation of the phenomena of terrorism –
as opposed to being hastily developed in response to political pressures. Third, and both
following on from the second point (and in contradistinction to it), academic definitions are
more easily able to be amended to better account for changes in terrorist activity in comparison
to the complex and time-consuming processes for amending official legal definitions.

Three key studies have reviewed the significant number of academic definitions of terrorism
developed over the last three decades. A widely cited survey by Schmid and Jongman in 198830
analysed the frequency of 22 definitional elements of terrorism from 109 academic definitions.
In their 2004 study, Weinburg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler undertook an empirical analysis
‘The List established and maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011)
with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida’ Last updated on 20
September 2013
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml; Accessed 1 October 2013
28
‘Designations of terrorist groups by the UN and by selected States as at 1 October 2013’
29
It should be noted that the UN has to “tread a very fine line” and balance numerous and divergent national
interests, so it will be necessarily constrained in terms of those groups it might designate as terrorist
30
Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases,
Theories and Literature (Transaction Books, 1988)
27
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of 73 academic definitions of terrorism drawn from 55 articles published in three journals
between 1977 and 2001,31 and contrasted the frequency of the occurrence of these definitions
under the 22 definitional elements noted by Schmid and Jongman in 1988. Figure 1 (which has
been widely cited in studies on definitions of terrorism) shows the list of the most common
elements included in the academic definitions of terrorism. Similar to the variances in
definitions of terrorism noted in [2.2.1], and the variances in the designation of groups as
terrorist organisations noted in [2.2.2], the considerable variations between academic
definitions of terrorism further indicate the challenges of conclusively defining terrorism.

31

The three journals these authors examined were Terrorism (New York: Crane Russak & Company), from 1977
to 1991 and then (Minneapolis, MN: John Scherer), 1982–1983, 1986–1989; Terrorism and Political Violence
(London: Frank Cass) from 1990 to 2001; and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (London: Taylor and Francis)
from 1992 to 2001: Leonard Weinburg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler ‘The Challenges of
Conceptualizing Terrorism’ (2004) 16(4) Terrorism and Political Violence, 780
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Figure 1:

Frequency of Definitional Elements of “Terrorism”

Source: Alex Schmid (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (Routledge,
2011), 85

Third and most recently, the comprehensive Routledge Handbook on Terrorism Research
(‘Schmid et al’) reviewed a wide range of academic, national and international legal definitions
of terrorism, and also sought feedback from terrorism academics. Drawing together the
commonalities of these definitions, Schmid et al developed a twelve point “Revised Academic
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Consensus Definition of Terrorism 2011” (Rev ACDT 2011), with the first paragraph of the
Rev ACDT 2011 presenting the most comprehensive “model” definition of terrorism to date:
‘Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special
form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a
conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral
restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and
psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties’.32 [Emphasis in original]

The remaining paragraphs 2 to 12 of the Rev ACDT 2011 serve an explanatory purpose by
further amplifying the definitional boundaries of terrorism.33 Relevantly for this Study (as
[5.2.2] distinguishes between the patterns of attacks on vessels by terrorists and from attacks
by pirates), Paragraph 9 of the Rev ACDT 2011 explains: ‘While showing similarities with
methods employed by organised crime, as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence
is predominantly political – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal
32

Schmid et al, above n 4, 86
The remaining paragraphs of the Rev ACDT 2011 specified that (2) Terrorism is a tactic employed in three
man contexts: (i) illegal state repression; (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in time of peace or
outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state and non-state actors;
(3) The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involves single-phase acts of lethal
violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual-phase life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking
and other forms of hostage taking for coercive bargaining), as well as multi-phase sequences of actions (such as
“disappearances involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder); (4) Public(-ized) terrorist
victimisation initiates threat-based communication processes whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are
made to individuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of
specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the
terrorist perpetrators; (5) At the origin of terrorism stands terror – instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety –
spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some of the
modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and
disregard for the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment; (6) The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are
in general not any armed forces but are usually civilians, non-combatants and other innocent and defenceless
persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conduct that gave rise to acts of terrorism; (7) The direct victims
are not the ultimate target (as in a classical assassination, where the victim and target coincide) but serve as
message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various
audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims’ plight or the terrorists’ professed cause; (8)
Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well
as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams); (paragraph 9 is
discussed above in the body); (10) The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorise, intimidate, antagonise,
disorientate, destabilise, coerce, compel, demoralise or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope
of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favourable power outcome, for example obtaining publicity, extorting
ransom money, obtaining submission to terrorist demands and/or immobilising sectors of the public; (11) The
motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or
vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological,
political, social, national or religious causes and objectives; and (12) Acts of terrorism rarely stand alone, but
rather form part of a campaign of violence which alone can, owing to the serial character of acts of violence and
threats of more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the political
process.
33
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repercussions’.34 Similarly, based on a review of numerous previous studies on the question35
Schmid et al also summarised a list of acts that should be excluded from a “model” definition
of terrorism.36

There has been extensive debate on whether politically-motivated non-state actors who
perpetrate violent actions should be characterised as terrorists rebels, insurgents or guerrillas –
even though the activities of such groups might fall within the Rev ACDT 2011 noted above.
Stepanova classifies politically-motivated violence as “insurgent terrorism” according to
whether it is global or local, and whether or not the campaign of terror is part of a broader
political conflict;37 whereas Schmid et al regard terrorism as a tactic which might be utilised
by a range of politically-motivated non-state actors including rebels, insurgents and
guerrillas.38 As the following sections reason, the inclusive definition developed by Schmid et
al enables the inclusion of attacks by groups which might also be characterised as insurgents
within conflict zones such as Iraq, Afghanistan and (within the 1980s) Nicaragua as “terrorist
attacks” – an approach which has been taken by the two leading international terrorism
databases which this Study draws upon to identify and analyse patterns in terrorist attacks over
time. The broad Rev ACDT definition of terrorism could also capture the “home-grown”
terrorist groups not yet officially designated as terrorist organisations – with [2.6.4] explaining
how such groups have perpetrated a significant number of major attacks since around 2005.
34

Schmid et al, above n 4, 87
Ben Saul Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) – whilst not specifically
referenced by Schmid et al, above n 4 – is a very comprehensive study on the definitional aspects of terrorism
36
These acts included mere acts of property damage, as well as sabotage such as interrupting the flow of an oil
pipeline, even where the saboteurs are engaging in acts of terrorism on other occasions; attacks on military
installations, aircraft, navy vessels, barracks and the like, which are guarded, even when those who attack military
installations or personnel are otherwise also engaging in acts of terrorism; attacks on police stations and armed
police on patrol during armed conflict in zones of combat; cases of collateral damage where the targeting of
civilians was not deliberate (eg when an attack on a police station misfires and civilians are (also) victims; cases
of attacks on secular or religious symbols unless such an attack is combined with the victimisation of people (an
attack on a church known to be empty would not qualify; an attack on a church, mosque or synagogue where
people are sheltering would); certain types of assassinations, for example when the direct victim is the only target,
as opposed to de-individualise murder where the victim serves only as a message generator to reach a wider
audience; acts which if a situation of war existed would not qualify as war crimes, nor be crimes against humanity
or grave breaches of the laws of war; guerrilla warfare activities that are not war crimes, crimes against humanity
or grave breaches of humanitarian law; acts of legal use of force by legitimate authorities to impose public order
when acting with restraint and in proportion to the threat and within the boundaries of the rule of law; and acts of
(collective) political violence which are spontaneous, as in riots, demonstrations and other forms of public protest
and dissent; industrial action (strikes) and revolts.
37
See for example Ekaterina Stepanova Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Research Report No 23, 13 March 2008, 9 – 11
38
Schmid et al, above n 4, 645 defines insurgency as ‘An armed uprising, revolt or rebellion by a political group
or party against a domestic or foreign ruling regime in order to subvert, overthrow, expel it or to break away from
it; or simply to enhance the group’s bargaining power for subsequent political compromises. Acts of terrorism are
frequent occurrences in many insurgencies’. [Emphasis added]
35
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[2.2.4]

Rationale for this Study’s use of the broad Rev ACDT definition of

terrorism

As Chapter 1 explained, this Study examines the full gamut of ways in which terrorists might
conceivably target and/or utilise vessels. It also noted that successful maritime terrorist attacks
have accounted for only two per cent of all recorded terrorist attacks since 1968. 39 Based on a
thorough review of all terrorism databases and other information sources, [3.3.1] explains that
228 maritime terrorist attacks have been recorded as having been successfully40 perpetrated
since 1968.41 A significant number of these attacks have been perpetrated by groups also
characterised as insurgents and/or rebels – particularly the LTTE42 and the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Furthermore, [5.2.2.1] notes there is some overlap
between maritime terrorism and other forms of maritime violence perpetrated by non-state
actors such as insurgents, pirates and other criminal groups. Given this scope for overlap, in
order to gauge the widest number of previous maritime terrorist attacks, this Study proceeds
from the broad Rev ACDT definition of terrorism in order to “capture” the widest number of
politically- or ideologically-motivated illegal maritime actions perpetrated by non-state actors.
As Chapter 1 explained, this Study does not examine the subsequent prosecutions or other legal
proceedings which States might take against suspected terrorist vessels once interdicted, so
questions regarding the terrorist status of interdicted vessels could be determined during
subsequent investigations and prosecutions on land.43

39

As [2.3] explains, terrorism statistics have been methodically recorded since 1968
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (GTD) from which many of the statistics utilised in this Study have been derived
defines a terrorist attack as being “successful” according to the tangible effects of the attack. For example, in a
typical successful bombing, the bomb detonates and destroys property and/or kills individuals, whereas an
unsuccessful bombing is one in which the bomb is discovered and defused or detonates early and kills the
perpetrators. Success is not judged in terms of the larger goals of the perpetrators. For example, a bomb that
exploded in a building would be counted as a success even if it did not, for example, succeed in bringing the
building down or inducing government repression.
41
With the full list being provided in Appendix G ‘Detailed summary of all successful maritime terrorism
incidents 1968 – 2012’
42
However as Appendix A shows, the LTTE has been designated as a terrorist organisation by several States
including the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada
43
This approach contrasts to many international legal studies which have sought to narrow and refine defensible
and justifiable definitions of terrorism. See for example Ben Saul Defining Terrorism in International Law
(Oxford University Press, 2006)
40
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[2.3] THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM: RAPAPORT’S FOUR WAVES THESIS
Before reviewing the evolution of terrorism, it is helpful to briefly consider the underlying
causes of terrorism. As at 1 October 2013 the most comprehensive examination on the
underlying causes of terrorism is a 2005 Norwegian study by Brynjar and Skjolberg.44 Based
on their review of 115 studies on the psychological, societal and international political causes
of terrorism, Brynjar and Skjolberg distilled 13 factors as contributing to the prevalence of
terrorism. These 13 factors were relative deprivation and inequality (particularly amongst
culturally defined groups) encouraging participation in acts of political violence and
terrorism; rejectionist groups seeking to “spoil” negotiated settlements to political conflicts
through acts of political violence; the “contagion effect” of terrorism in one country leading
to terrorism in neighbouring countries – with terrorists learn from the tactics of other groups;
mass media enhancing the agenda-setting function of terrorism, increasing its lethality, and
expanding its transnational character; rapid modernisation making societies more exposed to
ideological terrorism – through increasing inequalities, and improving communications and
access to audiences; poverty and weakness in state structures leaving such States more
exposed to political violence; democratisation processes – with totalitarian states and fully
democratic states being less exposed to terrorism – and with semi-authoritarian states
(especially when undergoing a democratisation process) being more exposed to terrorism;
lack of legitimacy of governing regimes – particularly the lack of integration of those at the
political fringes of the society; technological developments offering new and more efficient
means and weapons for terrorist groups; the global power balance – with an international
system characterised by strong hegemonic power(s) being more exposed to international
terrorism than a more multi-polar system; economic and cultural globalization encouraging
acts of terrorism, especially against US targets; the proliferation of weak and collapsed states
– which have experienced civil wars, under-development, and corrupt elites providing ideal
“breeding grounds” for terrorist groups; and ongoing and past armed conflicts providing
“rallying points” of justification for acts of terrorism.45 Whilst the above-mentioned factors
have been noted to have contributed to the causation of terrorism over the last two centuries,
as the following sections explain over recent years terrorism has taken on an increasingly
more lethal profile.

44

Lia Brynjar and Katja Skjolberg Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature
(Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2005)
45
Brynjar and Skjolberg, above n 44, 71 – 72
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Whilst numerous studies have overviewed the evolution and development of terrorism,46
Rapaport’s “four waves” thesis47 has been described as the closest we may come to a general
theory on the evolution of terrorism.48 As depicted in Figure 2, Rapaport conceptualises four
“waves” in the history of terrorism, with differing motives and energies driving each wave over
certain time periods. Figure 2 provides a succinct generalised overview of the primary
strategies and targets of groups that have characterised these waves, and the events regarded as
the starting points for these four waves of terrorist activity. Rapaport’s ‘four waves’ thesis
provides a useful conceptual starting point for this Chapter’s analysis of how terrorism has
developed, and what the contemporary forms of terrorism may be historically compared to.
Figure 2: High-level summary of Rapaport’s Four Waves of Terrorism

Source: Karen Rasler and William Thompson ‘Looking for Waves in Terrorism’ (2009) 21(1)
Terrorism and Political Violence 28 at 31
46

See for example Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds), The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda,
translated by Edward Schneider, Kathryn Pulver, and Jesse Browner (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2007)
47
David Rapaport ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’ in Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (eds) Attacking
Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington D.C Georgetown University Press, 2004)
48
Schmid et al, above n 4, 228 – 235
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It has been recognised that Rapaport’s four waves theory is a broad generalisation49 – which
has both empirically validated50 and criticised.51 It would be erroneous and over-simplified to
specify arbitrary “start” and “finish” dates for the above waves of terrorism, and as explained
below, the forms of terrorism perpetrated by groups such as Al Qaeda have not entirely replaced
older forms of terrorism.52 Rather, like waves of the ocean, different waves of terrorism can be
seen to have co-existed over recent decades – with one wave becoming less prominent at the
same time as the next wave has developed momentum as the more prevalent form of
terrorism.53

[2.3.1]

The first, second and third of Rapaport’s waves

According to Rapaport’s four waves theory, the first anarchist wave existed from the late 1800s
until the second decade of the twentieth century. Consisting of a variety of Russian, Balkan
and other European groups,54 many groups comprising this wave had intentions of
overthrowing nation states; however none were successful in achieving such goals. 55 The
second nationalist / anti-colonial wave had its initial genesis in the 1920s following the delegitimisation of colonial empires, which has been attributed to the ideals enunciated by US
President Woodrow Wilson following the First World War.56 This second wave became most
prominent following the end of the Second World War with the rise of national liberation
movements seeking independence and the establishment of their own nation states.57 Although
Figure 2 above describes this wave as being most prominent from the 1920s to the 1960s,
Appendix B58 shows that many “second wave groups” such as the Irish Republican Army

49

Schmid et al, above n 4, 233
Karen Rasler and William Thompson ‘Looking for Waves in Terrorism’ (2009) 21(1) Terrorism and Political
Violence, 31; Schmid et al, above n 4, 186
51
However, Rapaport’s waves characterisation has been challenged in Mark Sedgwick ‘Inspiration and the
Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism’ (2007) 30(2) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 97
52
Paul Wilkinson Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response Second Edition (Routledge, 2006),
37
53
Schmid et al, above n 4, 348
54
See for example Ersel Aydinli ‘Before Jihadists There Were Anarchists: A Failed Case of Transnational
Violence’ (2008) 31(10) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 903
55
Schmid et al, above n 4, 229 – 230
56
Schmid et al, above n 4, 230
57
Schmid et al, above n 4, 230
58
Based on a review of attacks by the 2,222 terrorist groups listed in the Global Terrorism Database maintained
by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the University
of Maryland (with [2.5.1] discussing this database), Appendix B ‘Terrorist Groups: Attacks and Fatalities 1968 –
2011’ summarises the total number of recorded attacks by each group, the years in which each group committed
50
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(IRA), the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Euskandi Ta Askatasuna ‘Basque
Homeland and Freedom (ETA) continued to be active over subsequent decades. The objectives
of such groups have been noted to be clearly defined and limited to the liberation of certain
peoples and areas, with many such groups seeking to legitimise themselves as “freedom
fighters”. Assassinations and targeted bombings have been noted as common tactics of such
groups.59 The third new left wave developed as a result of adverse public reactions to the
Vietnam War, and the successes of the Viet Cong during the late 1960s. Groups such as the
West German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army saw
themselves as “vanguards” for oppressed Third World masses, and perpetrated attacks against
government officials and property. As noted above, longer-established second wave groups
such as the IRA and PLO continued to perpetrate attacks in furtherance of their objectives. 60
Also, from the 1970s onwards, terrorism began to take on a more international profile, with a
growing number of (frequently high profile) aircraft hijackings involving movements between
States.61

[2.3.2]

The fourth (and contemporary) of Rapaport’s waves

The fourth ideological / religious wave has been, and continues to be, the most deadly of all of
the four waves of terrorism conceptualised by Rapaport. The 1979 Iranian revolution, which
overthrew the former royal government and replaced it with an Islamic fundamentalist
theocracy, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1980s, are cited as providing the
impetus for the development of this wave.

As Figure 2 notes, attacks by fourth wave terrorist groups have been characterised by
significant escalations in casualty numbers. [2.5.1] explains how mass casualty attacks (which
this Study defines as attacks resulting in more than fifty casualties), 62 frequently involving

attacks and the total fatalities resulting from all attacks by the group. Also, Appendix B excludes attacks where
the perpetrators were listed as ‘Unknown’.
59
Schmid et al, above n 4, 230
60
For an overview of the objectives commonly shared by such groups, see Richardson, above n 58, 95 - 113
61
For example, Bruce Hoffman Inside Terrorism Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2006), 63 describes the advent of “modern terrorism” being the 1968 hijacking of an Israeli airliner by the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine en route from Rome to Tel Aviv – which he describes as being one
of the first truly international acts of terrorism records attacks resulting in over fifty fatalities, and attacks resulting
in over 100 fatalities – which this Study terms ‘major mass casualty attacks’
62
Although the present author’s research could not locate any definitions of the term ‘mass casualty attack’, as
[2.5.1] explains, the Global Terrorism Database records attacks as causing more than 50 fatalities (which this
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suicide bombings, have typified fourth wave terrorism.63 Religious (and particularly Islamic)
extremism has been the driving influence behind the vast majority of such attacks, which have
been directed towards US and Israeli interests, and secular regimes within Muslim-dominated
States – a significant distinguishing factor to previous waves of terrorism.64 Other extremist
religious ideologies have also driven significant fourth wave attacks - including Aum
Shinrikyo's nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing by
Timothy McVeigh in 1995, and several attacks by extremist Jewish and Christian groups.65

Fourth wave attacks were first perpetrated in Lebanon during the 1980s by Islamic groups such
as Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s 1983 suicide bombing of a US military base in Beirut, which killed
241 US and 58 French soldiers66 and lead to the withdrawal of Western troops from Lebanon
was the first major mass casualty suicide attack, has been described as the most important
significant development in international terrorism.67 From the early 1990s until its military
defeat in mid-2009,68 the LTTE (which has also been influenced by extremist religious
ideologies)69 perpetrated numerous suicide and mass casualty attacks – including five out of
the ten recorded suicide maritime attacks.70 Therefore, attacks by the LTTE are still examined
in this Study because they “set the bar” in terms of the deadliness of maritime attacks that nonstate actors might perpetrate, and which other terrorist groups might seek to emulate.

[2.3.3]

Factors facilitating development of Fourth Wave terrorism

Several factors have facilitated the development of fourth wave terrorism to the point where
terrorist groups have been able to perpetrate attacks such as those of 9/11. First, the
transnational Al Qaeda movement has been widely credited as being the major driving force
behind the growth of the deadly contemporary forms of fourth wave terrorism over the last two
Study terms ‘mass casualty attacks’), and those causing more than 100 fatalities (which this Study terms ‘major
mass casualty attacks’)
63
Rapaport, above n 45, 62
64
Wilkinson, above n 52, 32; Rapaport, above n 47, 63
65
Rapaport, above n 47, 61
66
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
67
Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin ‘From 1968 to Radical Islam’ in Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin The
History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda (University of California Press, 2007), 222; Wilkinson, above
n 52, 6
68
Although as [2.4.2] notes, concerns have been expressed since 2009 that the LTTE could resurge in the future
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Michael Roberts ‘Tamil Tiger “Martyrs”: Regenerating Divine Potency?’ (2005) 28(6) Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 493
70
These statistics are shown in Appendix G ‘Chronology of successful maritime terrorism attacks: 1968 – 2013’
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decades.71 Al Qaeda and many of the groups influenced by it72 adhere to extreme
fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. While the development of Al Qaeda has been
extensively studied,73 for present purposes74 it will suffice to note that under the leadership and
patronage of the late Osama bin Laden (hereafter ‘bin Laden’), Al Qaeda initially developed
out of the mujahedeen movement that opposed the Soviet military during Afghan civil war of
the 1980s – which provided a central rallying point for many Islamic fundamentalists from
around the world to join the struggle against the Soviets. The Afghan War provided a valuable
training ground for Al Qaeda to develop its irregular combat capabilities, which were further
developed in training camps under both the Taliban government in Afghanistan during the
1990s, and in Sudan between 1992 and 1996. Many thousands of individuals from numerous
countries are estimated to have passed through these training camps – and were inculcated with
Al Qaeda’s philosophy of radical Jihad and knowledge and skills in irregular warfare. As
[2.5.1] explains, these skills have been utilised with devastating effect in terrorist attacks from
the mid-1990s onwards. Second, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, which transformed
the international security environment,75 further facilitated the development of the Al Qaeda
movement. The downfall of formerly powerful Communist regimes such as the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia lifted the “coercive lid” of state control over previously-suppressed ethnoreligious tensions, and also lead to a number of “black markets” for military weaponry.
Following the end of the Cold War, ethno-religious wars occurred in Kosovo and Chechnya.
Similarly to the Afghan Civil War of the 1980s, these conflicts served as rallying points for
radical Islamic fighters from around the world, – enabling Al Qaeda to further develop its
irregular combat capabilities.76 Third, the growth of internet and other communications
technology enabled Al Qaeda to connect with Islamic groups with a similar outlook in a number
of countries – leading to the development of what has variously been described as the ‘Al
Qaeda-linked movement’,77 and from around 2005, the development of “home-grown” terrorist
groups examined in [2.6.4].

71

Rapaport, above n 47, 61 - 65
Including as [2.6.4] explains, a potentially significant number of “home-grown” radical Islamic groups
73
See generally Rohan Gunaratna Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Scribe Publications, 2005); and
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Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Georgetown University Press, 2004), 62
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[2.3.4]

Statements of Al Qaeda’s ideology

The Al Qaeda movement is noted to have assumed its current anti-Western outlook after 1990
when bin Laden’s offer of the services of his Mujahedeen fighters to the Saudi Arabian
government to repel invading forces of Saddam Hussein was refused, with the Saudi
government instead allowing an international coalition lead by the United States (to bin
Laden’s disgust), causing him to turn against Saudi Arabia and the United States. 78 This antiWestern outlook has influenced Al Qaeda’s thinking ever since. Similar to a jigsaw puzzle, the
ideology that influences and directs many terrorist groups influenced by Al Qaeda may be
“pieced together” from declarations made by senior Al Qaeda figures, notwithstanding the
variances in its public rhetoric.79 The most widely cited declaration is bin Laden’s Fatwa ‘Jihad
Against the Jews and Crusaders’ Fatwa issued on 23 February 1998, declaring that:
‘The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty
for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate
the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move
out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim’

Numerous similar pronouncements and communiqués by bin Laden before his death in 2011,
and by his former deputy and since bin Laden’s death, current leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman alZawahiri (hereafter ‘al-Zawahiri’) have served as “rallying calls” for the perpetration of attacks
against the interests of the United States, Israel, secular Muslim regimes and states linked to
them.80 [3.3.1] discusses the “maritime-specific” pronouncements by Al Qaeda’s - evidencing
its thinking about maritime terrorism.
In generalised contrast to the “more attainable” objectives of many second and third wave
groups81Al Qaeda’s desired “end objective” has been described as being the establishment of

David Rapaport ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’ in Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (eds) Attacking
Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Georgetown University Press, 2004), 64
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Jonathon Stevenson ‘Counter-Terrorism: Containment and Beyond’ (2006) 44(367) Adelphi Papers 10
80
For a summary of pronouncements issued by bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri between 1991 and 2008, see
Schmid et al, above n 4 Appendix 4.3 at 280
81
As [2.3.1] noted, the desired “end objectives” of most second and third wave groups were clearly defined and
limited to the liberation of certain peoples and areas - with many such groups seeking to legitimise themselves as
“freedom fighters”.
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a fundamentalist pan-Islamic Caliphate.82 [2.6] explains how particularly following the military
defeat of the former Taliban government in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has progressed from being
a “controlling force” to being an “inspiring force” for extremist Islamic terrorist groups
worldwide, which since 2005 have come to include “home grown” extremist Islamic groups.
However several of the Islamic terrorist groups which are not considered to be associated with
Al Qaeda that have perpetrated “fourth wave” mass casualty and/or suicide attacks over recent
decades include Hamas,83 Hezbollah84 and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).85 These groups
are noted to have more localised, territorial objectives compared to Al Qaeda’s grandiose “end
objectives”.86 Furthermore, the LTTE is a non-Islamic terrorist group that has also perpetrated
a significant number of “fourth wave” mass casualty and/or suicide attacks (including 105
suicide terrorist attacks between 1990 and 2009, five mass casualty attacks and two major mass
casualty attacks) with its motives noted as being localised and territorial. As Chapters 5 and 6
explain, several of these “non-Al Qaeda” fourth wave groups have also perpetrated several
significant maritime terrorist attacks. Therefore, as [2.4] explains, an “umbrella term” is needed
to distinguish Al Qaeda-influenced groups, “more traditional” Islamic groups, and the LTTE
which have actively perpetrated “fourth wave” attacks, from “older and more restrained”
terrorist groups.

[2.4]

DISTINGUISHING

CONTEMPORARY

AND

OLDER

FORMS

OF

TERRORISM

Over the last two decades, and particularly following the 9/11 attacks, the seriousness of fourth
wave terrorism outlined in [2.3] above has been widely recognised by scholars, states and
international bodies as one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. As
[2.7.1] explains, around 27 UN Security Council resolutions have re-affirmed the seriousness
of contemporary transnational terrorism as a threat to international peace and security; and the
UN Secretary-General’s 2004 High Level Report on Threats, Challenges and Changes
recognising the global reach and sophisticated capacity of the Al Qaeda terrorist network. 87
82
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However, similarly to the variations in the designation of terrorist groups noted in [2.2], a
variety of terms have been used to distinguish ‘fourth wave’ forms of terrorism (largely driven
by Al Qaeda) from “older” forms of terrorism – and indeed, the further that we progress after
9/11, such variations that are increasingly emerging.88

[2.4.1]

Existing distinguishing terminologies

First, many governments and scholars have talked of “pre-9/11” and “post-9/11” terrorism.
Whilst the 9/11 attacks were by far the most deadly terrorist attacks in history, and following
9/11 a marked increase in both mass casualty and suicide attacks is clearly evident, a significant
number of mass casualty and suicide attacks had occurred in the years before 9/11, with the
LTTE having perpetrated six mass casualty suicide attacks.89
Second, whilst the term “new terrorism” has been widely used by terrorism scholars90 to
distinguish forms of terrorism perpetrated by Al Qaeda-influenced groups from “traditional”
or “old” terrorism, the validity of the term “new terrorism” has been debated. Duyvesteyn91
and Crenshaw92 criticise the making of arbitrary distinctions between “new” and “old”
terrorism as over-simplified - pointing out several similarities between Al Qaeda linked groups
and “older” terrorist groups.93 Other terrorism scholars such as Kurtulusthe have counterwith global reach and sophisticated capacity. Attacks against more than 10 Member States on four continents in
the past five years have demonstrated that Al-Qaida and associated entities pose a universal threat to the
membership of the United Nations and the United Nations itself. In public statements, Al-Qaida has singled out
the United Nations as a major obstacle to its goals and defined it as one of its enemies’
88
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89
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First, that the 9/11 attacks shattered the illusion of an invulnerable US homeland; second, the increased violence
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Isabelle Duyvesteyn ‘How New is the New Terrorism?’ (2004) 27(5) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 439 for
example points out that several older terrorist groups such as the IRA, the PLO, the Red Army Faction and the
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criticised critics of the term “new” terrorism.94 In spite of this terminological debate, more
than ten years after the 9/11 attacks, the question arises as to when “new terrorism” ceases to
be “new”? Furthermore, the term ‘new terrorism’ does not “capture” the LTTE – which as
[2.3.4] noted, perpetrated numerous mass-casualty and suicide attacks (including several
maritime attacks) from the mid-1980s until its military defeat in 2009.
Third, the terms “Al Qaeda Network”, “Al Qaeda Movement” and “Al Qaeda-linked
movement” have been used interchangeably by terrorism commentators and governments
when discussing various Islamic groups since 9/11.95 As [2.2.3] noted, a number of “Al Qaeda
linked” groups have been proscribed under the Security Council Resolution 1267 list,96 with
these groups being listed in Appendix A.97 However there is no clear consensus amongst
terrorism scholars about the groups that do, and do not, constitute “the Al Qaeda
organisation”98 – with particular conjecture regarding the linkages of the Abu Sayyaf Group99
and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)100 to Al Qaeda. Adding further complexity to these
variations is the questioning by several terrorism scholars since around 2008 of the continuing
influence of Al Qaeda as a movement,101 with such questioning increasing following the 2011
support bases; secondly that several “older” groups were religiously motivated; and thirdly that several “older”
terrorist groups perpetrated attacks involving considerable fatalities
94
Ersun Kurtulusthe ‘New Terrorism and its Critics’ (2011) 34(6) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 476, after
criticising several of the arguments underlying critics of the term “new terrorism” points out that the contemporary
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95
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Qaeda heading but does include Jemaah Islamiyah
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that GAM rejected their invitation to establish links with Al Qaeda; that GAM recruits trained at Moro Islamic
Liberation Front camps in Philippines; that it has been reported to have connections with the LTTE; and that the
group has received arms and training from Iran and Libya
101
See for example Paul Pillar ‘Jihadi Terrorism: A Global Assessment of the Threat in the Post Al Qaeda Era’
in Rik Coolsaet (ed) Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation of Europe (Ashgate Publishing, 2008)
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death of bin Laden. On this point there has also been extensive debate between Bruce
Hoffman102 - who argues that Al Qaeda is likely to remain a significant threat as a group, and
Marc Sageman103 - who argues that contemporary Islamic extremism has become “leaderless”,
with future terrorist attacks more likely to be perpetrated by self-organised Islamic extremist
groups than being driven by Al Qaeda as an organisation.104
Fourth, terms such as “Islamic terrorism”, “Islamic extremism”, “Radical Islamism”, and over
more recent years “Jihadi terrorism” and “Radical Jihadism” have been utilised
interchangeably to refer to Islamic terrorist groups that have actively perpetrated significant
terrorist attacks over the last two decades including Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah.105 Such
terms could also encompass smaller, grass roots / home-grown terrorist groups – which as
[2.6.4] explains are not controlled by Al Qaeda, but are influenced by its ideologies. However
as noted in the third point above, several terrorism commentators have critically questioned
whether certain Islamic terrorist groups do in fact have any linkages with Al Qaeda; or
alternatively point out that such groups are more “traditional” and territorial in their foci – and
are not motivated by the radical jihad ideals of Al Qaeda and similar groups. Furthermore,
such descriptors would not “capture” the LTTE.

Finally, other descriptors that have been used to distinguish between contemporary and older
forms of terrorism include “Corrigible” vs “Incorrigible” terrorism,106 and terrorism that is
motivated by “temporal goals” (which would encompass groups such as the IRA) as opposed
to “transformational goals” (which would encompass groups such as Al Qaeda).107

[2.4.2]

Rationale: Contemporary and Pre-Contemporary Terrorism

To address the first question of this Study stated in [1.2.2], namely ‘how should the threat of
contemporary post-9/11 forms of maritime terrorism be understood?’, this Study seeks to
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overcome the terminological variances outlined in [2.4.1] through the use of the generalised
terms “Contemporary Terrorism” and “Pre-Contemporary Terrorism”.
The generalised term ‘contemporary terrorism’108 encompasses those terrorist groups, and the
individuals influenced by their ideologies,109 that have actively perpetrated the dominant forms
of fourth wave terrorism - being mass casualty and/or suicide attacks since 1998. The year 1998
is selected firstly because as [2.3.4] noted, it was on 23 February 1998, that bin Laden issued
his Fatwa, and secondly because it was on 7 August 1998 that Al Qaeda and its associated
group Egyptian Islamic Jihad perpetrated two coordinated suicide bombings of the US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed 223 and injured more than 4,000.
The term ‘contemporary terrorism’ encompasses Al Qaeda and associated groups,
Hezbollah,110 Hamas111 and the LTTE112 (which as [2.3] noted, has been a significant
perpetrator of mass-casualty and suicide attacks, and a very significant perpetrator of maritime
attacks). It also includes ‘those individuals inspired and/or influenced by their ideologies’
because as [2.6.4] explains, home grown terrorism has assumed increasing significance over
the last decade, with several “home-grown” terrorist groups perpetrating significant attacks.
Conversely, the generalised term “pre-contemporary terrorism” is used to the numerous
terrorist groups (such as the IRA, PLO and ETA) that would not fall within the description of
‘contemporary terrorism’ enunciated above - either because the group was no longer active

Audrey Kurth Cronin ‘Sources of Contemporary Terrorism’ in Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (eds) Attacking
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after 1998, or because the group has not perpetrated “fourth wave” mass casualty and/or suicide
attacks.

Although the terms contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorism involve broad
generalisations, they provide a basis for distinguishing the “worst possible extents” of terrorism
in contemporary times from the “worst possible extents” of terrorism in “previous” times. As
noted in Chapter 1, and reinforced in the following chapters, this Study argues that the success
of the international agreements must be assessed in terms of ensuring the prevention the “now
more dominant” forms of terrorism – being very lethal “9/11 style” terrorist attacks – rather
than arresting and/or prosecuting the perpetrators of “more restrained” assassinations,
hijackings and hostage-takings. The next sections illustrate the generalised contrasts between
contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorism. [2.5] compares the operational profiles of
attacks by contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorist groups, and [2.6] examines the
contrasts in the organisational profiles of contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorist groups
(that is, their structures and supporting infrastructure).

[2.5]

CONTEMPORARY

vs

PRE-CONTEMPORARY

TERRORISM:

COMPARISON OF OPERATIONAL PROFILES
In generalised comparison to the “more restrained” tactics used by pre-contemporary terrorist
groups (for example “negotiable” hostage-takings), the worst extents of contemporary
terrorism have been characterised by indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks, frequently
involving suicide tactics. This section utilises charts to depict patterns in the very large number
of terrorist attacks since the early 1970s, and also discusses some of the most notable attacks
perpetrated by contemporary terrorist groups. [3.3]113 undertakes a similar, but more detailed,
comparative analysis of the operational profiles of maritime attacks perpetrated by
contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorist groups, showing how maritime attacks reflect the
global trends outlined in this chapter.

The terrorism statistics discussed in this Chapter are derived from the two most commonly used
international terrorism databases – the Global Terrorism Database maintained by National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the

113

‘Comparison of contemporary and pre-contemporary maritime terrorism’
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University of Maryland (GTD)114 and the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
(RDWTI).115 Whilst both GTD and RDWTI record statistical information on terrorist attacks
between since 1968, they have both have different strengths and shortcomings.

First, the GTD records a total of 106,546 attacks between 1970 and 2011 - more than twice
those recorded by the RDWTI which lists 40,129 attacks between 1968 and 2010. The GTD
incorporates statistics about attacks by groups more commonly regarded as insurgents and
rebels rather than strictly “terrorists” - including the Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda, and
various combatant groups in the Nicaraguan civil war of the early 1980s. Whilst the GTD’s
inclusion of statistics about attacks by such groups might distort statistical trends in terrorist
attacks, the GTD nevertheless still demonstrates how terrorist attacks have become
increasingly lethal since the mid-1990s. Second, the GTD more readily enables high-level
comparisons of trends in statistics over longer periods than the RDWTI. Third, whilst both
databases contain similar categories of attack types116 the GTD is more specific in its definition
of the nine ‘attack types’ about which it records statistical information - these being
assassinations,117 armed assaults,118 bombings/explosions,119 hijackings,120 hostage-takings
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(barricade incidents),121 hostage-takings (kidnappings),122 facility/infrastructure attacks,123
unarmed assaults,124 and unknown incidents.125 Fourth, the RDWTI is more consistent in terms
of the amount of detail recorded about each terrorist attack; whereas for many attacks occurring
before the 1990s, the GTD merely records the occurrence of an attack. Finally, GTD omits
statistical information about terrorist attacks occurring in 1993.

Based on a review of attacks by the 2,222 terrorist groups listed in the GTD, Appendix B
summarises the total number of recorded attacks by each group, the years in which each group
committed attacks, and the total fatalities resulting from all attacks perpetrated by the group.
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this Study to analyse the patterns of attacks by all of these
2,222 groups, the statistics in Appendix B show the increased lethality of attacks by
contemporary groups over those by pre-contemporary terrorist groups. To illustrate with a few
examples - between 1970 and 2011 the IRA perpetrated 2,674 attacks killing 1,792; 179 attacks
by the PLO between 1970 and 1985 killed 182; the PFLP (responsible for the 1985 Achille
Lauro hijacking) perpetrated 146 attacks between 1970 and 2011 killing 186; and between
1970 and 2011 Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) perpetrated 2,027 attacks resulting in
818 fatalities. By contrast contemporary terrorist groups have been far more deadly in their
smaller number of attacks. Between 1998 to 2011, 124 attacks by Al Qaeda resulted in 4,636
fatalities; Al Qaeda in Iraq’s 187 attacks between 2004 and 2011 –killed 2,123; the 118 attacks
by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba between 1999 and 2011 caused 1,002 fatalities; and the
1,600 attacks by the LTTE between 1975 and 2010 caused 10,838 fatalities.

Which the GTD defines as ‘An act whose primary objective is to obtain political or other concessions in return
for the release of prisoners (hostages); such attacks are distinguished from kidnapping since the incident occurs
and usually plays out at the target location with little or no intention to hold the hostages for an extended period
in a separate clandestine location’.
122
Which the GTD defines ‘As for Barricade Incident - but distinguished by the intention to move and hold the
hostages in a clandestine location. Usually in kidnappings the victims are selected beforehand’.
123
Which the GTD defines as ‘An act, excluding the use of an explosive, whose primary objective is to cause
damage to a non‐human target, such as a building, monument, train, pipeline, etc; Such attacks consist of actions
primarily aimed at damaging property, or at causing a diminution in the functioning of a useful system (mass
disruption) yet not causing direct harm to people. Such attacks include arson and various forms of sabotage. Can
include acts that intend to cause harm to people as a result of the harm done to objects (e.g., blowing up a dam so
that the ensuing flood will kill residents downstream). Such acts can include acts which aim to harm an installation,
yet also cause harm to people incidentally’.
124
Which the GTD defines as ‘An attack whose primary objective is to cause physical harm or death directly to
human beings by any means other than explosive, firearm, incendiary, or sharp instrument (knife, etc.).
125
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[2.5.1]

Operational profiles of contemporary terrorist attacks

Tables 2 to 6 below depict the yearly trends in worldwide terrorist attacks between 1972 and
2011, with Appendix C summarising the more specific details about these yearly trends.126 The
information depicted in these tables has been derived from the GTD – which as at 1 October
2013, only includes statistics on terrorist attacks until 31 December 2011. Although “raw”
statistics on terrorist attacks in 2012 and 2013 are available from various media sources, such
statistics have not been subject to the same analysis as those incorporated into the GTD.
Nevertheless, these tables still depict the significant increase in mass-casualty and suicide
terrorist attacks since the mid-1990s which [2.4] outlined.

Table 1:

Suicide terrorist attacks per year: 1972 – 2011

Table 1 depicts the steady increase in suicide attacks since the late 1990s. Whilst as Appendix
C shows, the majority of suicide attacks since 2004 – 2005 have occurred in Iraq and
Afghanistan, suicide terrorist attacks have occurred in very wide range of locations. Since 9/11,
numerous studies have analysed the phenomena of suicide terrorism, noting it to be a very
concerning form of terrorism due to the lack of restraints by the perpetrators, with the potential
for such attacks to cause significant casualties.127

In relation to mass casualty and suicide attacks, Appendix C ‘Summary of yearly statistics in mass-casualty
and suicide terrorist attacks: 1972 – 2011’ summarises the total yearly number of attacks, the numbers of mass
casualty attacks resulting in over 50 fatalities, the numbers of major mass casualty attacks resulting in over 100
fatalities, the total number of fatalities per year and a summary of the locations of such attacks for each year.
Appendix C excludes attacks where the GTD listed the perpetrator as ‘Unknown’
127
A sizeable literature has emerged on Al Qaeda’s tendency towards mass-casualty suicide attacks. See for
example Robert Pape Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, 2005); Scott Atran
‘The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism’ 2006 29(2) Washington Quarterly 127 - who argues that
religion is not the major influencing factor behind suicide terrorism attacks; Bruce Hoffman ‘Terrorism, Signalling
and Suicide Attack’ 2004(2) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 243; Schmid et al, above n 4, which at 237 discusses
the origins and development of suicide terrorism, and definitional challenges; and at 239 – 240 quotes Robert
Pape as describing forms of terrorist violence in terms of increased lethality from Demonstrative; Destructive and
Suicide; and Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay The Globalisation of Terror: The Challenge of Al Qaida and the
Response of the International Community (Herzliya: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism,
2004, 153 – 164
126
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Table 2: Fatalities per year from suicide terrorist attacks: 1972 – 2011

Table 2 below shows how since 2001 there has been a significant rise in the number of fatalities
arising from suicide attacks. The 9/11 attacks account for the large “spike” in 2001, and the
combination of several mass casualty suicide attacks in Iraq account for the even larger “spike”
in 2007 which is depicted in Table 3.
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Table 3: Mass-casualty suicide terrorist attacks: 1972 - 2011
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Table 4: Comparison of yearly numbers of mass casualty attacks per year: Suicide vs
Non-Suicide attacks: 1972 - 2011

Tables 4 and 5 depict how the numbers of suicide mass casualty terrorist attacks have markedly
increased since 1999 and with the exception of the significant “spike” reflecting the 9/11
attacks in Table 5, how such attacks have accounted for nearly as many fatalities as those from
non-suicide mass casualty attacks over more recent years.
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Table 5: Comparison: Fatalities from mass-casualty attacks per year: Suicide vs NonSuicide attacks: 1972 - 2011
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Table 6 below summarises the details of the most notable attacks by contemporary terrorist
groups since 1998. As well as showing the significant lethality of these attacks inflicted by
very small numbers of perpetrators, the table shows the close coordination between many of
these attacks (several of which were executed almost simultaneously).
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Table 6: Significant contemporary terrorist attacks: 1998 – 2013
Date

Location

7 August 1998

Nairobi, Kenya and
Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania

11 September
2001

New York City;
Washington DC;
Shanskville
Pennsylvania, USA

12 October
2002

Kuta and Denpasar,
Bali

23-26 October
2002

Moscow

11 March 2004

Madrid, Spain

1–3
September
2004

Beslan, Russia

7 July 2005

London, United
Kingdom

11 July 2006

Mumbai, India

20 September
2008

Islamabad, Pakistan

Summary of Attack

Near-simultaneous suicide
bombings by explosivesladen trucks against US
embassies
Four airliners were hijacked,
with two being crashed into
the World Trade Centre
towers and one into the
Pentagon. The fourth airliner
crashed during an attempted
revolt by passengers
A small suicide backpack
bomb with 2.2 pounds of TNT
was detonated outside a
night club frequented by
Western tourists. Twenty
seconds later a bomb with
300 pounds of Ammonium
Nitrate was detonated.
Shortly afterwards a third
bomb was detonated outside
the US consulate

Siege of Dubrovka Theatre by
suicide attackers. The siege
was ended after three days
by Russian forces using
chemicals
Ten explosions resulting from
four coordinated bombings
on Madrid’s train system
within three minutes of the
first attack
Around 30 suicide attackers
staged a siege of a school.
The siege was ended by
Russian forces
Four suicide attacks on
London underground and on
a double decker bus within
one hour of the first, with the
first three attacks within one
minute of the first explosion
Seven explosions on
Mumbai’s train system over
11 minutes
Suicide bombing in a dump
truck detonated outside
Marriott Hotel

Perpetrators

Four members of
Al Qaeda and
Egyptian Islamic
Jihad (two per
truck)

19 members of Al
Qaeda

Four members of
Jemaah Islamiyah
50 members of
Special Purpose
Islamic Regiment;
Riyad-us Saliheen
Brigade of
Martyrs; Islamic
International
Brigade
Around 30
members of Al
Qaeda inspired
Abu Hafs alMasari Brigade
Around 30
members of
Riyad-us Saliheen
Brigade of Martyrs

Fatalities

Injuries

223

More
than
4,000

2,996

More
than
6,000

202

209

170

700

192

2,500

385

783

Four members of
the Secret
Organisation of Al
Qaeda in Europe
Students Islamic
Movement of
India; Lashkar-eTaiba

56

700

209

714

Lashkar e-Jhangvi

54

266

52

[2.5.2]

Operational profiles of pre-contemporary terrorist attacks

In contrast to the propensity of many contemporary terrorist groups to perpetrate mass-casualty
and suicide attacks as outlined in [2.5.1], the operational profiles128 of attacks by precontemporary terrorist groups have been noted as more constrained in several respects. Several
terrorism scholars have noted pre-contemporary terrorist groups being mindful of influencing
mostly localised public opinion towards their causes, and the achievement of “more attainable”
short-term objectives such as independence or autonomy for specific regions, or for the release
of political prisoners;129 as opposed to being fanatically devoted to, and willing to martyr
themselves for, the achievement of grandiose goals such as those espoused by Al Qaeda. As
such, pre-contemporary terrorist groups generally tended to be highly selective in their targets,
seeking to maximise the symbolic value of their attacks to influence public opinions in favour
of their causes, as opposed to maximising casualties. For example, Richardson explains that on
17 December 1983, the IRA planted a bomb outside of Harrods in London which killed 5
people; and whilst this number of casualties could have been increased to hundreds if it had
been planted inside, the IRA consciously refrained from doing so to avoid alienating its core
Catholic support base in Northern Ireland.130

Outside of civil wars and with the exception of aircraft bombings, mass-casualty attacks were
generally not characteristic of the operational profile of attacks by pre- contemporary terrorist
groups. One notable exception to this trend was the 1980 “Bologna Massacre” bombing outside
a railway station by an Italian neo-fascist terrorist organisation which killed 85 and wounded
more than 200. Terrorism commentators also note a common practice of telephone warnings
being made just before bombings, and representatives of the terrorist groups often claiming
responsibility and stating the reasons for such attacks.131

Aviation terrorism incidents (which have been comparatively more frequent than maritime
terrorism incidents),132 illustrate the generalised distinctions between the operational profiles
of contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorist groups.

Even though terrorism studies do not use this exact term – it is still used here for structural purposes
Rapaport, above n 47, 57
130
Richardson, above n 58, 84
131
Richardson, above n 58, 34
132
As Chapter 1 noted, maritime terrorist attacks have accounted for around two per cent of all recorded terrorist
attacks since 1968. Chapter 3 explains that the present author’s research has recorded around 228 maritime
terrorist attacks since 1961.
128
129
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Appendix D records a total of 35 aircraft bombings between 1970 and 2009, resulting in 1,833
fatalities overall. It shows these non-suicide bombings were most prevalent during the 1970s
and 1980s – with the only two suicide bombings occurring in 1994 and 2004. These non-suicide
bombings (in which the perpetrators were not willing to martyr themselves as the perpetrators
of contemporary terrorist attacks have) contrast to one attempted133 and the combined total of
22 suicide bombings that are reported to have been planned by Al Qaeda since the mid-1990s.
In early January 1995, Al Qaeda members Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheik Mohammed had
planned the “Bojinka Plot” which was to have involved the bombing of 12 airliners over the
Pacific Ocean; and in early August 2006, the “Transatlantic Plot” by Al Qaeda to detonate ten
US-bound airliners over the Atlantic was disrupted by British authorities.134

Patterns in aircraft hijackings since 1968 also illustrate the generalised distinctions between the
operational profiles of contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorism. As depicted in Table 7
below, and further summarised in Appendix E, whilst 323 aircraft hijackings have been
recorded between 1968 and 2012, these occurred with far greater frequency during the early
1970s, then the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. As Appendix E details, the majority of these
hijackings involved the perpetrators making demands (typically for the release of political
prisoners), with most hijackings being peacefully resolved with minimal or nil fatalities –
thereby demonstrating the “negotiability” that was characteristic of pre-contemporary
terrorism incidents. Aside from the 9/11 hijackings, the fatalities resulting from these
hijackings were caused by accidental crashes of the hijacked aircraft (in five cases), or shootouts with security forces (in six cases). Appendix E notes numerous pre-contemporary aircraft
hijackings involving the perpetrators demanding passage to (or in other cases, away from)
locations such as Cuba, Libya and other communist states. A significant number of precontemporary aircraft hijackings also involved the progressive movement of hijacked aircraft
across several States. Notable examples of long distance hijackings included the 1976 hijacking
of a Philippine Airlines aircraft from Manila to Libya (the longest distance aerial hijacking),
the 1976 hijacking of Air France Flight 139 from Athens to Entebbe in Uganda (where Israeli
special forces mounted a long distance rescue mission), and the 1977 hijacking of Lufthansa

133

As Appendix D notes, on 22 December 2011 suspected Al Qaeda member Richard Reid attempted to detonate
a bomb concealed in his shoe aboard American Airlines Flight 63 whilst over the Atlantic Ocean, but this bomb
failed to detonate
134
Gunaratna, above n 71, 56
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Flight 181 from Spain to Mogadishu in Somalia (where German and British special forces
mounted a long distance rescue mission).135

As Table 7 shows, and as Appendix E details, aircraft hijackings have decreased significantly
since the late 1990s. The unsuccessful attempt by members of the Al Qaeda-linked Armed
Islamic Group of Algeria to hijack Air France Flight 8969 en route from Algiers to Paris on 24
December 1994, which was intended to be crashed the aircraft into the Eiffel Tower, provides
further indications of the resolve of contemporary terrorist groups to perpetrate mass casualty
suicide attacks.
Table 7: Summary of air hijackings per year: 1968 – 2011
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The contrasts between contemporary and pre-contemporary forms of terrorism are also evident
in the patterns of barricade hostage-taking incidents.136 As Table 8 below shows, and as
Appendix F further details, barricade incidents were prevalent at a wide range of locations
during the late 1970s, early 1980s and mid-1990s, but then declined significantly during the
last decade. The very large “spike” in barricade incidents during 2005 is attributable to
barricade incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan occurring during the respective civil conflicts in
those two States. Terrorism scholars have noted that outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, barricade
hostage-taking incidents have not featured regularly in the operational profiles of attacks by

135

Appendix E records the full details of these hijackings
The GTD defines barricade / hostage incidents as ‘An act whose primary objective is to take control of hostages
for the purpose of achieving a political objective through concessions or through disruption of normal operations.
Such attacks are distinguished from kidnapping since the incident occurs and usually plays out at the target
location with little or no intention to hold the hostages for an extended period in a separate clandestine location.’
136
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contemporary terrorist groups - even for the release of the large number of Al Qaeda detainees
at Guantanamo Bay.137

Whilst barricade hostage-taking incidents have decreased in their frequency, they have
increased in their lethality. For example, the Moscow Theatre Siege between 23 and 26 October
2002, where 850 people in a Moscow Theatre were held hostage by members of the RiyadusSalikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, Special Purpose Islamic
Regiment and the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, with this siege ended broken by
Russian Spetsnaz forces – with a total of 170 fatalities; and the Beslan school siege – where
1,100 people (including around 770 children) were held hostage for two days between 1 and 3
September 2004 until the siege was ended by Russian security forces, resulting in 385
fatalities.138 More recently on 21 September 2013, an armed three day siege of the Westgate
shopping centre in Nairobi in Kenya by the Islamic extremist group Al-Shabab resulted in 72
fatalities and around 175 being injured.139
Table 8: Barricade incidents per year: 1968 – 2011

In summary Tables 2 to 8 above illustrate a general global trend towards mass-casualty and
suicide attacks, away from restrained incidents such as targeted bombings and “negotiable”

137

Adam Dolnik and Keith Fitzgerald Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists (Praeger Security
International, 2008), 15 - 16 points out that hostage-takings have not featured prominently in the tactics of Al
Qaeda-linked groups
138
Appendix F notes the barricade terrorism incidents which have resulted in significant casualties; see also
Dolnik, above n 137, 2 - 3
139
Nicholas Soi and Robyn Dixon ‘Kenya says Nairobi mall siege is over, with 72 dead’ Los Angeles Times 25
September 2013; Paul Bentley ‘Horrific claims of torture emerge as soldiers reveal gory Kenyan mall massacre
details’ Daily Mail 27 September 2013
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hostage-takings. Howard succinctly summarises the distinctions between the operational
profiles of Al Qaeda-influenced groups and pre-contemporary terrorist groups by explaining
that ‘ … under the old rules, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.
They did not want large body counts because they wanted converts and a seat at the
[negotiating] table’ and that ‘ … [Al Qaeda] terrorists are not particularly concerned about
converts, and rather than wanting a seat at the [negotiating] table, they want to destroy the table
and everyone sitting at it. In fact [Al Qaeda] want casualties – lots of them’.140 Numerous other
terrorism scholars have expressed similar conclusions.141

[2.5.3]

Comparisons of reported interest in acquiring and utilising Weapons of

Mass Destruction

A further significant point of comparison between contemporary and pre-contemporary
terrorist groups is the widely reported,142 yet also challenged,143 interest by contemporary
terrorist groups to acquire what have become commonly referred to as ‘weapons of mass
destruction’ (WMD). Whilst there is no universally accepted definition of ‘WMD’, the term
is usually understood as referring to nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons
capable of causing mass destruction, and with the raw materials, related ‘precursors’ capable
of being used construction and potential delivery systems collectively being referred to as
WMD materiel’.144

Concerns about terrorists acquiring WMD materiel came to fore after the Oklahoma bombing
and the Aum Shrinkyo attacks in 1995, and took on additional significance following 9/11.145
Russell Howard ‘Pre-emptive Military Doctrine: No Other Choice’ in Rohan Gunaratna (ed) The Changing
Face of Terrorism (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 39
141
Akiva Lorenz Al Qaeda’s Maritime Threat (International Institute for Counter Terrorism) 15 April 2007, 7
similarly concludes that ‘Al Qaeda, unlike traditional separatist-irredentist terrorist groups such as Provisional
IRA, does not want to become part of today’s international political system, but to replace it entirely’. Wilkinson,
above n 52 at 44 makes similar observations
142
James Van de Velde ‘The Impossible Challenge of Deterring “Nuclear Terrorism” by Al Qaeda’ (2010) 33(8)
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 682; Robert Ayson ‘After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic
Effects’ (2010) 33(7) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 571; Stevenson, above n 79, 33 - 34
143
Robin Frost ‘Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11’ (2005) 45(378) Adelphi Papers
144
Douglas Guilfoyle ‘Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction' (2007) 12 Journal of Conflict and
Security Law, 2. More recently, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific defined WMD as ‘…
atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any
weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic
bomb or other weapons mentioned above’: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific WMD Study
Group Handbook on Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia-Pacific (Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, 2013), 2
145
For a succinct overview of the threat of WMD terrorism, see CSCAP, above n 144, 3 - 12
140
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Almost two months after 9/11, bin Laden was reported to have stated in a 7 November 2001
interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, ‘I wish to declare that if America used chemical
or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We
have the weapons as a deterrent’. In the same interview, al-Zawahiri is recorded as stating: ‘If
you have $30 million, go to the black market in central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet
scientist, and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available. They have contacted us,
we sent our people to Moscow to Tashkent to other central Asian states, and they negotiated
and we purchased some suitcase bombs’.146 Bin Laden is also reported to have declared that:
‘Acquiring weapons for the defence of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed
acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to
acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to
try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on
Muslims.’147

The potential for terrorists to acquire WMD materiel has been specifically acknowledged in
three UN Security Council Resolutions between 2004 and 2011,148 within the UN’s 2004 High
Level Report149 and the 2005 In Larger Freedom Report.150 Whilst nuclear weapons have only
been used as weapons of war on two occasions in 1945 in the bombings of Hiroshima (killing
around 160,000) and Nagasaki (killing approximately 80,000), chemical weapons have been
previously utilised in several armed conflicts – including the first world war and in more recent
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen ‘Al Qaeda’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ Foreign Policy 25 January 2010
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/25/al_qaedas_pursuit_of_weapons_of_mass_destruction?page=
0,2&hidecomments=yes
147
Charles Ferguson and William Potter The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Routledge, 2005), 31
148
Including UNSC Res 1450 (13 December 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1450, UNSC Res 1810 (25 April 2008) UN
Doc S/RES/1810; and UNSC Res 1977 (20 April 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1977: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/
accessed 1 October 2013
149
The United Nations A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Report of the Secretary-General Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change GA 59th session, Agenda Item 55 UN Doc A/59/565 (2 December
2004) noted at para [146] that ‘the threat that terrorists - of whatever type, with whatever motivation - will seek
to cause mass casualties creates unprecedented dangers. Our recommendations provided above on controlling the
supply of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials and building robust global public health systems
are central to a strategy to prevent this threat’
150
United Nations In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All – Report of
the Secretary-General GA 59th session, Agenda Items 45 and 55 UN Doc A/59/2005 (21 March 2005) noted at
para [87] that ‘Terrorism is a threat to all that the United Nations stands for: respect for human rights, the rule of
law, the protection of civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is
a threat that has grown more urgent in the last five years. Transnational networks of terrorist groups have global
reach and make common cause to pose a universal threat. Such groups profess a desire to acquire nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons and to inflict mass casualties. Even one such attack and the chain of events it
might set off could change our world forever’.
146
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times by the Iraqis against Iranian forces and Kurdish minorities. The only chemical terrorist
attack to date has been the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinrikyo
sect on 20 March 1995 which killed 13 and injured around 6,000 people.151

Terrorism scholars have pointed out that WMD of various levels of sophistication could
conceivably be assembled from quite small amounts of raw materials - nuclear weapons from
small amounts of uranium, and biological and chemical weapons from commonly used
agricultural and industrial chemicals.152 Numerous concerns have been expressed that over the
last two decades since the end of the Cold War, the scope for the proliferation of nuclear
materiel, and also very destructive conventional weaponry, has markedly increased due to the
lessening of government control over such materiel due to the collapse of former communist
states.153 Added to these concerns, it has been noted that information on the assembly such
weapons may be found on the internet. However other studies have challenged such concerns,
pointing out the very significant levels of technology and scientific expertise to successfully
assemble such WMD.154 By contrast, the present author’s research has not found any
indications of pre-contemporary terrorist groups having an interest in acquiring, or possessing,
WMD materiel. This may be explained by “more restrained” operational profiles of such
groups as noted in [2.5.2], and the near complete control by a very small number of states over
WMD during the Cold War.

One of the key ways by which WMD materiel may be transported over long distances is by
sea. As [7.2] explains, countering the maritime trafficking of WMD materiel is arguably the
most operationally and legally challenging of the all the maritime terrorism threats examined
in this Study – due to the challenges of tracking and locating small amounts of WMD materiel
concealed within shipping containers being akin to “finding a needle in a haystack”; the
legitimate dual uses of what might be regarded as ‘WMD materiel’, and firmly entrenched
freedom of navigation principles under UNCLOS restricting the scope for the interdiction of
laterally transiting vessels.

151

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
152
See for example Charles Ferguson and William Potter The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), 3; Graham
Allison Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (2004); Frost, above n 143 25 - 40
153
David Fidler ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Law’ American Society of International Law
Insights February 2003. See also Martin van Creveld The Rise and Decline of the State (1999); Richardson, above
n 58, 188 - 208
154
Frost, above n 143
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[2.6]

CONTEMPORARY

vs

PRE-CONTEMPORARY

TERRORISM:

COMPARISON OF ORGANISATIONAL PROFILES

Several generalised distinctions may be made between the common organisational profiles of
contemporary and pre- contemporary terrorist groups.

[2.6.1]

Globalised outlook of contemporary terrorist groups

As noted in Table 7 above, numerous terrorist attacks have perpetrated by extremist Islamic
groups over the last 15 years from South America, 155 Eastern Africa, the United States,
Southeast Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Terrorism scholars have noted the ability of likeminded contemporary terrorist groups to operate across borders, in contrast to the general
tendency of attacks by most pre-contemporary terrorist groups to be localised.156 On this point,
Schmid et al explains that the term “transnational terrorism” is now used more widely that
“international terrorism” amongst terrorism scholars.157 As noted in [2.4], it has been widely
claimed that various linkages have developed between around 15 – 20 Islamic extremist groups
across the world (but with no clear consensus on which groups do and do not fit within these
groupings). Many such linkages have been both ideological (groups being inspired by bin
Laden’s pronouncements and/or the methods of Al Qaeda’s previous attacks), and operational
(before the loss of its training bases in Afghanistan, operatives receiving training in Al Qaeda’s
attack methods; financial, logistical and personnel support), and as recently discovered in the
2011 US raid on bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad Pakistan, strategic direction on the
perpetration of terrorist attacks.158

155

For example, on 18 July 1994, a major suicide bombing by Hezbollah in Buenos Aires, Argentina resulted in
96 fatalities and 236 injuries: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global
Terrorism Database http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
156
Rapaport, above n 47, 63 One exception to this general pattern was the machine gun by members of the
Japanese Red Army (in cooperation with the PFLP) at Lod Airport in Israel on 30 May 1972 (which killed 28 and
injured 78): RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php
157
Schmid et al, above n 4, 184 - 185
158
See for example ‘The Osama Bin Laden files: All documents and key findings’ The Telegraph 14 March 2013
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/9243419/The-Osama-Bin-Laden-files-all-documents-andkey-findings.html ; David Gardner ‘Revealed: How bin Laden plotted to bring down Air Force One to kill Obama
and replace him with 'totally unprepared' Biden’ Daily Mail 3 May 2012 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2138851/Osama-bin-Laden-files-reveal-plot-bring-Air-Force-One-kill-Barack-Obama.html; Accessed 1 October
2013
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Terrorism scholars have described Al Qaeda having “franchised” its ideology and modus
operandi. For example, Hoffman talks of “many Al Qaedas” connected to a central ideological
or motivational base, but advancing the remaining centre’s goals - at once simultaneously yet
independently of each other – with Al Qaeda being an “umbrella organisation” initially
providing financing and training to such groups prior to the loss of its ability to operate in an
unfettered manner in Afghanistan in 2001, and then providing the inspiration for these
groups.159 Similarly, Gunaratna explains that through “franchising” its philosophy and style of
operations, the [Al Qaeda] movement has enabled multiple campaigns to be waged against USrelated interests across the world driven by the ideal of universal jihad.160

[2.6.2]

Contemporary terrorist groups operating without active State sponsorship

or support

In several instances, pre-contemporary terrorist groups were provided various degrees of overt
and covert support from certain states – with Libya, Iran, North Korea and more recently Sudan
and Afghanistan alleged to have provided such various levels of support to terrorist groups.161
In several cases, terrorist and rebel groups were supported by superpowers playing “proxy
wars” – notable examples being the support provided by the United States to the mujahedeen
in Afghanistan, and also to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
159

Bruce Hoffman Inside Terrorism Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press,
2006), 282
160
Rohan Gunaratna ‘Al Qaeda‘s Origins, Threat and its Likely Future’ (2003) in Rohan Gunaratna (ed) Terrorism
in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response (Eastern University Press 2003); Michael Richardson A Time Bomb for
Global Trade: Maritime Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Institute for Southeast Asian
Studies, 2004), 29 In Southeast Asia for example, Al Qaeda has influenced a change in outlook within previously
locally-focused Islamic separatist groups towards the pursuit of a more transnational agenda of a pan-Islamic
caliphate (“Daulah Islamiah”) to include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines and southern
Thailand: E. Pavlova ‘Terrorism After September 11: Regional and Global Implications’ in Rohan Gunaratna (ed)
The Changing Face of Terrorism (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 54; Rapaport, above n 47, 64
161
For example, Anthony Cassese International Law 2nd Edition (Oxford University Press, 2005) at 469-470
expresses the view that ' … generally terrorist groups are not part of the official apparatus of any State, although
they usually receive, in varying degrees, some form of backing from that official apparatus.' He discusses six
"degrees of state support" for terrorism – which are summarised below in descending order of state support for
terrorism. Firstly, terrorist groups comprising State officials; secondly, agents, mercenaries, and/or armed bands
engaged by the authorities of a State; thirdly terrorist groups being supplied with financial aid and/or weapons by
a State; fourth terrorist groups being provided with logistical and/or training facilities by a State; fifth states that
acquiesce to the presence of terrorist groups within their territory; and sixth and terrorist groups operating within
the territory of a State that is unable to exercise effective control over that territory. The fourth, fifth and sixth of
Cassese's points are relevant in describing the levels of state support provided to terrorist groups by the former
Taliban regime in Afghanistan prior to the US-led intervention. However his characterisation it is not capable of
addressing the threat posed by trans-national "home-grown" terrorist groups which have been responsible for
perpetrating many significant attacks over recent years – demonstrated most notably by the 2005 London train
bombings. It could not accurately be said that one particular state provided active “support” to enable these attacks
to occur
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In contrast, it is generally recognised that whilst Al Qaeda (as the most significant driver of
contemporary terrorism) previously received various levels of state support from the former
Taliban government of Afghanistan, and also from the governments of Sudan and Iran through
the provisions of safe havens for training and planning purposes - its ideology agenda has not
been directly or indirectly influenced by the government of any state – but rather by the
teachings of figures such as the late bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Furthermore, numerous
terrorism studies explain that even following the loss of its capacity to train and operate in a
largely unfettered manner within Afghanistan following the US-led intervention from 2001, Al
Qaeda has still proven itself to be an adaptive and highly networked transnational movement162
– with groups influenced by its ideologies being responsible for numerous mass-casualty and
suicide attacks.
Terrorism scholars explain that Al Qaeda has flourished based on its own financial resources,163
noting that what it lacks in state sponsorship, it makes up for in its flexibility in being able to
operate across borders, recognising these capabilities are not possessed by states and thereby
effectively “privatising” international terrorism.164 There have been numerous claims that Al
Qaeda receives significant financial support from various criminal activities.165 It has also been
explained that the strength of the Al Qaeda movement lies not in its possession or occupation
of defined geographical territories – but rather its fluidity and impermanence – enabling it to
continue as, as its name translates, to be “the base” of operations166 - with one recent study
describing Al Qaeda as a “dune organisation” that is able to quickly and flexibly adapt to
changing circumstances. 167
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As [2.6.4] below notes, over more recent years since around 2005, whilst Al Qaeda as an
organisation may no longer directly control the perpetration of terrorist attacks, Al Qaedainfluenced home-grown terrorist groups (which have for example perpetrated the 2004 Madrid
and 2005 London bombings) also operate independently of state support.

[2.6.3]

Less identifiable organisational structures

Terrorism scholars have explained that most second and third wave terrorist groups tended to
be discretely organised168 with hierarchical and identifiable command structures. Particularly
in relation to barricade incidents (which [2.5.2] above noted were perpetrated with greater
regularity during the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s), the “controlling minds” of precontemporary terrorist groups were generally identifiable, and frequently amenable to
negotiation – particularly in hijacking and barricade incidents as Tables 8 and 9 depicted. Bruce
Hoffman is widely quoted as explaining that ‘ … however disagreeable or repugnant such
terrorists and their tactics may have been, we at least knew who they were and what they
wanted’.169

By contrast, through being influenced by highly secretive extremists, being able to operate
across national borders, and through having access to funding and advanced technology,
terrorist movements such as Al Qaeda are not susceptible to diplomacy or military deterrence
in the way that many pre-contemporary terrorist groups were, because its leaders are not
identifiable to negotiate with, nor to retaliate against.170 For example, Yasser Arafat addressed
the UN as the leader of (the then terrorist) PLO in 1974; by contrast it would be impossible to
imagine the late bin Laden or other Al Qaeda leaders doing so today.

However at the same time, the leadership of other non-Al Qaeda influenced contemporary
terrorist groups such as the LTTE, Hezbollah and Hamas have been remained identifiable.
Furthermore, groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have assumed functions as de facto
governing bodies of their support bases, and their representatives have been elected into
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governments of Palestine and Lebanon. Nevertheless, as [2.5.1] above noted, such
contemporary terrorist groups have still actively perpetrated attacks typical of fourth wave
terrorism.

[2.6.4]

The increasing prevalence of home grown terrorism

As a result of the “franchising” of Al Qaeda’s ideology and modus operandi outlined above,
several “home grown” terrorist groups have emerged since around 2005.171 As [2.3.2] noted,
the Al Qaeda movement developed significantly during the later 1980s and early 1990s in
Sudan and Afghanistan – with thousands of Islamic extremists from all over the world passing
through Al Qaeda’s training camps. Many of these individuals gaining irregular combat
experience in conflicts such as Kosovo and Chechnya before returning to their home countries.
Combined with advances in internet communications, the “returning home Afghan alumni”
have contributed to the radicalisation of many Islamic communities across the world, and
facilitated the growth of “home-grown” terrorist groups.172

As [2.4.1] noted, several terrorism commentators have opined that over recent years, and
particularly following the 2011 death of bin Laden, Al Qaeda has declined as a terrorist
organisation that is capable of perpetrating attacks on the scale of 9/11. However as Table 7
showed home grown terrorist groups173 have been responsible for perpetrating several
significant attacks – including the 2004 Madrid bombings174 and the 2005 London bombings.175
Home-grown Islamic extremists have also been responsible for the assassination of Dutch film
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maker Theo van Gogh in 2004176 and the attempted suicide attack on Glasgow Airport on 30
June 2007.177
Kurtulusthe talks of an “increased atomisation” in the organisational profile of contemporary
terrorist groups in less than four years between the 9/11 attacks and the 2005 London bombings
from being Al Qaeda-controlled hierarchies, to Al Qaeda-influenced networks to home-grown
self-starter cells, explaining that ‘ ... according to several accounts, the 9/11 hijackers were
directly affiliated to the Al Qaeda leadership and may have received direct orders; the Madrid
bombers, however, were more or less a flat network that had several influential individuals as
its nods; and finally, 7/7 London bombers have all the hallmarks of an isolated self-starter
cell’.178 The increasing independence of contemporary terrorist groups and the growth of home
grown terrorism mean that that terrorists could potentially strike anywhere, any time.

[2.7]

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY

TERRORISM

The combination of the demonstrably more lethal operational profile and largely invisible
organisational profile of contemporary terrorism outlined in this chapter has over the last 15
years brought terrorism to the fore as a very significant threat to national and international
security. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that small numbers of fanatical terrorists could
successfully employ asymmetric warfare tactics through their non-conventional use of
conventional technologies such as hijacked aircraft to perpetrate mass-casualty, synchronised
attacks against even the United States as the universally-recognised hegemon of the post-Cold
War international system.179 This has transformed terrorism from a localised nuisance and a
“sideshow” in the “East vs West” confrontation of the Cold War180 needing be contained,
managed and suppressed to a major transnational threat to national and international security
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needing to be disrupted, destroyed and eliminated.181 However it has been widely noted that it
is virtually impossible to “eliminate” or “defeat” many (largely invisible) contemporary
terrorist groups because such groups are not identifiable “enemies” that can be defeated in
traditional military terms; and that the absolutist ideologies of such groups means that the
struggle against such groups cannot be precisely said to “end” at with ceasefire agreements.
Rather, most terrorism specialists have emphasised the need to progress from talking of a “war”
to be “won” against Al Qaeda-influenced contemporary terrorist groups to an on-going struggle
for security against a largely invisible threat.182 As one international legal scholar accurately
summed up ‘ ... given their nature [attacks by contemporary terrorist groups] are very difficult
to defend against whilst underway – the potential target is usually only revealed by the attack
itself, all of society represents a potential target thus rendering on-the-spot defence
problematic, the actual violence may occur after the terrorists have left the scene (as in a
bombing), the terrorists may be willing to die in the attack, and the identity and location of the
terrorists may not be uncovered until the completion of a particular action’.183 Ronzitti
summarises the challenges contemporary terrorist groups present to States when explaining
that ‘ ... in the past, the imminence of attack was much more visible because it consisted of the
mobilisation of army, navy and air force. Nowadays, terrorist movements operate underground,
ready to [strike anywhere]’.184

The challenges faced by States in countering contemporary terrorism are succinctly depicted
in Figure 3 below. This diagram contrasts the “Aggregate Intelligence Effort” required by
States to monitor the “Enemy Size/Tactical Footprint” of security threats from opposing States
during the Cold War, and from contemporary terrorist groups during what was referred to
following 9/11 as the “War on Terror”. It shows that in comparison to the Cold War,
significantly greater intelligence and monitoring efforts need to be focused on very small
groups of terrorists operating trans-nationally.
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Figure 3: Comparison of “Enemy Size/Tactical Footprint” and “Aggregate Intelligence
Effort” between the Cold War and the War on Terror.

Source: Rupert Herbert-Burns ‘Terrorism in the Early 21st Century Maritime Domain’ in
Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond (eds) The Best of Times, The Worst of Times: Maritime
Security in the Asia-Pacific (World Scientific, 2004), 173

[2.7.1]

Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism Security Council Resolutions185

The increased and expanded threat of contemporary terrorism to international peace and
security following 9/11 outlined in the above sections has been recognised extensively by the
UN Security Council. Resolution 1267 (1999) provided the foundations for these counterterrorism resolutions, through obliging all states to refrain from providing any form of support
to the Taliban, bin Laden and his associates, and as noted in [2.2.2] establishing a committee
to designate terrorist organisations, with this list being last updated on 20 September 2013.186
In Resolution 1368 the Security Council characterized the 9/11 attacks, as a ‘threat to
international peace and security’ and expressed its readiness to take ‘all necessary steps … to
combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the [UN
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Charter]’.187 The preamble to Resolution 1368 expressed the Security Council’s determination
to ‘ … combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts’,
and ‘recognize[ed] the inherent right of individual or collective self defence in accordance with
the [UN] Charter’.188
Resolution 1373 re-affirmed that terrorism constitutes189 a serious threat to international peace
and security and re-affirmed the inherent rights of individual and collective self defence under
the UN Charter.190 It also both obliged and invited states to implement measures to prevent
terrorist acts and the financing and support of it – including criminalizing the willful provision
or collection of ‘funds, financial assets or economic resources’ by their nationals or persons
within their territories; and freeze the funds of persons and entities associated with the
commission, or facilitation, of terrorist acts’.191 It obliged States to refrain from providing “safe
havens” for persons financing, planning, supporting or committing terrorist acts;192 exchange
information with other states to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; 193 bringing to justice
any person participating in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist
act;194 co-operating in relation to criminal investigations relating to the financing or support of
terrorist acts – including assistance in obtaining evidence;195 and preventing the movement of
persons associated with proscribed terrorist groups – through effective border controls and
travel documentation.196

Resolution 1373 also noted with concern the close connections between international terrorism
and illegal activities including transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering,
illegal arms trafficking, and the illegal movement of WMD materiel;197 recognized the need
for states to complement international cooperation by taking ‘additional measures’ to prevent
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and suppress the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism within their territories,198
and declared that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism, (as well as knowingly financing,
planning and inciting such acts) as ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN’.199

Through imposing these obligations, Resolution 1373 laid the foundations for subsequent
Security Council Resolutions to make more detailed statements and impose more specific
obligations on states to combat all manifestations of terrorism. Resolution 1377 went one step
further to declare in the preamble that ‘ … acts of international terrorism constitute one of the
most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century’, and also
that stressed that acts of international terrorism ‘ … are contrary to the purposes and principles
of the [UN Charter], and that the financing, planning and preparation of as well as any other
form of support for acts of international terrorism are similarly contrary to the purposes and
principles of the [UN Charter]’.200 Since 2001, preambles of 27 further Security Council
Resolutions have re-affirmed the seriousness of terrorism as a threat to international peace and
security; affirmed and re-affirmed the need to ‘combat through all means’ terrorist threats to
international peace and security; affirmed and re-affirmed the inherent rights of individual and
collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.201

Although these post-9/11 counter terrorism resolutions have been passed unanimously, several
non-members of the Security Council have voiced concerns regarding the haste and informality
with which these resolutions had been adopted, calling for a more transparent and interactive
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approach from the Security Council.202 These post-9/11 counter terrorism resolutions have
been noted to represent a significant “paradigm shift” in the Security Council’s practice,
through imposing obligations that are not constrained by time nor geographic location.
Contrastingly, it has been noted that “traditional” Security Council resolutions (and indeed pre9/11 terrorism-related Security Council Resolutions) have been limited to specific state(s),
regions or groups of persons for specifically limited time periods.203 This has led several
international legal scholars to criticise the Security Council for taking on an “international
legislative role” - particularly given that Article 25 of the UN Charter obliges all member states
to comply with obligations imposed by resolutions of the Security Council.204

This scholarly analysis increased following the passing of Resolution 1540 in 2004 on WMD
proliferation amongst non-state actors. Despite the efforts of the United States, Resolution 1540
did not result in binding obligations being imposed on States to interdict suspected shipments
of WMD materiel to non-state actors, but merely ‘called upon’ States to ‘take cooperative
action’ to prevent such transfers.205 As [7.2] explains, international legal scholars have been
divided on the extent to which Resolution 1540, and the other post-9/11 counter-terrorism
Security Council Resolutions, might add further justification to the interdiction of vessels
suspected of transporting WMD materiel for terrorist purposes under the vaguely-worded
provisions of UNCLOS, and in exceptional cases, Article 51 of the UN Charter (which Chapter
8 examines).206
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Of all post-9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council Resolutions, Resolution 1390 whilst
focusing on the situation in Afghanistan, has imposed the most wide-ranging obligations on
States regarding (and broadly defined) ‘Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida
organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated
with them.’207 Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1390 obliged States to prevent their territories being
utilised by these groups and individuals for financing,208 entering or transiting through,209 and
for supplying weaponry,210 - with these obligations have been re-affirmed in ten subsequent
Security Council resolutions.211 As the term ‘territories’ within Resolution 1390 was expressed
generally and did not specifically exclude maritime territories, [7.3.3] considers the extent to
which the vaguely-worded provisions of UNCLOS, when considered in light of the obligations
imposed by Resolution 1390, might allow States to interdict foreign vessels suspected of
transporting conventional weaponry, terrorist-connected persons and being utilised for terrorist
financing across the UNCLOS maritime zones, and in exceptional cases, Article 51 of the UN
Charter (which Chapter 8 examines).
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[2.8]

CONCLUSION

Through enunciating the generalised terms of contemporary terrorism and pre-contemporary
terrorism, this Chapter has enabled the forms of terrorist attacks perpetrated by both Al Qaedainfluenced groups, and the (now defeated) LTTE to be examined under the one heading, and
distinguished from older forms of terrorism. It explained how contemporary terrorism has been
characterised by fanatically-driven, transnational, increasingly independent and home-grown
groups (organisational profile) perpetrating infrequent yet very deadly mass-casualty attacks,
frequently through the use of suicide tactics – in comparison to “more constrained” and
negotiable hostage takings (operational profile). Finally it explained how recognition of the
threat of contemporary terrorism has resulted several significant counter-terrorism Security
Council Resolutions, which have imposed wide-ranging obligations on States that are neither
geographically nor temporally limited.

At present, no official statements from government security agencies (which are fully informed
through both public and classified information sources) indicate that the contemporary post9/11 threat of terrorism has disappeared. For example, Australia’s terrorism alert level has not
been lowered from “Medium” to “Low” since the 9/11 attacks, 212 and indeed was elevated to
“High” on 12 September 2014.213 In October 2013 the Director General of the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation publicly stated that ‘… nothing I have seen in four years as
Director-General of Security has led me to think otherwise than that the threat of terrorism is
real and persistent, both globally and in Australia itself’.214 Similarly, the United Kingdom’s
terrorist threat levels have not been reduced below “Substantial” since the introduction of their
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five public terror threat levels on 1 August 2006,215 and was raised to “Severe” on 29 August
2014.216

Chapter 3 shows that whilst maritime attacks have accounted for around only two per cent of
recorded terrorist attacks since 1968, maritime attacks by contemporary terrorist groups since
the mid-1990s have reflected the trend towards significant casualty and suicide attacks outlined
in this chapter. It also reasons that the disruptive consequences following from a significant
maritime terrorism incident could be very profound. The chapter formulates the Maritime
Terrorism Threat Matrix, which provides a structured framework for analysing how terrorists
have, and might seek to, target or utilise vessels, and reinforces the importance of preventing
maritime terrorism incidents from occurring.

Terrorist threat level history’ United Kingdom MI5 Security Service https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/thethreats/terrorism/threat-levels.html#history
216
Threat level from international terrorism increased from substantial to severe’ United Kingdom Home Office,
29 August 2014 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/threat-level-from-international-terrorism-increased
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CHAPTER 3
THE THREAT OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN

[3.1]

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter outlines the serious threat contemporary terrorism could pose within the maritime
domain.1 It explains how the disruptive effect of a terrorist attack on significant port facilities
or navigational choke-points could be profound, and that terrorist attacks on land enabled
through weaponry or operatives transported by sea, or financed by the terrorist utilisations of
vessels, could also be (and have been) very devastating. Through a high-level overview2 of the
228 recorded maritime terrorism attacks, the chapter shows the contrasts between
contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorism articulated in Chapter 2 away from restrained
and negotiable forms of terrorism and towards significant-casualty and suicide attacks.3 It also
notes indications of contemporary terrorist groups having the intent and capabilities to
perpetrate maritime attacks. After reviewing the insightful yet overly specific maritime
terrorism scenarios postulated by maritime security specialists since 9/11, the chapter
formulates the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix, which provides the most structured
framework to date for statistically analysing all of the ways in which terrorist have, and might
conceivably4 target and/or utilise vessels. It concludes by emphasising the importance of
preventing the occurrence of maritime terrorism incidents in the first instance, rather than
responding after terrorist attacks occur – which is the challenging standard against which the
prospects for the international agreements succeeding should be assessed.

This chapter addresses the first of the sub-questions posed in [1.2.2], namely ‘(1) How should the threat of
contemporary post-9/11 forms of maritime terrorism be understood?’
2
The term ‘high level’ here refers to the analysis of trends over several years
3
[3.3] contrasts the bombings of USS Cole in 2000, MV Limburg in 2002 and Super Ferry 14 in 2004 to precontemporary incidents such as the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking
4
Given the cunning, innovative and unpredictable operational profile of contemporary terrorist groups
demonstrated in attacks such as 9/11, which contrasts to the more predictable operational profile of pirate groups,
Chapter 3 reasons that it is very important to examine planned and postulated maritime terrorism incidents as well
as successful and attempted ones. Chapter 2 also noted that the 9/11 Commission Report at 339 – 348 cited the
lack of imagination and the failure to “think outside the box” as a contributing factor to the failure to pre-empt the
9/11 attacks
1
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[3.2]

VULNERABILITIES OF THE MARITIME DOMAIN TO TERRORIST

TARGETING AND UTILISATION
Covering around seventy per cent of the world’s surface, oceans are the focus of numerous
economic, commercial, recreational and military activities. It has been estimated that around
eighty per cent of international trade moves by sea, 5 with both the volumes of trade and the
number of ships ploughing the world’s oceans continually increasing. These large volumes of
trade are concentrated in four key respects that make the maritime domain particularly
vulnerable to targeting and/or utilisation by terrorists. First, recent decades have seen a
significant concentration of the international trade moving by sea into containerised cargoes –
it has been widely estimated that up to 90 per cent of goods transported by sea move via
shipping containers.6 Whilst facilitating maritime trade and commerce, the impossibility of
physically inspecting each and every shipping container provides scope for shipping containers
to be utilised for nefarious purposes by terrorists – including smuggling WMD materiel,7
conventional weaponry and terrorist-connected persons to enable subsequent terrorist attacks
on land.

Second, recent decades have also seen the increasing concentration of containerised shipping
onto larger vessels (such as “Panamax” vessels), and towards the increasing importance of a
smaller number of “mega-ports” capable of handling very large vessels and cargo volumes.8
Such large, slow moving and often “minimum manned” vessels are particularly vulnerable to
targeting by both terrorist and pirate groups. A significant attack on one or more of the large
“mega-ports” that are capable of servicing such large vessels could cause significant
disruptions to the free-flow of international trade - given that international supply chains
function and indeed survive according to the “Just enough, Just in time” principle - whereby
goods are delivered in the sufficient quantity just in time for consumption or sale in order to
minimise the time spent in storage.9

5

Michael Richardson A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 3; Martin Murphy Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty
Money: Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (2009), 266
6
Richardson, above n 5, 3
7
Marc Levinson The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger
(Princeton University Press, 2006); Richardson, above n 5, 5 - 6
8
Levinson, above n 7, 10 - 15
9
Akiva Lorenz Al Qaeda’s Maritime Threat (International Institute for Counter Terrorism) 15 April 2007, 15;
Richardson, above n 5 at 7 explains that ‘the global economy is built on integrated supply chains that feed
components and other materials to users just before they are required and just in the right amounts. That way,
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The costs from a significant disruption to the functioning of a “mega-port” were seen between
27 September and 9 October 2002 when industrial action by port workers on the closed all 29
sea ports along the West Coast of America. This was estimated to have disrupted the itineraries
of more than 200 ships carrying 300,000 containers, and resulted in costs in the range of
US$450 million to several billion dollars to the US economy, as well as removing between 0.4
and 1.1 per cent of the nominal GDP of prominent Asian exporters, including Hong Kong,
Malaysia, and Singapore.10 The effects of these disruptions were drawn upon in a widely-cited
“port security war game” exercise facilitated by consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, which
considered the effects from a significant terrorist attack on a major US port causing closure of
other US ports. This exercise reasoned that the economic consequences flowing from such an
attack could be more profound than 9/11 attacks because it would affect the functioning of the
real economy (that is, the physical interchange of goods) as opposed to the financial economy
(that is, the interchange of financial flows). It reasoned that whilst governments and businesses
can implement business continuity measures to survive the loss of their offices and personnel
from attacks such as 9/11, attacks on physical infrastructure such as “mega-ports” could take
far longer to return to pre-attack capacity.11

Third, several key navigational chokepoints around the world are very significant for the freeflow of international shipping. These include the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the
Bosporus Strait, Bab-el-Mandab linking the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the Strait of
Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca and the Panama Canal. The waters in proximity to these
chokepoints are also heavily trafficked by smaller vessels whose activities are challenging to
monitor. Furthermore, Islamic extremist groups are reported to be active in areas in proximity
to several of these international straits, leading to widespread concerns of terrorist attacks
following 9/11.12 Similarly to the effect of attacks on “mega-ports”, actual or threatened
disruptions to the free flow of international shipping through these chokepoints, even for a

inventory costs are kept low. If supply chains are disrupted, it will have repercussions around the world,
profoundly affecting business confidence’.
10
Michael Greenberg, Peter Chalk and Henry Willis Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability (RAND Corporation:
2006) ; Philippe Crist Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact (Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development Maritime Transport Committee, 2003), 122 - 123
11
This port security war game exercise examined the hypothetical impacts on the US economy and international
financial markets that could result from the discovery of radiological bombs entering the United States via
shipping containers progressively over a 92 day period, estimating the total cost could be as high as USD 58
billion: Crist, above n 10, 19 - 23
12
Lorenz, above n 9, 16
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short period of time, could have profoundly adverse consequences for international shipping
and economies around the world through increasing both the time and the cost for goods to be
transported by sea, as the closure of the Suez Canal during the Suez Crisis of the 1950s
demonstrated.13 Furthermore, large volumes of potentially volatile and explosive materials
such as oil, liquefied natural gas and ammonium nitrate are transported by sea, and concerns
have also been expressed that such vessels might be targeted by terrorists. However several
maritime security specialists have played down such concerns, pointing out that such vessels
are constructed to ensure the safe transport of such materials under all conditions.14

Fourth, the widespread anonymity regarding the ownership and control of vessels that plough
the world’s oceans, given the often lax controls of “open registry” flag states15 and as [4.4]
discusses, inconsistencies in the enforcement of seafarer identity measures have raised
concerns about the nefarious uses of ships and seafarer identification by terrorist and criminal
groups. Such factors make the world’s oceans very vulnerable to targeting and/or utilisation by
terrorists, with the following section showing how the maritime domain has presented, and
could well present, an attractive location for future terrorist attacks.

[3.3]

COMPARISON

OF

CONTEMPORARY

AND

PRE-CONTEMPORARY

MARITIME TERRORIST ATTACKS

The Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group on
Maritime Cooperation has defined maritime terrorism as the ‘ ... undertaking of terrorist acts
and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at
sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, [or] against coastal
facilities’.16 Although the CSCAP definition also included the undertaking of such acts against
‘ ... settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities’, 17 because this
Study is limited to examining the threat of terrorism in the maritime (as opposed to terrestrial)

13

See for example John Noer Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in the South China Sea (Washington:
National University Press, 1996)
14
Peter Martin ‘Security in the Maritime Sector of the Liquefied Natural Gas Industry’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns,
Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyds MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2009), 159 - 169
15
See in particular Crist, above n 10; and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Maritime
Transport Committee Ownership and Control of Ships (2003)
16
Lorenz, above n 9, 3
17
Lorenz, above n 9, 3
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domain, terrorist attacks executed from the landward side against such land targets18 are not
counted by this Study as maritime terrorist attacks.

[3.3.1]

Comparison of operational profiles

As previously mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, maritime attacks have only accounted for around
two per cent of all recorded terrorist attacks since 1968.19 Based on the widest possible review
of terrorism databases and other sources, this Study has recorded 228 maritime attacks having
been successfully20 perpetrated by groups which have been variously described as terrorist
between 1968 and 2013.

Whilst small in comparison to the global total, maritime attacks over the last two decades reflect
the contrasts in the operational profile between contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorist
groups explained in Chapter 2 away from restrained and “negotiable” forms of terrorism such
as vessel hijackings and towards significant-casualty and suicide attacks.21 Table 9 below
summarises the yearly statistic trends in the 228 recorded successful maritime terrorist attacks
between 1968 and 2013, with Appendix G providing the full details of these attacks.22 It shows
how the yearly numbers of maritime attacks have fluctuated – with the first “spike” around
1974 to 1976 mostly due to attacks on vessels around the Caribbean by anti-Castro Cuban
groups such as El Poder Cubano; the second (and largest) “spike” between 1984 to 1985 mostly
reflecting attacks on vessels around Nicaraguan waters during its Civil War by groups such as

18

An example of an attack executed from the landward side would be an attack on a port facility by an
explosives-laden vehicle – which would not be an attack against the port facility executed from the maritime
side
19
1968 is when the RAND Terrorism Chronology Database and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database
started methodically recording statistics on terrorist attacks: Murphy, above n 5, 185-186
20
As noted in [2.2.4], the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global
Terrorism Database http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (GTD) from which many of the statistics utilised in this Study
have been derived, defines a terrorist attack as being ‘successful’ according to the tangible effects of the attack.
The notes to the GTD explain ‘For example, in a typical successful bombing, the bomb detonates and destroys
property and/or kills individuals, whereas an unsuccessful bombing is one in which the bomb is discovered and
defused or detonates early and kills the perpetrators. Success is not judged in terms of the larger goals of the
perpetrators. For example, a bomb that exploded in a building would be counted as a success even if it did not,
for example, succeed in bringing the building down or inducing government repression’.
21
Akiva Lorenz The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel (International Institute for Counter Terrorism) 15
April 2007, 26
22
Appendix G ‘Chronology of successful maritime terrorist attacks: 1961 – 2013’ summarises the following
information for each attack: the date; the location of the attack and the navigational status of the attacked vessel
(Underway (U), In port (P), At anchor (A), or Offshore platform (OP)); the perpetrators of the attack; the attacked
vessel; the method of attack and its effects; the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix incident category; the injuries
resulting from the attack; the fatalities resulting from the attack; and the source from which the information about
the attack was derived
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the Nicaraguan Democratic Force and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance; and the “spike”
between 2005 to 2007 mostly driven by attacks on offshore platforms around Niger Delta by
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and also by LTTE attacks on
shipping around Sri Lanka.
Given the low numbers of maritime terrorist attacks, the “spikes” in fatalities have mostly been
driven by significant-casualty23 attacks resulting in over ten fatalities. Aside from one single
attack in 1971 with 24 fatalities, such significant-casualty attacks have mostly occurred since
the mid-1990s. Similarly, all of the ten suicide maritime terrorist attacks have been perpetrated
since 1999 - which further evidences the observation made in [2.5] about mass-casualty and
suicide attacks being a characteristic of contemporary terrorism since the mid-1990s. As
detailed in Appendix G, the LTTE has perpetrated five of these ten suicide maritime terrorist
attacks, with other attacks been perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf Group against a Philippines
passenger ferry in 2000 (resulting in one fatality); by Jamaat al-Tawhid/ Tawhid and Jihad in
2004 against the Khor al-Amaya and Al-Basra offshore oil terminals in Iraq in 2004 (resulting
in six fatalities, and causing a temporary shut-down in oil production from the terminals; and
a suicide speedboat attack in 2010 against the Japanese tanker MV Star in the Persian Gulf by
an unknown perpetrator.24

Whilst the term ‘Mass casualty’ is widely used to refer to attacks with more than 50 casualties, due to the
comparatively lower occurrence of maritime terrorist attacks, this Study uses the term ‘Significant casualty’ attack
to refer to maritime terrorist attacks resulting in more than ten fatalities
24
Anthony DiPaola ‘UAE Confirms Terror Attack on Japan Tanker in Persian Gulf Last Month’ Bloomberg 7
August 2010 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-06/u-a-e-confirms-terror-attack-on-japan-tanker-inpersian-gulf-last-month.html
23
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Table 9:
Year
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
Totals
25

Yearly trends in recorded maritime terrorist attacks: 1968 - 201325
Attacks per year
0
7
9
9
9
10
3
4
3
2
2
5
5
0
7
5
2
7
1
7
9
3
6
5
5
7
9
21
3
2
4
6
6
3
2
9
7
8
3
0
1
0
0
7
223

Total fatalities
0
6
50
29
2
71
0
134
30
1
20
58
2
0
39
5
1
15
0
45
12
2
4
18
1
19
6
7
1
6
1
0
5
5
0
3
0
0
0
0
24
0
0
0
622

Attacks >> 10 fatalities
0
0
2
1
0
4
0
2
2
0
2
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
22

Suicide attacks
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11

This is a high level summary of the attacks listed in Appendix G. As at 1 October 2013 neither the GTD nor the
RDWTI had been updated for the terrorist attack statistics for 2012, and the author’s research did not identify any
maritime terrorist attacks occurring during 2012 or 2013.
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Both Al Qaeda, and the Al Qaeda-influenced Adan Abyan Islamic Army have been responsible
for the two most notable suicide attacks over the last decade. First, the bombing of the USS
Cole by an explosives-laden dinghy whilst refuelling in Aden, Yemen in 2000 resulted in 17
fatalities and 39 injuries, extensive damage to the Cole. Shortly after this attack bin Laden is
widely reported to have composed and read the following poem at the wedding of one of his
sons praising the attack.
‘Your brothers in the East prepared their mounts and Kabul has prepared itself and the
battle camels are ready to go, A destroyer: even the brave fear its might. It inspires
horror in the harbor and in the open sea. She goes into the waves flanked by
arrogance, haughtiness and fake might. To her doom she progresses slowly, clothed in
a huge illusion. Awaiting her is a dinghy, bobbing in the waves, disappearing and
reappearing in view’. 26

Second, the suicide attack by an explosives-laden dinghy on the oil tanker MV Limburg on 6
October 2002 off the coast of Yemen caused one fatality and 12 injuries. The 157,000 GRT
Limburg, which was carrying 397,000 barrels of crude oil from Iran to Malaysia, caught fire,
causing around $45 million damage to the vessel and almost 90,000 barrels of crude oil to link
into the Gulf of Aden. Following this attack, oil prices immediately rose by around 30 cents
per barrel; and marine hull and cargo insurance rates for ships operating in and around Yemen
trebled.27 The overall loss to the Yemeni economy was estimated at around $56 million –
including the loss of $3.8 million to Yemen in port revenues, and the loss of 3000 jobs relating
to the Yemeni shipping industry.28 Two Al Qaeda communiqués following this attack evidence
the extremist ideology noted in Chapter 2 as driving the actions of Al Qaeda-influenced
contemporary terrorist groups. One communiqué explained ‘If a boat which didn’t cost US
$1,000 managed to devastate an oil tanker of that magnitude, imagine the extent of the danger
that threatens the West’s commercial lifeline, which is petroleum’.29 Another communiqué

Tracey Connor ‘Bin Laden: Cole Poetic Justice’ New York Post 2 March 2011
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/item_af8AIarmoUUffkHpb8YvvO; Craig Unger House of Bush, House of Saud
(Scribner, 2004), 229
27
Lorenz, above n 9, 14; Peter Lehr ‘Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors and Capabilities’ in Rupert HerbertBurns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008), 59 60
28
Catherine Zara-Raymond Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment (Institute for Defence and
Strategic Studies Working Paper No. 74, March 2005), 31
29
Lorenz, above n 9, 14
26
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evidences Al Qaeda’s recognition of the vulnerabilities of Sea Lines of Communication, and
its strong resolve to target those vulnerabilities, when declaring that:
‘We congratulate our Islamic nation for heroic and brave jihadi operations that were
undertaken by its justified mujahedeen sons in Yemen against the crusader oil tanker
and in Kuwait against the invading forces and the American occupation. By hitting the
oil tanker in Yemen, the mujahedeen hit the secret line, the provision line and the
feeding to the artery of life to the crusader’s nation. They reminded the enemies of the
heaviness of the blood bill and the enormity of losses, that they will pay a high price
for the continuation of their aggression on our nation and their plunder of our good and
our wealth.’30
The USS Cole and MV Limburg attacks, and several of the significant casualty31 and suicide
attacks summarised in Table 9 (and detailed in Appendix G), were perpetrated without warning
and with devastating effect. Such attacks contrast markedly to common patterns of maritime
attacks perpetrated by pre-contemporary terrorist groups, which as Appendix G shows,
involved “hit and run” attacks on ships causing a maximum of one to two fatalities, and
“negotiable” hijackings with specific demands such as the release of political prisoners.32

The well-known 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking illustrates the contrast in the operational profiles
of maritime attacks by contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorist groups, with several other
pre-contemporary vessel hijackings being perpetrated in a similar, albeit less “high profile”
manner.33 The Achille Lauro cruise liner was hijacked by four members of the Palestinian
Liberation Front (PLF) whilst en route from Alexandria to Port Said – who had not originally
planned to hijack the ship – but forcibly took over the vessel after a crew member discovered
them cleaning their weapons within their cabins. The four PLF members then forced the Achille

This communique was cited in Lorenz, above n 9, 14; and in David Claridge ‘The Terrorist Threat to Trade and
Commerce’ in Rohan Gunaratna (ed) Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response (Eastern University
Press 2003), 58
31
Given that maritime terrorist attacks have only constituted around 2 per cent of all recorded terrorist attacks
since 1968, this Study notes attacks involving more than 10 fatalities as ‘significant casualty’ attacks
32
Thereby reflecting the broader trends in terrorist incidents globally - as [2.5.2] explained, the frequency of
“negotiable” aerial hijackings have declined over the last decade, and are more characteristic of pre-contemporary
than contemporary terrorism. Furthermore [2.5.2] outlined the decline in barricade terrorism incidents outside of
Iraq where many such actions were perpetrated by insurgent groups following the US-led intervention under
Operation Iraqi Freedom
33
See Appendix G ‘Chronology of successful maritime terrorist attacks: 1961 – 2013’
30
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Lauro to change course towards Tartus in Syria, and also demanded the release of around fifty
Palestinian prisoners being held in Israeli prisons. After being refused permission to dock at
Tartus, the hijackers killed a disabled American-Jewish passenger Leon Klinghoffer, and threw
his body overboard. The hijackers then directed the Achille Lauro back towards Port Said in
Egypt, and following two days of negotiations, agreed to abandon the vessel in exchange for
safe passage to Tunisia aboard an Egyptian commercial airliner. However on President
Reagan's orders the airliner was intercepted by US Navy airplanes and escorted to Sicily in
Italy – where the hijackers were arrested by Italian authorities – but were subsequently released.
Following this incident, Leon Klinghoffer’s family sued the PLF for its role in his death –
eventually settling its $1.5 million lawsuit for an undisclosed sum.34 In contrast, it far less likely
that persons aggrieved by attacks involving secretive and un-identifiable groups such as Al
Qaeda could institute legal proceedings against such groups – particularly given the propensity
of such contemporary terrorist groups to carry out suicide attacks where the perpetrators do not
survive to be arrested and prosecuted. The Achille Lauro incident highlighted several
shortcomings in the UNCLOS piracy provisions,35 and provided the impetus for the
development of the 1988 SUA Convention which is examined in Chapter 6.36

[3.3.2]

Indications

of

maritime-focused

intent

and

capability

amongst

contemporary terrorist groups

A well-accepted approach to assessing the threat posed by terrorist groups is to consider the
combination of their intent and their capabilities.37 [3.3.1] above overviewed trends in the small
yet significant number of maritime attacks by contemporary terrorist groups over the last two
decades. In addition to the two Al Qaeda communiqués noted above, several statements provide
indications of maritime-focused intent by Al Qaeda with a similar “extremeness” in their
ideology noted in Chapter 2. A 1998 statement by the International Islamic Front for Jihad
entitled ‘Clinton Humiliates More than a Billion Muslims’ evidenced the resolve of Al Qaeda
target the maritime domain in an effort to retaliate against the US and its related interests:
Anthony Cassese International Law 2nd Edition (Oxford University Press, 2005) 477 – 478
[6.2.4] explains how the Achille Lauro affair highlighted the limitations of the UNCLOS piracy provisions
under Article 101 in relation to situations involving violence aboard ships that had the potential to prejudice the
safety of maritime navigation which were not committed for ‘private ends’ and which did not involve two ships
36
Cassese, above n 34; Natalino Ronzitti (ed) Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1988); Greenberg et al, above n 10, 20 - 23; Schmid et al, above n 36, 519; Anthony Cassese and Steven
Greenleaves Terrorism, Politics and Law: The Achille Lauro Affair (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989)
37
David Claridge ‘The Terrorism Threat to Trade and Commerce’ in Rohan Gunaratna (ed) Terrorism in the AsiaPacific: Threat and Response (Eastern Universities Press, 2003), 169 – 170
34
35
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‘Oh Muslims, it is our obligation upon us to retaliate against the American aggression
[in Sudan and Afghanistan] and its alliance and to take the necessary measures to
prevent her from repeating her atrocities. It is obligatory upon us to close all their
embassies and to expel their employees from Muslim countries, to boycott them
economically (not exporting to or importing from them), to withdraw all our money
from their banks and countries, to close their companies, to remove their trace from all
Muslim countries and to forbid them passage whether by land, sea or air, via planes,
ships or any other means of transportation’.38 [Emphasis added]
A 2002 article by former bin Laden aide Abu Upheid Al-Qurashi entitled ‘The Nightmares of
America’ evidenced similar thinking about Al Qaeda’s intent to target significant maritime
areas. Whilst lengthy, it is reproduced in full below to show Al Qaeda’s recognition of the
dependence of the US and other Western economies on unobstructed maritime navigation
around the world, particularly through key navigational chokepoints where contemporary
terrorist groups are understood to have support. It also indicates the strong ideological
commitment to, and global focus of, Al Qaeda’s willingness to wage jihad against the US and
its interests, as well as the highly asymmetric nature of contemporary maritime terrorism shown
in the USS Cole attack (through noting that $5,000 could damage a $1 billion destroyer):
‘It is known that America, even before it became a global power, always focused on
freedom of navigation to market its products via the oceans and it reaped large
economic benefits from that. And it increased in intensity America’s susceptibility to
the capitalism that built it and that made the biggest capitalists the true controllers of
politics in America. Consequently, they strongly protect their ability to spread their
commodities throughout the world without restrictions or conditions. After the brave
attacks against the Cole, the page of maritime jihad was opened anew, for this operation
was a major step in the works of the jihadis, and it showed that sacrifice and expense
not exceeding $5,000 destroyed a $1 billion destroyer. What’s worse for America is
that most of the important straits and trade routes are controlled by Muslim countries
(Bosporus, Dardanelles, Gibraltar, Suez, Malacca, Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab). Likewise,

Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim The Al-Qaeda Threat: An Analytical Guide to Al-Qaeda’s Tactics and Targets
(Intel Center: 2002), 134
38
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the long history that Muslims have in maritime warfare and stressing Crusader
commerce increases the possibility of returning to that form of jihad. This type of jihad
has been revived again in the southern Philippines and the Indonesian archipelago
where the Muslim nature of these countries made them among the highest targets for
the Americans. Perhaps this is also one of the reasons America defended its targeting
of Somalia, especially since no centralised country controls it and has a strategic
location over Bab al-Mandab and consequently controls the entrance to the Red Sea.
So if maritime jihad were resurrected another time in this country, it will be going after
global trade. Among these paradoxes that show the extent of the American fear from
this option, is the violence that happened to the members of the Algerian Salafist Group
for Call and Combat (GSPC) in most European countries for reporting to the Americans
that the group was thinking about undertaking maritime jihad against American ships
in the Strait of Gibraltar. This shows how severely disturbed the Americans are from
this possibility’.39

Additionally, since post-9/11 several studies by maritime security specialists have reported on
the maritime capabilities of various contemporary terrorist groups.40 As [7.3.1.3] explains, it
has been noted that after the loss of its territorial bases in Afghanistan and the death of bin
Laden, Al Qaeda continues to maintain maritime attack capabilities, with numerous references
to ‘Al Qaeda’s Navy’ providing an independent source of finances to the group. Several
Palestinian groups including the Palestinian Liberation Front, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad
and Hezbollah have been reported to maintain maritime attack capabilities.41 Even following
its military defeat in mid-2009, the LTTE has been widely noted as having maintained
extensive maritime attack capabilities (albeit localised to Sri Lanka and India), and as [2.4.2]
noted concerns about its future resurgence have been raised. It has also been claimed that
Islamic terrorist groups have learnt from the LTTE’s successful perpetration of maritime
attacks.42 The Abu Sayyaf Group, which has perpetrated several significant maritime attacks
(including the most deadly to date by bombing the Super Ferry 14 in 2004 – which as [5.3.1]

Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim The Al-Qaeda Threat: An Analytical Guide to Al-Qaeda’s Tactics and Targets
(Intel Center: 2002), 135
40
Including Lehr above n 27; Hans Tino Hansen ‘Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The Four Circles
Model for Maritime Security Threat Assessment’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds)
Lloyds MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2009); Murphy, above n 5
41
Akiva Lorenz The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel (International Institute for Counter Terrorism, 24
September 2007), 3
42
Joshua Sinai ‘Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism (March 2004) 3(1) The Quarterly Journal, 65
39
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notes killed 116), reportedly has well-practiced maritime attack capabilities.43 Whilst the
Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah has not perpetrated any maritime attacks to date, it is
reported to possess such capabilities, and the explosives for the devastating 2002 Bali
bombings were reportedly transported by vessels.44 The Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND) has been noted as maintaining significant maritime attack capabilities
- which as Appendix G and [6.3.1] notes have been utilised to carry out at least 23 attacks
against offshore platforms around the Niger Delta since 2006. MEND is generally considered
to be more of an insurgent, as opposed to terrorist group,45 which is evident in the operational
profile of its maritime attacks.46

Whilst maritime security specialists have reasoned that some forms of attacks might require
highly specialised expertise and resources, 47 and that other forms of attack might be perpetrated
without specialised expertise and resources,48 as Chapter 1 explained, this Study does not seek
to “rank” the comparative probabilities of particular types of maritime terrorism incidents
occurring in practice. Rather, it examines all of the ways in which maritime terrorism
incidents49 have occurred, and might conceivably occur in the future. [3.5], which formulates
the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix, explains that instead of talking about certain forms of
maritime attacks being “more probable” or “less probable”, it talks about them being
“conceivable” or “inconceivable”.

Zara-Raymond, above n 28, 18 - 20; Rommel Banlaoi ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf
Threat’ (Autumn 2005) 58(4) Naval War College Review, 65
44
Catherine Zara-Raymond Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment (Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies Working Paper No. 74, March 2005), 17 - 18
45
But for a contrary view, see Moshe Terdman ‘The Movement For The Emancipation Of The Niger Delta
(MEND): Al Qaeda’s Unlikely Ally In Nigeria’ (January 2007) 2(1) Islam In Africa Newsletter Cited in Schmid
et al, above n 36, 494
46
Analysis of the Global Terrorism Database indicates the predominant operational profile of the 67 attacks by
MEND recorded between 2006 and 2011 have been mostly “hit and run” attacks and kidnappings – as opposed
to mass casualty / suicide attacks. Whilst on 5 December 2006 MEND perpetrated a bombing of an oil pipeline
in Atlas Creek Island, Nigeria killing 200, its “next most deadly” attack resulted in 11 fatalities
47
For example, Sam Bateman ‘Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region’ (October 2006) 2(3)
Kokoda Foundation Security Challenges 77 at 85 – 86 opines that actions such as the sinking of large ships to
block the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the deliberate detonation of ships with hazardous or dangerous cargoes
as “floating bombs”, and underwater swimmer attacks on ships or port facilities would require highly specialised
skills and resources – and rates such actions as ‘less credible maritime terrorism scenarios’
48
For example, Sam Bateman ‘Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region’ (October 2006) 2(3)
Kokoda Foundation Security Challenges, 86 – 87 opines that actions such as bomb attacks on cruise liners or
passenger ferries, the blocking of navigational “choke points” by sea mines, and suicide attacks by small craft
could be perpetrated without specialised skills and resources – and rates such actions as ‘more credible maritime
terrorism scenarios’
49
As [1.2] explained, this Study uses the “umbrella” term ‘maritime terrorism incident’ to encompass both
maritime terrorist attacks, and the utilisation of vessels to enable the perpetration of subsequent terrorist attacks
through transporting weaponry, operatives or financing terrorist activities
43
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The next section examines the various ways in which maritime security specialists have
postulated that contemporary maritime terrorism incidents might conceivably occur. It shows
that whilst the range of postulated scenarios are insightful, there is considerable overlap and
variation, highlighting the need for a more generalised and structured framework for recording
and analysing maritime terrorism statistics.

[3.4]

HOW COULD POST-9/11 MARITIME TERRORISM INCIDENTS OCCUR?

In the field of counter-terrorism studies, the analysis of attempted and planned terrorist attacks
has been deemed to be an important factor in understanding the profiles of terrorist groups, and
in pre-empting future attacks. For instance, the first of the seven ‘Sinai Attack Indicators’
which may provide indicia of future terrorist attacks has been noted to be ‘ ... previous terrorist
attacks, failed attacks or plots not yet executed, which serve as blueprints for intentions and
future targeting’.50 Indeed, one of the seven major shortcomings of US intelligence noted by
the 9/11 Commission Report was the lack of imagination in interpreting information that fell
“outside the box”.51 Given the demonstrated propensity of contemporary terrorist groups to
perpetrate innovative significant casualty attacks such as those noted in [2.5] and [3.3] above,
to consider how future contemporary maritime terrorism incidents might conceivably occur
(and thereby assess the prospects of the international agreements enabling the prevention of
such incidents), it is important to think broadly and imaginatively. Because terrorism is an
inherently “low occurrence / high impact” phenomena, considering only the precedents of
previous successful terrorist attacks will not achieve this full appreciation of all conceivable
maritime terrorism threats. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated how a far-fetched scenario became
a devastating reality.

In addition to the 228 successful maritime terrorist attacks referred to in [3.3] (the details of
which are summarised in Appendix G, and discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7), there have been
numerous reports of maritime attacks having been attempted or planned by terrorist groups.

Joseph Sinai ‘Teaming Catastrophic Terrorism by Al Qaeda Jihadists’ (Winter 2005) 11(4) Journal of
Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International Cited in Paul Wilkinson Terrorism versus Democracy:
The Liberal State Response Second Edition (Routledge, 2006), 188. The other ‘Sinai Attack Indicators’ are a
terrorist group’s modus operandi, especially tactics; use of particular types of weaponry and devices that a terrorist
group perceives will achieve its objectives; the objectives of a state sponsor; the geographic factor; historical dates
of particular significance to terrorist groups; and triggers that propel a group to launch attacks in a revenge mode
as quickly as possible
51
Schmid et al, above n 36, 29
50
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Vessels have also been utilised by terrorist groups to enable subsequent attacks on land through
transporting weaponry and operatives, and as a means of fundraising. Furthermore since 9/11,
several maritime security specialists have examined the vulnerabilities of specific countries
and/or regions,52 or maritime industry sectors,53 to maritime terrorist threats. In doing so, they
have postulated54 a range of scenarios on how terrorists might seek to target and/or utilise
vessels. As the following review shows, whilst these scenarios provide excellent insights into
how maritime terrorism incidents might occur, there is considerable variation and overlap
between these scenarios, with several scenarios being specifically confined towards certain
geographical areas and/or maritime industry sectors, rather than being generalised and capable
of global application.

In 2004, section 8.9 of the Part B of the ISPS Code, which provides guidance on steps that
should be considered when implementing and complying with the mandatory requirements of
Part A of the Code,55 listed eight ‘possible security incidents’ which it recommended that Ship
Security Assessments should consider.56 Also in 2004, Richardson undertook a comprehensive
study of the vulnerabilities of the containerised shipping sector to terrorist targeting and
utilisation, and postulated that ‘vessels of all sizes, and also the cargo containers they carry,
can be used in a number of ways by terrorists to further their aims’.57 He also discussed various
ways in which ships with volatile cargoes might be detonated to cause disruption to shipping.
58

In a 2005 analysis of Australia's preparedness to counter maritime threats from Al Qaeda-

linked terrorist groups, Bateman and Bergin postulated ‘eleven credible scenarios for a

52

For example, the Asia-Pacific region, the United States or Australia
For example, major sea ports, the cruise industry, or containerised shipping
54
The term ‘postulated’ is widely used within the literature on post-9/11 maritime terrorism – for instance
Greenberg et al, above n 10, 27 noted that ‘at least seven [maritime terrorism] scenarios are routinely postulated’
55
[4.2] provides an overview of the ISPS Code
56
These ‘possible security incidents’ included ‘damage to, or destruction of, the ship or a port facility – through
explosive devices, arson, sabotage or vandalism; hijacking or seizure of the ship or persons on board; tampering
with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship’s stores; unauthorised access [to] or use [of] [the vessel],
including the presence of stowaways; smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction;
use of the ship to carry those intending to cause a security incident and/or their equipment; use of the ship itself
as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction; attacks from seaward whilst at berth or at anchor; and
attacks [on the ship] whilst at sea’.
57
According to Richardson, these ways included ‘the raising of money, through legal or illegal trade, to finance
their activities; to covertly transport operatives, equipment and weapons to support terrorist operations; to deliver
bombs or other means of destruction to their destination, such as a container set to explode near a port city or
other target; and to use vessels as weapons in their own right’: Richardson, above n 5, 8
58
Richardson postulated that ‘Oil and chemical tankers could be sunk or set ablaze in a busy strait, waterway or
port to cause pollution and disrupt shipping. Ammonium nitrate carriers or petroleum tankers could be rigged as
floating bombs. Ammonium nitrate is a common agricultural fertiliser. It is widely traded around the world by
sea. But it can, when mixed with fuel oil, be turned into a powerful explosive. Packed into trucks, vans and cars,
it has been used in many terrorist bombings’: Richardson, above n 5, 8
53
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maritime terrorist attack either within Australian waters or against Australian targets. 59 The
2005 US National Security Strategy for Maritime Security noted several maritime ‘attack
capabilities’ that terrorists might develop,60 and also discussed how terrorists might ‘take
advantage of a vessel’s legitimate cargo’ to perpetrate attacks.61 In a briefing paper for the US
Congress, Fritelli discussed eight conceivable ‘maritime terrorism tactics’ which might be used
against the United States and its interests.62 In a 2006 study of the risk of maritime terrorism to
the containerized and passenger shipping sectors, Greenberg et al noted ‘at least seven maritime
terrorism scenarios’ as ‘having been routinely postulated’.63 Herbert-Burns summarized the
These eleven scenarios were ‘An attack on an Australian port, either by using a ship as a weapon or by causing
an explosion on board a ship carrying hazardous or dangerous cargo; the sinking of a vessel in a channel or in a
berth; an attack on the loading and storage facilities for hazardous and volatile materials; an attack on ships
transiting the Indonesian or Philippines archipelagos carrying trade to or from Australia; an attack on an LNG
carrier loading cargo at a northwestern Australian port; a small-boat suicide attack against a high-value target such
as a warship, cruise liner, ferry or oil tanker alongside in an Australian port, or moving within the port; an attack
against a cruise liner or passenger ferry, including a harbor ferry; an attack on a warship, especially a US Navy
vessel, alongside in an Australian port, or an [Royal Australian Naval] vessel in an overseas port; mining or the
threat of mining to close an entrance channel to an Australian port; smuggling of weapons or equipment, perhaps
including WMD, into an Australian port; and/or infiltration of terrorists and/or their materials into Australia by
sea, either by clandestine landing of the use of fraudulent seafarer documentation’: Sam Bateman and Anthony
Bergin Future Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime Security (Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, 2005), 35
60
These ‘attack capabilities’ included ‘using explosives-laden suicide boats and light aircraft; merchant and cruise
ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility or offshore platform; commercial vessels as
launch platforms for missile attacks; underwater swimmers to infiltrate ports, and/or unmanned underwater
explosive delivery vehicles; or the use of sea mines’: United States Government National Security Strategy for
Maritime Security (Department of Homeland Security, 2005), 4
61
The policy document also discussed how chemicals, petroleum or liquefied natural gas could be used as the
explosive component of a terrorist attack, and noted that vessels can also be used to transport powerful
conventional explosives or WMD for detonation in a port or alongside an offshore facility: United States
Government National Security Strategy for Maritime Security (Department of Homeland Security, 2005), 4
62
The ‘maritime terrorism tactics’ noted by Fritelli were ‘ … using commercial cargo containers to smuggle
terrorists, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, components thereof, or other dangerous materials into the
United States; seizing control of a large commercial cargo ship and use it as a collision weapon for destroying a
bridge or refinery located on the waterfront; sinking a large commercial cargo ship in a major shipping channel,
thereby blocking all traffic to and from the port; attacking a large ship carrying a volatile fuel (such as liquefied
natural gas) and detonate the fuel so as to cause a massive in-port explosion; attacking an oil tanker in a port or at
an offshore discharge facility so as to disrupt the world oil trade and cause large-scale environmental damage;
seizing control of a ferry (which may carry hundreds of passengers) or a cruise ship (which can carry more than
3,000 passengers, of who usually about 90 per cent are US citizens) and threaten the deaths of the passengers if a
demand is not met; attacking US Navy ships in an attempt to kill US military personnel, damage or destroy a
valuable US military asset, and (in the case of nuclear-powered ships) cause a radiological release; and/or using
land around a port to stage attacks on bridges, refineries located on the waterfront, or other port facilities’: John
Fritelli Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 27
May 2005), 7
63
These ‘eleven maritime terrorism scenarios’ included ‘the use of a commercial container ship to smuggle
chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) materials for an unconventional attack carried out on land or at a major
commercial port such as Rotterdam, Hong Kong, Dubai, New York or Los Angeles; use of a “Trojan Horse”, such
as a fishing trawler, resupply ship, tug or similarly innocuous-looking vessel, to transport weapons and other
battle-related material; hijacking of a vessel as a fund-raising exercise to support a campaign of political violence
directed toward ethnic, ideological, religious or separatist designs; scuttling of a ship in a narrow SLOC in order
to block or disrupt maritime traffic; hijacking of an LNG carrier that is then detonated as a bomb or used as a
collision weapon; use of a small, high-speed boat to attack an oil tanker or offshore energy platform to affect
international petroleum prices or cause major pollution; and directly targeting a cruise liner or passenger ferry to
59
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three ways in which terrorists might utilize the maritime domain as ‘within which, through
which, and from which’ to perpetrate attacks.64 In addition to discussing the maritime attack
capabilities of several terrorist groups, Sinai discussed how terrorists might utilize vessels to
transport weaponry, and smuggle illegal substances such as narcotics as fundraising
measures.65 Nincic postulated five generalised ways in which ships might be targeted or utilized
by terrorists,66 and along similar lines, Murphy postulated four ‘broad categories for terrorism
at sea’.67 In a study of maritime terrorism risks in Southeast Asia, Zara-Raymond discussed
nine ‘vulnerability factors’,68 and in a later study, she postulated four maritime terrorism
scenarios that might conceivably occur in the waters of Southeast Asia.69 Most recently,
Schmid et al discussed the various ways in terrorists might seek to perpetrate attacks within
maritime areas, and also to utilise vessels to enable subsequent attacks through deriving funds
from the use of vessels.70

cause mass casualties by contaminating the ship’s food supply, detonating an on-board or submersible improvised
explosive device or, again, by ramming the vessel with a fast-approach, small, attack craft’: Greenberg et al, above
n 10, 27
64
Rupert Herbert-Burns ‘Terrorism in the Early 21st Century Maritime Domain’ in Catherine Zara Raymond and
Joshua Ho (eds) The Best of Times, The Worst of Times (Word Scientific, 2005), 156
65
Sinai, above n 42, 53 - 57
66
These included including ‘ … ships of concern: terrorist shipping “fleets”; the ship as an agent of proliferation;
the ship as a WMD; the ship as a delivery system: a radiological device in a shipping container; and risks to
dangerous maritime cargo vessels: hijacking and suicide bombing’: Donna Nincic ‘The Challenge of Maritime
Terrorism: Threat Identification, WMD and Regime Response’ (August 2005) 28(4) The Journal of Strategic
Studies, 625
67
The ‘four broad categories’ conceptualized by Murphy were ‘ … ships as iconic targets; ships as economic
targets; ships as mass-casualty targets, and ships as weapons’: Murphy, above n 5, 199
68
These ‘vulnerability factors’ were ‘sea lines of communication; ports; vessel inspection rates; containerized
shipping; information and documentation; people; vessels in transit; bulk shipments; and flags of convenience:
Catherine Zara-Raymond Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment (Singapore: Institute of
Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005)
69
These four scenarios were ‘ … ships sunk to block the Straits of Malacca; tankers being utilised as floating
bombs to strike ports; the Malacca straits blocked by mines; and missiles launched at aircraft from vessels’:
Catherine Zara-Raymond ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios’ (2006) 4(7) Terrorism
Monitor
70
Schmid et al reasoned that maritime terrorism could encompass ‘attacks against off- and onshore vessels and
facilities, including ships and ports, or involving ships (eg LNG tankers) for the purpose of intimidation, coercion,
blackmail, ransom or propaganda. This special variant of terrorism could be defined as: (1) a plotted or executed
attack against a ship, port facility or offshore facility; or (2) an attempt to further political motives by utilising
elements in the maritime environment to execute an act of terrorism. This definition highlights the fact that some
elements of the maritime environment (ie ships) could be both targets of maritime terrorism and instruments of
maritime terrorism – just imagine an oil tanker scuttled in a narrow strait or blown up in a major port. Again, this
definition should not be seen as excluding somewhat more pedestrian acts committed with the intent to finance a
wider terrorist or guerrilla struggle. Such acts, like kidnapping sailors and their ships for ransom, occur quite
frequently in the Strait of Malacca and off the coast of Somalia, thus establishing a “grey area” where piracy
committed for private ends overlaps with piracy committed for political reasons by maritime terrorist groups’:
Schmid et al, above n 36, 659
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This variation amongst the above scenarios raises important questions such as ‘Which
postulated scenario(s) should be used as the “baseline benchmark” to conceptualise all the
conceivable ways in which maritime terrorism incidents might occur, and form the basis for
analysing statistics about occurrences, attempts and plans of maritime terrorism incidents?’
And importantly for this Study ‘What information source(s) should States, maritime industries
and scholars look to in order to establish whether their laws and/or security plans address all
conceivable threats’?.71

The following section overcomes this uncertainty by developing the Maritime Terrorism Threat
Matrix. The Threat Matrix provides a structured framework for statistically analysing all
conceivable forms of maritime terrorism that is capable of global application. Chapters 5, 6
and 7 show how the Threat Matrix “captures” all of the maritime scenarios noted above.

[3.5]

[3.5.1]

THE MARITIME TERRORISM THREAT MATRIX

Development of the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix

As at 1 October 2013 only two studies have postulated “generic summaries” of how terrorists
might target and/or utilize vessels that are capable of global application. A 2003 study by the
OECD72 identified four ‘terrorist risk factors from shipping’ as depicted in Figure 4 below.

71

As Chapter 4 explains, Part B of the ISPS Code states that Ship Security Plans and Port Facility Security Plans
should address ‘all possible threats’
72
Crist, above n 10, 7
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Figure 4:

‘Terrorist Risk Factors from Shipping’

Source: Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact (OECD Maritime
Transport Committee, 2003), 7
Whilst the four ‘risk factors’ noted in the 2003 OECD study are useful in providing a starting
point for conceptualising how terrorists might attack and/or utilise vessels, the ideas expressed
in a 2003 article by Campbell and Gunaratna73 provide the foundations for developing a
structured framework that can enable the statistical analysis of all forms of maritime terrorism
incidents. Drawing analogies to the 9/11 attacks, where commercial airliners were hijacked and
transformed into flying weapons, Campbell and Gunaratna postulated “five methods” in which
vessels might conceivably be utilised by terrorists. These were ‘the vessel as a means’; ‘the

Tanner Campbell and Rohan Gunaratna ‘Maritime Terrorism, Piracy and Crime’ in Rohan Gunaratna (ed)
Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response (Eastern University Press, 2003), 80
73
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vessel as a weapon’; ‘the vessel as a bomb’; ‘the vessel as a disruption tool’; and ‘the vessel as
a target’. Noting that these “five methods” might be used in combination, Campbell and
Gunaratna provided a brief amplification how the “five methods” enunciated might occur in
practice.
First, regarding the ‘vessel as a means’, they explained that ‘ … terrorist groups actively use
front shipping companies, flags of convenience, frequent vessel name changes, and other
commonly used tactics within the maritime industry to smuggle members, weapons and
supplies as well as to smuggle humans, narcotics and other contraband’.74 Second, regarding
the ‘vessel as a weapon’, they explained ‘ … a large vessel, possibly laden full of fuel or other
highly explosive materials, could be commandeered or hijacked and rammed into another
vessel or other port infrastructure. The IMO has warned that terrorists “could use hijacked oil
tankers or liquefied natural gas carriers”. Collisions involving such massive vessels have the
potential to cause significant destruction as has been documented in the many instances in
which the collision was accidental. An additional factor to consider is that these vessels, due to
their enormous size and weight, are very hard to stop; turning and stopping distances are
measured in miles’.75 Third, regarding the ‘vessel as a bomb’, they explained that ‘… vessels
could also be used to smuggle or transport a bomb or WMD which could be detonated in port.
The bomb could be “built” into the ship via modifications to the vessel or other components to
house an explosive device; it could be smuggled on board by the crew; or it could be hidden
within a container. Terrorists might also look to leverage the explosive characteristics of the
cargo as well as by detonating a shipload full of fertilizers (ammonium nitrate), for example.
Furthermore, they explained that ‘ … as passengers and crew, terrorists can clandestinely or
deceptively gain access to ships and plant explosive devices’.76 Fourth, regarding the ‘vessel
as a disruption tool’, they explained ‘ … recent union protests and lockouts in the west coast
of the United States cost the US economy approximately US$1 billion per day. Terrorist
groups, intent on causing significant economic damage, have surely taken notice of the
situation. As such, the possibility that such disruptive tactics may also be deployed by terrorist
groups is great … Sinking vessels in key trade bottlenecks, port channels and key military
installations creates significant economic and military disruption, as well as over-stressing the
surrounding infrastructure like roads and rail, which are not equipped to shoulder such a major
74

Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 73, 81
Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 73, 82
76
Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 73, 82
75
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logistical burden’.77 Fifth, regarding the ‘vessel as a target’, they explained that ‘ … historically
maritime terrorist operations have been conducted in a manner that targets the vessel as the
ultimate asset to be destroyed’.78
As at 1 October 2013, Campbell and Gunaratna’s ‘five methods’ has not been expanded upon
further. Shie made brief mention of Campbell and Gunaratna’s five methods” approach, but
did not develop these ideas further.79 Nevertheless, Campbell and Gunaratna’s ‘five methods’
concept can be further elaborated through developing more specific “sub-categories” of
specific ways in which terrorists might target and/or utilise vessels.
First, the ‘vessel as a means’ can be used as an “umbrella term” to encompass terrorists utilising
vessels as a means of enabling subsequent attacks on land, through transporting WMD materiel,
conventional weaponry or operatives to land locations, and for raising funds – both from illegal
and “apparently legitimate” maritime trade and commerce. Second, the ‘vessel as a weapon’
can be used as an “umbrella term” to encompass terrorists using vessels to attack various targets
either through the vessel’s kinetic impact (that is, “ramming” the vessel into the target), or as
platforms from which to fire weapons against targets – which could include other vessels, land
targets such as port facilities, offshore platforms, or aircraft. Third, the ‘vessel as a bomb’ can
be used as an “umbrella term” to encompass terrorists deliberately exploding vessels in
proximity to a targets – which might include other vessels, land targets such as port facilities,
or offshore platforms. The term could also encompass terrorists causing explosions onboard
offshore platforms. Fourth, the ‘vessel as a disruption tool’ can be used as an “umbrella term”
to encompass terrorists utilising vessels to perpetrate disruptive acts – including through
disabling vessels in proximity to critical navigational “choke-points”, causing deliberate
pollution, laying seas mines and interfering with submarine cables or pipelines. Fifth, the
‘vessel as a target’ can be used as an “umbrella term” to encompass terrorist attacks on high
profile target vessels from various sources – including from other vessels (for example, being
physically “rammed”, or fired upon by other vessels), from beneath the surface (by sea mines
or divers), from within the vessel itself (through placing explosives on the vessel or otherwise
harming persons on board), from the air (through ramming aircraft in in a “kamikaze-style”
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Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 73, 83
Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 73, 83
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Tamara Shie ‘Ports in a Storm?: The Nexus Between Counterterrorism, Counter-proliferation and Maritime
Security in Southeast Asia’ 4(4) Issues & Insights (Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 2004), 3
78

94

into the vessel, or launching weapons or bombs against the vessel), and from the land (for
example, launching weapons against the vessel from land sources).
Drawing together all of these sub-categories, it possible is to develop the “Maritime Terrorism
Threat Matrix” shown in Table 10 below which provides a generic and structured framework
for analysing statistics about all previous maritime terrorism incidents. The 21 forms of
maritime terrorism incidents noted above may be termed ‘incident categories’, and their
previous occurrences may be categorised under four headings. Firstly, “successful” – meaning
that the particular incident category has actually occurred and has achieved its intended
objectives (for example USS Cole attack in 2000);80 secondly, “attempted” – meaning that the
particular threat category has been attempted by terrorists, but has failed to eventuate or achieve
its objectives; or has been thwarted by authorities (for example the attempted but failed attack
on USS Sullivans in 1999); thirdly, “planned” – meaning that credible intelligence has been
received that the particular threat category has been planned by terrorists – for example through
confessions of captured terrorists; or through analysis of captured terrorist documents; and
fourth, “postulated” – meaning that the particular threat category has been postulated by
maritime security specialists.

80

As [2.2.4] noted, The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global
Terrorism Database http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (GTD) from which many of the statistics utilised in this Study
have been derived defines a terrorist attack as being “successful” according to the tangible effects of the attack.
For example, in a typical successful bombing, the bomb detonates and destroys property and/or kills individuals,
whereas an unsuccessful bombing is one in which the bomb is discovered and defused or detonates early and kills
the perpetrators. Success is not judged in terms of the larger goals of the perpetrators. For example, a bomb that
exploded in a building would be counted as a success even if it did not, for example, succeed in bringing the
building down or inducing government repression.
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Table 10: Enumerated Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix

INCIDENT CATEGORY
(1) VESSEL AS A TARGET
(a) From other vessels
(b) From sub-surface
(c) From within the vessel
(d) From the land
(e) From the air
(2) VESSEL AS A WEAPON
(a) Against other vessels
(b) Against land targets
(c) Against offshore platforms
(d) Platform for attacking aircraft
(3) VESSEL AS A BOMB
(a) Against other vessels
(b) Against land targets
(c) Against offshore platforms
(d) Exploding offshore platforms
(4) VESSEL AS A DISRUPTION
TOOL
(a) Against a critical “chokepoint”
(b) Against marine environment
(c) To lay sea mines
(d) To disrupt submarine cables
(5) VESSEL AS A MEANS
(a) Transporting WMD materiel
(b) Transporting conventional
weaponry
(c) Transporting terrorist persons
(d) Terrorist financing

SUCCESSFUL

ATTEMPTED

PLANNED

POSTULATED

67
27
21
26
0

3
1
1
2
0

8
2
1
0
1

7
7
2
0
0

0
1
25
0

0
1
0
0

0
2
0
0

4
2
1
1

0
1
2
0

6
1
0
0

2
1
1
0

1
3
0
0

1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

6
5
3
2

1

6

Many

6

8

7

0

0

7
2

11
1

1
0

2
4
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As Campbell and Gunaratna acknowledged, it is possible that maritime terrorism incidents
could be perpetrated using a combination of the metrics described above. Therefore, for
statistical purposes, this Study distinguishes between the ‘vessel as a weapon’, the ‘vessel as a
bomb’ and the ‘vessel as a target’ according to the notability of the vessels involved. For
example whilst the USS Cole and MV Limburg attacks both involved two vessels – the
explosives-laden dinghies as floating bombs that attacked the Cole and Limburg, and secondly
the Cole and MV Limburg as targets - it was the fact that prominent ships such as Cole and
Limburg were the targets of the attacks that made these two incidents notable. To explain this
further, media reports of these incidents were titled “17 sailors killed - USS Cole targeted by
explosives-laden dinghy” – not “Two Yemenis killed when dinghy exploded next to US
warship”. Therefore, for statistical purposes - the Cole and Limburg attacks are counted as
‘vessel as a target’ maritime terrorist incidents.
All references to ‘suspected terrorist vessels’ in the following chapters refer to vessels that are
suspected of being about to perpetrate one or more of the maritime terrorism incidents
envisaged by the Threat Matrix

[3.5.2]

Use of the Threat Matrix for analysing the practical application of the

international agreements in Chapters 5, 6 and 7

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine how the international agreements might apply in practice in
preventing maritime terrorism incidents. These chapters examine how different forms of
maritime terrorism incidents have previously occurred, been attempted or planned, and
postulated by maritime security specialists in order to establish the “threat context” (that is, the
types of maritime terrorism threats that might have to be prevented), noting trends in the
geographical and jurisdictional locations of these maritime terrorism incidents and the types of
vessels involved.

Several points regarding the methodology used to derive and present these previous maritime
terrorism case studies warrant explanation. First, as noted in [1.6] many of the sources referred
to in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 regarding previous maritime terrorism incidents81 include media

The term ‘maritime terrorism incident’ here is used in the widest sense to encompass both maritime terrorist
attacks, and also utilisations of vessels as a means
81
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reports, which often describe the location and details of previous vessel interdictions in
generalised terms (for example ‘in international waters’, or ‘off the coast of xxx’). Other
sources used to derive these statistics include terrorism databases such as the Global Terrorism
Database and RAND Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents which [2.4.1] overviewed –
which in many cases only provide basic details of maritime terrorist attacks. As [5.2] notes, in
several cases the source of previous terrorist attacks on vessels (that is, from another vessel,
the land, beneath the waterline, within the vessel or from the air) were not stated, and whilst
the best efforts have been made to ascertain more precise details about such incidents, this has
not been possible in all cases – meaning that 56 previous maritime terrorist attacks (25 per cent)
are recorded in Appendix G as ‘Vessel as a Target: Unknown’.

Second, whilst Appendix G summarises the details of all recorded successful maritime terrorist
attacks since 1968, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focus on analysing trends in the particular maritime
terrorism incidents82 - through considering all the ways they have previously been successfully
perpetrated, attempted, planned and postulated by maritime security specialists. These analyses
of maritime terrorism trends also show the increased lethality of attacks by contemporary
terrorist groups compared to those of pre-contemporary terrorist groups that [2.5] and [3.4]
articulated.

Third, as explained in [1.5], this Study does not seek to rank the probability of certain maritime
terrorism incidents occurring; rather it talks of certain terrorist acts as being “conceivable” or
“inconceivable”. As Chapter 5 explains, (outside of Hollywood movies) an example of an
“inconceivable” maritime terrorism threat would be terrorists hijacking and utilising naval
submarines to attack vessels, which are extremely well secured and would require very
specialised skills to operate. However this Study still discusses some maritime terrorism
scenarios that have been postulated as conceivable but which might sound far-fetched. An
example discussed in Chapter 5 is the “9/11-style” targeting of vessels by ramming them with
hijacked aircraft.

Fourth, as [2.2.4] noted, due to the low frequency of maritime terrorist attacks, and in order to
“capture” the maximum number of examples of previous maritime terrorism incidents, Chapter

For example, Chapter 5’s examination of terrorist targeting of vessels is necessarily selective, as this form of
maritime terrorism has accounted for around 85 per cent of the 228 recorded maritime terrorist attacks
82
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6 includes examples of maritime attacks by groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation
of the Niger Delta (MEND) which are generally more characterised as insurgent than terrorist,
in order to illustrate how maritime attacks could conceivably be perpetrated.

Finally as Chapter 1 noted, maritime terrorism incidents are very infrequent, and government
authorities might well keep information about attempted and planned terrorism incidents, and
ISPS Code security plans, classified for national security reasons. These considerations mean
that this Study’s analysis of the likely success of the international agreements can only be
evaluated according to the “most informed hypothetical”, which asks: ‘Through taking account
of how maritime terrorism incidents have previously occurred, and might occur in future, what
factors could determine the success of the international agreements in enabling the prevention
of maritime terrorism incidents?”

The following section [3.6] draws together the conclusions from this chapter and Chapter 2,
and articulates criteria used within the following chapters in assessing the prospects for the
international agreements to succeed in enabling the prevention of contemporary post-9/11
maritime terrorism incidents.

[3.6]

CRITERIA

FOR

ASSESSING

THE

PROSPECTS

FOR

THE

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO PREVENT MARITIME TERRORISM
INCIDENTS

At this point it is fitting to summarise the points articulated thus far in this Chapter. [3.2]
explained the vulnerabilities of the maritime domain to terrorist attacks and utilisations; [3.3]
outlined how contemporary forms of maritime terrorism have reflected the global trend towards
significant casualty and suicide attacks; and from its analysis of maritime terrorism scenarios
postulated by maritime security specialists since 9/11, [3.5] formulated the Maritime Terrorism
Threat Matrix to conceptualise all the ways in which maritime terrorism incidents might occur.
With these points in mind, it is important to consider: “What criteria should be used in
assessing the prospects for the international agreements to succeed in enabling the prevention
of contemporary post-9/11 maritime terrorism incidents?”
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[3.6.1]

Factors that should characterise international efforts to counter

contemporary forms of maritime terrorism

Numerous post-9/11 terrorism studies have proffered recommendations on the question of how
contemporary forms of terrorism ought to be countered.83 While most of these studies have
adopted a globalised and terrestrial (as opposed to specifically maritime) focus, 84 several
relevant points may nevertheless be distilled from such studies. First, Schmid et al summarised
the responses to a survey of terrorism experts on the question: ‘What are, in your view, the
most effective countermeasures against international terrorism?’ as including (of relevance to
this Study) as effective intelligence (47 per cent); effective inter-agency and international
information sharing and cooperative action (44 per cent); cutting off many of the sources of
funding for terrorists (24 per cent); educating the public about what to do if an attack is
suspected, and after an attack (10 per cent); and improved border, airport and maritime security
(8 per cent).85
After reviewing similar studies on counter-terrorism, Schmid et al formulated ‘Twelve Rules
for Preventing and Combating Terrorism’. Of these twelve rules, the ones most directly
relevant to countering maritime terrorism included (4) deny[ing] terrorists access to arms,
explosives, false identification documents, safe communication, and safe travel and
sanctuaries; disrupt and incapacitate their preparations and operations through infiltration,
communications intercepts and espionage, and by limiting their criminal and other fund-raising
capabilities; (5) reduc[ing] low-risk/high-gain opportunities for terrorists to strike by enhancing
communications security, energy security and transportation security, by hardening critical
infrastructure and potential sites where mass casualties could occur, and by applying the
principles of situational crime prevention to the countering of terrorism; (7) prepar[ing] for

83

Schmid et al, above n 36, 255 - 265 summarises the theories on counter-terrorism. The approaches identified
include ‘preventive counter-terrorism’ (establishing obstacles between terrorists and their objectives including
defensive measures, law enforcement capabilities, and legal reforms); ‘detection-oriented measures’; ‘managerial
measures’ (such as crisis management); and ‘response-oriented measures’ (involving retaliatory measures). These
theories are arguably less directly relevant to addressing the research problem of this Study – given their terrestrial
focus
84
And as a result have emphasised the importance of constructively engaging with potential recruits for terrorist
organisations and finding long-term solutions to international conflicts
85
The other countermeasures which are not of direct relevance to this Study voted as most effective were: A
prudent foreign policy (16 per cent); international consensus over the definition and scope of terrorism (13 per
cent); limiting the spread of terrorist ideology through propaganda and the internet (11 per cent); providing
counter-terrorism assistance to countries lacking expertise (10 per cent); military cooperation (9 per cent): Schmid
et al, above n 36, 29
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crisis and consequence management for both “regular” and “catastrophic” acts of terrorism in
coordinated simulation exercises and educate first responders and the public on how best to
cope; (8) establish[ing] an all-sources early detection and early warning intelligence system
against terrorism and other violent crimes on the interface between organised crime and
political conflict; and (9) strengthen[ing] coordination of efforts against terrorism both within
and between states; enhance international police and intelligence cooperation, and offer
technical assistance to those countries that lack the know-how and means to upgrade their
counter-terrorism instruments.86

Second, in his analysis of the factors that should characterise international efforts to counter
post-9/11 maritime terrorism threats, Herbert-Burns emphasised the importance of three ‘interlocking elements’. These included intelligence about the navigational activities of vessels, what
is carried inside them and who is in control of them; holistic risk management across the whole
gamut of sectors such as ports and supply chains that interface with the activities of vessels;
and transnational and international co-operation between both government and commercial
sectors.87

Along similar lines to Schmid et al and Herbert-Burns, Gunaratna emphasised the need for the
flexible application of a broad range of possible responses by States when arguing that ‘ ...
target hardening and other forms of protection will not permanently reduce the threat of a
terrorist attack. To manage the ever-changing post 9/11 threat, governments need to develop a
full range of responses requiring a multitude of actors…’.88 Gunaratna’s reference to the
importance of developing ‘a full range of responses’ is one of the reasons this Study examines

86

The other rules less directly applicable to the maritime domain included: (1) try[ing] to address the underlying
conflict issues exploited by the terrorists and work towards a peaceful solution while not making substantive
concessions to the terrorists themselves; (2) prevent[ing] alienated individuals and radical groups from becoming
terrorist extremists by confronting them with a mix of “carrot” and “stick” tactics and searching for effective
counter-motivation measures; (3) stimulat[ing] and encourage[ing] defection and conversion of free and
imprisoned terrorists and find ways to reduce the tacit or open support of aggrieved constituencies for terrorist
organisations; (6) keep[ing] in mind that terrorists seek publicity and exploit the media and the internet to gain
recognition, propagate their cause, glorify their attacks, win recruits, solicit donations, gather intelligence,
disseminate terrorist know-how and communicate with their target audiences.; (10) show[ing] solidarity with, and
offer support to, victims of terrorism at home and abroad; (11) maintain[ing] the moral high ground in the struggle
with terrorists by defending and strengthening the rule of law, good governance, democracy and social justice and
by matching [one’s] deeds with [one’s] words; and (12) counter[ing] the ideologies, indoctrination and
propaganda of secular and non-secular terrorists and try to get the upper hand in the war of ideas – the battle for
hearts and minds of those the terrorists claim to speak and fight for: Schmid et al (2011), 38
87
Herbert-Burns, above n 64, 173 - 175
88
Rohan Gunaratna ‘Introduction: Change or Continuity’ in Rohan Gunaratna (ed) The Changing Face of
Terrorism (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 3
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both UNCLOS and the SUA treaties (which enable States to enforce laws at sea), and Article
51 of the UN Charter and the doctrine of Necessity (which might enable interdictions to be
undertaken in exceptional circumstances). Similar and more directly relevant points were made
in a critique of vessel interdiction powers under UNCLOS and the 1988 SUA Convention in
2003 by Jesus (who served as President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
from 2008 to 2011).89 Whilst this article pre-dated the finalisation of the 2005 SUA Convention
which is examined in Chapters 6 and 7, Jesus argued the importance of States having the
capacity to interdict suspected terrorist vessels before potentially deadly and disruptive terrorist
attacks occur – rather than taking what he termed ‘ex-post-facto’ measures after such attacks
occur. Whilst lengthy, his arguments below are directly relevant to this section’s articulation
of criteria against which the success of the international agreements in enabling the prevention
of contemporary post-9/11 maritime terrorism incidents ought to be assessed:
‘One cannot protect lives unless states are allowed to intervene before human tragedy
happens. That is when it makes sense to recognise to any state the right to board, search,
seize and arrest ships and offenders in the context of maritime terrorism in all maritime
space with the exception of internal, maritime and inland waters. This is more so in the
case of suicidal terrorist attacks for which the current [ie, 1988] SUA Convention’s
strategy of prosecuting or extraditing offenders is totally inoperative and inefficient.

This [1988 SUA] Convention, as is well known, was adopted in the aftermath of the
1985 Achille Lauro incident in response to terrorist attacks against shipping. It
approaches this matter, therefore, from the point of view of punishment of offenders,
an ex post facto repression measure that only makes sense if the perpetrator survives
the attack. This approach does not totally respond to contemporary needs to the extent
that it does not contemplate a special breed of terrorist acts, potentially the most
dangerous ones, against ships or from ships that may be carried out by persons who
themselves are supposed to die in the attack, as witnessed recently in the 11 September
2001 New York City attack’.90

Jose Luis Jesus ‘Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects’ (2003) 18(3)
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 393
90
Jesus, above n 89, 395 - 396
89
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Jesus’ remarks succinctly recognise the distinctions between the profiles of contemporary and
pre-contemporary terrorism (that is away from restrained hostage-takings and towards
significant casualty and suicide attacks) that were articulated in Chapter 2, and demonstrated
in [3.3], and which Chapters 5, 6 and 7 further illustrate. He strongly argued the importance of
States being able to interdict suspected terrorist vessels before potentially devastating attacks
occur – rather than responding after such attacks:
‘The only to address this situation with respect to shipping, from the standpoint of legal
protection, is by taking a preventative approach, allowing any state party to assert police
jurisdiction,91 including in territorial waters, to board, inspect, seize the ship and
equipment and arrest persons on board. In other words, in order to effectively prevent
acts of sea terrorism from happening and address in legal terms this kamikaze-style
terrorist attack against ships and other targets, states should be able to enjoy not only a
judicial jurisdiction over offenders by claiming after fait accompli, that they be
prosecuted or by prosecuting them themselves, but also a police jurisdiction that will
allow them to prevent and stop terrorist ships from making terrorist attacks against other
ships or against other targets such as port or pipeline facilities, platform structures, or
that may be directed at blocking straits used for international navigation or causing
major environmental damage’.92
Whilst Jesus’ calls for ‘any state’ to be able to interdict suspected terrorist vessels might sound
like an unachievable ideal, his remarks nevertheless provide a useful benchmark against which
the success of the international agreements in enabling the prevention of contemporary post9/11 maritime terrorism incidents should be assessed.

[3.6.2]

The coverage and acceptance criteria for assessing the prospects for the

international agreements to prevent maritime terrorism incidents

Taking into account the points noted in [3.6.1] about the factors that should characterize
international efforts to counter maritime terrorism, this section explains how Chapters 4 to 8
utilise the combination of the criteria of ‘coverage’ and ‘acceptance’ to evaluate the prospects

91
92

That is, the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction
Jesus, above n 89, 395 - 396
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for the international agreements to succeed in enabling the prevention of maritime terrorism
incidents. The ‘coverage’ criterion considers: ‘To what extent do the relevant provisions of the
international agreement enable States prevent the maritime terrorism incident from
occurring?’; and the ‘acceptance’ criterion considers: ‘To what extent has the international
agreement become accepted internationally?’ The acceptance of international counterterrorism instruments has been noted by the 2004 UN High Level Panel Report to be critical to
international counter-terrorism efforts.93

Assessments of the international acceptance of the SOLAS Chapter XI security amendments
including the ISPS Code, the amendments to SOLAS Chapter V (AIS and LRIT) and the 2003
SID Convention (which collectively have a “preventative” focus) must consider the extents to
which these measures have become ingrained both amongst contracting governments, and at
operational levels within maritime industries. Through being a generalised, adaptable security
risk management framework that needs to be continually applied,94 the prospects for the ISPS
Code to succeed in preventing maritime terrorism incidents will be largely determined by the
rigour of its continual application by contracting governments, shipping companies, ships and
port facility operators, and that it will only be as strong as its weakest link. After analysing
IMO proceedings relating to the SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code since its entry into
force in July 2004, Chapter 4 explains why it is impossible to make an overall assessment of
the extent to which the ISPS Code has become ingrained internationally. Instead, Chapter 4
articulates “best case” and “worst case” scenarios of the factors likely to influence the prospects
for ISPS Code measures to prevent maritime terrorism incidents. 95 These “best case” and

93

The extent of acceptance of counter-terrorism agreements between States has been noted as a key determinant
of global counter-terrorism efforts. For example the 2004 UN High Level Report noted with concern that: ‘...
several United Nations anti-terrorist conventions have laid important normative foundations. However, far too
many States remain outside the conventions’ and at [204] noted: ‘the effectiveness of the global collective security
system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the
common perception of their legitimacy — their being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for the right reasons,
morally as well as legally’: United Nations A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the
Secretary-General High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change GA 59 th session, Agenda Item 55 UN
Doc A/59/565 (2 December 2004) at [149]
94
In other words such security measures need to be continually applied to lessen the scope for maritime terrorism
incidents to occur – whereas the provisions of UNCLOS, the SUA treaties (and Article 51 of the UN Charter) will
only “come into play” when the need to interdict suspected terrorist vessels arises
95
As [4.2.6] explains, these factors include the size and type of vessels involved in maritime terrorism incidents;
whether terrorists controlled the vessel involved in a maritime terrorism incident in the first instance; the rigour
of the continual application of the ISPS Code security measures by ships and entities interfacing with them
(including port facility operators and government authorities); whether a maritime terrorism incident involved an
entity subject to the ISPS Code such as a security-regulated port facility or offshore platform; the form of a
maritime terrorist attacks; and the effectiveness of government oversight and response capabilities
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“worst case” scenarios are then applied in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 – which consider how the ISPS
and other SOLAS maritime security measures might apply in practice.

Chapters 6 and 7 consider the coverage and acceptance of UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA treaties
in examining how well these instruments could enable States to prevent maritime terrorism
incidents through interdicting suspected terrorist vessels.96 Chapter 6 examines the interdiction
of vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate dangerous97 or disruptive acts98 in the
maritime domain; and Chapter 7 examines the interdiction of vessels suspected of being utilised
to enable subsequent terrorist attacks.99

In relation to UNCLOS, Chapters 6 and 7 show that whilst widely ratified and accepted by
States, the ambiguity of many of its provisions make assessments of the coverage of UNCLOS
less straightforward. These chapters show the scope for varying interpretations of UNCLOS –
with Chapter 7 articulating “restrictive” and “liberal” views of UNCLOS in relation to the
interdiction of suspected illicit shipments of WMD materiel. Whilst Chapter 7 reasons that the
more flexible liberal view of UNCLOS would better enable the prevention of maritime
terrorism incidents, it argues in favour of States formalising specific agreements to facilitate
vessel interdictions.
In relation to the 2005 SUA Convention, Chapters 6 and 7 show how the Convention’s
coverage is very clear and objective, through carefully defining offences and the procedures
for interdicting suspected terrorist vessels. However these chapters also explain that the current
low levels of its ratification (that is, its acceptance) mean that the 2005 SUA Convention would
most likely only be applicable in a limited range of circumstances.

Chapter 8 analyses the extent to which States might interdict suspected terrorist vessels in
exceptional circumstances (where it otherwise lacked a clear jurisdictional basis under

96

As [1.5.2] explained, this Study only examines the relevant provisions of these international agreements up to
the point of enabling States to interdict suspected terrorist vessels – and so it does not consider the various
domestic legal processes involved in subsequent legal proceedings against interdicted vessels, people or cargo.
As Chapter 9 explains, it is intended this Study to stimulate further studies to examine such issues
97
As Chapter 1 explained, this could involve using vessels as “weapons” (either as launching platforms or as
kinetic ramming weapons) or as “floating bombs” against other vessels, land targets and offshore platforms
98
As Chapter 1 explained, this could involve disabling vessels near critical navigational chokepoints, deliberate
pollution, facilitating the laying of sea mines, or interfering with submarine cables
99
Through transporting weaponry (conventional and WMD materiel) or terrorist operatives to a land location to
perpetrate attacks, or utilising vessels to finance terrorist activities
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UNCLOS or the SUA treaties) under Article 51 of the UN Charter, or the doctrine of Necessity.
Similarly to UNCLOS, it shows that the ambiguity of the term ‘armed attack’ creates scope for
“liberal” and “restrictive” views of Article 51 self-defence rights in the contemporary post9/11 maritime terrorism context. Whilst Chapter 8 reasons that the more flexible liberal view
of Article 51 would better enable the prevention of maritime terrorism incidents, similarly to
Chapter 7 it argues in favour of States formalising specific agreements to facilitate vessel
interdictions.

[3.7]

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how maritime attacks by contemporary terrorist groups have involved
significant casualty and suicide attacks, reflecting the global trend articulated in Chapter 2. It
reasoned that the disruptive consequences following from a significant maritime terrorism
incident could be very profound, and noted indications of significant attacks having been
contemplated by contemporary terrorist groups. This prognosis highlights the importance of
understanding all conceivable ways in which maritime terrorism incidents could occur, and
explained the value of scenario analysis. From the numerous insightful maritime terrorism
scenarios postulated since 9/11, it developed the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix to provide
a structured framework for both conceptualising all the conceivable ways in which maritime
incidents could occur, and for analysing statistics about how such incidents have previously
occurred, been attempted and planned, and have been postulated. It concluded by arguing the
importance of preventing maritime terrorism incidents from occurring in the first instance,
rather than responding after attacks have occurred. For assessing the prospects for the
international agreements to prevent maritime terrorism incidents, it articulated the coverage
and acceptance criteria – the combination of which are applied in the following chapters.

Chapter 4 analyses developments relating to the post-9/11 maritime security and vessel
tracking amendments to the SOLAS Convention (including the ISPS Code under Chapter XI2, and the AIS and LRIT regulations under Chapter V) and the 2003 SID Convention since
their entry into force – with these “preventative” measures being relevant to preventing all of
the forms of maritime terrorism examined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. It explains how the identified
limitations of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code have been addressed within the IMO
since their entry into force, and how it is impossible to make an overall assessment of the extent
to which the ISPS Code has become accepted internationally. Instead, it articulates the factors
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which will be likely to influence the prospects for the ISPS Code to succeed in lessening the
scope for maritime terrorism incidents to occur. It also explains that while the vessel
identification and tracking measures under SOLAS Chapter V (AIS and LRIT) have
contributed to improved maritime domain awareness, several uncertainties and shortcomings
remain. Finally it examines how the 2003 SID Convention has lessened the scope for terrorists
and also criminals to travel under fraudulent seafarer identification documentation.

CHAPTER 4
SOLAS MARITIME SECURITY AND VESSEL IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING
AMENDMENTS AND 2003 SID CONVENTION: ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS
SINCE THEIR ENTRY INTO FORCE

[4.1]

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses developments relating to the SOLAS Chapter XI security amendments
including the ISPS Code, the amendments to SOLAS Chapter V (AIS and LRIT) and the 2003
SID Convention since their entry into force. Collectively, these measures are the “preventative”
first line of defence against maritime terrorism incidents.1 [4.2] examines how the ISPS Code’s
identified limitations (being its limited application to ‘ship-port interfaces’ and not to broader
supply chains; its restricted application to large SOLAS Ships; its inconsistent application to
offshore platforms; and uncertainties regarding Ship Security Alert System arrangements) have
been addressed within the IMO since July 2004 through the development of voluntary
guidance. It explains that while there are both positive and concerning indications about the
extent of the ISPS Code’s implementation, inconsistencies in the information reported to IMO
by contracting governments,2 and the confidentiality of ISPS Code arrangements, make it
impossible to make an overall assessment about how well the ISPS Code has been implemented
at all levels.3 Instead, it articulates the factors that could influence the likelihood of “best case”
or “worst case” scenarios of ISPS Code security measures preventing maritime terrorism
incidents. [4.3] explains how mandatory AIS requirements have contributed to improved
maritime security through reducing collision risks and improving situational awareness for
ships, and examines how the risks of unauthorised access to AIS transmissions for nefarious
1

These instruments have a preventative focus because the measures they mandate and recommend are aimed at
preventing maritime terrorism incidents occurring in the first instance – through ship and port security measures,
vessel identification and tracking, and seafarer identification - as opposed to enabling States to interdict suspected
terrorist vessels. This Chapter addresses the second and third of the sub-questions posed in [1.2.2] – namely (2)
‘What are the limitations of the international agreements, and how have these limitations been addressed to date?’;
and (3) ‘What factors are likely to influence the prospects of the international agreements being successful in
preventing maritime terrorism incidents?’.
2
All references to ‘Contracting Governments’ this Chapter refer to Contracting Governments to the 1974 SOLAS
Convention. As explained in [4.2.5], the IMO has noted with concern significant delays in the provision of
information by SOLAS Contracting Governments regarding their implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and
the ISPS Code, and low response rates from Contracting Governments to voluntary IMO surveys about national
maritime security arrangements
3
It explains that because the ISPS Code is a risk management framework applicable (through various national
implementing laws and regulations) to States, shipping companies, port facilities and ships, this Study also
considers how the ISPS Code applies at operational levels within maritime industries
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purposes have been addressed within the IMO. It also shows that since becoming operational
from early 2011, LRIT arrangements have been shown to function effectively, with LRIT
information proving valuable in counter-piracy operations around the Gulf of Aden; but also
notes uncertainties remaining about the actions States might take based on LRIT information.
Finally [4.4] examines the extent to which the 2003 SID Convention could lessen the scope for
terrorists to travel under false seafarer identification.4 The observations from this Chapter are
applied in Chapters 5, 6 and 75 – as the preventative security measures mandated and
recommended under SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code are relevant to lessening the
scope for all the forms of maritime terrorism incidents examined in those chapters.

[4.2]

SOLAS CHAPTER XI AND ISPS CODE SECURITY MEASURES

Chapter 3 outlined how the vulnerabilities of ships and port facilities to terrorist targeting
and/or utilisation became increasingly apparent following the 9/11 attacks. At its 22nd
Assembly meeting in November 2001, the IMO acknowledged the need to address these
vulnerabilities through the development of new internationally consistent security measures.
During 2001 and 2002, negotiations were held to develop the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code as an international security risk management framework for the
maritime sector.6

Following these negotiations, the IMO’s Diplomatic Conference on

Maritime Security held between 9 and 13 December 2002 adopted significant amendments to
the 1974 SOLAS Convention (SOLAS) – including amendments to SOLAS Chapter XI-1
(‘Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety’), and with a new SOLAS Chapter XI-2
‘Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety’ being added. These 2002 amendments to
SOLAS were incorporated into SOLAS under the SOLAS ‘tacit acceptance’ procedure, and
entered into force on 1 July 2004.

4

However Chapter 7 reasons such improved seafarer identification measures would be not be applicable if
terrorists sought land through clandestine landings rather than through major ports, as several groups have
previously done
5
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 address the fourth question noted in [1.2.2], namely - (4) Considering how maritime terrorism
incidents have previously occurred, and might occur in the future, how might the international agreements apply
in practice in preventing maritime terrorism incidents?
6
For an overview of the development processes for the ISPS Code, see generally Ashley Roach ‘Container and
Port Security: A Bilateral Perspective’ (2003) 18(3) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 341;
Hartmut Hesse ‘Maritime Security in a Multilateral Context: IMO Activities to Enhance Maritime Security’
(2003) 18(3) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 327; Hartmut Hesse and Nicolaos
Charalambous ‘New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community’ (2004) 2(3) WMU Journal of
Maritime Affairs 123; and Chris Trelawny ‘Maritime Security: Implementation of the ISPS Code’ Paper presented
at the 3rd Intermodal Africa 2005 Tanzania Exhibition and Conference – Dar es Salaam, 3 - 4 February 2005
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After overviewing the application and requirements of the ISPS Code in [4.2.1], [4.2.2] to
[4.2.5] examine how the limitations in the application of the ISPS Code have been addressed
within the IMO since its entry into force in July 2004 through the development of voluntary
guidance. After [4.2.6] explains the challenges in assessing the extent to which ISPS Code
security measures have become ingrained at operational levels within maritime industries,
[4.2.7] articulates the factors likely to influence whether “best case” or “worst case” scenarios
of ISPS Code measures lessening the scope for the occurrence of maritime terrorism incidents
might apply, which are then examined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

[4.2.1]

Obligations imposed by SOLAS Chapter XI and the ISPS Code

The ISPS Code is a risk management framework applicable (through various national
implementing laws and regulations) to States, shipping companies, port facilities and ships. Its
objective is to increase level of security awareness and preparedness for large ships engaged
on international voyages, and the port facilities that service these ships – through providing a
standardised, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset changes
in threat levels with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities. 7 It applies to three
categories of ships engaged on international voyages, being passenger ships, including highspeed passenger craft; cargo ships, including high speed craft, or 500 gross tonnage and
upwards; and mobile offshore drilling units,8 commonly referred to as ‘SOLAS ships’. It also
applies to the port facilities serving such ships.9 Despite this narrow application, contracting
governments may specify security requirements for smaller vessels.10 The ISPS Code consists
of two parts – a mandatory Part A prescribing generalised requirements for contracting
governments, ships, shipping companies and port facilities that service such larger ships; and
a non-mandatory Part B providing more detailed, recommendatory guidance for the aforementioned entities to comply with the requirements of Part A of the Code and ensure maritimerelated security. Rather than prescribing detailed mandatory rules, the ISPS Code takes the
approach that the safety and security of ships and port facilities is a risk management activity

7

ISPS Code Foreword (IMO, 2003), p. iii
ISPS Code Part A, Section 3.1.1
9
ISPS Code Part A, Section 3.1.2
10
ISPS Code Part A, Section 3.2; ISPS Code Part B Section 4.46 – which provides that ‘Ships below Convention
size are subject to measures by which States maintain security’
8
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– requiring an assessment of the risks in each particular case to determine what security
measures are appropriate in the circumstances.

[4.2.1.1]

Obligations for Contracting Governments

SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and Part A of the ISPS Code impose several obligations on contracting
governments. First, they are responsible for implementing and ensuring compliance with the
ISPS Code by SOLAS ships subject to their jurisdiction and by port facilities that service such
ships. They are required to nominate ‘Designated Authorities’ responsible for assessing and
approving preventative security plans for SOLAS ships, companies operating SOLAS ships
and port facilities serving SOLAS ships, and issuing International Ship Security Certificate
(ISSCs) to SOLAS ships.11 Contracting governments may also delegate certain maritime
security responsibilities to ‘Recognised Security Organisations’ outside of government.
Recognised Security Organisations may serve as initial recipients for ship-to-shore security
alerts; maritime security-related communications from other contracting governments; and
requests for maritime security advice and assistance to ships.12 SOLAS Regulation XI-2/13
obliges contracting governments to communicate specified security-related information to the
IMO,13 and to advise the IMO of changes to such information. A list of national agencies
responsible for maritime security matters is available on the IMO’s website; 14 however as
[4.2.6] explains, concerns have been expressed about the currency of information supplied to
the IMO by contracting governments. Second, contracting governments are required to
continually monitor the maritime security situation applicable to ships operating in, or
intending to enter, their territorial seas, and to set and promulgate security levels applicable to
11

ISPS Code Part A Section 19
For some examples of the legislative and institutional arrangements put in place by contracting governments
to implement the requirements of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, and improve maritime security more
generally, see Ashley Craig and John Seher ‘US Maritime Transportation and Port Security: An Update and
Analysis of Current Efforts’; Joshua Ho ‘Managing Port and Ship Security in Singapore’; John Lavers ‘Canada
and the ISPS Code’; Devinder Grewal ‘The ISPS Code: The Australian Experience and Perspective’; and Noor
Apandi Osnin ‘ISPS Code: Implementation in Malaysia’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr
(eds) Lloyds MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2009)
13
SOLAS Regulation XI/13 specifies the information to be communicated to the IMO (to be made publically
available) as including the names of their national authorities responsible for ship and port facility security; the
locations within their territory covered by approved port facility security plans; the names and contact details of
those designated to receive and act upon ship to shore security alerts referred to in Regulation XI/6.2.1; the names
and contact details of those designated to receive and act upon communications from Contracting Governments
exercising control and compliance measures referred to in Regulation XI/9.3.1; and the names and contact details
of those designated to be available at all times to provide advice or assistance to ships, and to whom ships can
report any security concerns referred to in Regulation XI/7.2
14
This information is available from the IMO’s Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GSIS) at
http://gisis.imo.org/Public/ISPS/Default.aspx; Accessed 1 October 2013
12
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such ships and port facilities.15 The ISPS Code specifies three progressively increasing security
levels for ships and port facilities, being Security Level 1: Normal (at which the ship or port
facility normally operates); Security Level 2: Heightened (applying for as long as there is a
heightened risk of a security incident); and Security Level 3: Exceptional (applying for the
period of time when there is a probable or imminent risk of a security incident).16 Third,
contracting governments are authorised to undertake ‘control and compliance measures’ in
relation to ships17 proposing to enter their port facilities – which might include denying
permission, or requesting further information prior to authorising such entry) in situations
where a contracting government had security-related concerns18 regarding a ship seeking to
enter one of its port facilities.19

[4.2.1.2]

Obligations for SOLAS ships and shipping companies20

SOLAS Chapters XI-1 and XI-2 and the ISPS Code impose several preventative security
requirements upon SOLAS Ships. They are required to prominently display non-erasable Ship
Identification Numbers,21 which are intended to prevent unauthorised alterations to identity
markings of the vessel; and maintain a Continuous Synopsis Record recording certain
important information about the ship’s activities.22 They are also required to be equipped with
Ship Security Alert Systems (SSAS)23 – being a silent alarm system which when activated
initiates and transmits a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority designated by the
ship’s flag State. Such ship-to-shore security alerts are required to identify the ship, its location
and indicate that the security of the ship is under threat or has been compromised, and be
capable of activation from the ship’s navigational bridge and at least one other location.

SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Regulation 7 ‘Threats to Ships’
ISPS Code Part A, Section 7
17
And possibly other ships if the Contracting Government extended the application of the ISPS Code to ships
below SOLAS Convention size: ISPS Code Part A, Section 3.2; ISPS Code Part B Section 4.46
18
These security-related concerns might arise in relation to the validity of the ship’s International Ship Security
Certificate; the effectiveness of the ship's preventative security measures; the effectiveness of security measures
at the ship's previous ports of call – or with other ships with which it may have interfaced with; the cargo or
passengers embarked on the ship; or the accuracy of the information contained in the ship's Continuous Synopsis
Record.
19
SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Regulation 9 ‘Control and compliance measures’
20
These two entities are grouped as one for the sake of brevity
21
SOLAS Chapter XI-1 Regulation 3
22
This information includes the ship's name and responsible company; its flag State; date of registration; Ship
Identification Number; registered owner; and the Designated Authority that issued the ship's ISSC: SOLAS
Chapter XI-2, Regulation 5
23
SOLAS Chapter XI Regulation 6 Most vessels were required to be fitted with SSAS by 2004 and the remainder
by 2006
15
16
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However as [4.2.5] below explains, several uncertainties regarding the arrangements for
coordinating responses to SSAS alerts have been identified.
Operators of SOLAS ships are required to designate a Ship Security Officer 24 responsible for
security matters within SOLAS ships; to undertake periodic Ship Security Assessments,25 and
have in place Ship Security Plans.26 Ship Security Plans are required to address various
measures to safeguard the physical security of the ship, including measures to prevent weapons
and other dangerous substances from being taken aboard the ship; control access to the ship (in
particular its restricted areas) and to respond to breaches of such access control measures; to
respond to changes in security levels set by contracting governments; and the operation of the
ship's SSAS.27 Ship Security Plan measures are required to be actively implemented through
developing and maintain accurate records relating to security matters – and ensuring that the
ship's personnel are conversant with its Security Plan and other measures through regular
training drills and exercises.28 Part B of the ISPS Code provides recommendatory guidance for
both ships and shipping companies on Ship Security Assessments,29 Ship Security Plans,30 and
security training, drills and exercises.31 Furthermore companies which operate ships subject to
the ISPS Code are required to designate Company Security Officers responsible for the
coordination of preventative security measures throughout their companies.32

[4.2.1.3]

Obligations for operators of port facilities

The ISPS Code imposes preventative security obligations on port facilities that serve SOLAS
ships which mirror those imposed on SOLAS ships as explained in [4.2.1.2]. These include
undertaking Port Facility Security Assessments33 and actively implementing34 Port Facility
Security Plans.35 Port Facility Security Plans are required to address measures to ensure the
24

ISPS Code Part A, Section 12
ISPS Code Part A, Section 8
26
ISPS Code Part A, Section 9
27
ISPS Code Part A, Section 9.4
28
ISPS Code Part A, Section 13 Ship Security Plans ‘Training, drills and exercises on ship security’
29
ISPS Code Part B, Section 8
30
ISPS Code Part B, Section 9
31
ISPS Code Part B, Section 13
32
ISPS Code Part A, Section 11
33
ISPS Code Part A, Section 15
34
Port Facility Security Plans are required to be actively implemented through developing and maintain accurate
records relating to security matters – and ensuring that the port facility’s personnel are conversant with the security
plan and other security measures through regular training drills and exercises: ISPS Code Part A, Section 18
35
ISPS Code Part A, Section 16
25
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security of the port facility,36 and designate Port Facility Security Officers37 responsible for
security throughout the Port Facility. Part B of the ISPS Code provides recommendatory
guidance for both ships and shipping companies on Port Facility Security Assessments, 38 Port
Facility Security Plans,39 and security training, drills and exercises.40

[4.2.1.4]

Identified limitations of the ISPS Code

Whilst the ISPS Code has made a significant contribution towards increasing maritime security
arrangements internationally through mandating and recommending the measures outlined
above, its restricted (mandatory) application to the ‘ship-port interface’, to large SOLAS ships,
and inconsistent application to offshore platforms have been acknowledged as limitations.
Additionally, several uncertainties regarding Ship Security Alert System arrangements have
been identified. The following sections show how these limitations have been addressed within
the IMO (and in cooperation with other international organisations where appropriate) since
the ISPS Code’s entry into force on 31 July 2004 – showing the preference amongst contracting
governments to address these limitations through voluntary guidance rather than extending the
mandatory application of the Code.

[4.2.2]

Limited application of ISPS Code to the ship-port interface

As noted above, the ISPS Code applies to ‘SOLAS ships’ and the port facilities servicing them
(the ‘ship/port interface’),41 and not to the supply chains that feed into the ship-port interface.
In the aftermath of 9/11, this has led to concerns that terrorists might seek to introduce
explosives, possibly including WMD, into shipping containers outside the ship-port interfaces
subject to the ISPS Code, possibly to transport to another State or to detonate within a major

36

Port Facility Security Plans are required to address and include measures to prevent weapons and other
dangerous substances from being taken into the port facility; measures to control access to the port facility
generally – particularly its restricted areas – and to respond to breaches of such access control measures; and
measures to facilitate responses to changes in security levels set by Contracting Governments; ISPS Code Part A
Section 16.3
37
ISPS Code Part A, Section 17
38
ISPS Code Part B, Section 15
39
ISPS Code Part B, Section 16
40
ISPS Code Part B, Section 18
41
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1.10 defines the ‘Ship/port interface’ as meaning ‘the interactions that occur
when a ship is directly and immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons, goods or the
provisions of port services to or from the ship’. The term is used widely in the records of various IMO proceedings
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port.42 Figure 5 from the 2003 study by the OECD which was discussed in [3.5]43 illustrates
the numerous phases typically involved in the international movement of goods by sea. Before
goods reach the ‘ship/port interface’, they frequently pass through the control of several entities
including manufacturers or shippers of goods; buying agents; storage facilities; (sometimes
multiple) land, air and waterways transport operators; freight forwarders and financial
institutions; and lastly customs authorities. After leaving the ‘ship/port interface’, goods again
pass through the control of customs authorities, freight forwarders, transport operators and
storage facilities, before reaching the end buyer. As depicted in Figure 5 below, the ISPS Code
only covers a very small phase of that overall process.

Figure 5:

Depiction of the limited scope of the ISPS Code

Source: Philippe Crist Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Maritime Transport Committee,
2003), 50

The 2002 IMO Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security recognised both the limited focus
of the ISPS Code to the ship-port interface, and the importance of increasing multi-modal
security, and resolved to pursue further cooperation with the World Customs Organisation

42

For example, the detonation of bombs concealed within shipping containers. See generally Michael Richardson
A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2004)
43
Philippe Crist Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development Maritime Transport Committee, 2003) – which undertook a comprehensive
economic analysis of the anticipated cost impact of the ISPS Code on the international maritime sector
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(WCO).44 This section discusses how these identified limitations have been addressed by the
IMO in consultation with the WCO, and through other cooperative supply chain security
initiatives.

[4.2.2.1]

Post 9/11 supply chain security initiatives

Since 9/11, several cooperative initiatives have been developed to increase the security of
supply chains. Since December 2001 the US Customs and Trade Partnership against Terrorism
(C-TPAT) has developed as a voluntary supply chain security initiative for private sector
entities within United States, Canada and Mexico that facilitate the transport of goods across
borders within the region.45 Through being able to demonstrate the implementation of security
risk management measures across their supply chains, C-TPAT participants are afforded
expedited clearance through national borders – although C-TPAT is confined to North
America. Secondly, the US Container Security Initiative (CSI), announced in January 2002,
was developed in response to the 9/11 attacks as part of the US Customs and Border
Protection’s (CBP) layered cargo security strategy. The CSI is intended lessen the scope for
terrorists to utilise shipping containers as both bombs and as a means to transport weaponry46
through deploying US CBP container inspection and screening teams to foreign seaports
exporting goods to the US which target and examine high-risk cargo before it is laden onto
vessels bound for the United States. Under the CSI the US also allows foreign container
inspection teams to inspect shipping containers departing from US ports to their ports. As at 1
October 2013 CSI inspection arrangements are reported to be operational in 58 ports
worldwide.47
44

IMO Consideration and Adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974
Agenda Items 7 and 8, IMO Doc SOLAS/CONF.5/34 (17 December 2002) Annex 2, Resolution 9 ‘Enhancement
of security in co-operation with the World Customs Organisation (Closed cargo transport units)’
45
With participants including US importers, US customs brokers, Canadian and Mexican manufacturers, US,
Canadian and Mexican cross-border highway carriers, third party logistics providers, marine port authorities and
terminal operators, Mexican long haul highway carriers, air, sea and rail carriers, air freight consolidators, ocean
transportation intermediaries and non-vessel operating common carriers
46
Jessica Romero ‘Prevention of Maritime Terrorism: The Container Security Initiative’ (2003) 4(2) Chicago
Journal of International Law 597
47
The ports listed are: Montreal, Vancouver and Halifax, Canada; Kingston, Jamaica; Santos, Brazil; Freeport,
The Bahamas; Buenos Aires, Argentina; Balboa, Colón and Manzanillo, Panama; Puerto Cortes, Honduras;
Cartagena, Colombia; Caucedo, Dominican Republic; Rotterdam, The Netherlands ; La Spezia, Genoa, Naples,
Gioia Tauro, and Livorno, Italy; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport,
Tilbury, and Southampton, United Kingdom; Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium; Piraeus, Greece; Le Havre and
Marseille, France; Algeciras, Barcelona, and Valencia, Spain; Gothenburg, Sweden; Lisbon, Portugal; Singapore;
Shenzhen and Shanghai, China; Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe, Japan; Kaohsiung and Chi-Lung, Taiwan;
Hong Kong; Colombo, Sri Lanka; Pusan, South Korea; Port Salalah, Oman; Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas,
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Third, and following the concepts of CSI and C-TPAT, on 23 June 2005 the then 166
representatives of national customs administrations unanimously adopted the WCO SAFE
Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (‘SAFE Framework’). The
SAFE Framework aims to harmonise and improve security risk management practices,
screening of cargo containers and electronic record keeping and reporting throughout supply
chains through two “pillars”. The first pillar, “Customs-to-Customs network arrangements”
aims to promote the exchange of “operational” information and mutual recognition of customs
measures. The second pillar, “Customs-to-Business partnerships” entails the accreditation of
entities involved in the movement of goods throughout supply chains48 as Authorised
Economic Operators (AEOs)49 through having in place appropriate preventative security
arrangements. The SAFE Framework provides the incentive of accelerated and simplified
cargo movements for entities that have in place appropriate preventative security arrangements.

The WCO has facilitated the development of Mutual Recognition Arrangements between
customs administrations. Mutual recognition is a broad concept whereby an action or decision
taken or an authorization that has been properly granted by one Customs administration is
recognized and accepted by another Customs administration.50 In a 2012 overview, the WCO
recorded 19 functioning AEO programmes in 45 countries worldwide. This included all 27 EU
Member States having developed their own national programmes; within the Asia-Pacific
China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore developing pilot projects; 8 AEO
programmes in the Americas and Caribbean region. The WCO also recorded 17 Mutual
Recognition Arrangements having been signed, with a further arrangement becoming
functional in July 2012 between the EU and the United States.51

Malaysia; Port Qasim, Pakistan; Laem Chabang, Thailand; Ashdod and Haifa, Israel; Dubai, United Arab
Emirates; Durban, South Africa and Alexandria, Egypt. Listed at United States Department of Homeland Security
‘Container Security Initiative Ports’ https://www.dhs.gov/container-security-initiative-ports Undated; Accessed 1
October 2013
48
Including manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers, carriers, consolidators, intermediaries, ports, airports,
terminal operators, integrated operators, warehouses and distributors
49
An Authorised Economic Operator is a party involved in the international movement of goods in whatever
function that has been approved by or on behalf of a national Customs administration as complying with WCO or
equivalent supply chain security standards. AEOs include inter alia manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers,
carriers, consolidators intermediaries, ports, airports, terminal operators, integrated operators, warehouses, and
distributors: World Customs Organisation WCO SAFE Framework of Standards June 2011, 6
50
World Customs Organisation WCO SAFE Framework of Standards June 2011, 61
51
Keynote Speech by Kunio Mikuriya, Secretary General of the World Customs Organization to the WCO Global
AEO
Conference
in
Seoul,
Republic
of
Korea,
17
April
2012
Accessed
at
http://www.wcoomd.org/speeches/default.aspx?lid=1&id=257; Accessed 1 November 2012

117

[4.2.2.2]

Post-2004 IMO-WCO Cooperation

Since the entry into force of the ISPS Code, the IMO has cooperated with the WCO to improve
security risk management arrangements throughout supply chains beyond the ‘ship-port
interface’. The MSC at its 81st session in May 2006 was informed that the 32nd session of the
IMO’s Facilitation Committee (FAL) had noted the adoption of the WCO SAEF Framework
of Standards by the WCO. It also noted a report from the IMO Secretariat,52 which had
developed preliminary guidance on how the relevant 17 WCO Standards might be incorporated
into Parts A and B of the ISPS Code, and others into the Convention on Facilitation of
International Maritime Traffic, 1965, as amended (‘FAL Convention’).53 MSC 81 concluded
that formal amendments to the SOLAS and FAL Conventions and the ISPS Code would take
a significant time to develop and implement through national enabling legislation, and instead
resolved to develop joint MSC/FAL interim guidance on procedures for maritime cargo supply
chain security.54 MSC 81 also received a report from Japan55 on the Tokyo Ministerial
Conference on International Transport Security held between 12 and 13 January 2006, which
was attended by representatives from 14 countries,56 resulting in the Ministerial Statement on
Security in International Maritime Transport Sector;57 and a report from the International
Standards Organisation (ISO)58 on its efforts to develop internationally consistent standards for
supply chain and freight container security.59
52

IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of security in co-operation with the World Customs
Organization: Note by the Secretariat IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MSC 81/5/4 (3 February
2006)
53
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-First Session IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item
25, IMO Doc MSC 81/25 (24 May 2006), 5.12 – 5.15
54
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-First Session IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item
25, IMO Doc MSC 81/25 (24 May 2006), 5.15
55
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Report on the Ministerial Conference on International Transport
Security Tokyo, Japan, 12-13 January 2006: Submitted by Japan IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item 5, IMO
Doc MSC 81/5/9 (10 February 2006)
56
This conference was attended by Ministers responsible for transport security and officials from 14 countries,
including Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
the Russian Federation, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, and from the European
Commission – and resolved to invite the IMO to consider, in co-operation with WCO, the development and
adoption, as necessary, of appropriate measures to enhance the security of the maritime transport of containers in
the international supply chain, while respecting efficiency and international harmonization
57
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Report on the Ministerial Conference on International Transport
Security Tokyo, Japan, 12-13 January 2006: Submitted by Japan IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item 5, IMO
Doc MSC 81/5/9 (10 February 2006), Annex 2. Noted in IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its
Eighty-First Session IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item 25, IMO Doc MSC 81/25 (24 May 2006), 5.16
58
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of security in co-operation with the World Customs
Organization: Note by the Secretariat IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item 5, IMO Doc MSC 81/5/4 (3 February
2006)
59
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-First Session IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item
25, IMO Doc MSC 81/25 (24 May 2006), 5.72 – 5.73
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The MSC at its 82nd session in December 2006 noted that the 33rd session of the IMO’s
Facilitation Committee had discussed the development of maritime cargo security procedures
in the context of the SAFE Framework of Standards, taking account of the preferences of
contracting governments to address supply chain security through voluntary guidance, rather
than extending the mandatory application of the ISPS Code (which had been proposed at MSC
81).60

MSC 82 also noted proposals on guidance for implementing security measures throughout
maritime transport related sectors submitted by Japan61 and by the United States62 for the
MSC’s consideration.63 The MSC also urged contracting governments to consult with their
national experts on safeguarding the security of maritime cargoes, and to submit their proposals
on the security and facilitation of the movement of freight containers to the 34th session of the
IMO’s Facilitation Committee for consideration by the Joint MSC/FAL Working Group. 64
At its 88th session in December 2010 whilst the MSC noted a report submitted by Canada65
proposing the development through the IMO of best practice guidance for maritime supply
chain resilience in cooperation with the IMO’s Facilitation Committee and the WCO, affirmed

60

IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Second Session IMO MSC 82nd session, Agenda
Item 24, IMO Doc MSC 82/24 (18 December 2006), 4.43
61
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: The interim guidance on the security and facilitation of the
movement of containers transported by ships: Submitted by Japan IMO MSC 82nd Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO
Doc MSC 82/4/2 (2 October 2006). Japan proposed that such security guidance should apply firstly to maritime
container transport-related operators working within port areas, and then be further developed as best practice
guidance for other operators working outside port areas. In addition to managing the placement of security seals
on shipping containers, Japan submitted that such supply chain security guidance should also address the
management of cargo control rooms, access arrangements, cargo load inventory documentation and control of
employees. Lastly, Japan recommended that beneficial incentives (such as guarantees of expedited transit through
checkpoints) should be provided to operators who implemented appropriate supply chain security measures.
62
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Improving security and facilitation provisions within IMO
instruments taking into account the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards IMO MSC 82nd Session, Agenda Item
4, IMO Doc MSC 82/4/3 (4 October 2006). The United States proposed several practical focus areas for supply
chain security, including maintaining the physical integrity of containers while within the port facility’s or vessel’s
control and effective measures for maintaining the security of seals on shipping containers. The United States
(MSC 82/INF.7) had catalogued, based on extensive validations and site visits, supply chain security best practices
and was making the catalogue available at:
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_best_
practices.ctt/ctpat_best_practices.pdf
63
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Second Session IMO MSC 82nd session, Agenda
Item 24, IMO Doc MSC 82/24 (18 December 2006), 4.46 – 4.50
64
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Second Session IMO MSC 82nd session, Agenda
Item 24, IMO Doc MSC 82/24 (18 December 2006), 4.80
65
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancements to the ISPS Code: Submitted by Canada IMO
MSC 88th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 88/4/2 (21 September 2010)
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the primacy of the WCO over supply chain security, with IMO’s role being limited to those
aspects related to ships and port facilities.66 After noting that proposals relating to supply chain
resilience were not within the High-level Action Plan of the IMO,67 MSC 88 decided not to
further pursue Canada’s proposal.68

In summary, the above developments indicate the promotion of security risk management
measures to supply chains outside the ship-port interface is being pursued both through
informal initiatives, and through the WCO in consultation with the IMO. It also noted
contracting governments favouring this approach continuing, rather than expanding the
mandatory scope of the ISPS Code beyond the ship-port interface. Chapter 7 further discusses
the scope for supply chain security measures to lessen the scope for maritime terrorism
incidents to occur.

[4.2.3]

Limited application of ISPS Code to ‘SOLAS vessels’

Another recognised limitation of the ISPS Code is its restricted application to very large vessels
over 500 Gross Registered Tonnes engaged on international voyages. Whilst as [4.2.1] noted,
the Part B of the ISPS Code recognises that contracting governments may apply security
measures to smaller ‘sub-SOLAS’ vessels,69 numerous vessels engaged in fishing activities
frequently transit long international distances and fall outside the mandatory application of the
ISPS Code. This has raised concerns that terrorists might utilise smaller vessels to transport
weaponry or operatives, or to perpetrate maritime terrorist attacks,70 with Chapters 5, 6 and 7
examining how terrorists have used, and also might use, smaller vessels to perpetrate terrorist
attacks.

66

IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item
26, IMO Doc MSC 88/26 (25 December 2010), 4.15
67
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item
26, IMO Doc MSC 88/26 (25 December 2010), 4.15
68
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item
26, IMO Doc MSC 88/26 (25 December 2010), 4.18
69
As [4.2.1] noted, ISPS Code Part B Section 4.46 provides that ‘Ships below Convention size are subject to
measures by which States maintain security’
70
Mike Buky ‘Maritime Terrorism: The Threat from Small Vessels’ (2007) 157 Maritime Studies 1
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The IMO acknowledged these limitations at its 2002 Diplomatic Conference on Maritime
Security.71 Since this time it has facilitated further discussions to improve security
arrangements for smaller vessels.72 Following the Tokyo Ministerial Conference on
International Transport Security held between 12 and 13 January 2006, 73 the MSC at its 81st
session in May 2006 invited submissions addressing security measures for ships falling outside
the scope of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code.74 In response to this invitation, the 82nd
session of the MSC in December 2006 received submissions on security measures for ‘subSOLAS’ vessels from the United States,75 Japan,76 and the United Kingdom.77 However several
delegations criticised the US and Japanese proposals for being too prescriptive and requiring
considerable resources to implement; and argued that given the wide variety of types, functions
and sizes of the ‘sub-SOLAS’ vessels concerned, any future ‘sub-SOLAS’ vessel security
measures should be developed as voluntary guidance rather than expanding the mandatory
application of the ISPS Code.78 At the conclusion of the 82nd session of the MSC, a

71

IMO Consideration and Adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Conference
of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, Agenda Items 7
and 8, IMO Doc SOLAS/CONF.5/34 (17 December 2002) Annex 2 Resolution 7 (Establishment of appropriate
measures to enhance the security of ships, port facilities, mobile offshore drilling units on location and fixed and
floating platforms not covered by chapter XI-2 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention)
72
For a succinct chronology of discussion on security arrangements for non-SOLAS vessels within the IMO, see
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of the security of ships other than those already
covered by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code: Submitted by Japan IMO MSC 82nd session, Agenda Item
4, IMO Doc MSC 82/4/5 (27 September 2006)
73
See above in [4.2.2.2]
74
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-First Session IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item
25, IMO Doc MSC 81/25 (24 May 2006), 5.61
75
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of the security of ships other than those already
covered by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code: Submitted by the United States IMO MSC 82nd session,
Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 82/4/4 (27 September 2006) – which provided an overview of security
arrangements in place within US ports for sub-SOLAS merchant vessels, and which invited other contracting
governments to contribute additional suggestions for appropriate security measures for such vessels
76
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of the security of ships other than those already
covered by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code: Submitted by Japan IMO MSC 82nd session, Agenda Item
4, IMO Doc MSC 82/4/5 (27 September 2006) – which provided a list of best practice security measures for
smaller ships not covered by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code to prevent attacks
77
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of the security of ships other than those already
covered by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code: Submitted by the United Kingdom IMO MSC 82nd session,
Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 82/4/6 (17 October 2006) – which summarised research being conducted in the
UK into technologies to protect ships against seaward attack from small craft. In another document submitted to
the 82nd session of the MSC, the United Kingdom also provided some examples of security guidance for leisure
craft operating on the River Thames – covering common locations for terrorists to conceal explosives aboard and
within the vicinity of large vessels, and recommended security precautions for preventing terrorist attacks on
vessels: IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Security guidance for leisure craft operating on the River
Thames: Submitted by United Kingdom IMO MSC 82nd session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 82/INF.15 (10
October 2006)
78
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Second Session IMO MSC 82nd session, Agenda
Item 24, IMO Doc MSC 82/24 (18 December 2006), 4.37 – 4.38
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Correspondence Group was formed to further investigate appropriate security measures
relating to sub-SOLAS vessels.79
The MSC at its 83rd session in October 2007 received reports from the Correspondence Group
formed at MSC 82.80 Proposals on ‘sub-SOLAS’ vessel security were also submitted by
Australia,81 Singapore (which provided a report on its Harbour Craft Security Code and
Transponder System arrangements)82 and the United States.83 Also, it was recommended that
for the Correspondence Group to develop appropriate preventative security guidance for subSOLAS vessels in an organised manner, such guidelines should focus on and differentiate
between four vessel types – namely commercial non-passenger vessels, passenger vessels,
fishing vessels, and pleasure craft.84 The MSC also recommended that sub-SOLAS vessel
security guidelines should address security measures applicable to normal operations and those
applicable to times and places of heightened security risk; and requested the Correspondence
Group to report to MSC 85.85
The MSC at its 85th session in December 2008 received a report from the Correspondence
Group on security arrangements for sub-SOLAS.86 Following MSC 85, the report of the

79

IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Second Session IMO MSC 82nd session, Agenda
Item 24, IMO Doc MSC 82/24 (18 December 2006), 4.73 – 4.75
80
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of the security of ships other than those already
covered by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code: Submitted by the United Kingdom as co-ordinator of the
Correspondence Group IMO MSC 83rd session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 83/4/2 (25 July 2007)
81
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of the security of ships other than those already
covered by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code: Submitted by Australia MSC 83rd session, Agenda Item 4,
IMO Doc MSC 83/4/4 (14 August 2007) – which proposed the development of voluntary guidance to prevent
thefts from or hijackings of ‘sub-SOLAS’ vessels through effective access control arrangements and the
undertaking of appropriate training of vessel crews in security matters
82
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: The Harbour Craft Transponder System (HARTS) in the Port of
Singapore: Submitted by Singapore IMO MSC 83rd session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 83/INF.11 (25 July
2007)
83
IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Enhancement of the security of ships other than those already
covered by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code: Submitted by the United States IMO MSC 83rd session,
Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 83/INF.17 – which provided an overview of the US National Small Vessel
Security Summit (NSVSS) held on 19 - 20 June 2007. The NSVSS resolved to establish an on-going dialogue
between Government agencies and the small vessel owners and operators from the commercial and recreational
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2007), 4.39
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Correspondence Group was released in the form of non-mandatory IMO security guidance for
sub-SOLAS vessels – covering risk assessment, security awareness and culture, and security
considerations for international voyages.87 Three years later, at its 89th session in May 2011,
the MSC noted a report from the United States regarding its release of Department of Homeland
Security Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan (SVS-IP) which implemented its Small
Vessel Security Strategy which had been advised to the MSC at its 84th session in May 2008.
Following a formal presentation the US delegation provided copies of the SVS-IP to other
delegations for their information.88

In summary, the above IMO proceedings indicate a consensus amongst contracting
governments for “sub-SOLAS” security arrangements to be addressed through the
development of voluntary guidance, rather than “extending downwards” the compulsory
application of the ISPS Code. The records of the proceedings of the IMO’s Maritime Safety
Committee do not explicitly state the reasons for States preferring to address the limitations of
the ISPS Code through voluntary guidance rather than extending its mandatory application.
However as Scott points out, the most plausible explanation is that developing states may not
perceive the same degree of maritime security threats as the United States and other major
developed states; that they may lack the economic and technological capacity to implement
advanced maritime security measures; and perceive the ISPS Code as an onerous cost which
does not provide many tangible benefits.89

[4.2.4]

Inconsistent application of ISPS Code to offshore platforms

As [4.2.1] noted, the ISPS Code applies to Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) ‘engaged
on international voyages’.90 This narrow definition excludes many MODUs that navigate only

United Kingdom and the United States IMO MSC 85th session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 85/4/1 (22 August
2008). The appendices of this report provided more specific guidance on examples of suspicious activity;
avoidance of attacks by pirates, prevention of stowaways. The appendices also provided guidance for operators
of commercial non-passenger vessels, passenger vessels, fishing vessels, pleasure craft; and for harbour, port and
marina authorities
87
IMO Non-mandatory guidelines on security aspects of the operation of vessels which do not fall within the
scope of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code IMO Doc MSC.1/Circ.1283 (22 December 2008)
88
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Ninth Session IMO MSC 89th session, Agenda Item
25 IMO Doc MSC 89/25 (27 May 2011), 4.21
89
Shirley Scott “Whose Security is it and how much of it do we want? The US influence on the International Law
against Maritime Terrorism” in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald Rothwell (eds) Maritime Security:
International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (Routledge, 2010), 90 - 91
90
ISPS Code Part A, Section 3.1.1
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within the waters of one coastal State, as well as many supply vessels and shuttle tankers that
service offshore platforms within the waters of the same coastal State.91 The IMO has
confirmed the ISPS Code does not apply to floating production, storage and offloading units
(FPSOs) and floating storage and offloading units (FSOs).92 Whilst the non-mandatory Part B
of the ISPS Code recommends that contracting governments ‘should consider establishing
appropriate security measures for fixed and floating platforms and MODUs on location’,93 in
contrast to the extensive guidance it provides for operators of SOLAS ships and port facilities
as noted in [4.2.1] above, Part B provides no further guidance on what such ‘appropriate
measures’ should entail. The paucity of the ISPS Code’s guidance on preventative security
arrangements for offshore platforms has been criticised by commentators – who point out that
while many FSOs, FPSOs and offshore platforms operate with ISPS security plans, other
offshore platforms have little or no security arrangements to maintain an awareness of vessel
movements in the vicinity, and to prevent weapons or explosives being introduced onto
offshore platforms – leading to inconsistent security arrangements internationally.94 For
instance, in September 2010, an offshore installation off the coast of Nigeria was attacked by
insurgents utilising a vessel resembling a petroleum supply ship.95

Similarly to the preventative security arrangements for supply chains outside the ship/port
interface examined in [4.2.2], and for ‘sub-SOLAS’ vessels examined in [4.2.3], contracting
governments have indicated a preference to address security arrangements for fixed and
floating platforms through non-mandatory guidance, rather than extending the mandatory
application of the ISPS Code. Relevantly, Resolution 7 of the December 2002 Diplomatic
Conference on Maritime Security ‘encouraged’ contracting governments, when exercising
their responsibilities for [MODUs] and for fixed and floating platforms operating on their
Continental Shelf or within their EEZ, to ensure that any security provisions applying to such
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units and platforms allow interaction with those applying to ships covered by [SOLAS] Chapter
XI-2, that serve, or operate in conjunction with, such units or platforms.’96

In contrast to the extensive guidance provided to assist contracting governments and operators
of SOLAS ships and port facilities in implementing the requirements and recommendations of
the ISPS Code, the IMO’s activities in relation to offshore platform security have as at 1
October 2013 been very limited. The 87th session of the MSC in May 2010 approved the
issuance of a non-mandatory guidance circular addressing safety, security, and environment
protection considerations for FPSOs and FSUs.97 This is the only guidance on preventative
security measures for offshore platforms to have been issued by the IMO, and has been
criticised for its paucity.98 After considering how terrorists have, and could in future attack
offshore platforms, [6.3.2] examines the consequences of the lack of consistent application of
the ISPS Code to offshore platforms.

[4.2.5]

Concerns about Ship Security Alert System arrangements

Concerns have been expressed about how the arrangements for responding to activations of
Ship Security Alert Systems (SSAS)99 might operate in practice. Timlen noted concerns
amongst merchant vessel captains that when activated aboard vessels under threat of terrorist
or pirate attack, SSAS might not be as effective as a silent alarm activated within premises on
land.100 In particular, he identified significant uncertainties regarding the division of
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of Appropriate Measures to Enhance the Security Of Ships, Port Facilities, Mobile Offshore Drilling Units on
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responsibilities and lack of coordination in responding to SSAS alerts between flag states
(which are the initially recipients of SSAS alerts), and nearby coastal States (which would be
the nearest to respond to SSAS alerts, although not necessarily the first to be informed),101
noting this could be particularly problematic in areas with contested maritime boundaries such
as the South China Sea. From his review of the “responsible agency arrangements” for
receiving and responding to SSAS alerts amongst fifteen flag states,102 he identified
considerable variation in the number of responsible agencies and steps involved in responding
to SSAS alerts.103 Whilst details of national agencies responsible for receiving SSAS alerts
from vessels flying their flags is available on the IMO website,104 as [4.2.6] below explains,
the IMO has expressed concerns about the timeliness of information communicated by
contracting governments to it pursuant to SOLAS Regulation XI-13.4 – meaning that such
information might not be entirely up to date and accurate. Timlen also noted concerns within
shipping industries about verifying whether SSAS alerts are genuine alerts or false activations,
leading to scepticism and complacency within maritime industries about the value of SSAS
alerts - being akin to “the boy who cried wolf”.105 More recently, a 2011 report submitted by
the Republic of Korea to the 89th session of the MSC reported malfunction rates of around
eleven per cent from a periodical survey of SSAS systems.106

Timlen also noted concerns amongst merchant vessel captains regarding the actions that might
be taken by nearby states after receiving an SSAS alert, including the use of force by authorities
– citing one senior merchant vessel captain querying ‘Do I dare activate the SSAS?’107 He also
noted the lack of information contained within SSAS alerts, opining in relation to the 2002
attack on the MV Limburg ‘ … considering the speed with which this attack was carried out,
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even if there had been an SSAS installed and activated as soon as the motorboat was spotted,
it is not likely that any responders could have done anything to prevent the incident’.108 He
proposed several refinements to the operation of SSAS systems, including accelerating the
SSAS alert management process possibly through linking SSAS alerts into vessels’ AIS
systems in order to alert ships in the near vicinity (but as [4.3.1.2] below explains, concerns
have also been raised about the likely effectiveness of AIS in the maritime security context);
addressing the false alert problem; expanding the amount of information contained in SSAS
alerts; also utilising other means of communications (such as audible alarms) to alert nearby
authorities of threats to a ship’s security; and updating the IMO guidance on piracy and armed
robbery against ships to address the use of SSAS.109
Refining the operation of SSAS has been on the IMO’s agenda for several years. At the 81 st
session of the MSC in May 2006, based on reports from several European contracting
governments about difficulties in identifying ships transmitting SSAS,110 the MSC released
guidance on the information that should be included in transmitted SSAS alerts.111 At its 82nd
session in December 2006, the MSC determined that SSAS systems should be excluded from
periodic examinations by radio inspectors during compulsory ship surveys to safeguard the
confidentiality of the ship’s ISPS Code security arrangements. Whilst the 82 nd session of the
MSC flagged the issue of compulsory inspections of SSAS, the MSC resolved that SSAS
inspections should remain a matter for decision by contracting governments.112
Five years later, the 89th session of the MSC in May 2011 noted a report submitted by the
Republic of Korea (which as noted above had reported malfunction rates of 11 per cent during
a periodic survey of SSAS systems) which had proposed mandatory requirements for
inspections of SSAS by radio inspectors in conjunction with the periodical ship surveys
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required by SOLAS regulations I/7 and I/8.113 However after extensive debate,114 MSC 89 reaffirmed the decision made at MSC 82 in December 2006 that requirements for inspections of
SSAS should remain a matter for contracting governments.115

In spite of the above technical problems and uncertainties relating to arrangements for
coordinating responses to SSAS activations, [5.2.2.5] explains that SSAS systems have proven
to be very effective in alerting nearby coalition naval forces of commercial vessels under threat
of attack by pirate vessels around the Gulf of Aden since 2005. However [5.2.2.6] reasons that
because maritime terrorist attacks could conceivably occur at a greater range of locations
compared to the more predictable locations of where piracy is prevalent (and where there may
not be naval forces accustomed to responding as rapidly as in the Gulf of Aden), SSAS should
not be seen as a panacea against maritime terrorist attacks. Chapter 9 reasons there is scope for
the IMO to facilitate further refinements in the coordination of response arrangements to SSAS
alert activations.

[4.2.6]

Challenges in assessing the actual implementation of the ISPS Code

Both before and since its entry into force on 31 July 2004, the IMO has developed and
promulgated extensive guidance on measures to assist contracting governments to implement
and administer the requirements and recommendations of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS
Code.116 Furthermore as [5.2.2.4] explains, since 2009 the IMO has actively cooperated with
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the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) to develop preventative security ‘Best
Management Practices’ for commercial vessels transiting the piracy-affected waters off
Somalia. However as this section explains, it is very challenging (if not impossible) to assess
the extent to which ISPS Code security measures have become ingrained amongst contracting
governments, ships and port facilities.
The IMO has emphasised that ‘ … although a ship or a port facility may operate in accordance
with an approved security plan, unless all contracting governments put in place and maintain
the necessary arrangements to address all the objectives and the functional requirements of the
ISPS Code, the actual level of security will not be enhanced’. 117 Since the ISPS Code’s entry
into force on 1 July 2004, whilst several short book chapters have overviewed the legislative
and institutional arrangements used by a select number of contracting governments to
implement the ISPS Code.118 In comparison to LRIT systems, in relation to which as [4.3.2.2]
explains the International Mobile Satellite Organisation has an auditing function through its
role as LRIT Coordinator, the IMO does not have a central oversight and auditing function for
the ISPS Code.119 Nevertheless as outlined below, reports from port state control regimes and
the IMO provide both positive and negative indications on how rigorously the ISPS Code has
been implemented internationally; and the IMO has also expressed concerns regarding delays
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and inconsistencies in reports from contracting governments about their implementation of
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 security measures.

Reports by regional Port State Control regimes on ship detentions for maritime security-related
deficiencies since 2005 show that the proportion of such detentions has thus far been
comparatively low, as depicted in Table 11 below. Whilst SOLAS Regulation XI-2/9 enables
port states to exercise various control and compliance measures with respect to ships (including
port state control inspections), in relation to maritime security such inspections are limited to
verifying that the ship has a current ISSC; and such inspections will not normally extend to
examining Ships’ Security Plans except in very limited circumstances. 120 It can therefore be
said that the low numbers of port state control detentions for maritime security-related
deficiencies provide limited indicia about the extent to which ISPS Code security measures
have been implemented and applied within SOLAS ships worldwide.
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Table 11: Summary of Port State Control detentions of ships for maritime securityrelated deficiencies: 2005 - 2011
MOU
Latin American
MOU121

2005
569
(3.7%)

2006
942
(5.2%)

2007
1004
(3.9%)

2008
774
(3.1%)

2009
508
(2.3%)

2010
442
(2.1%)

194
(0.8%)

451
(1.9%)

225
(0.9%)

410
(1.5%)

471
(2.1%)

437
(2.0%)

2011

West and Central
African MOU122
Black Sea MOU123

No
stats

41
(0.2%)

60
(0.4%)

32
(0.2%)

59 (0.3%)

4
(0.92%)
57
(0.3%)

817
(1.3%)

735
(1.1%)

775
(1.0%)

951
(1.1%)

764
(1.0%)

865
(1.3%)

2011
(2.3%)

2750
(2.95%)

Caribbean MOU124
Indian Ocean MOU125
Mediterranean
MOU126
Paris MOU127

2 (2.4%)

64 (0.3%)

Riyadh MOU128
Tokyo MOU129

2933
(2.75%)

Source: Compiled by author from statistics in the annual reports of regional port state control regimes
for the years between 2005 and 2011130

Reports from the IMO MSC indicate raise concerns that whilst several contracting
governments are noted to rigorously and continually monitor, test and evaluate compliance
with the requirements and recommendations of SOLAS Chapter XI-2, other contracting
governments (and maritime industry participants) have appeared to simply “pay lip service” to
such requirements – for example, not undertaking (or falsifying) further training and testing of
121
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Ship Security Plans, Port Facility Security Plans and ISSCs (as applicable) once these
authorisations are approved and granted.
The IMO’s progress report on the implementation of the ISPS Code tabled at the 79th session
of the MSC on 24 September 2004131 noted considerable progress having been made,
particularly in the number of training courses provided in developing regions.132 However this
report also noted that implementation levels had varied, with the approval of Port Facility
Security Plans in Africa,133 Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States134
being slower than the global average.135
In his opening remarks to the MSC at its 80th session in May 2005, the IMO Secretary-General
noted ISPS Code security measures leading to reductions in both the number of reported thefts
in security-restricted port facilities and in the number of reported stowaways since 1 July 2004.
However he noted with concern indications that some contracting governments had not given
full effect to all provisions of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, and that levels of
stringency in implementing, adhering to and enforcing such measures were reported to have
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been relaxed in some instances. He concluded by urging all contracting governments to take
any necessary corrective actions without delay.136
The 81st session of the MSC in May 2006 received reports from the International Chamber of
Shipping (ICS)137 and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions,138 as well as
several written and verbal reports from contracting governments about the failures of port and
coastal states to notify the flag state when exercising control and compliance measures – thus
raising serious concerns about the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 internationally.139
Immediately following MSC 81, the MSC issued Circular 1194,140 which formally
acknowledged these concerns141 and urged contracting governments, if they had not already
done so (almost two years after the entry into force of the ISPS Code), to establish appropriate
national oversight programmes for ensuring compliance with SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the
ISPS Code.142
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IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eightieth Session, IMO MSC 80th Session, Agenda Item
24, IMO Doc MSC 80/24 (24 May 2005), 5.4
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IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: The effective implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the
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Facility Security Officers being absent from port facilities and failing to respond to calls for assistance from ships
under attack by armed robbers
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Item 5, IMO Doc MSC 81/5/8 (14 February 2006). Based on surveys of unions representing around 700,000
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been denied access to shore leave after long voyages – with many seafarers feeling they had been looked upon as
“potential terrorists”
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May 2006)
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continuing difficulties faced by seafarers in accessing ships and shore leave; officials in several contracting
governments disregarding access control requirements on board ships subject to the ISPS Code; contracting
governments failing to notify flag states when exercising control measures against ships under SOLAS regulation
XI-2/9; and contracting governments providing incomplete, outdated or inaccurate information to the IMO for
inclusion on the IMO’s Global Integrated Shipping Information System, pursuant to SOLAS regulation XI-2/13
(Communication of information)
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IMO Effective Implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code IMO Doc MSC.1/Circ.1194 (30
May 2006) Annex (Guidance on basic elements of national oversight programmes for SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and
the ISPS Code) – which urged that national oversight programmes should ensure that contracting governments
meet their obligations under SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code; verify that their ships and port facilities
comply with the ISPS Code and continually apply their approved security plans; ensure their officials conduct
themselves in a manner conducive to the aims and objectives of the ISPS Code; and promptly take appropriate
corrective actions in relation to non-compliance with the ISPS Code.
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The MSC at its 81st session in May 2006 also approved the release of two circulars providing
guidance for contracting governments and operators of SOLAS ships and port facilities to
undertake voluntary self-assessments of their preventative security arrangements for ships143
and port facilities144 through detailed questionnaires.145 These questionnaires asked contracting
governments about their arrangements for implementing and ensuring compliance with
SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code;146 arrangements for the conduct, approval and reassessment of Port Facility and Ship Security Assessments and Port Facility and Ship Security
Plans;147 arrangements for setting and communicating changes to security levels to ships and
port facilities;148 and (if applicable) delegation of tasks and duties to Recognised Security
Organisations.149 More detailed questions were included for operators of SOLAS ships and
port facilities.150 Although SOLAS Regulation XI-2/13 does not require contracting
governments to report compliance with the ISPS Code by ships flying their flag, these two
circulars invited contracting governments to report the results of the experience gained from
the use of these circulars in assessing their maritime security arrangements to the IMO MSC.
However, as outlined below, responses to these invitations by contracting governments have
thus far been quite scant.
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IMO Guidance on Voluntary Self-Assessment by Administrations and for Ship Security IMO Doc
MSC.1/Circ.1193 (30 May 2006)
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IMO Guidance on Voluntary Self-Assessment by SOLAS Contracting Governments and by Port Facilities IMO
Doc MSC.1/Circ.1192 (30 May 2006)
145
As the content of these questions was largely similar in both IMO MSC Circulars – with some minor differences
between the questions applicable to ships in MSC.1/Circ 1193 and to port facilities in MSC.1/Circ 1192 - for the
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Including details of Designated Authorities, national implementing legislation, guidance to industries, means
of communication with ships, shipping companies and port facilities regarding ISPS Code implementation,
processes in place to document initial and subsequent compliance, the designation of points of contact for ships
to request assistance and report security incidents, guidance provided to officials for exercising control and
compliance measures against ships, the adopted definition a Port Facility, details of bilateral or multilateral
agreements with other Contracting Governments on alternative security agreements, port facilities authorised to
implement equivalent security arrangements, and the arrangements for notifying and updating the IMO with
information in accordance with SOLAS regulation XI-2/13
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Contracting Government, and for notifying ships of contact details, and the procedures used to determine when a
Declaration of Security is required, and the minimum timeframe that a Declaration of Security is required to be
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Including the oversight measures in place to ensure the integrity and independence of such organisations
150
Including organisational arrangements for ensuring the performance of security duties; access control
arrangements; arrangements for monitoring the areas surrounding port facilities and ships – and also restricted
areas within port facilities; arrangements for controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects to and from
ships; arrangements for the supervision of the handling of cargo and ship’s stores; ensuring the effectiveness and
protection of security communication equipment and procedures; and the conduct of training, drills and exercises
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The MSC at its 86th session in June 2009 received two positive reports in response to the
invitations in MSC Circulars 1192 and 1193 from the Islamic Republic of Iran 151 and from
Singapore.152 Several contracting governments welcomed these reports, with some delegations
providing verbal reports on actions taken to implement the requirements and recommendations
of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code.153
The 87th session of the MSC in May 2010 received a report from Colombia154 on the outcomes
of the 2009 Third Latin American Forum on Maritime and Port Security. This forum had
examined issues arising in the region after five years’ implementation the ISPS Code, and
consensus was reached about the importance of continuing to ensure the requirements and
recommendations of the ISPS Code were continually and actively implemented. 155 Members
of the Spanish delegation who had attended the Latin American Forum emphasized the
importance of continually ensuring the training of port facility personnel in security matters.156
MSC 87 also received a verbal report by the observer from the African Union (AU) – who
advised that the last meeting of the AU held in Durban in April 2010 had adopted an updated

IMO Measures to enhance maritime security: A brief report on how the ISPS Code has been implemented –
Measures taken to enhance security policies and activities: Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran MSC 86th
Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 86/4/1 (11 March 2009) – which reported no security incidents had
occurred in Iran’s ports or territorial waters; that ISPS Code security measures had not adversely affected the
smooth operation of its ports; and that it was ready to share its experiences with other contracting governments.
Iran also advised it had used MSC.1/Circ.1192 and MSC.1/Circ.1194 to tailor security assessment tools to meet
its national requirements
152
IMO Measures to enhance maritime security: Guidance on port facility security audits: Submitted by
Singapore MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 86/4/4, (1 April 2009), 1 – 7. Singapore reported it
had actively participated in multilateral and bilateral capacity building programmes to share expertise and
contribute to technical assistance – including to the APEC ISPS Code Assistance Programme and contributing to
maritime security-related courses in Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand under Japan’s Maritime
Transport Security Programme for ASEAN countries. Singapore was also the first international port to participate
in the US Coast Guard’s International Port Security Programme, which sought to share best practices; and advised
Singapore was prepared to further share its experience and exchange of ideas with other contracting governments
to enhancement maritime security internationally
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Item 26, IMO Doc MSC 86/26 (12 June 2009), 4.5
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IMO Measures to Enhance Maritime Security: Report of the Third Latin American Forum on Maritime and
Port Security: Submitted by Colombia IMO MSC 87th Session, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc MSC 87/4/1 (18 January
2010)
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shipping concerns and private security companies; training bodies in the maritime and ports sector and the security
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African Charter on Maritime Transport, and had resolved to increase efforts to ensure maritime
safety and security in waters off the coast of Africa.157
The 88th session of the MSC in December 2010 noted with concern the absence of responses
from contracting governments to the self-assessment guidance and questionnaires released at
MSC 86 in June 2009.158 The 89th session of the MSC in May 2011 received a report from the
Republic of Korea,159 and at its 90th session in May 2012, the MSC received a report from
Australia.160 Aside from these submissions, and despite repeated urgings from the MSC for
contracting governments to submit responses at MSC 86,161 MSC 88,162 MSC 89163 and MSC
90,164 it remains to be seen whether contracting governments will respond to the IMO’s
repeated invitations to report on their voluntary self-assessments of their maritime security
arrangements.

The IMO has also expressed concerns regarding the slowness of many contracting governments
to communicate updated information about Port Facility Security Plans as required by SOLAS
Regulation XI-2/13.4.165 For instance, the MSC at its 87th session in May 2010 noted with
concern that an audit by the IMO Secretariat of port facility security information in the IMO’s
Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GSIS) had found that less than 50 out of 159
contracting governments had advised the IMO about updates to port facility security plans since
157
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SOLAS Regulation XI-2/13.4 - which states that ‘Contracting Governments shall, at five year intervals after 1
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any amendments thereto) which will supersede and replace all information communicated to the Organisation
pursuant to paragraph 3, during the preceding five years’.
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1 April 2009; and that many contracting governments had not advised updates such as changes
to the national authorities and/or individuals responsible for ship and port facility security.166
A year later, the 89th session of the MSC in May 2011 noted a similar review by the IMO
Secretariat finding that for a significant proportion of port facilities subject to the ISPS Code,
updates on security plans had not been advised to the IMO since initial port facility security
plans were approved prior to 1 July 2004.167 Similar concerns were noted by the MSC at its
91st session in December 2013,168 and its 92nd session in June 2013.169 These repeated urgings
by the IMO for contracting governments to ensure the provision of accurate and timely
information about their maritime security arrangements, nearly ten years after the ISPS Code’s
entry into force, call into question the extent to which SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
have become accepted internationally amongst contracting governments.

[4.2.7]

Prospects for the ISPS Code to prevent maritime terrorism incidents: Best

case / worst case scenarios factors

Whilst SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code have put in place an internationally consistent
security risk management framework since its entry into force in July 2004, this framework is
not a perfect one without limitations. As [4.2.2] to [4.2.5] explained, since the ISPS Code’s
entry into force in July 2004, contracting governments have preferred to address the recognised
limitations of the ISPS Code through developing voluntary guidance rather than extending its
mandatory application. Whilst [4.2.6] noted several positive reports about the implementation
of the ISPS Code by contracting governments, it also identified several concerns being
expressed within the IMO – particularly regarding delays and inconsistencies in the provision
of up-to-date information by contracting governments about maritime security arrangements
to the IMO, and low response rates by contracting governments to voluntary self-assessment
questionnaires about their experiences in implementing ISPS Code security arrangements.
These considerations make it very challenging (if not impossible) to make an overall
assessment about the extent to which the security measures mandated and recommended by
166
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the ISPS Code have become genuinely accepted amongst contracting governments and within
maritime industries.

Nevertheless, taking account of the observations made in [4.2.2] to [4.2.6], it is possible to
identify six generalised factors which will influence the likelihood of “best case” and “worst
case” scenarios of the SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and ISPS Code security measures lessening the
scope for the occurrence of maritime terrorism incidents.

The first factor would be the size and type of vessel involved in a maritime terrorism incident.
A “best case” scenario could be more likely to apply if larger vessels subject to the ISPS Code
preventative security requirements170 were targeted (examined in Chapter 5); utilised for
perpetrating one or more of the dangerous or disruptive actions examined in Chapter 6; or being
used as a means of enabling the perpetration of subsequent terrorist attacks on land (examined
in Chapter 7). By contrast a “worst case” scenario could be more likely to apply if smaller
vessels (particularly fishing vessels) not subject to the ISPS Code preventative security
requirements were involved. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 discuss the extent to which large and small
vessels have been either targeted or utilised by terrorists.

The second factor would be whether terrorists controlled the vessel involved in a maritime
terrorism incident in the first instance. A “best case” scenario could be more likely to apply if
terrorists did not have either complete or partial control171 over vessels in the first instance that
were either being targeted (examined in Chapter 5); being utilised for perpetrating one or more
of the dangerous or disruptive actions examined in Chapter 6; or as a means of enabling the
perpetration of subsequent terrorist attacks on land (examined in Chapter 7). For instance, if
terrorists sought to hijack a large vessel and then utilise to perpetrate dangerous or disruptive
acts examined in Chapter 6, rigorously-implemented security measures (discussed in the third
point below) could lessen the scope for hijacking attempts to succeed. Conversely a “worst
case” scenario would clearly apply if terrorists had control over the vessel in the first instance.

The third factor would be the rigour of the application of the security measures mandated and
recommended by the ISPS Code by the SOLAS ships and other entities interfacing with it,

170
171

Or other maritime security arrangements as required by contracting governments
For instance a sympathiser within the ship’s crew
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including port facility operators, and government authorities.172 Compared to the “vessel
interdiction provisions” of UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA Conventions (examined in Chapters 6
and 7), which are only exercised by the authorities of States when necessary to interdict vessels,
as explained in [4.2.1], as a risk management framework, the ISPS Code measures need to
implemented and maintained continuously - not just at the times when Ship and Port Facility
Security Plans are audited and approved.

On the basis of his maritime industry experience and discussions with ship owners and crews,
Murphy explains that ‘ ... it is likely that ISPS will only succeed if owners and managers in the
ship and port industries are convinced that the increased costs will either yield commercial
benefits or be borne equally by competitors, not just in their own countries but around the
globe. It will also succeed only once an active, day-to-day commitment to security has been
accepted, and demonstrated, by seamen and port workers at all levels, whatever their training
and background. Results to date have therefore been patchy but progress is being made’. 173
[Emphasis added]

Along similar lines, Jones noted anecdotal evidence of many Ship Security Plans having been
applied in an “off the shelf” manner, rather than being carefully tailored to address the
characteristics of individual ships. He also noted reports of complacency about security
developing after Ship Security Plans have been approved – with these two factors resulting in
a tendency towards a “box-ticking” compliance mentality towards maritime security matters.174
When considered in light of the negative indications about the ISPS Code’s implementation in
[4.2.6], and the fact that ISPS Code security arrangements remain confidential for security
reasons, such anecdotal evidence may well be the best “indicator” of the extent to which the
ISPS Code security measures and recommendations may be applied “at the coalfaces” of
maritime industries – that is ships and port facilities which could be subject to terrorist targeting
and/or utilisation. Taking account of the above observations, Table 12 below formulates several
generalised factors likely to influence whether a “best case” or “worst case” scenario of ISPS
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Code security measures would be more likely to apply and therefore lessen the scope for the
occurrence of maritime terrorism incidents.
Table 12: “Best case” / “Worst case” scenarios: Rigour of implementation
Non-rigorous implementation: Worst case
Rigorous implementation: Best case scenario
scenario
Well thought out / researched
Hastily drawn up
Customised
Applied “off the shelf”
All personnel having effective training
Brief / superficial training
Well / regularly rehearsed
Complacency
Genuinely accepted
Regarded as a burden
Understood by all crew etc
Not understood / only understood by a few
Access to ship / port continually controlled
Access to ship / port lax
Consistency between all relevant entities
Variations between relevant entities
Communication between all entities
Lack of communication between relevant entities
Vigilance
Inattentiveness
Comprehensively audited by authorities
Treated as a “box-ticking” exercise
Continuously evaluated and adjusted if needed
Remaining static

To illustrate the above points, a large ship in which preventative security measures were
genuinely accepted and well-rehearsed, and where the crew maintained a vigilant awareness of
vessel movements in the vicinity would be more likely to be identify (and possibly evade) a
vessel-based terrorist attack. Conversely in a large ship where such measures were not wellaccepted and rehearsed, the chances of evading such attacks might well be decreased.
Similarly, rigorous access controls within both port facilities and aboard vessels could decrease
the scope for terrorists to smuggle weaponry or operatives onto a vessel to be transported to
another location to enable subsequent terrorist attacks; whereas lax access controls might
increase the scope for such utilisations of vessels.

The fourth factor would be whether a maritime terrorism incident involved an entity subject
to the ISPS Code - such as a security-regulated port facility or offshore platform. Chapter 5
considers “best case” scenarios of vessels being targeted by terrorists from inside securitycontrolled port facilities or controlled land areas; and “worst case” scenarios where attacks
were launched from outside these controlled confines as being less “preventable”. Chapter 7
considers best case scenarios where terrorists might seek to transfer weaponry or terroristconnected persons within a regulated port facility; and worst case scenarios where terrorists
might seek to do so outside the “ship/port interface”; or at even clandestinely at sea.
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The fifth factor would be the form of a maritime terrorist attack. A “best case” scenario would
be more likely to apply where terrorists launched a “more manageable” form of attack such as
a “negotiable” hostage-taking. However as Chapters 2 and 3 explained, such attacks are not
characteristic of contemporary terrorism – with Chapter 5 showing such tactics being more
characteristic of attacks by pre-contemporary terrorist groups and by pirates. Conversely a
“worst case” scenario would be more likely to apply where terrorists launched a “more
challenging” forms of attack – involving either an overwhelming amount of force such using
an explosives-laden small boat in a suicide attack as in the USS Cole and MV Limburg
bombings discussed in [3.3]; or if they utilised unconventional forms of attack such as ramming
an aircraft into a target vessel.

The sixth factor would be the effectiveness of government oversight and response capabilities.
A key factor would be the coordination of SSAS175 arrangements – with [4.2.5] noting several
concerns regarding how these arrangements might function in the event of a maritime terrorist
attack. A “best case” scenario would be more likely to apply where an SSAS alert was actioned
immediately by the threatened vessel’s flag state, and/or where authorities in the vicinity of the
threatened vessel’s vicinity were able to promptly render assistance. Conversely a “worst case”
scenario would be more likely to apply where an SSAS alert was not actioned immediately by
the threatened vessel’s flag state, and/or where authorities in the vicinity of the threatened
vessel’s vicinity were not able to promptly render assistance. Other measures that could
influence the effectiveness of such measures would be the timeliness and accuracy with which
changes to security levels were promulgated to ships and port facilities by the authorities of
contracting governments;176 control over vessel movements in sensitive areas such as in
proximity to major ports; and the ability of law enforcement or naval forces to render assistance
to vessels under threat of attack in a timely manner. After reviewing how the various forms of
maritime terrorism have previously occurred, and might occur in future, Chapters 5, 6 and 7
apply the above best and worst case factors to analysing the prospects for ISPS Code security
measures to prevent maritime terrorism incidents.

175
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Ship Security Alert Systems: SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Regulation 6
SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Regulation 7
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[4.3]

SOLAS CHAPTER V VESSEL IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING

MEASURES

This section analyses the prospects for the AIS and LRIT regulations under Chapter V of
SOLAS to lessen the scope for terrorists to target and/or utilise vessels through facilitating the
identification and tracking of vessel movements – over short ranges in the case of AIS, and
long-ranges in the case of LRIT. The section focuses on examining developments relating to
these requirements since their entry into force.

[4.3.1]

Automatic Identification Systems

Since 31 December 2004, all ships over 300 gross tonnes engaged on international voyages,
cargo ships over 500 gross tonnes not engaged on international voyages, and all passenger ships
irrespective of size have been required to be equipped with Automatic Identification Systems
(AIS).177 AIS must be capable of automatically providing information about the ship’s identity,
type, position, course, speed, navigational status to other safety-related information to
appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft; receive such information
automatically from similarly fitted ships and monitor and track other shipping movements; and
exchange data with shore-based facilities.178

The IMO has explained that the intent of AIS (which is estimated to apply to around 40,000
ships) is to lessen the scope for vessel collisions through facilitating automatic transmissions
of ships’ navigational information at regular intervals – including the identification of vessels,
the tracking of targets and reducing the necessity for the verbal exchange of navigational
information – thereby improving situational awareness.179 Whilst SOLAS Chapter V
Regulation 19 requires AIS to be in operation when ships are underway or at anchor, the IMO
has acknowledged if ships’ masters believe the operation of AIS might compromise the safety
or security of the ship (for instance in areas where pirates and armed robbers are known to
operate), the AIS may be switched off.180
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Whilst reducing the scope for vessel collisions, several shortcomings of AIS within the
maritime security context have been identified. These include the limited range of AIS systems;
the less than universal implementation of AIS (meaning that AIS cannot facilitate the
identification of all large commercial vessels); the potential for AIS system malfunctions to
lead to the transmission of incorrect and/or misleading information; the less than complete
coverage of AIS in certain parts of the world; and the possibility that AIS may contribute to
the “information overload” affecting ship's bridge teams.181

However the most significant identified shortcoming of AIS is the free availability and
accessibility of AIS information – given that AIS signals are broadcast and able to be received
by anyone with an appropriate receiver (which are commercially available for a few hundred
dollars), and with AIS data having been commonly accessible via the internet. This has raised
concerns about pirate and maritime terrorist groups monitoring AIS transmissions in order to
track and select vessels to target.182 Anecdotal evidence indicates these concerns have
prompted numerous ships’ masters to deactivate their AIS transmitters within maritime areas
of known pirate activity.183
These concerns have been acknowledged by the IMO’s MSC – which at its 79th session in
December 2004 condemned the publication of AIS data on the internet, urged contracting
governments to discourage such practices, and also urged masters of vessels not to deactivate
their AIS transponders due to such concerns.184 However almost five years later the 86th session
of the MSC in June 2009 noted there had been no clear evidence of Somali pirate groups having
utilised AIS to target ships in that no arrested pirate vessels had been found to be equipped with
AIS receivers.185 This may have influenced the recommendation within counter-piracy
guidance (discussed in [5.2.2]) that vessel masters should not deactivate their AIS transponders

Martin Murphy ‘Lifeline or Pipedream? Origins, Purposes and Benefits of Automatic Identification Systems,
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while transiting the High Risk Area.186 However in light of the reasoning in Chapter 3 that in
comparison to localised pirate groups, terrorists might attack at a wider range of locations, and
carefully plan attacks on vessels, the shortcomings of AIS noted above cannot be ignored.
Chapters 5 and 6 consider how AIS might function in practice in providing advanced warning
of maritime terrorist attacks, and Chapter 9 argues that the IMO should continue to actively
facilitate international efforts to further address the concerns noted above about AIS in the
maritime security context.

[4.3.2]

Long Range Identification and Tracking

The 2002 IMO Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security resolved to develop measures to
enable the long range and tracking (LRIT) of ships in order to complement the preventative
security measures introduced by the ISPS Code.187 Following extensive negotiations within the
IMO, provisions to mandate the LRIT of larger ships engaged on international voyages were
introduced into SOLAS through Chapter V Regulation 19-1, with these provisions being
unanimously adopted by the MSC at its 81st session in May 2006.188

SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1 applies to specified ships engaged on international
voyages189 and mobile offshore drilling units190 - which are required to transmit specified
‘LRIT information’ about the ship. Such LRIT information (which must be able to be received
by the ship’s flag state) includes the ship’s identity, its latitudinal and longitudinal location,
and the date and time of the position reported191 anywhere in the world;192 by contracting
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Consideration and adoption of the resolutions and recommendations and related matters, SOLAS/CONF.5/34, 17
December 2012. Cited in Martin Tsamenyi and Mary-Ann Palma ‘Legal Considerations in the Implementation of
Long-range Identification and Tracking Systems for Vessels’ (2007) 13 Journal of International Maritime Law
42 - 43
188
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-First Session IMO MSC 81st session, Agenda Item
25, IMO Doc MSC 81/25 (24 May 2006), Annex 2
189
Which include passenger vessels, including high speed craft; and cargo ships, including high speed craft, of
300 gross tonnage and upwards: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1/2.1 .1 and .2
190
SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1/2.1/.3
191
SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1/5
192
SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1/8.1/.1 – provided the ship is not located within waters landward of the
baselines of another SOLAS Contracting Government
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governments for ships that have indicated their intention to enter their port facilities.193 Coastal
states may receive LRIT information from ships navigating at distances of up to 1000 nautical
miles from their coastlines.194 SOLAS Regulation 19.1/8.2 requires contracting governments
to specify and communicate to the IMO their policies pertaining to the receipt of LRIT
information as provided under SOLAS Regulation 19.1/8.2.

Overseen by the International Mobile Satellite Organisation (IMSO) as LRIT Coordinator, the
LRIT system consists of six inter-related components. These including the shipborne LRIT
information transmitting equipment, Communication Service Provider(s), Application Service
Provider(s), National, regional and cooperative LRIT Data Centre(s) (including any related
Vessel Monitoring System(s)), LRIT Data Distribution Plans and the International LRIT Data
Exchange.195

Several potential shortcomings and uncertainties regarding the LRIT system have been noted
within maritime security studies. First196 the restricted application of LRIT to larger ships, and
the exclusion of many smaller ships such as fishing vessels,197 which frequently operate within
proximity to sensitive offshore installations, often undertake significant international voyages,
and which could conceivably be utilised for a range of nefarious purposes to threaten maritime
security,198 has been criticised as a significant gap in the application of LRIT.199 Second, it has
been noted that the limited scope of LRIT information would not be sufficient, on its own, to
determine whether a vessel constitutes a security threat to nearby state(s) 200 – and that
additional information and intelligence would usually be required to determine what, if any,
action(s) should be taken in relation to ‘suspicious’ ships.201 Third, it is also unclear what
measures States might permissibly take against suspicious ships based on the receipt of LRIT
193

SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1/8.1/.2
Provided such ships are not located within waters landward of the baselines of another contracting government;
or within the territorial sea of the vessel’s flag state: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1/8.1/.2/.3 and /.4
195
IMO ‘Long Range Identification and Tracking: Overview’
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/safety/navigation/pages/lrit.aspx Accessed 1 October 2013
196
Similarly to criticisms of the lack of internationally consistent application of the ISPS Code to smaller vessels:
see [4.1.4] above
197
Notwithstanding that many fishing vessels are subject to national and/or regional vessel monitoring systems:
Martin Tsamenyi and Mary-Ann Palma ‘Long-Range Identification and Tracking Systems for Vessels: Legal and
Technical Issues’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyds MIU Handbook of Maritime
Security (CRC Press, 2009), 217
198
The various ways that terrorists have previously successfully utilised, and attempted to utilise, fishing vessels
for nefarious purposes are overviewed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7
199
Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 197, 217; Murphy, above n 181, 21
200
Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 187, 42
201
Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 187 42
194
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information,202 with SOLAS Chapter V emphasising that LRIT does not create or affirm any
new rights of States, nor does it prejudice any existing rights for States.203 When discussing
Maritime Domain Awareness (which by analogy, could be extended to LRIT) Perry raised the
possibility that ‘ ... failure [by a vessel] to report location information could be viewed as the
rough equivalent of driving [a car] with a broken tail light – and might establish reasonable
suspicion to conduct an interdiction’.204 Finally, concerns were expressed by several States
during the IMO LRIT negotiations about the confidentiality of LRIT information.205 As a
result, the final version of SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1 requires contracting
governments to give undertakings to implement measures to safeguard the confidentiality of
LRIT information.206
SOLAS Regulation 19.1 entered into force on 1 January 2008.207 At that time it was envisaged
around one year would be sufficient to enable contracting governments to establish and test
their LRIT systems, with such systems to be operational no later than the first radio survey
after 31 December 2008, or in the case of ships operating in Sea Area A4208 – no later than the
first radio survey after 1 July 2009.209 However the predictions of Tsamenyi and Palma that
practical, financial and legal concerns associated with LRIT system might delay its timely
implementation210 have proven valid. None of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee’s reports
before the 88th session of the MSC in December 2010 included statistics about the
implementation of LRIT by contracting governments; however as outlined below the
implementation levels progressively and significantly improved since early 2011.

Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 197, 224; Jason Krajewski ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind? A Case for Long Range
Identification and Tracking of Vessels on the High Seas’ 56 (2008) Naval Law Review 219
203
SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1/1 provides that ‘Nothing in this regulation or the provisions of performance
standards and functional requirements adopted by the Organisation in relation to the long-range identification and
tracking of ships shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction or obligations of States under international law, in
particular the legal regimes of the high seas, the exclusive economic zone, the contiguous zone, the territorial seas
or the straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea lanes’. Cited in Martin Tsamenyi and MaryAnn Palma ‘Long-Range Identification and Tracking Systems for Vessels: Legal and Technical Issues in Rupert
Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyds MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press,
2009), 224
204
Timothy Perry ‘Blurring the Ocean Zones: The Effect of the Proliferation Security Initiative on the Customary
International Law of the Sea’ (2006) 37 Ocean Development and International Law, 43
205
Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 197, 225
206
Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 187, 47
207
Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 197, 228
208
‘Sea Area A4’ refers to the remote polar regions:
http://www.inmarsat.com/Maritimesafety/gmdss1.htm
209
Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 197, 229
210
Tsamenyi and Palma, above n 197, 228
202
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At the 88th session of the MSC in November 2010, 98 out of the 159 contracting governments
(69 per cent) had communicated their national policies on the receipt of LRIT information as
required by SOLAS Regulation 19.1/8.2, 10 (6 per cent) had communicated part of this
information and 51 (32 per cent) had not communicated any such information to the IMO.211
The MSC also noted that 59 LRIT Data Centres212 were operating in the live production
environment, 11 Data Centres were still undergoing testing and four Data Centre had not yet
started testing.213 Six months later, the 89th session of the MSC in May 2012 noted that as at 6
May 2011, 64 Data Centres214 were operating in the production environment, and that 10 Data
Centres were still undergoing testing.215 Whilst it noted a report from Canada about problems
in receiving LRIT information entering its ports,216 it also noted that the LRIT International
Data Exchange217 and observed that the majority of Data Centres operating in the production
environment had satisfactorily completed modification testing.218 The 89th session of the MSC
also noted positive feedback received by the IMO Secretariat regarding the LRIT Information
Distribution Facility which had been established at IMO Headquarters to provide flag state
LRIT information to NATO and other European naval forces operating around the Gulf of

211

IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda
Item 26, IMO Doc MSC 88/26 (25 December 2010), 6.2
212
Which were providing LRIT services to 87 SOLAS Contracting Governments
213
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda
Item 26, IMO Doc MSC 88/26 (25 December 2010), 6.2
214
Which were providing LRIT services to 93 SOLAS Contracting Governments – the LRIT IDE reports that as
at April 2011, LRIT Data Centres for the following states were connected to the LRIT IDE in the production
environment: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Comoros, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia,
Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines,
Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Bermuda (United Kingdom), Cayman
Islands (United Kingdom), Isle of Man (United Kingdom), Faroe Islands (Denmark); and also the EU Cooperative
LRIT Data Centre (which provides LRIT services to 27 EU member states, as well as Iceland and Norway), the
Brazil Regional LRIT Data Centre, the Pacific Cooperative LRIT Data Centre, and the Information Distribution
Facility located at IMO Headquarters in London (which is discussed in the next paragraph)
215
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Ninth Session IMO MSC 89th session, Agenda
Item 25 IMO Doc MSC 89/25 (27 May 2011), 6.6
216
IMO LRIT-Related Matters: Report on the performance of the LRIT system from a port State tracking
perspective: Submitted by Canada IMO MSC 89th Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MSC 89/6/7 (15 March
2011)
217
Since 2 March 2011 the LRIT International Data Exchange has been operated by the European Maritime Safety
Agency in Lisbon, Portugal – with the United States Coastguard (which operated the interim LRIT International
Data Exchange) providing a disaster recovery site: IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its EightyNinth Session IMO MSC 89th session, Agenda Item 25 IMO Doc MSC 89/25 (27 May 2011), 6.12 – 6.17;
http://www.emsa.europa.eu/see-also-lrit-ide/171-lrit-international-data-exchange/471-long-range-identificationinternational-data-exchange-lrit-ide.html Accessed 1 July 2012
218
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Ninth Session IMO MSC 89th session, Agenda
Item 25 IMO Doc MSC 89/25 (27 May 2011), 6.10
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Aden for counter-piracy duties. Naval force commanders had advised that LRIT information
received through the LRIT Information Distribution Facility had been ‘invaluable’ in helping
them to build a more accurate picture of the commercial ships operating in areas of high piracy
risk – thereby enabling the optimal deployment of naval resources to protect transiting
commercial ships.219 Therefore, the first “operational test” of the value of LRIT information
(and indeed the LRIT system overall) can be seen as being a successful one.

Recent reports to the IMO on audits of national and regional LRIT Data Centres undertaken by
the International Mobile Satellite Organisation (IMSO) as LRIT Coordinator have been quite
positive. These reports have found nearly all LRIT Data Centres to be substantially in
compliance with the technical and operational requirements of the LRIT system during the
periods examined by the audits - including 4 for the period 18 November 2009 to 9 April
2010,220 17 (and the LRIT International Data Exchange) for the period 10 April 2010 to 21
September 2010,221 and 15 (and the LRIT International Data Exchange) for the period 22
September 2010 to 7 March 2011.222 For the most recent reported period from 7 March 2011
to 8 December 2011,223 39 LRIT Data Centres audits were reported as satisfactorily

219

IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Ninth Session IMO MSC 89th session, Agenda
Item 25 IMO Doc MSC 89/25 (27 May 2011), 6.19
220
IMO LRIT-related matters: Summary Audit Reports of the LRIT Data Centres: Note by the Secretariat IMO
MSC 87th Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MSC 87/6/8 (16 April 2010). These LRIT Data Centres included
Bahamas, Brazil, Canada and Marshall Islands
221
IMO Summary audit reports of the International LRIT Data Exchange and LRIT Data Centres: Note by the
Secretariat IMO MSC 88th Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MSC 88/INF.14 (21 October 2010) These LRIT
Data Centres included Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Belize, Cayman Islands (United Kingdom),
Chile, European Union Cooperative Data Centre; India, Isle of Man (United Kingdom), Jamaica, Japan, Liberia,
Republic of Korea, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, United States and Vanuatu
222
IMO Summary audit reports of the International LRIT Data Exchange and LRIT Data Centres: Note by the
Secretariat IMO MSC 89th Session, Agenda Item 6, IMO Doc MSC 89/INF.14 (8 March 2011) These LRIT Data
Centres included Bahrain, Bermuda (United Kingdom), China, Croatia, Faroe Islands (Denmark), Indonesia,
Jordan, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Panama, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sierra Leone and
South Africa
223
IMO Consideration of LRIT-related matters: Summary audit reports of the LRIT Data Centres: Submitted by
the International Mobile Satellite Organisation, Sub-Committee on Radio Communications and Search and
Rescue 16th Session, Agenda Item 13, IMO Doc COMSAR 16/13/1 (9 December 2011)
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completed,224 17 audits (including the LRIT International Data Exchange) as being in
progress,225 two as overdue,226 one as cancelled227 and one as not progressing.228

So overall, as at 1 October 2013 it may be confidently concluded that despite the initial delays
in its implementation, the LRIT system has achieved widespread acceptance internationally;
that it has been objectively judged to function as required; and that the information derived
through the LRIT system has already been proven to be of “maritime security value” in the
counter-piracy context. However the uncertainties regarding the measures that contracting
governments may permissibly take based on LRIT information noted in above still remain, and
it remains to be seen whether any legal or jurisdictional problems relating to LRIT will arise in
future.

[4.4]

2003 REVISED SEAFARER IDENTITY DOCUMENTS CONVENTION

Since 9/11 concerns have been raised that terrorist and criminal groups might exploit
vulnerabilities in the availability (and ease of forgery) of seafarer identification
documentation.229 At the same time, it has been recognised that due to the demanding nature
and isolation of their work, seafarers need access to shore leave, and for these reasons, should
not remain confined to their vessels while in ports.

[4.4.1]

224

Provisions of the 2003 SID Convention

Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil RDC,
Canada, Cayman Islands (United Kingdom), China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, European
Union CDC, India, Isle of Man (United Kingdom), Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Liberia, the Marshall Islands,
Mauritius, Montenegro, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United
States and Vanuatu:
225
Algeria, Bermuda (United Kingdom), Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Ecuador, Faroes (Denmark), Jordan, Kenya,
Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, South Africa, and the LRIT IDE
226
Meaning the LRIT Data Centre did not cooperate with IMSO within the time frame required to enable the
satisfactory completion of an audit of its performance (Pacific and Venezuela)
227
Meaning the LRIT Data Centre declined to be audited (Bangladesh)
228
Meaning the LRIT Data Centre had not communicated its acknowledgement to the audit at the time of the
report (Indonesia)
229
See for example Martin Rudner ‘Misuse of Passports: Identity Fraud, the Propensity to Travel and International
Terrorism’ (2008) 31(2) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 95 and Martin Tsamenyi, Mary Ann Palma and Clive
Schofield ‘International Legal Regulatory Framework for Seafarers and Maritime Security Post-9/11’ in Rupert
Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyds MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press,
2009), 237 – 238
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To strike a balance between these two competing concerns, the 91st session of the International
Labour Conference in June 2003, agreed to update and extend the requirements of the 1958
Identity Documents Convention (1958 SID Convention).230 The outcome of this process was
the 2003 Revised Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (2003 SID Convention),231 which
requires signatory states to ensure that seafarers subject to their jurisdiction are issued with
verifiable identification documents that minimise the scope for forgery or tampering.232
Such identification documents are required to incorporate several features – including the
name, contact details and official seal or stamp of the issuing authority; date and place of issue;
a digital or original photograph of the seafarer; and certain information about the seafarer –
including his or her full name; date and place of birth; nationality; special physical
characteristics that may assist identification and signature. Also required to be included is the
expiration date, conditions, and identification number of the identity document – as well as
mechanisms to enable the biometric identification of the seafarer.233
The term ‘seafarer’ is broadly defined by Article 1(1) of the 1958 SID Convention to mean: ‘
... any person who is employed or is engaged or works in any capacity on board a vessel, other
than a ship of war, ordinarily engaged in maritime navigation”. Furthermore, Article 1(2) of
the 1958 Convention provides that ‘In the event of any doubt whether any categories of persons
are to be regarded as seafarers for the purpose of this Convention, the question shall be
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention by the competent authority of
the State of nationality or permanent residence of such persons after consulting with the
shipowners' and seafarers' organizations concerned’. Article 1(3) of the 2003 Revised
Convention provides that the term ‘seafarers’ may be extended to include persons involved in
commercial fishing.234 Article 4 of the 2003 Revised SID Convention requires state parties to
develop and maintain a National Electronic Database as a facility for storing records of each
seafarer’s identity document issued, suspended or withdrawn by it. Furthermore, Article 4(4)
requires state parties to designate a permanent ‘focal points’ [of contact] for responding to
230

Seafarers Identity Documents Convention, opened for signature 13 May 1958, ILO Convention No. 108
(entered into force 19 February 1961)
231
Seafarers Identity Documents Convention (Revised), opened for signature 19 June 2003, 2304 UNTS 121
(entered into force 9 February 2005)
232
2003 SID Convention Article 2
233
2003 SID Convention Article 3
234
It provides that ‘After consulting the representative organizations of fishing-vessel owners and persons working
on board fishing vessels, the competent authority may apply the provisions of this Convention to commercial
maritime fishing’
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inquiries, from the immigration or other competent authorities of all members of the ILO,
concerning the authenticity and validity of the seafarer’s identity document issued by its
authority, and Article 4(5) provides that the details requested shall at all times be immediately
accessible to the immigration or other competent authorities in member states of the ILO, either
electronically or through the focal point required in Article 4(4).

[4.4.2]

Implementation status of 2003 SID Convention

The 2003 SID Convention entered into force on 9 February 2005, and as at 1 October 2013,
has been ratified by 24 States.235 A 2005 summary of the 19 States that supply the highest
number of seafarers showed a high level of acceptance of the 2003 Revised SID Convention –
including by the Philippines (second highest supplier), Russia (sixth highest supplier),
Indonesia (seventh highest supplier), Croatia (fifteenth highest supplier) and Brazil (eighteenth
highest supplier).236

Providing it is implemented thoroughly and consistently by the state parties, the 2003 Revised
SID Convention could contribute to harmonising international efforts to lessen the scope for
terrorist groups to utilise fraudulent identification documentation to facilitate their movements
internationally. However, as [7.3.2] reasons, the checking of such enhanced identity
documentation would normally be restricted to formal entry points into a state (for example
international ports). If for example terrorists and/or criminal groups sought to enter a state at a
remote location, it is possible that such identity documentation may not be subject to such
checking.

[4.5]

CONCLUSION

This chapter explained how the ISPS Code and other SOLAS Chapter XI maritime security
measures have developed an improved framework for consistently managing maritime security
risks. It undertook the first comprehensive analysis of how the recognised limitations of the
ISPS Code have been addressed within the IMO since its entry into force in July 2004. This
International Labour Organisation ‘Ratifications of C185 – Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention
(Revised), 2003 (No. 185)’
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312330;
Accessed 1 October 2013
236
Cited in Tsamenyi, Palma and Schofield, above n 229, 235
235
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review highlighted both encouraging and concerning indications, as well as the preference
amongst contracting governments to address these limitations through the development of
voluntary guidance, rather than extending the compulsory application of the ISPS Code. It also
explained how it is impossible to make an overall assessment about the extent to which the
ISPS Code has become ingrained internationally, particularly due to the potential unreliability
of information provided to the IMO by contracting governments. Therefore, it articulated the
factors likely to influence the prospects for the ISPS Code to succeed in lessening the scope for
maritime terrorism incidents to occur. The “best case” and “worst case” scenarios developed
with these criteria are considered against the previously successful, attempted, planned and
postulated maritime terrorism incidents in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. For the vessel identification
and tracking measures under SOLAS Chapter V (AIS and LRIT), it noted whilst these measures
have contributed to improved maritime security, several uncertainties remain – particularly the
actions States might take based on LRIT information. Finally it explained how the 2003
Revised SID Convention has contributed to lessening the scope for terrorists to travel
internationally under fraudulent seafarer identification documentation.

Chapter 5 analyses the prospects for ISPS Code preventative security measures to succeed in
lessening the scope for terrorist attacks on vessels from the five sources noted in the Threat
Matrix.237 After reviewing the previous instances of successful, attempted, planned and
postulated terrorist attacks on vessels, it applies the “best case” / “worst case” scenarios of the
ISPS Code. It reasons that the scope for many terrorist attacks on vessels may be significantly
lessened through rigorously-implemented preventative security measures. It also distinguishes
the patterns of vessel-based attacks by maritime terrorists from those of pirates, and explains
the different consequences this has for the application of preventative security measures.
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That is, from other vessels, from the land, from beneath the surface, from within the vessel and from the air

CHAPTER 5
COUNTERING TERRORIST TARGETING OF VESSELS

[5.1]

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter analyses the prospects for SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, and AIS, to
prevent terrorists from targeting (ie attacking) high profile vessels.1 Terrorist targeting of high
profile vessels has accounted for around 193 of the 228 (85 per cent) recorded maritime terrorist
attacks since 1968.2 The chapter examines how terrorist attacks on vessels have previously
occurred, been attempted or planned, and postulated by maritime security specialists – showing
the geographical and jurisdictional locations of these attacks, fatalities resulting, the increasing
use of suicide tactics, and types of vessels involved.3 Vessel-based attacks (accounting for most
attacks) are examined first, followed by attacks from land locations, from inside the vessel,
from beneath the surface and finally from the air.
The application of the “best case / worst case” scenario factors for considering the likely
success of the ISPS Code from Chapter 4 highlights the importance of security measures being
rigorously and continuously applied by ships, port facilities and contracting governments to
preventing terrorist attacks on vessels. The Chapter also argues there are both positive and
negative inferences to be drawn from the maritime sector’s experiences in preventing
(comparatively more prevalent and predictable) vessel-based attacks by pirates around the Gulf

This Chapter addresses the fourth sub-question posed in [1.2.2], namely ‘(4) Considering how maritime terrorism
incidents have previously occurred, and might occur in the future, how might the international agreements apply
in practice in preventing maritime terrorism incidents?’ Chapters 6, 7 and 8 also address this question.
2
As [1.4] explained, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are ordered according to the “lead warning time” for the maritime
terrorism incidents they examine. Because terrorist attacks on vessels could occur with little or no “lead warning
time”, they are examined in this Chapter - before Chapters 6 and 7 which examine terrorist utilisations of vessels
– as these maritime terrorism incidents would involve longer “lead warning times”. Also, terrorist targeting of
vessels would be the most imminent of the forms of maritime terrorism conceptualised by the Threat Matrix
3
As [1.6.1] explained, because this Study examines many statistics about terrorist attacks, statistical trends and
notable case studies are discussed in the chapters to illustrate the arguments of the Study, with complete details
being recorded in the appendices. Appendix G summarises all maritime terrorist attacks. It records the following
information about successful maritime terrorist attacks: (i) Date; (ii) Location and status of attacked vessel (OP =
Offshore Platform, U = Underway, P = In port, A = At anchor); (iii) Perpetrators; (iv) Attacked vessel; (v) Method
and effect of attack; (vi) Maritime Terrorism Threat Category; (vii) Injuries; (viii) Fatalities and (ix) Source of
information. However As [3.5.2] noted, in several cases the source of previous terrorist attacks on vessels (that is,
from another vessel, the land, beneath the waterline, within the vessel or from the air) were not stated, and whilst
the best efforts have been made to ascertain more precise details about such incidents, this has not been possible
in all cases – meaning that 59 previous maritime terrorist attacks are recorded in Appendix Gas ‘Target:
Unknown’.
1
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of Aden since 2005. It reasons that whilst preventative security measures have been
demonstrably effective in deterring pirate attacks since 2005,4 it would be erroneous to
uncritically assume that fanatical terrorists prepared to martyr themselves 5 would be deterred
by the prospects of apprehension as economically-motivated pirates have been. It also reasons
that while the experience of preventing vessel-based attacks by pirates may have honed security
arrangements aboard commercial vessels, such vessels should not completely “drop their
guard” once outside the Somali High Risk Area where they might be the target of an
unanticipated terrorist attack.

[5.2]

COUNTERING TERRORIST TARGETING OF VESSELS FROM OTHER

VESSELS

[5.2.1]

Threat context: Previous occurrences

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

At least 67

2

8

6

Vessel-based attacks on high profile vessels account for the highest number of recorded
successful maritime terrorist attacks between 1968 and 2013. Appendix G records at least 67
of the 228 recorded maritime terrorist attacks (29 per cent) being vessel-based, with these
attacks resulting in 173 fatalities. Notable examples have included the 2000 suicide attack by
an explosives-laden dinghy on the USS Cole in Aden Harbour, Yemen killing 17 and injuring
39, and the 2002 suicide attack by an explosives-laden speedboat on the oil tanker MV Limburg
off the Yemeni coast, killing 1 and injuring 12 crew members, which were discussed in [3.3.1].

Vessel-based terrorist attacks have been reasonably consistent between 1968 and 2011,
averaging around one to three attacks per year. Attacks have occurred in several locations,
including around the Caribbean region (mostly during the 1970s and early 1980s), Southeast

4

[5.2.2] explains that whilst the ISPS Code was introduced in response to the 9/11 attacks to lessen the scope for
terrorist incidents, the IMO has acknowledged ISPS Code security measures are also applicable to preventing
attacks on vessels by pirates and armed robbers. Additionally, whilst this Study focuses on maritime terrorism it has significantly been the first to undertake a detailed review of the effectiveness of the SOLAS Chapter XI-2
and other preventative security arrangements in preventing attacks on commercial vessels by pirates from the IMB
Annual Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships since 2005 (notwithstanding the acknowledged
problems of under-reporting of pirate attacks on vessels)
5
As in the USS Cole and MV Limburg attacks
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Asia (with many attacks occurring in the Philippines and Indonesia), throughout the
Mediterranean Sea, off the coast of North West Africa (with attacks around the Niger Delta
becoming prominent from 2006 onwards), Yemen and the Red Sea, the Irish Sea and Sri Lanka.
The yearly numbers of attacks were high in 1994 (four), 1997 (five), 2006 and 2007 (four each)
and 2008 (seven), with most of those attacks being perpetrated by the LTTE around Sri Lanka.
A range of vessel types have been targeted through vessel-based attacks – including cargo ships
(19), fishing vessels (17) – but mostly in areas where there have been long-running conflicts,
petroleum industry vessels (eight), naval vessels (six), tankers (six), passenger ferries (four),
yachts and sailing vessels (three), and cruise ships (one). The vessel types for seven targeted
vessels were not specified.

Around 30 vessel-based attacks resulting in hostage-takings have occurred continuously
between 1968 and 2013. However since 2006 these maritime hostage-takings have been largely
confined to the Niger Delta region and perpetrated by groups such as MEND – which as [3.3]
noted, are regarded more as insurgents than as terrorists. This reflects the trend noted in
Chapters 2 and 3 about the decreasing prevalence of “negotiable” hostage-takings by
contemporary terrorist groups. Around 25 “stand-off” attacks (whereby terrorists fire rockets
or grenades at the target vessels) have also occurred between 1968 and 2013. The most deadly
“stand-off” attack was perpetrated by the LTTE on 9 September 1997, involving the firing of
rocket-propelled grenades from speedboats at the Chinese ship MV Cordiality whilst it was
underway off the coast of Pulmoddai, Sri Lanka – killing 37 and injuring 10,6 and ranking as
the third most deadly maritime terrorist attack.7 Furthermore, since 1997 the LTTE and AlQaeda-linked groups have perpetrated seven “significant casualty” vessel-based attacks
(resulting in over ten fatalities per attack);8 whereas before 1997 vessel-based attacks caused
only around one to two fatalities per attack. This illustrates the points made in [2.5.1] and
[3.3.1] about the increased tendency of contemporary terrorist groups to perpetrate significant
casualty attacks.

6

RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents: http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php; National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
7
After the bombings of Super Ferry 14 (killing 116) and Our Lady of Mediatrix (killing 40), which are discussed
in [5.3.2]
8
As [3.3.1] explained, given that maritime terrorist attacks have only constituted around 2 per cent of all recorded
terrorist attacks since 1968, this Study notes attacks involving more than 10 fatalities as “significant casualty”
attacks – which are summarised in Appendix G ‘Chronology of successful maritime terrorist attacks: 1961 – 2013’
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However the most notable aspect of vessel-based attacks by contemporary terrorist groups
since around 2000 has been the prevalence of suicide attacks involving explosives-packed
small boats being rammed into target vessels. Aside from the attacks on the USS Cole and MV
Limburg by Al Qaeda-linked groups, and one attack by an unknown perpetrator off Oman in
2010, five vessel-based suicide attacks have been perpetrated by the LTTE between 2000 and
2008 – with fatalities ranging from 14 to 17 per attack. Examples of such suicide attacks include
the LTTE detonating five small boats alongside the Sri Lankan Navy oil tanker Silk Pride
whilst it was underway off Point Pedro, Sri Lanka on 30 October 2001, killing 10 and disabling
the vessel,9 and on 22 March 2008 an LTTE speedboat exploding alongside a Sri Lankan Navy
Super Dvora patrol boat, killing 14.10 Furthermore, several vessel-based attacks by the LTTE
have involved multiple “attacking” vessels. For example on 11 May 2006, 15 small boats
attacked the Sri Lankan troop ship Pearl Cruise II, killing 17,11 and one month later on 29 June
2006 around 20 small boats hiding amongst fishing vessels launched attacks on several Sri
Lankan naval vessels around 100nm north of Colombo, again killing 17.12 Whilst coordinated
attacks such as those perpetrated by the LTTE have thus far been confined to Sri Lanka, they
nevertheless illustrate the scope for determined non-state actors to perpetrate coordinated
attacks within the maritime domain. Relevantly, [2.5.1] noted that simultaneously-coordinated
suicide attacks being characteristic of attacks by contemporary terrorist groups.

Whilst most vessel-based attacks have involved speedboats as the attacking vessel, it is also
conceivable that terrorists could utilise large vessels as kinetic ramming weapons – which
[6.2.1.4] examines. As Appendix G notes, most (at least 25) vessel-based attacks have occurred
while the target vessel has been underway, however the target vessels’ distances from land
have either not been specified, or described vaguely (for example ‘in international waters’ or
‘off the coast of xxx’). Four vessels have been attacked whilst at anchor, and one (the USS
Cole) was attacked whilst alongside in port.

9

RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents: http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php; National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
10
Martin Murphy Small Boats, Weak States and Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern
World (Hurst & Company 2009), 319
11
Murphy, above n 10, 317
12
Murphy, above n 10, 317 - 318
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In addition to the successfully perpetrated vessel-based attacks discussed above, two recorded
attempts by terrorists to attack high-profile naval vessels with explosives-packed small boats
in 2000 also evidence the resolve of contemporary terrorist groups to perpetrate significant
casualty, suicide attacks. On 3 January 2000 an Al Qaeda-linked group had attempted to launch
a suicide attack on the destroyer USS Sullivans in Aden Harbour, Yemen, and whilst this heavy
explosives-laden dinghy sank, the lessons learned from this attempt were applied a year later
in the USS Cole bombing.13 Later that year on 7 November 2000, members of Hamas attempted
to detonate a fishing boat within proximity of an Israeli patrol craft north of Rafah in the Gaza
Strip; however this vessel exploded prematurely.14

Furthermore, numerous reports have indicated plans by Al Qaeda and associated groups such
as Jemaah Islamiah (JI) to launch vessel-based attacks on high profile vessels. The use of
explosives-packed zodiac speed boats to ram warships and other ships was reportedly part of
Al Qaeda's ‘Four Pillars’ maritime strategy developed by its former chief of maritime
operations Abd al-Rahmin Al Nashiri, nicknamed Al Qaeda's ‘Prince of the Sea’.15 US Navy
warships around Southeast Asia have reportedly been targets for such plans. In early 2000
Tafiq Muhammed Saleh bin Roshayd bin Attash (one of the alleged planners of the USS Cole
bombing) had reportedly plotted attacks on visiting US Navy ships in Malaysia in 2000, 16 and
less than a year later Malaysian intelligence reportedly foiled a plan to attack a second US
ship.17 In December 2001, members of JI had reportedly planned attack attacks on US naval
vessels docked at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base;18 in January 2002 Singaporean intelligence
officials discovered sophisticated and detailed reconnaissance of US naval facilities and ships
in the region by JI members, with plans to launch multiple simultaneous attacks against US
warships around Singapore in the following months;19 and similar attacks on US naval vessels

13

Michael Richardson A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 17 – 18; Peter Lehr ‘Maritime Terrorism: Locations,
Actors and Capabilities’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of
Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008), 68
14
Joshua Sinai ‘Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism’ (March 2004) 3(1) The Quarterly Journal, 61;
Murphy, above n 10, 296; Tanner Campbell and Rohan Gunaratna ‘Maritime Terrorism, Piracy and Crime’ in
Rohan Gunaratna (ed) Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response (Eastern University Press 2003), 71
15
Richardson, above n 13, 20
16
Richardson, above n 13, 24
17
Richardson, above n 13, 24
18
‘Sweeping Asian Terror Alliance Uncovered’ CNN 19 September 2002 Cited in Catherine Zara Raymond
Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Paper No.
74, March 2005, 16; Richardson, above n 13, 23 - 24
19
Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 14, 77
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were reportedly planned by JI around August 2003.20 The Mediterranean has also been within
the sights of planned vessel-based attacks by Al Qaeda-linked groups. Three suspected
members of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb were arrested by Moroccan authorities in June
2002 for reportedly planning to attack US, UK and Israeli merchant and naval vessels transiting
the Straits of Gibraltar,21 and Turkish intelligence reports revealed indications of Al Qaeda
operative Lauai Sakka planning to attack Israeli cruise ships ‘in international waters’ with
explosives-packed speedboats in mid-2005.22

Finally, maritime security specialists have postulated scenarios of vessel-based terrorist
attacks on high profile vessels at least six times, with these scenarios envisaging the use of
small explosives-packed speedboats to attack warships, oil tankers, cruise liners and ferries. In
2005 Bateman and Bergin outlined four scenarios of vessel-based attacks on high profile
vessels, and also noted ports and Southeast Asian waterways as being possible locations for
such attacks. The scenarios they postulated included ‘ ... an attack23 on ships transiting the
Indonesian or Philippines archipelagos carrying trade to or from Australia’; ‘ … a small-boat
suicide attack against a high-value target such as a warship, cruise liner, ferry or oil tanker
alongside in an Australian port, or moving within the port’; ‘ … an attack against a cruise liner
or passenger ferry, including a harbor ferry’; and ‘ … an attack on a warship, especially a US
Navy vessel, alongside in an Australian port, or a Royal Australian Naval vessel in an overseas
port'.24 In 2006 Greenberg et al discussed two scenarios of terrorists using ‘ ... a small, highspeed boat to attack an oil tanker … to affect international petroleum prices or cause major
pollution’; and also ‘directly targeting a cruise liner or passenger ferry to cause mass casualties
by … ramming the vessel with a fast-approach, small, attack craft’.25

Whilst many of the significant maritime terrorist attacks reviewed above such as the Cole and
Limburg bombings occurred over ten years ago, and while the most recent reported attempts
and plans occurred before the LTTE’s military defeat in 2009, [2.8] concluded that there are

Peter Day ‘US Fears Terrorist Attack in the Straits of Malacca’ Financial Review 16 June 2003, 2. Cited in
Zara-Raymond, above n 18, 14
21
Campbell and Gunaratna, above n 14, 77; Richardson, above n 13, 19 – 20
22
Akiva Lorenz The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel (International Institute for Counter Terrorism) 24
September 2007, 23
23
However Bateman and Bergin did not specify the source of such an attack
24
Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin Future Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime Security
(Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005), 35 (Scenarios 4, 5, 6 and 7)
25
Michael Greenberg, Peter Chalk and Henry Willis Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability (RAND Corporation:
2006), 27 (Scenarios 6 and 7)
20
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no grounds for concluding that the threat of terrorism globally has disappeared. This means
that the possibility of terrorist attacks involving vessels cannot be entirely ruled out, and could
conceivably occur with little or no warning. Chapter 2 also showed that attacks by
contemporary terrorist groups have occurred at a wide range of locations around the world, and
have been perpetrated with considerable lethality through the use of innovative tactics. Chapter
4 reinforced the importance of continual vigilance at all times through the rigorous application
of ISPS Code preventative security measures in order to prevent the occurrence of maritime
terrorism incidents.

[5.2.2]

Comparative analysis: Countering vessel-based attacks by terrorists and

by pirates

Since around 2005, vessel-based attacks by pirates on commercial vessels have increased
significantly, dwarfing maritime terrorist attacks in their regularity. The majority of these pirate
attacks have occurred around the Gulf of Aden26 and also in the waters of Western Africa –
although recorded pirate attacks in Southeast Asian waters have decreased due to concerted
efforts by State authorities in this region.27 A 2010 study estimated piracy and armed robbery
against ships to have cost the international community between $7 to 12 billion per year. 28 As
explained below, these increases in pirate attacks have prompted several international
developments – including the development of regional maritime security cooperation
frameworks, the deployment of multinational naval taskforces around the Gulf of Aden to
protect commercial vessels, UN Security Council mandates for the interdiction of pirate
vessels, and increased preventative security guidance developed through the IMO for
26

Pirate attacks on vessels around the Gulf of Aden between 2008 and 2012 have accounted for at least one quarter
of all reported actual and attempted pirate attacks on commercial vessels worldwide. These statistics are derived
from the 2011 Annual ICC-International Maritime Bureau Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,
5 – 6. According to the present author’s calculations, the percentages of actual and attempted pirate attacks on
commercial vessels in these areas in comparison to the global total were: 2008 = 31 per cent; 2009 = 37 per cent;
2010 = 18 per cent; and 2011 = 18 per cent
27
Sam Bateman ‘Regional maritime security: Threats and risk assessments’ in Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (eds)
Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power (Routledge, 2010), 101. For a discussion of the
maritime security cooperative efforts between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia which since 2005 have
contributed to this reduction (including cooperative Malacca Straits Sea Patrols and the “Eyes in the Sky”
maritime air patrols), see Robert Beckman ‘Maritime security and the cooperative mechanism for the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore’ in Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (eds) Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian
Naval Power (Routledge, 2010), 114 – 126
28
This figure includes costs of ransoms, increased insurance premiums, re-routing ships, security equipment
aboard vessels, naval forces, prosecutions, piracy deterrent organizations and costs to regional economies Anna
Bowden, Kaija Hurlburt, Eamon Aloyo, Charles Marts and Andrew Lee The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy
One Earth Future Working Paper, 2010). Cited in Review of Maritime Transport, 2011 United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, 29
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commercial vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden.29 Not surprisingly, as the following sections
reason, since around 2005 threats of piracy and armed robbery against ships have come to
assume comparatively greater prominence than terrorism on maritime security agendas.30
While threats of piracy remain high, there are numerous indicators that preventative security
measures mandated and recommended by SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code including
the sounding of alarms, implementation of evasive manoeuvres, activations of Long Range
Acoustic Devices (LRADs) and the presence of on-board security (including Privately
Contracted Security Personnel (PCASP),31 combined with the presence of coalition naval
forces ready to assist ships under threat of pirate attack, have been effective in deterring vesselbased attacks on commercial vessels by pirates since 2005. Although [4.2.1] explained the ISPS
Code was developed following the 9/11 attacks to lessen the scope for maritime terrorism
incidents, the IMO has also acknowledged that the ISPS Code is equally applicable to lessening
the scope for pirate attacks against vessels.32

After reviewing the various responses to piracy around the Gulf of Aden since 2005, [5.2.2.6]
reasons that both positive and negative inferences for countering vessel-based terrorist attacks
may be drawn from the combination of international efforts to counter pirate attacks on vessels
since around 2005. It cautions that fanatical contemporary terrorists (possibly intending to ram
ships with explosives-packed craft in suicide missions) may well not be deterred from attacking
by measures such as embarked security personnel or the prospects of apprehension from
approaching coalition naval forces to the same extent as economically-motivated Somali
pirates have demonstrably been. Nor can it be assumed that naval and other forces always be
within one hour’s response time following the activation of distress or SSAS alerts as they have
been in Gulf of Aden. [5.2.2.6] argues that in order to counter less localised and predictable
maritime terrorist attacks, ships need to be continually vigilant – and not “drop their guard”
29

As [5.2.2.5] explains, this guidance has been developed cooperatively between the IMO and the International
Chamber of Shipping
30
Although responses to a 2007 survey on seafarers’ risk and threat perceptions by the Nautilus International
Seafarers Union noted that 53 per cent of respondents considered terrorism as the major threat compared to 43 per
cent considering piracy the major threat, it is possible these comparative percentages may have changed in recent
years. Cited in Murphy, above n 10, 190
31
This abbreviation is widely used within maritime security publications
32
The IMO’s ‘Frequently Asked Questions on the ISPS Code’ answer the question ‘Will the new security
measures imposed after 1 July 2004 will help reduce the piracy and armed robbery incidents?’ by stating
‘Logically it should be so. In the months leading up to the 1 July 2004 deadline of the ISPS Code, there has been
a reduction in the number of incidents reported to have occurred during the first quarter of 2004. There could be
a possible correlation between the two but only a careful monitoring over a longer period would give a firm
indication of the long-term trend in this respect.’ IMO Frequently Asked Questions: Maritime Security:
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/FAQ/Pages/Maritime-Security.aspx Accessed 1 November 2012
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once out of the Somali High Risk Area – given that (as [5.2.1] showed) maritime terrorist
attacks have occurred, and have been attempted, planned and postulated to occur at wider range
of locations.

[5.2.2.1]

Distinguishing maritime terrorism from piracy

Figure 6 below depicts the generalised distinctions and overlaps between the motives and
profiles of piracy and maritime terrorism. [5.2.2.5]33 illustrates the points made in Figure 6
about the economic goals of pirates34 influencing the profiles of their attacks, and in particular,
pirates being deterred by various security measures and the prospects of apprehension. By
contrast, as Chapters 2 and 3 explained, and as [5.2.1] further demonstrated, the political and
ideological and goals of maritime terrorists frequently drive them to seek attention and
perpetrate as much damage as possible – with several of the significant contemporary maritime
terrorist attacks since the late 1990s involving large casualties and causing significant costs to
maritime industries. More recently Schmid et al made similar observations to those depicted in
Figure 6 when formulating four criteria to distinguish the motives and profiles of terrorist and
organised criminal groups on a global basis.35

33

Effectiveness of preventative security measures against pirate targeting of vessels
The economic goals of piracy are reflected in the ‘private ends’ requirement of UNCLOS Article 101 – which
defines piracy as being ‘(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas,
against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship,
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation
in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act
of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).’ [Emphasis added]
35
Schmid at al noted that terrorist groups are usually ideologically or politically motivated - whereas organised
crime groups are usually profit oriented; secondly that whilst terrorist groups often wish to compete with
governments for legitimacy – whereas organised crime groups do not; thirdly that terrorist groups usually relish
media attention – whereas organised crime groups do not; and fourth that terrorist victimisation is generally less
discriminate than the violence used by organised crime groups: Alex Schmid (ed) The Routledge Handbook of
Terrorism Research (Routledge, 2011), 85
34
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Figure 6:

36

Overlaps and distinctions between piracy and maritime terrorism36

Graham Gerard Ong Ships Can Be Dangerous Too: Coupling Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast
Asia’s Maritime Security Framework Institute of South East Asian Studies Working Paper: International Politics
& Security Issues Series No. 1 (2004), 14
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The comparison between the profiles of piracy and maritime terrorism depicted in Figure 6
above are illustrated in Table 13 below – with the 403 fatalities from the 5,479 recorded37
pirate attacks between 1995 and 2012 standing in contrast to the 624 fatalities from the 228
recorded maritime terrorist attacks between 1968 and 2012. Fatalities from pirate attacks have
been explained to result from botched hijackings, rather than being the intent of pirates. It has
also been noted that fatalities from individual pirate attacks have generally been low, with one
reported exception being the 1998 pirate hijacking of the MV Cheung Son in the South China
Sea - where the pirates killed 23 crew members.38

Table 13:

37

Yearly global summary of piracy attacks and acts of violence, 1995 - 201239

Year

Assaulted

Hostage

Injured

Kidnap
/Ransom

Killed

Missing

Threatened

Total
pirate
attacks

2012

4

585

28

26

6

0

13

662

2011

6

802

42

10

8

0

895

439

2010

6

1174

37

27

8

0

1270

445

2009

4

1050

69

12

10

8

1167

410

2008

7

889

32

42

11

21

1011

293

2007

29

292

35

63

5

3

433

263

2006

2

188

15

77

15

3

317

239

2005

6

440

24

13

0

12

509

276

2004

12

148

59

86

32

30

401

329

2003

40

359

88

0

21

71

644

445

2002

9

191

38

0

10

24

327

370

2001

16

210

39

0

21

0

331

335

2000

9

202

99

0

72

26

480

469

1999

22

402

24

0

3

1

473

300

1998

58

244

37

0

78

0

485

202

1997

23

419

31

0

51

0

643

248

1996

9

193

9

0

26

0

293

228

1995

2

320

3

0

26

0

410

188

Totals

264

8108

709

356

403

199

10102

6141

Regarding the under-reporting of pirate attacks, see Murphy, above n 10, 65 - 72
Murphy, above n 10, 155
39
As at 1 October 2013 the statistics for piracy attacks during 2013 were not yet available
38
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Source: Derived by author’s analysis of the International Maritime Bureau’s Annual Reports
on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships for the years between 1995 and 2012

Furthermore, notwithstanding that Somali pirates have reportedly attacked as far south as the
Seychelles and as far east as the Indian coastline, maritime security specialists generally agree
that piracy is a localised phenomenon, in comparison to the globally-focused phenomena of
contemporary terrorism as outlined in Chapter 2.40 Nevertheless, since 9/11 several assertions
have been made (but also challenged) about linkages between pirate and terrorist groups including claims of ‘pirate to terrorist linkages’ whereby pirates provide training to terrorists,
and terrorist groups deriving funds from piratical activities. Concerns have also been raised
about pirate groups having political objectives which could prompt them to undertake terrorist
acts. Examples include the 2005 attack on the Seabourne Sprit off the coast of Somalia which
was alleged to have been politically motivated, and several reports of GAM engaging in
piratical acts around the coast of Aceh (notwithstanding that linkages between Al Qaeda and
GAM have been questioned).41 However such assertions have been criticised as lacking in
evidence,42 and more likely to be opportunistically short-term rather than long-term and
entrenched.43 Further still, Hansen’s ‘Four Circles Model’ depicted in Figure 7 below shows
the scope for both overlaps and distinctions between piracy, maritime terrorism, insurgency
and organised crime – with several groups reported as previously perpetrating more than one
of these four forms of illegal maritime activity. 44

40

See for example Murphy, above n 10, 123, 177
Murphy, above n 10, 161
42
Murphy, above n 10, 159
43
Schmid et al, above n 35 at 191 also noted ‘... lately the resurgence of piracy off the coast of Somalia has led to
the use of the term “maritime terrorism”. To the extent that civilian sailors are taken hostage and held for ransom,
there are indeed similarities, but this is basically piracy, which is robbery of ships, not terrorism’.
44
Hans Tino Hansen ‘Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The “Four Circles Model” for Maritime Security
Threat Assessment’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyds MIU Handbook of
Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2009), 75 - 78
41
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Figure 7:

Four Circles Model: Piracy, Terrorism, Insurgency and Organised Crime

Source: Hans Tino Hansen ‘Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The “Four Circles
Model” for Maritime Security Threat Assessment’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and
Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008), 78

[5.2.2.2]

International counter-piracy maritime security cooperation frameworks

Since 2004, increases in piracy and armed robbery against ships have prompted the
development of a number of international maritime security cooperation frameworks. The
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia (ReCAAP) has facilitated dialogue, capacity building and practical cooperation against
piracy and armed robbery in Asia amongst its 19 contracting coastal and maritime user states.45
Since November 2006 the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre has facilitated the secure
exchange of information on a 24/7 basis among ReCAAP Focal Points to enable responses to

The nineteen Contracting Parties to ReCAAP are Australia, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei
Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Denmark, the
Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of the Philippines,
the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, the
United Kingdom and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx
Accessed 1 October 2013. ReCAAP was finalised on 11 November 2004, and entered into force on 4 September
2006: Douglas Guilfoyle Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 53
45
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piracy incidents and to gather intelligence about piracy activities.46 The Maritime Organization
of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) has progressively developed a regional maritime
security framework,47 with an IMO-MOWCA forum in October 2005, agreeing to form an
integrated regional coast guard network.48 A meeting of MOWCA ministers in September 2007
agreed to establish coastguard co-ordinating centres in Abidjan, Dakar, Lagos, Pointe Noire,
Accra and Luanda,49 and in April 2008 a meeting of MOWCA governments agreed to the
formalisation of a Memorandum of Understanding for a Subregional Coastguard Network.50

Regional efforts to counter piracy around the Gulf of Aden were significantly advanced through
the formalisation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct on 29 January 2009, which was adopted at
the 102nd session of the IMO Council.51 Modelled on ReCAAP,52 the Djibouti Code of
Conduct facilitates cooperation amongst 20 states around the Gulf of Aden 53 through
information sharing, enabling the interdiction of suspected pirate ships and aircraft, and

Relevantly, Article 9 (Information Sharing) of the ReCAAP Agreement provides, inter alia, that ‘(1) Each
Contracting Party shall designate a focal point responsible for its communication with the Center, and shall declare
its designation of such focal point at the time of its signature or its deposit of an instrument of notification provided
for in Article 18’; and ‘(3) Each Contracting Party shall ensure the smooth and effective communication between
its designated focal point, and other competent national authorities including rescue coordination centres, as well
as relevant non-governmental organizations’.
47
Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)
http://www.amssa.net/framework/MOWCA.aspx, Accessed 1 October 2013
48
This forum was held in Dakar, Senegal from 23 to 25 October 2005, and was attended by around 160 participants
and observers from the 22 Member States of MOWCA – including Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo – as well as representatives of maritime user states and international
organisations: IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Second Session IMO MSC 82nd
session, Agenda Item 24, IMO Doc MSC 82/24 (18 December 2006), 17.19 – 17.23
49
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Third Session IMO MSC 83rd session, Agenda
Item 28, IMO Doc MSC 83/28 (26 October 2007), 19.27
50
Soon after the MoU was adopted and opened for signature, 11 of the 20 coastal Member States of MOWCA,
representing 55 per cent of the membership, immediately signed the MoU (including Cameroon, Cape Verde, the
Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Nigeria, Senegal and Togo), with other MOWCA member states expressing their intent to sign it in due course:
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Fifth Session IMO MSC 85th session, Agenda Item
26, IMO Doc MSC 85/26 (19 December 2008), 18.38
51
IMO Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes: Sub-regional meeting to conclude agreements on maritime security,
piracy and armed robbery against ships for States from the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea
areas: Note by the Secretary-General IMO Council 102nd Session, Agenda Item 14, IMO Doc C 102/14 (3 April
2009) Annex ‘Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden’
52
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item
26, IMO Doc MSC 86/26 (12 June 2009), 18.6
53
Including Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa Sudan, Tanzania, Yemen, Mozambique and the United
Arab Emirates:
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/27-mozambiqueDCOC.aspx Accessed 1 October 2013
46
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enabling the apprehension and/or prosecution54 of persons suspected of being involved in acts
of piracy and armed robbery against ships.55 Similarly to Security Council Resolution 1816
(discussed in [5.2.2.3] below), the provisions of the Djibouti Code of Conduct apply only to
piracy56 and armed robbery against ships,57 with participants committing to cooperate with
other States and stakeholders as necessary to repress piracy.58 Lastly, on a multilateral level,
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (established under Security Council
Resolution 1851 on 14 January 2009) has provided a forum for international counter-piracy
efforts amongst 60 countries59 and 21 international organizations60 through five counter-piracy
working groups.61

Whilst these regional maritime security cooperation frameworks focus specifically on
coordinating the capacities of States to counter piracy, and not maritime terrorism, [5.2.2.6],
and also the concluding Chapter 9, consider the extent to which these counter-piracy
frameworks may have also improved the capacities of States to counter maritime terrorism
Under Article 11 of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (‘Review of National Legislation’), Participants agree to
review their national legislation to ensure there are appropriate national laws in place to criminalise piracy and
armed robbery against ships
55
Article 2 of the Djibouti Code of Conduct
56
Article 4(1) of the Djibouti Code of Conduct
57
Article 5(1) of the Djibouti Code of Conduct
58
Article 6(2) of the of the Djibouti Code of Conduct notes that ‘The Participants recognize that multiple States,
including the flag State, State of suspected origin of the perpetrators, the State of nationality of persons on board
the ship, and the State of ownership of cargo may have legitimate interests in cases arising pursuant to Articles 4
and 5. Therefore, the Participants intend to liaise and co-operate with such States and other stakeholders, and to
coordinate such activities with each other to facilitate the rescue, interdiction, investigation, and prosecution’.
59
These States include Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China ,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives,
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore,
Somali Republic(TFG), Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States of America and Yemen: http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do?action=structure. Accessed 1
October 2013
60
These international organisations include the African Union, the Arab League, the Baltic and International
Maritime Council, the European Union, The European Union External Action Service, European Commission,
the European Police Office, the International Maritime Bureau, the IMO, the International Criminal Police
Organisation, International Chamber of Shipping, the International Group of P&I Clubs, NATO, the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum, the Seaman’s Church Institute, the UN, the Word Food Programme,
Seafarers International Union, the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, the European Naval
Force Somalia, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners
http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do?action=structure Accessed 1 October 2013
61
Working Group 1 (chaired by the United Kingdom) facilitates the coordination of naval forces and promotes
regional capacity development; Working Group 2 (chaired by Denmark) facilitates international cooperation on
the legal and judicial aspects of countering piracy; Working Group 3 (chaired by the Republic of Korea) facilitates
efforts to improve the capacities of shipping industries to counter pirate attacks; Working Group 4 (chaired by
Egypt) facilitates the dissemination of public information about counter-piracy efforts; and
Working Group 5 (chaired by Italy) coordinates international efforts to identify and disrupt the financial networks
of pirate leaders and their financiers: http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?action=work Accessed 1 October 2013
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threats through developing the necessary lines of communication between States to facilitate
the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels.

[5.2.2.3]

Multinational naval deployments and strengthened mandates for

interdicting pirate vessels

In addition to the international maritime security cooperative arrangements noted above, since
2006 a very considerable number of naval forces from various maritime user states have been
deployed around the Gulf of Aden to protect commercial vessels from pirate attacks. Naval
ships and aircraft have been deployed by the European Union as part of Operation Atalanta, by
NATO through Operations Allied Provider, Allied Protector, and Ocean Shield, and as part of
successive US-led combined maritime task forces. Additionally, several maritime user states
have deployed naval resources to the Gulf of Aden independently.62 As [5.2.2.5] notes, these
naval forces have able to quickly respond to assist commercial vessels under threat of attacks
by pirates.

The international legal basis for interdicting pirate vessels around the Gulf of Aden were given
a significant boost through Security Council Resolution 1816, adopted unanimously on 2 June
2008. Resolution 1816 specifically authorised States cooperating with the then Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia to:
‘(a) Enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high
seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law; and (b) Use, within the
territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high
seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.63

62

For the details of naval force deployments into the Gulf of Aden since 2006, see Robin Geis and Anna Petrig
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy Operations in Somalia and the
Gulf of Aden (Oxford University Press, 2011), 17 – 25
63
UNSC Res 1816 (2 June 2008), UN Doc S/RES/1816, paras 7(a) and (b)
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Resolution 1816 emphasised that the authorisation it provided for naval forces of patrolling
states to enter the territorial sea of Somalia applies64 only with respect to the piracy situation
in Somalia, with this authorization being specifically approved by the (then) Somali
Transitional Federal Government. It also emphasised that the Resolution did not affect the
rights or obligations or responsibilities of member states under international law, including
UNCLOS, and that it did not establish any customary international legal norms.65 The mandate
for piracy interdictions provided by Resolution 1816 has been progressively extended for
twelve monthly intervals by five subsequent Security Council Resolutions, and as at 1 October
2013, is still in force.66
Through being specifically limited in its geographical,67 temporal68 and subject matter69 focus,
and emphasising that it does not establish customary international law, Resolution 1816 and its
subsequent extensions contrast to the post-9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council Resolutions
reviewed in [2.7.1] – which have imposed a range of obligations on UN member states that are
neither geographically nor temporally limited. The divergent views amongst international legal
scholars about the extent to which the post-9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council
Resolutions might add further justification to the interdiction of vessels suspected of illicitly
transporting WMD materiel are examined in Chapter 7 (which focuses on UNCLOS) and
Chapter 8 (which focuses on Article 51 of the UN Charter).

[5.2.2.4]

IMO counter-piracy security guidance for commercial vessels

In addition to the considerable numbers of naval forces deployed around the Gulf of Aden,
carefully targeted counter-piracy information has been made available to commercial vessels

64

The present tense was used within Resolution 1816, and is retained here in this present form because as at 1
October 2013, this authorisation is still valid – having been progressively extended by five subsequent resolutions.
See Note 65 below
65
Following receipt of the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Somalia Republic to the United Nations
to the President of the Security Council dated 27 February 2008 conveying the consent of the Somali Transitional
Federal Government: UNSC Res 1816 (2 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1816, para 9
66
UNSC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846, para 10; UNSC Res 1897 (30 November 2009) UN
Doc S/RES/1897 para 7; UNSC Res 1950 (23 November 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1950 para 7; UNSC Res 2020
(22 November 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2020 para 9; and UNSC Res 2077 (21 November 2012) UN Doc
S/RES/2077, para 12
67
That is, through only applying to the area around the Somali territorial sea
68
That is, through only applying for 12 monthly intervals which have been specifically extended
69
That is, through only applying to piracy
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transiting the Gulf of Aden. The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa70 (MSCHOA) and
the UK Maritime Trade Operations Centre – Dubai have been established as security contact
points for vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden through providing piracy alerts, facilitating the
registration of commercial vessel movements, and providing up to date advice for transiting
commercial vessels.71
Since 2009 the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) has promulgated ‘Best Management
Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia’ (BMPs), with the
fourth and current version of these BMPs being released with the approval of the IMO in
September 2011 (BMP 4).72 BMP 4 provides recommendations to operators of ships transiting
the ‘Somali High Risk Area’73 – covering patterns of Somali pirate activity,74 risk assessment,75
typical profiles of pirate attacks,76 vessel reporting procedures,77 company planning,78 ship
masters’ planning,79 and ship protection measures,80 recommended measures in the event of a
military response, and post incident reporting. Of most relevance to this section’s comparison
between countering vessel-based attacks by pirates and by terrorists, BMP 4 firmly cautions
ships’ crews not to resist pirates that succeed in gaining control of the vessel. In such cases,
paragraph 10.3 of BMP4 recommends that ships’ crews should ‘Offer no resistance to the

The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa provides these services through a secure website:
http://www.mschoa.org/, Accessed 1 October 2013
71
Robin Geis and Anna Petrig Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy
Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Oxford University Press, 2011, 28 - 29
72
IMO Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: Best Management Practices
for Protection against Somalia-based Piracy IMO Doc MSC.1/Circ.1339 (14 September 2011), Annex 2
73
Being an area bounded by Suez and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78°E): IMO Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: Best Management Practices for Protection against
Somalia-based Piracy IMO Doc MSC.1/Circ.1339 (14 September 2011), Annex 2, 4
74
Noting the more common times of pirate attacks, and the influence of regional monsoon systems on pirate attack
patterns
75
Including preparation for attacks, use of muster points and barricaded citadels for crews, the influence of the
height of the targeted vessel’s freeboard, and the influence of the targeted vessel’s speed (noting at para 3.4 that
whilst there have been no reported attacks where pirates have boarded vessels travelling at over 18 knots, it is
possible that pirate tactics could develop to enable them to board faster moving vessels)
76
Including the use of mother-ships, typical weapons used by pirates, methods used by pirates to get aboard
targeted vessels and their typical practices once aboard - usually heading to the bridge to gain control of the
targeted vessel, and the times of the day when prate attacks most commonly occur
77
To either UK Maritime Trade Operations Centre – Dubai or the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa
upon initial entry to the High Risk Area, daily reports whilst transiting the High Risk Area, and final reports upon
departure from High Risk Area or arrival in port
78
In terms of planning and preparing ships and their crews for transit through the High Risk Area
79
Including the briefing and training of the ship’s crew, preparing contingency plans, reviewing current warnings,
and navigating in waters where naval forces are concentrated
80
Including watch keeping and vigilance, bridge protection measures, controlling access to sensitive areas of the
ship; the erection of temporary physical barriers (such as razor wire, water sprays and audible alarms),
manoeuvring practice, the use of Closed Circuit Television systems, upper deck lighting, the use of safe muster
points and citadels, and the use of Private Maritime Security Contractors (both armed and unarmed)
70
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pirates once they reach the bridge. Once on the bridge the pirates are likely to be aggressive,
highly agitated, and possibly under the influence of drugs, (including khat, an amphetamine
like stimulant), so remaining calm and cooperating fully will greatly reduce the risk of harm.’
However considering the propensity of contemporary terrorist groups to perpetrate significant
casualty and suicide attacks (for example in the 9/11 attacks where terrorists hijacked
commercial airliners and utilised them as weapons),81 and the contrasts between the motives
and profile of pirate and maritime terrorism in [5.2.2.1], [5.2.2.6] reasons that it would be
erroneous to uncritically assume that fanatical terrorists attempting to hijack a vessel would be
placated to the same extent by cooperative ships’ crews. Chapter 6 discusses the range of
offensive acts that terrorists in control of a hijacked vessel might conceivably undertake.82

Increases in pirate attacks have also prompted the more frequent carriage of firearms for selfdefence purposes aboard commercial vessels, by both ships’ crews and by embarked Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP). However the carriage and use of firearms
aboard commercial vessels has historically been avoided within shipping industries for fears
that it might encourage future attackers to also carry firearms, thereby escalating already
dangerous situations, and also because firearms aboard vessels may become attractive targets
for attackers. Furthermore, the use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the
risk of accidents or wrongful discharges of weapons is considerable. For example, during early
2012 armed security personnel aboard a commercial vessel off the coast of India mistook a
fishing boat in the vicinity of their ship to be a pirate boat and fired at the boat, killing two
people.83 In some jurisdictions, killing a national may have serious consequences even for
ships’ crews acting in self-defence, and the presence of firearms aboard vessels might also
contravene customs laws prohibiting the importation of weapons.84 The IMO has historically
discouraged the carriage of firearms aboard commercial vessels;85 however since December

81

In the film United 93 based on the actual hijacking of United Airlines Flight 93 on 11 September 2001, a
passenger was overheard to remark (in reference to the Al Qaeda hijackers then in control of the aircraft ‘ ... we
should not disturb them – they will ask for ransom and let us go!’ However as events turned out this hoped-for
outcome did not eventuate.
82
Including the utilisation of hijacked vessels as kinetic ramming weapons or as floating bombs against a range
of targets
83
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Ninetieth Session IMO MSC 90th session, Agenda Item
28, IMO Doc MSC 90/28 (31 May 2012), 20.7
84
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item
26, IMO Doc MSC 88/26 (25 December 2010), 18.13
85
In 1993, the 62nd session of the MSC had resolved that ‘The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection
or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged’: IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth
Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item 26, IMO Doc MSC 88/26 (25 December 2010), 18.13
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200886 whilst still discouraging the carriage of firearms, it has taken the approach that the
carriage of firearms and the embarkation of PCASP are matters for flag states to regulate.87 On
this point there is considerable variation the laws of various states – a survey in December 2011
by the International Chamber of Shipping and European Community Shipowners Association
of the laws of 27 flag States88 regarding the carriage of firearms aboard vessels and the
employment of PCASP89 found considerable inconsistency in such laws.90 Most states neither
specifically authorised nor prohibited the carriage of firearms and PCASP, some states
(including Greece and Japan) expressly prohibited it, and a small number of other states
(including Denmark and Singapore) specifically allowed it. For these reasons, the MSC at its
90th session in May 2012 called upon contracting governments to make clear their positions to
the IMO regarding the disembarkation and carriage by PCASP of related firearms, ammunition
and security-related equipment.91 However as at 1 October 2013 there are no indications of
further progress on this issue.

Again whilst as [5.2.2.6] reasons, carefully implemented non-lethal self-defence measures have
been proven to be effective in deterring vessel-based attacks by economically-motivated pirates
and armed robbers, it is questionable whether such measures would be equally effective in
deterring fanatically motivated contemporary terrorists from targeting vessels – meaning that
lethal force may be the only measure that could stop attacks such as the USS Cole bombing. In
that incident the Cole’s crew were precluded by applicable US Navy Rules of Engagement
from firing in self-defence at the attacking dinghy.92
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At its 85th session in December 2008, the MSC agreed there was a need for a full re-examination of the issue of
the carriage of firearms or armed personnel on board merchant vessels: IMO Report of the Maritime Safety
Committee on its Eighty-Fifth Session IMO MSC 85th Session, Agenda Item 26, IMO Doc MSC 85/26 (19
December 2008), 18.10
87
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item
26, IMO Doc MSC 88/26 (25 December 2010), 18.30
88
Including Antigua and Barbuda, Bermuda, Bahamas, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Lithuania, Malta, Marshall Islands, Netherlands,
Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States
89
The International Chamber of Shipping survey used the term “Private Armed Security Guards” – but the
abbreviation PCASP is used here for consistency
90
International Chamber of Shipping and European Community Shipowners Associations Private Armed Guards
Flag State Law: Comparison of Flag State Laws on Armed Guards and Arms on Board December 2011
https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2012/09/04_Antipiracy_shipowner_stay_on_your_toes/~/media/Security/Piracy/Private_Armed_Guards_Flag_State_Laws_June
_2012.ashx, Accessed 1 October 2013
91
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Ninetieth Session IMO MSC 90th session, Agenda Item
28, IMO Doc MSC 90/28 (31 May 2012), 20.11
92
During the USS Cole bombing, when the Cole’s crew saw a second dinghy approaching – because US Navy
rules of engagement applicable at this time prohibited the USS Cole's ship's company from firing upon the
approaching small boat in self-defence without first obtaining permission from the Cole's Commanding Officer
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[5.2.2.5]

Effectiveness of preventative security measures against pirate attacks

Analysis of the Annual Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships published by the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) between 200593 and 201294 indicates that various
preventative security measures have been demonstrably effective in preventing vessel-based
attacks by pirates - particularly around the Gulf of Aden where (as [5.2.2.3] noted),
international naval forces have been on hand to immediately respond to SSAS alerts and
distress messages from vessels threatened by pirate attacks. Measures such as activating SSAS
systems, sounding alarms and/or foghorns, activations of fire hoses, firing of warning shots,
activation of Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD),95 requesting assistance from Coalition
naval forces,96 and taking evasive manoeuvres through increasing speed and changing course
have successfully deterred at least 145 attempted pirate attacks between 2005 and 2012. These
statistics include three attempted attacks in 2005, 7 in 2006, 16 in 2007, 17 in 2008, 19 in 2009,
39 in 2010, 38 in 2011, and 6 in 2012. From these 145 attempted attacks, 79 (55 per cent)
occurred around the Gulf of Aden, 27 in waters and ports around the Gulf of Guinea (19 per
cent), 18 in Southeast Asian waters (13 per cent), 8 occurred in South America (6 per cent), 3
in South Eastern Africa (around Tanzania, Madagascar and Mozambique) (3 per cent), 2 in the
Persian Gulf in Iraqi ports and anchorage (2 per cent), and one attempted attack in an Indian
anchorage (1 per cent).

or authorised delegate. One US Navy Petty Officer later explained that immediately after the attack, he was
ordered not to fire on a second small boat approaching the Cole: ‘With blood still on my face – that’s the rules of
engagement: no shooting unless we're shot at … In the military it's like we're trained to hesitate now. If somebody
had seen something wrong and shot, he probably would have been court-martialed.” Another sailor explained that
if they had fired on the second approaching craft they ‘ … would have been in more trouble for killing two
foreigners than losing 17 American sailors’: Stephen Robinson ‘Bombed US warship was defended by sailors
with unloaded guns’ Daily Telegraph 15 November 2000. While the Cole attack involved issues of military rules
of engagement etc which are outside the scope of this Study, the considerations against that that apply against the
use of force by a vessel subject to targeting from another vessel illustrate the limitations on the ability of nonmilitary vessels to use force to repel attacks from pirates and terrorists.
93
Given that the ISPS Code entered into force on 1 July 2004, the 2005 IMB Annual Report is the first to contain
one complete years’ worth of information on the impact of the ISPS Code
94
As Chapter 1 noted, this Study is the first to methodically investigate the effectiveness of various preventative
security measures in preventing vessel-based pirate attacks since the entry into force of the ISPS Code in July
2004
95
LRAD is a high-intensity directional acoustic hailing system used by military forces and law enforcement
agencies, and which has more recently been deployed as a means of protecting commercial vessels from attacks
by pirates. When activated, LRAD systems emit high intensity sound waves that are intolerably painful and
potentially deafening, forcing attackers or protestors to retreat. See LRAD: Product Overview:
http://www.lradx.com/site/content/view/15/110/, Accessed 1 October 2013
96
Only around the Gulf of Aden
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Whilst Appendix I provides detailed summaries of these attempted attacks and the effect of the
security measures taken,97 the following three sample quotations98 from the IMB Annual
Reports illustrate the effectiveness of preventative security measures in deterring attacks by
economically-motivated pirates – showing how they have been deterred by prospects of
apprehension by approaching naval forces. First ‘Seeing the crew's vigilance, the speedboats
moved away and re-grouped near a fishing trawler in the vicinity’: Attempted attack on the
Indian bulk carrier Murshidabad whilst underway within Indonesian waters on 4 March 2008
by 15-20 speedboats closing to within 5 metres of the stern – which implemented evasive
manoeuvres including increasing speed and broadcast a security message via VHF channel
16.99 Second ‘Seeing the alert crew and the aggressive manoeuvres, the pirates abandoned the
attack’: Attempted attack on the Maltese bulk carrier Eleni G whilst underway in the Gulf of
Aden on 29 January 2009 by six speedboats – which activated its SSAS and audible alarm,
implemented evasive manoeuvres taken, activated its fire hoses activated, and notified coalition
forces notified which arrived on scene 50 minutes later.100 Third ‘The pirates aborted the attack
upon seeing the presence of a warship and two helicopters’: Attempted attack on the Norwegian
bulk carrier Carmencita whilst underway off the Somali coast near Oman on 22 November
2010 by ten armed pirates in two skiffs who chased and fired upon the ship; and attempted to
board it several times - which activated its SSAS, sounded its alarm, increased speed; and
contacted a nearby coalition warship for assistance.101 The above reports of economicallymotivated pirates being deterred by the prospects of apprehension empirically corroborate the
distinctions made by Ong (see Figure 6 above) about the contrasts between the profiles of
piracy and maritime terrorism.
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Appendix I summarises the effectiveness of ISPS Code and other security measures in deterring pirate attacks
on vessels between 2005 and 2012. For each attempted attack it includes the date; the location and navigational
status of the attacked vessel (Underway (U), In port (P), At anchor (A), or Offshore platform (OP)); the name and
nationality of the attacked vessel; details of the attack including the number of attackers, their weapons and means
of transport; details of security measures taken by the targeted vessel; the effect of the security measures taken by
the targeted vessel; and references to the Annual Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships from which
these attempted attacks were reported.
98
Only a few of the entries in the IMB Annual Reports contain such detailed descriptions of the effectiveness of
security measures in deterring pirate attacks – with many other reports simply reporting statistics on attempted
attacks
99
ICC-International Maritime Bureau Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 1 January – 31
December 2008, 71
100
ICC-International Maritime Bureau Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 1 January – 31
December 2009, 86
101
ICC-International Maritime Bureau Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 1 January – 31
December 2010, 85
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[5.2.2.6]

What might the experience in countering pirate attacks portend for

preventing vessel–based terrorist attacks on vessels?

In summary, whilst pirate attacks have been far more prevalent than maritime terrorist attacks
over recent years, and assumed a higher priority on maritime security agendas, [5.2.2.2] to
[5.2.2.6] have reasoned that by virtue of their extremist motives, and demonstrated lethal
profile, vessel-based attacks by contemporary terrorist groups could well be significantly more
deadly and disruptive than attacks by contemporary pirate groups. In fact it may not be until
attackers are actually on board and in control that an attacked vessel’s crew may discover
whether the attackers are pirates seeking to steal and escape from the vessel (who might be
deterred by the possibility of apprehension), or maritime terrorists seeking to perpetrate a
deadly and destructive attack, who might be fanatically prepared to die in the perpetration of
such an attack.102 This section reasons there are both potentially positive and negative
indications about what the “Somali counter-piracy experience” could portend for preventing
vessel-based terrorist attacks against high profile vessels.

First, on the more positive front, the 145 reports of the effectiveness of various preventative
security measures in countering pirate attacks noted in [5.2.2.6]103 could be taken as evidence
of high levels of security alertness within maritime industries, and preparedness of naval forces
to respond to ships under threat of pirate attacks. This could suggest commercial vessels and
naval forces are equally prepared to counter vessel-based attacks by terrorists. However, on the
less positive front, it is worth recalling the distinctions articulated in [5.2.2.1] between the
motives and profiles of piracy and maritime terrorism. All of the 145 reports of the
effectiveness of ISPS and other security measures in deterring pirate attacks summarised in
Appendix I involved pirates abandoning their attacks when targeted commercial ships
increased speed or implemented evasive manoeuvres, or after being deterred by the activation
of extra lighting, audible alarms or LRADs, the firing of warning shorts or flares, or the
prospects of being apprehended by approaching coalition naval forces. By contrast, [3.3.1]
noted indications of fanatical contemporary terrorist groups being motivated to perpetrate
disruptive significant casualty attacks, possibly involving suicide tactics. Therefore it would be

Chapter 6 discusses the range of offensive “9/11-style” acts that terrorists in control of a hijacked vessel might
conceivably undertake
103
These reports are detailed in Appendix I ‘Detailed summary of the effectiveness of ISPS Code preventative
security measures against pirate attacks 2005 – 2012’
102
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erroneous to uncritically assume terrorists would be deterred from attacking by various security
measures to the same extent that pirates have been.

Second, as [5.2.2.1] noted, notwithstanding reports of attacks by Somali pirates extending south
to the Seychelles, and east to the West Coast of India, attacks by pirate groups are
geographically concentrated in specific maritime regions.104 By contrast, as Chapter 2
explained, through the combination of extremist ideologies and the growth of home-grown
terrorism, contemporary terrorism has been recognised to be a global, as opposed to localised,
phenomenon.105 The challenges this presents to States and maritime industries is succinctly
encapsulated in the ‘Comparison of enemy size/tactical footprint and aggregate intelligence
effort between the cold war and the war on terror’ diagram depicted in Figure 3 in [2.7]. The
localised occurrence of piracy activity provides “geographical certainty” to operators of
commercial vessels in terms of knowing the maritime areas where their preventative security
arrangements should be increased – with the sources of preventative maritime security
guidance noted in [5.2.2.5] such as BMP 4 talking of ‘typical pirate attack patterns’. 106 By
contrast, maritime terrorism attacks could not be said to have a similar level of predictability
in terms of locations and methods - which accounts for the extensive number of maritime
terrorism scenarios that have been postulated by maritime security specialists since 9/11 as
noted in [3.4], to which this Study adds greater structure to through the Threat Matrix
developed in [3.5]. Furthermore, [5.2.1] noted that maritime terrorist attacks have occurred at
a wide range of locations around the world.

The localised and predictable profile of Somali piracy has enabled the focused deployment of
naval forces;107 which as [5.2.2.6] explained, have been able to rapidly respond to ships under
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For instance, the ICC-International Maritime Bureau Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 1
January – 31 December 2011 at 5 – 6 notes that 75 per cent of the 439 reported piracy / armed robbery attacks
against shipping during the reported 12 months were reported in the following seven locations: Somalia (160), the
Red Sea (39), Malaysia (16), Indonesia (46), the Gulf of Aden (37), Benin and the South China Sea (13)
105
Murphy, above n 10, 386 – 387 makes similar conclusions
106
IMO Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: Best Management Practices
for Protection against Somalia-based Piracy IMO Doc MSC.1/Circ.1339 (14 September 2011), Annex 2, 9 - 10.
This IMO guidance noted six typical features of pirate attacks – including (i) the common use of two small high
speed open boats (skiffs) often approaching from either quarter or the stern; (ii) common formations of vessels –
including the frequent usage of “mother ships”; (iii) the increasingly frequent use of Rocket-Propelled Grenades
– which are generally focused towards the ship’s bridge and accommodation areas; (iv) positioning of skiffs
alongside the vessel, and the use of lightweight ladders and ropes to access the deck; (v) most attacks taking place
early in the morning; and (vi) the increasing success of targeted vessels in repelling attacks through implementing
appropriate preventative security measures.
107
The deployment of coalition naval forces was overviewed in [5.2.2.3]
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pirate attack. Appendix I records at least 80 activations of SSAS alerts (with the UK Maritime
Trade Operations Centre in Dubai monitoring such alerts) from threatened ships prompting
responses by coalition naval forces – with some warships and helicopters arriving on scene
within one hour of the SSAS activation. However it would be erroneous to uncritically assume
the same swift response would occur in many other parts of the world, with [4.2.5] noting quite
complex and variable “responsible agency” arrangements, meaning that if an SSAS were to be
activated outside the Somali High Risk Area such swift responses could not be guaranteed to
be as forthcoming. Relevantly when discussing the 2002 MV Limburg bombing, Timlen
concluded that ‘ … considering the speed with which this attack was carried out, even if there
had been an SSAS installed and activated as soon as the motorboat was spotted, it is not likely
that any responders could have done anything to prevent this incident’.108

Third and finally, it is possible that either before or after transiting the designated Somali High
Risk Area (an area bounded by Suez and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78°E)109
or other known areas of pirate activity – possibly including some of the world’s key
international straits, which [3.3.2] noted have reportedly been “within the sights” of planned
attacks by contemporary terrorist groups, commercial vessels might well be operating at lower
levels of security readiness and hence might be less prepared to counter maritime terrorist
attacks. For these reasons, it would be erroneous to uncritically assume the demonstrated
effectiveness of preventative security measures in deterring vessel-based attacks by pirates
would automatically mean such measures would be equally successful in deterring vesselbased attacks by fanatical terrorists prepared to martyr themselves. Preventing vessel-based
attacks by terrorists requires crews of ships to be both imaginative (that is thinking “outside
the box” in pre-empting maritime terrorist attacks) and continuously vigilant, and to not “drop
their guard” once out of Somali High Risk Area.
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Thomas Timlen The Use of SOLAS Ship Security Alert Systems Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Working Paper No. 154 5 March 2008, 7
109
IMO Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: Best Management Practices
for Protection against Somalia-based Piracy IMO Doc MSC.1/Circ.1339 (14 September 2011), Annex 2, 4
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[5.2.3] Best case / worst case analysis of ISPS Code security measures preventing vesselbased terrorist attacks on vessels

This section analyses the prospects for the preventative security measures mandated and
recommended by the ISPS Code to succeed in preventing vessel-based terrorist attacks on
target vessels. It considers how the six “best case / worst case” scenario factors articulated in
[4.2.7] might apply in light of the observations in [5.2.1] about how vessel-based attacks have
previously been successfully perpetrated, attempted, planned, and postulated by maritime
security specialists. It also applies the observations in [5.2.2.6] about the implications which
might be drawn from the international shipping industry’s experience in countering vesselbased attacks by pirates around the Gulf of Aden and other areas since 2005.

[1]

Larger or smaller vessels? [5.2.1] noted that most vessels targeted through vessel-

based terrorist attacks have been in the “larger vessel” category - including cargo ships (19),
petroleum industry vessels (eight), naval vessels (six), tankers (six), passenger ferries (four)
and cruise ships (one), with seven other vessel types not able to be ascertained despite the best
efforts of the present author. Whilst 17 fishing vessels were also targeted, since 2001 these
attacks were predominantly around Sri Lanka and Western Africa. This means the ISPS Code
would be more likely to apply to such targeted vessels (a “best case” scenario). While such
large “target” vessels would be more likely to be fitted with AIS, [5.2.1] showed nearly all the
“attacking” vessels to be small speedboats (which would not be equipped with AIS). It is also
conceivable that terrorists could target vessels with large hijacked or terrorist-controlled vessels
as kinetic ramming weapons – which [6.2.1.3]110 discusses. Furthermore, it is worth recalling
that as [4.3.1.2] discussed, since 9/11 there have been widespread concerns within maritime
industries about the ease with which AIS data can be publicly accessed – including by pirates
and terrorists to select and track vessels for attacks, with these concerns acknowledged by the
IMO.111 However, nearly five years later the 86th session of the MSC in June 2009 noted that
no apprehended Somali pirate vessels had been found to be equipped with AIS receivers 112 –
‘The Vessel as a Weapon Against Other Vessels’
IMO Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Seventy-Ninth Session IMO MSC 79th Session, Agenda
Item 263 IMO Doc MSC 79/23 (15 December 2004), 5.99 – in which the MSC condemned the publication of AIS
data on the internet, urged contracting governments to discourage such practices, and also urged masters of vessels
not to deactivate their AIS transponders due to such concerns; re-affirmed at Report of the Maritime Safety
Committee on its Eighty-Sixth Session IMO MSC 86th Session, Agenda Item 26, IMO Doc MSC 86/26 (12 June
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which may have influenced the recommendation within BMP 4 that vessel masters should not
deactivate their AIS transponders while transiting the Somali High Risk Area.113 Furthermore,
whilst the present author’s research has not found any reports of terrorists utilising AIS
receivers in attempted or planned attacks on vessels, this is not to say they may not have
contemplated such actions.

[2]

Terrorist-controlled in first instance? [5.2.1] did not reveal any indications of

terrorist involvement aboard the targeted vessels; that is crew members causing the vessel to
be less able to repel a vessel-based terrorist attack.

[3]

Rigor of application of ISPS Code measures? A “best case” scenario could apply if

crews of vessel targeted by terrorists were vigilant and alert to vessel movements in
surrounding waters, which when combined with well-rehearsed security procedures, could
increase the chances of a targeted vessel identifying such “attacking” vessels and outmaneuvering such attacks, or also apply other security measures such as the activation of
LRADs or the firing of warning shots. Conversely a “worst case” scenario could apply if a
ship’s crew was inattentive to vessel movements in surrounding waters, or un-prepared to
swiftly implement appropriate security measures. Furthermore, as [5.2.2.6] reasoned, it could
apply if a ship’s crew completely “let down their guard” once outside of the Somali High Risk
Area. Whilst as [4.2.1] explained the ISPS Code is a flexible risk management framework that
is capable of being adjusted up and down as required, this Study reasons that preventative
security arrangements should never be lowered to “Security Level Zero” where complacency
sets in.

[4]

Did the maritime terrorism incident involve a security-regulated port? The 2000

bombing of the USS Cole114 by an explosives-laden dinghy whilst alongside in Aden harbor is
the only recorded vessel-based terrorist attack on a target vessel in port.115 Although this
incident pre-dated the entry into force of the ISPS Code, it is possible the scope for this attack
to occur could have been lessened through greater controls over small vessel activity around
this port, particularly when high profile vessels such as the USS Cole were to visit the port.
113

MSC.1/Circ.1339 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia: Best
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114
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179

[5.3.5] below applies the “best case / worst case” scenario analysis in the context of port facility
security measures in more detail.116

[5]

Form of maritime terrorist attack A “best case” scenario could apply if terrorists

attempted a “more constrained” form of vessel-based attack, such as seeking to get operatives
on board the target vessel, or launching a “stand-off” attack, with [5.2.1] noting several such
attacks occurring between 1968 and 2012. As [5.2.2.6] reasoned, alert and well-prepared ships’
crews could out-maneuver such attacks, or also apply other security measures such as the
activation of LRADs or the firing of warning shots. However a “worst case” scenario could be
more likely to apply if terrorists attacked with explosives-packed speedboats such as those
which struck the USS Cole and MV Limburg; or attacked with multiple speedboats as [5.2.1]
noted the LTTE have done. [5.2.1] also noted that such attacks have been attempted and
planned by contemporary terrorist groups, and which could prove very challenging for target
vessels to out-maneuver or otherwise deter.

[6]

Government oversight arrangements, Coordination of SSAS arrangements,

Changes to security levels; Vessel movement restrictions Given that most vessel-based
terrorist attacks have occurred while the target vessels have been underway rather than within
the confines of port facilities,117 the reasoning about the “preventative security value” of SSAS
arrangements noted above in [5.2.2.6] is directly applicable here.118 Additionally, the prospects
of a “best case” scenario applying could be improved through the timely and accurate
promulgation of changes to security levels119 by relevant Designated Authorities could further
contribute towards alerting ships’ crews of the need for extra vigilance, thereby lessening the
scope for vessel-based attacks on target vessels to occur. Furthermore, the various international
maritime security cooperation frameworks noted in [5.2.2.2] may have improved arrangements
and lines of communication between States which could enable States to respond to ships under
threats of attacks in a timely manner. Conversely the prospects of a “worst case” scenario
applying could result from a failure to promulgate changes to security levels in a timely fashion.
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That is, because more maritime terrorist attacks on vessels from land and from beneath the surface have
occurred within the confines of port facilities
117
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In summary, this section has shown that vessel-based terrorist attacks on high-profile vessels
by contemporary terrorist groups over the last two decades have become increasingly lethal.
Whilst such attacks have not been anywhere near as frequent (or predictable) as vessel-based
attacks by pirates, it reasoned that continually and rigorously-applied preventative security
measures could significantly lessen the scope for such attacks to succeed.

[5.3]

COUNTERING TERRORIST TARGETING OF VESSELS FROM OTHER

THAN VESSEL SOURCES

This section analyses the prospects for the ISPS Code security measures to lessen the scope for
terrorist attacks on vessels from the land, from inside the vessel, from below the surface and
from the air. In comparison to [5.2] it examines Port Facility security measures (in addition to
Ship Security measures) because as the threat context sections explain, many of these
previously recorded terrorist attacks have occurred whilst target vessels have been alongside
in port. Similarly to [5.2] it shows the increased lethality of attacks by contemporary terrorists,
and the applicability of the “best case / worst case” scenario analysis of the ISPS Code. It also
reasons that terrorist attacks from within the vessel are the most “preventable” of all the 21
maritime terrorism incident types examined in this Study.

[5.3.1]

Threat context: Vessel targeting from the land

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

At least 26

1

0

0

Terrorist attacks on high profile vessels launched from land locations have accounted for 26
(11 per cent) of the 228 recorded successful maritime terrorist attacks against vessels between
1968 and 2011, causing a total of 53 fatalities.

As noted in Appendix G, of the 26 targeted vessels, nine vessel types were not specified, five
were cargo ships, four were passenger ferries, three were naval vessels, two were cruise ships
and one was an oil tanker. The majority of land-based attacks have involved a range of vessel
types being attacked whilst alongside in port – including eleven bombings and eight ‘armed
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attacks’ involving the firing of weapons at vessels, or the vessels being stormed by armed
attackers. Such attacks have been perpetrated around the Caribbean and Latin America (mostly
during the 1970s and early 1980s), in the Philippines, throughout the Mediterranean and in Sri
Lanka. One land-based attack was also launched in Belfast in 1971.

Whilst smaller in number than vessel-based attacks reviewed in [5.2.1], land-based attacks
evidence the propensity of attacks by contemporary terrorist groups to involve significant
casualties and/or the use of suicide tactics. The most deadly land-based attack to date has been
the detonation of a powerful bomb by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front at the port of Davao
City in the Philippines on 1 April 2003 within proximity to the Filipina Princess and Super
Ferry 15 passenger ferries docked alongside, killing 16 and injuring 30.120 Additionally on 25
July 1999, the LTTE launched a suicide bombing attack on the commercial vessel Neuuco
Endurance docked in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka, killing two people.121 Other attacks by Islamic
extremist groups during the 1990s have resulted in seven fatalities (the attack on the Italian
ship Luciana by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria whilst alongside in the port of Jijel on 8
July 1994) and four fatalities (being the grenade attack on the Christian missionary vessel MV
Doulous by members of the Abu Sayyaf Group whilst in the port of Zamboanga in the
Philippines on 11 August 1991, killing four.122

The two recorded land-based terrorist attacks on ships underway also illustrate the increased
lethality of land-based attacks by contemporary terrorist groups compared to pre-contemporary
groups. On 1 June 1976, Cuban exiles opposed to Fidel Castro launched a shelling attack
against a Soviet ship navigating off the coast of Cuba – but this did not result in any
casualties.123 Just over thirty years later on 17 July 2006, Hezbollah launched a missile attack
against the Israeli naval corvette INS Ahi Hanit which was underway 10 nautical miles off the
coast of Lebanon, killing four Israeli sailors.124

The one recorded attempt to target high-profile vessels from the land evidences the
innovativeness of contemporary terrorist groups. On 19 August 2005 four members of the Al
120
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Qaeda of the Two Rivers group launched rocket attacks against two US amphibious warships
(USS Ashland and USS Kearsarge) moored in the port of Aqaba from a rented hilltop
warehouse overlooking the port – however the rockets over-shot the two US warships and no
damage or injuries resulted.125 However in practice it is conceivable that terrorists may well
have attempted more land-based attacks. The present author’s research has not identified any
specific instances of terrorists having planned land-based attacks, nor have maritime security
specialists postulated such scenarios.

[5.3.2]

Threat context: Vessel targeting from inside the vessel

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

At least 21

1

1

2

Terrorist attacks perpetrated from inside target vessels have accounted for at least 21 (9 per
cent) of the 228 recorded successful maritime terrorist attacks. Collectively, such attacks have
resulted in 211 fatalities (the highest of all the Threat Matrix categories), with such attacks
occurring both within ports and up to 300 nautical miles offshore. Most attacks have involved
the detonation of explosives aboard the vessel, and two hijackings - being the Achille Lauro
incident discussed in [3.3.1], and the 1961 hijacking for 11 days of the Portuguese cruise ship
Santa Maria by Portuguese rebels whilst it was underway with 600 passengers, who were all
subsequently released.

Eight passenger ferries and three cruise ships have been the targets of attacks from inside the
vessel, followed by three cargo and three ship types not being specified. Such attacks have
occurred around the Caribbean and in the port of Los Angeles during the 1970s, around the
Mediterranean, within the Caspian Sea and around Southeast Asia – with the Philippines
accounting for three such attacks.

Bombings by contemporary terrorist groups have accounted for the two most deadly of all
maritime terrorist attacks. On 27 February 2004, a bomb concealed inside a television set
within passenger cargo exploded aboard the Super Ferry 14 about an hour out of Manila off
Corregidor Island in the Philippines, causing 116 fatalities and the sinking of the vessel – with
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this attack being attributed to the Abu Sayyaf Group.126 On 25 February 2000, a bomb planted
on a bus aboard the Our Lady Mediatrix passenger ferry by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
exploded when the ferry was several hundred metres away from docking at Ozamis City in the
Philippines, killing 40 and wounding around 50 passengers.127 The 2001 bombing of the
Indonesian ferry Kalifornia caused 10 fatalities;128 and a 1992 attack on a ferry departing Baku
in Azerbaijan killed 12 passengers.129

On 11 July 1988 three members of the Abu Nidal Organisation opened fire on passengers
aboard the City of Poros passenger ferry approximately three nautical miles outside the port of
Piraeus in Greece, with concealed weapons and hand-grenades, killing nine and injuring
approximately 100, before escaping on a speed boat immediately after the attack. 130 A bomb
planted aboard a Portuguese vessel by the Greek terrorist group Armed Revolutionary Action
which exploded on 26 April 1971 whilst the vessel was underway off the coast of Mozambique,
killing all 23 crew on board,131 ranks as the sixth most deadly recorded maritime terrorist attack
– and stands out starkly in terms of the maritime attacks during the 1970s perpetrated by precontemporary terrorist groups.
Whilst the present author’s research has identified one reported attempt to target a high profile
vessel from within – being the 1997 discovery of a home-made bomb on a Sydney Harbour
ferry which was successfully defused132 - in practice a significantly greater number of attacks
may have been attempted but not reported publically.

Similarly, whilst in October 2002 the Israeli newspaper Maariv reported that Hamas' military
wing Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, had planned to bomb a passenger vessel in the Israeli
port of Eilat through the use of a Palestinian suicide bomber smuggling a camera filled with
explosives,133 it is conceivable that terrorists may have planned numerous other attacks on
vessels from inside the vessel.
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Finally the possibility for terrorist attacks on vessels from inside has been postulated at least
twice – with passenger vessels envisaged as likely targets. Greenberg et al postulated scenarios
of the ‘hijacking of a vessel as a fund-raising exercise to support a campaign of political
violence directed toward ethnic, ideological, religious or separatist designs,’134 and of terrorists
‘directly targeting a cruise liner or passenger ferry to cause mass casualties by contaminating
the ship’s food supply, or detonating an on-board explosive devices’.135

[5.3.3]

Threat context: Vessel targeting from below the surface

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

27

1

7

2

Underwater terrorist attacks on high profile vessels have accounted for 27 (12 per cent) of the
228 recorded maritime terrorist attacks to between 1968 and 2013, resulting in 12 fatalities
overall. The majority (16) of these underwater attacks have occurred against target vessels in
port through the use of magnetic limpet mines which have been attached to ships’ hulls by
underwater swimmers, and at least four vessels have been targeted by the use of floating sea
mines whilst underway. As Appendix G notes, the vessel types were not specified for seven of
the targeted vessels, five were cruise ships, three were naval vessels, two were cruise ships,
one was a passenger ferry and one was a fishing vessel.

The majority (18) of the successful underwater attacks occurred during the 1970s and 1980s
around the Caribbean, the Mediterranean and Latin America, as the following three examples
illustrate. On 4 March 1973, the Sanya cruise liner was sunk in Beirut harbour following an
explosion caused by a magnetic limpet mine attached its keel by the Fatah unit Black
September. Whilst none of the 250 American tourists were on-board the Sanya when this
explosion occurred, significant casualties could have resulted had they been on-board.136
During March 1984, a total of eleven Soviet, Panamanian, Dutch, Liberian and Nicaraguan
vessels were sunk by sea mines in waters around Nicaragua placed by members of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance with the backing of
134
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the CIA.137 Later in 1984 between 9 July and 20 September a total of nineteen ships were
damaged by seas mines placed along the Suez Canal by members of Hezbollah.138

The two recorded underwater attacks by the LTTE around Sri Lanka illustrate the greater
lethality of attacks perpetrated by this contemporary terrorist group. The bombing of the
Philippines cargo vessel Princess Wave in the port of Pulmiddai on 9 August 1996 killed 5
crew members and injured 9;139 and a suicide diver attack on the Sri Lankan Navy Supply Ship
Invincible in the port of Trincomalee on 12 May 2008 causing the Invincible to sink within
thirteen minutes of the initial attack.140
Whilst only one attempted underwater attack has been specifically recorded – being the
placement of 2.2 pounds of explosives on the hull of the Royal Navy hydrographic vessel
Hecate by the Irish National Liberation Army in Nantes Harbour, France on 2 November 1984
(which was located and disarmed by clearance divers) – it is conceivable that other underwater
terrorist attacks may have been attempted but not discovered.

There have been numerous reports about plans by Al Qaeda-linked groups to perpetrate
underwater attacks on high profile vessels. The deployment of underwater demolition teams
was reportedly part of Al Qaeda’s ‘Four Pillars’ maritime terrorism strategy developed by its
former chief of maritime operations Abd al-Rahmin Al Nashiri, nicknamed Al Qaeda's ‘Prince
of the Sea.141 Additionally in late 2002 Al Qaeda's former head of operations in Southeast Asia
Omar al-Faruq confessed to interrogators his direction of planned scuba attacks on US warships
in Indonesia in the port of Surabaya.142 More generally, it has been widely reported that FARC
had advanced capabilities to build and operate mini-submarines.143 In June 2002 the US
Coastguard went on high alert for ‘suspicious scuba diving activity’, leading the FBI to
investigate scuba training schools throughout the US, and in November 2002, the FBI issued
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an alert about terrorists attacks on shipping, possibly through trained scuba divers placing
explosives under vessels.144 A further warning was issued in August 2003 by the Department
of Homeland Security about terrorists planning underwater attacks.145 In February 2003 the
then CIA Director George Tenet told the US Senate Committee on Intelligence about reports
of Al Qaeda developing the use of ‘underwater methods of attacking maritime targets’.146
Hezbollah is reported to have trained operatives in scuba diving and underwater explosives
techniques at terrorist camps, with captured Al Qaeda training tapes showing members learning
to swim and utilise diving gear;147 and following 9/11 suspicions were raised about the
establishment of ‘Al Qaeda diving schools’ in the Netherlands, with reports of Al Qaeda
members being trained to attach explosives to the hulls of vessels.148
Underwater attacks have also been postulated by maritime security specialists – with
Greenberg et al discussing scenarios of terrorists ‘ ... directly targeting cruise liners or
passenger ferries to cause mass casualties … through submersible improvised explosive
device’;149 and Bateman discussing the scenario of underwater swimmer attacks on ships, but
classifying this as a ‘less credible’ scenario.150

[5.3.4]

Threat context: Vessel targeting from the air

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

0

0

1

0

Terrorists might conceivably ram hijacked aircraft into vessels through kamikaze attacks, or
drop explosives onto large passenger cruise liners or tankers carrying volatile substances.
Although such attack scenarios might be sound far-fetched and unlikely, prior to 9/11 the
scenario of ramming airliners into large office towers might also have sounded far-fetched and
unlikely. Thus far, the use of airplanes to ram into vessels has been reportedly planned only
once, being part of Al Qaeda's ‘Four Pillars’ maritime strategy developed by its former chief
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of maritime operations Abd al-Rahmin Al Nashiri, nicknamed Al Qaeda’s ‘Prince of the
Sea’.151

[5.3.5]

Best case / worst case critical analysis of SOLAS Chapter XI / ISPS Code

in preventing “other than vessel-based” terrorist attacks on vessels

This section analyses the prospects for the preventative security measures mandated and
recommended by the ISPS Code to succeed in lessening the scope for “other than vessel-based”
terrorist attacks on vessels, through considering the six “best case / worst case” scenario factors
articulated in [4.2.7] in light of the observations in [5.3.1], [5.3.2] and [5.3.3] about how such
forms of attack have previously been successfully perpetrated, attempted, planned and
postulated by maritime security specialists.

[1]

Larger or smaller vessels? As Appendix G details, of the 23 vessels attacked by

terrorists from land, five were cargo ships, four were passenger ferries, three were naval
vessels, two were cruise ships and one was an oil tanker, and for nine attacked vessels, the type
was not specified. The 20 vessels targeted from inside included eight passenger ferries, three
cruise ships three cargo and three unspecified type ships. From the 20 vessels targeted from
beneath the surface, five were cruise ships, three were naval vessels, two were cruise ships, one
was a passenger ferry, one was a fishing vessel and vessel types were not specified for seven.
This indicates that larger vessels have generally presented the most attractive targets for
terrorists to attack - which would (from July 2004 onwards) be more likely to be subject to the
ISPS Code (a “best case” scenario). However [5.3.2] noted at least 13 instances where
passenger ferries were targeted from inside. If such ferries were restricted to shorter intra-state
voyages, they would not ordinarily be subject to the requirements of the ISPS Code, unless the
relevant state imposed security measures.152 Examples of intra-state passenger ferries targeted
from inside in the Philippines include Super Ferry 14 in 2004 - where 116 passengers were
killed and the vessel was destroyed, and the Our Lady Mediatrix passenger ferry in 2000, where
40 passengers were killed. Whilst Appendix G notes that several fishing vessels (which would
also not be subject to the ISPS Code) have been attacked, such attacks have mostly occurred in
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locations with on-going conflicts – including the waters around Sri Lanka, Western Africa and
Central America.

[2]

Terrorist-controlled in first instance? Whilst none of the previous instances of

targeting from within the vessel reviewed in [5.3.1] showed any cases of “inside jobs” whereby
crew members of targeted ships might assist in the perpetration of a terrorist attack, paragraph
[3] below emphasizes the importance of applying preventative security measures throughout
shipping companies to minimize the risk of terrorist-connected persons gaining access to
positions from where they might be able to facilitate attacks from within vessels.

[3]

Rigor of application of ISPS Code security measures? The rigor of the application

of ISPS Code preventative security measures would be a critical factor in lessening the scope
for the three forms of targeting examined above. In relation to land-based attacks, given that
(as [4] below notes) most recorded attacks have occurred whilst the targeted vessel was
alongside at a significant port, rigorously-applied port facility security measures (such as
controls on access to the port facility)153 could significantly reduce the scope for such attacks
to occur. Conversely a lack of access control measures could lessen the preventative security
value of the ISPS Code. [5.3.2] noted at least 17 recorded cases where vessels have been
targeted from inside through the covert placement of explosive devices within the vessel, and
also a number of hijackings and armed attacks aboard vessels. The targeting of vessels by
terrorists from inside is arguably the most “preventable” of all the 21 forms of maritime
terrorism conceptualized by the Threat Matrix. For instance, if the baggage and personal effects
of passengers had been screened and checked upon embarkation, incidents such as the 1985
Achille Lauro hijacking (which was on an international voyage) and the 1988 City of Poros
grenade and gun attack might have been prevented. Preventing the smuggling of weapons or
covert placement of explosives onto vessels would depend on the rigour with which
preventative security measures were applied within relevant ships and shipping companies, and
also port facilities (considered under [4] below). As [4.2.1.2] noted, at shipping company level
the ISPS Code requires the designation of Company Security Officers 154 responsible for
ensuring the implementation of preventative security measures throughout the company.
Rigorously applied security risk management measures such as background security
153
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assessments on company personnel could reduce the scope for persons with links to criminal
or terrorist groups to gain access to “security sensitive” positions within that shipping company
– and thereby possibly aid the perpetration of terrorist attacks involving the company’s vessels.

At individual ship level, rigorously-applied Ship Security Plans could prevent weapons and
other dangerous substances being taken aboard the ship, and also control access to restricted
areas of the ship, such as its bridge and engine spaces - thereby reducing the scope for terrorists
to gain control over vessels. Furthermore, rigorously-applied security measures could reduce
the scope for other forms of targeting of vessels from inside through contaminating or
interfering with food or water supplies, or air conditioning systems. However as noted in [5]
below, even rigorously-applied preventative security measures might not be able to detect very
carefully concealed explosives – such as the bomb concealed within a television set aboard the
Super Ferry 14. Finally, [5.3.3] noted that nine of the 20 recorded sub-surface terrorist attacks
on vessels have involved ships in port by underwater swimmers placing explosives on the hulls
of vessels. Part B of the ISPS Code recommends that at Security Level 3, Ship Security Plans
should make provision for (inter alia) the ‘preparation for underwater inspection of the hull of
the ship’155 and the ‘initiation of measures, including the slow revolution of the ship's
propellers, if practicable, to deter underwater access to the hull of the ship’.156 Rigorouslyapplied Ship Security Plans could ensure such measures are planned and rehearsed, and
possibly incorporate commercially-available underwater surveillance and deterrence
systems.157 Conversely a “worst case” scenario could result if ships lacked the capability to
undertake searches of the ship's hull for explosive devices or underwater swimmers.

[4]

Did the maritime terrorism incident involve a security-regulated port? If terrorists

sought to attack vessels within a port facility subject to the ISPS Code, rigorously-applied Port
Facility Security Plans could significantly lessen the scope for terrorist attacks on vessels. As
paragraph [3] above noted, controls on access to port facilities, as well as the active monitoring
of activities in the areas surrounding them, could significantly reduce the scope for terrorists to
target vessels from the land. However [5.3.1] noted instances of terrorists launching land-based
attacks from outside the confines of port facilities – examples being the attempted attack on
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USS Ashland and USS Kearsarge in 2005 which was launched from a hilltop overlooking the
port of Aqaba in Jordan where they were docked (however these missiles over-shot the two
warships), and Hezbollah launching a missile against an Israeli naval vessel whilst it was
underway 10 nautical miles offshore. Many port facilities where high profile cruise ships and
military vessels dock are located in close proximity to publicly-accessible transport routes from
which terrorists could conceivably fire weapons at target vessels – with Australian examples
including Circular Quay, Woolloomooloo Bay, Darling Harbour and Botany Bay. In relation
to terrorist targeting of vessels from inside, while the sources reviewed for the attacks noted in
[5.3.2] did not specify the location at which the explosives were placed onto the vessels, it is
reasonable to infer this took place whilst the target vessel was in port. As [4.2.1.3] noted, Port
Facility Security Plans are required to include measures to control access to the port facility,
and measures to prevent weapons and other dangerous substances from being taken into the
port facility.158 If rigorously applied, such measures could serve as a first line of protective
security to prevent weapons being taken onto passenger vessels, which [5.3.2] noted have been
the types of vessels previously targeted from inside the vessel. However if explosives or other
weapons were introduced onto vessels at port facilities not subject to the ISPS Code, a “worst
case” scenario could result. Finally, [5.3.3] noted that nine of the 20 recorded sub-surface
terrorist attacks on vessels have involved ships alongside in port being targeted by underwater
swimmers placing explosives on the hulls of vessels. As [3] above noted, Part B of the ISPS
Code provides guidance for ships to counter such threats. Additionally, rigorously-applied Port
Facility Security Plans could further reduce the scope for such attacks through monitoring of,
and restrictions on, small boat activity in waters surrounding the port facility – particularly
when high-profile vessels are in port. However a “worst case” scenario could result if the
geography of the area surrounding the port facility enabled the undetected launching of divers.
[5.3.3] also noted eight instances where terrorists have targeted vessels through deploying sea
mines. It is highly unlikely that commercial vessels outside of on-going conflict situations
would be on the lookout for floating sea mines – so this could result in a “worst-case” scenario.
A worst case scenario might also apply if security measures in and around the port facility were
not rigorously applied – with [4.2.6] noting concerns being expressed about ISPS security
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Part A Section 16.3
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arrangements merely being paid “lip service” – and in some cases port facility security officers
not responding to calls for assistance or even being absent from the port facility.

[5]

Form of maritime terrorist attack: A “best-case” scenario of the ISPS Code in

lessening the scope for attacks on vessels could be more likely to result of terrorists launched
more manageable and preventable forms of attack. For attacks from inside the vessel, whilst
“negotiable” hostage-takings such as the Achille Lauro incident could be more manageable,
Chapters 2 and 3 showed such tactics are more characteristic of pre-contemporary than
contemporary terrorism. Also, carefully concealed explosives such as the bomb concealed
within a television set aboard the Super Ferry 14 could make a terrorist attack less manageable.
Attempts by terrorists to target vessels by divers placing explosives on the hulls of vessels
whilst alongside at port facilities subject to the ISPS Code could be prevented through the
measures noted above. However [5.3.3] noted reports of the LTTE and FARC previously
developing small submersible attack craft. Although operating such craft could require
considerable resources and expertise, a worst case scenario could result if terrorists utilised
such craft to attack high-profile vessels at the entrances to ports or navigational chokepoints.
Finally air-based attacks, which as [5.3.4] noted were reportedly planned by Al Qaeda, would
be almost impossible for even the most rigorously-applied Ship Security Plans to counter, as
unarmed159 non-military160 commercial vessels would not be able to defend against terroristcontrolled aircraft either being rammed into them, or dropping explosives onto the vessel.

[6]

Government oversight arrangements: Changes to security levels; Vessel

movement restrictions: Whilst port facility security measures would in most cases be the most
relevant “first line of security” against the three forms of terrorist targeting, government
security controls over land areas in proximity to vulnerable waterways could lessen the scope
for land-based attacks on vessels transiting littoral areas. Additionally effective surveillance
arrangements over waters within proximity to navigational chokepoints could lessen the
chances of sea mines being laid to target vessels from the sub-surface.

Apart from ship’s security teams which may sometimes be armed with small arms and other non-lethal
defensive equipment – such as Long Range Acoustic Devices and fire hoses. Also as [5.2.2.5] explained, several
States impose significant restrictions on the carriage and use of weapons by such security teams
160
Armed military vessels would in most cases have more extensive self-defence capabilities
159
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[5.4]

CONCLUSION

This chapter demonstrated the practical application of the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix
for developing the most informed threat contexts for examining the five sources of terrorist
attacks on vessels. It also analysed factors such as the previous locations of attacks, the types
of vessels targeted (which have mostly been larger vessels – which since July 2004 are likely
to be subject to the ISPS Code), methods of attack (for example suicide attacks as opposed to
hostage-takings), and the fatalities caused. It demonstrated the increased lethality of attacks on
vessels by contemporary terrorist groups compared to attacks by pre-contemporary terrorist
groups. Through exploring “best case / worst case” scenarios it reasoned that the prospects for
the ISPS Code and SSAS arrangements to succeed in lessening the scope for terrorist attacks
on vessels will very much be determined by the rigour of its application at all levels – especially
at individual ship and port facility levels. In particular, it reasoned that terrorist attacks from
inside vessels are the most “preventable” through rigorously-applied preventative security
measures. Finally, it reasoned that since around 2005, vessel-based attacks by pirates on high
profile vessels (particularly around the Gulf of Aden) have assumed greater prominence over
terrorist attacks on maritime security agendas. It explained that while the combination of
various preventative security measures have been demonstrably effective in countering vesselbased attacks by pirates, it should not be uncritically assumed that fanatical terrorists would be
deterred to the same extent by the prospects of apprehension. It argued that pirate and terrorist
targeting of vessels should not be “conflated” and that high profile vessels should not
completely “let down their guard” once outside of the Somali High Risk Area, given the global
focus of contemporary terrorist groups; and concluded that ISPS Code security measures need
to be continually and rigorously applied.

Chapter 6 analyses the prospects for the SOLAS security and vessel identification and tracking
provisions, and UNCLOS and the SUA Treaties161 to succeed in preventing terrorists from
offensively utilising vessels to perpetrate dangerous acts through using vessels as “weapons”
(either as launching platforms or as kinetic ramming weapons) or as “floating bombs” against
other vessels, land targets and offshore platforms; or the perpetration of other disruptive acts.162
It utilises the “best case” / “worst case” scenario analysis to consider the extent to which the
161

Pertaining to the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels and the protection of maritime infrastructure
Including through disabling the vessel near critical navigational chokepoints, against the marine environment
through deliberate pollution, through facilitating the laying of sea mines, and interfering with submarine cables
162
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ISPS Code and other preventative security measures might lessen the scope for terrorists to
utilise vessels in such a manner. Regarding the powers of States to interdict vessels suspected
of being about to163 be utilised by terrorists to perpetrate offensive acts, it highlights several
jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS, and considers the consequences of the currently low
acceptance of the 2005 SUA treaties.

163

As [3.6] argued, countering contemporary forms of maritime terrorism must mean preventing terrorist attacks
from occurring – not responding after the event

CHAPTER 6
COUNTERING OFFENSIVE UTILISATIONS OF VESSELS BY TERRORISTS

[6.1]

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the prospects for the international agreements to succeed in preventing
terrorists from utilising vessels to perpetrate offensive acts1 - including the use of vessels as
weapons,2 or as floating bombs against various targets, or the use of vessels to perpetrate
disruptive acts.3 To date such actions have been far less prevalent than the targeting of high
profile vessels examined in Chapter 5,4 with several such actions remaining as hypothetical
scenarios.5 As well as examining how the ISPS Code and other SOLAS maritime security and
vessel identification measures might lessen the scope for such offensive acts, this chapter
analyses the extent to which UNCLOS and the SUA treaties would enable States to interdict
vessels6 suspected of being about to perpetrate such offensive acts.7 This analysis highlights
the jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS in relation to States’ powers to protect offshore

As [1.4] explained, such actions would involve a “lead warning time” greater than terrorist attacks on vessels
(examined in Chapter 5), but lesser than the utilisation of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks (examined
in Chapter 7) – which explains why these actions are examined in this chapter
2
Either as weapons-launching platforms or as kinetic ramming weapons
3
As [3.5] explained, ‘disruptive acts’ by terrorists could involve disabling vessels near critical navigational
chokepoints, deliberately polluting the marine environment, facilitating the laying of sea mines, and interfering
with submarine cables. This Chapter addresses the fourth sub-question posed in [1.2.2], namely ‘(4) Considering
how maritime terrorism incidents have previously occurred, and might occur in the future, how might the
international agreements apply in practice in preventing maritime terrorism incidents?’
4
As explained in [3.5.1], for enumeration purposes, this Study counts maritime terrorist attacks as (i) the vessel
as a target or (ii) the vessel as a weapon or bomb according to which of the two vessels was most prominent – for
example the USS Cole was the prominent vessel that was targeted – whereas the explosives-laden dinghy (the
vessel as a bomb) was not a prominent vessel – and is therefore not counted. This means that the majority of
previous “vessel to vessel” attacks are counted in [5.2] and not in [6.2]. Stated alternatively, this Chapter focuses
on actions of the “attacking” vessel – whereas Chapter 5 focused on the “attacked” vessel. Finally in practice there
could well be some overlap in between the ‘vessel as a weapon’ and the ‘vessel as a bomb’ – for example situations
where a terrorist-controlled vessel were rammed and also exploded in proximity to a target.
5
However, as the 9/11 attacks showed, it is important to examine both “routine” attack types, and also
extraordinary and unconventional ones
6
As [1.4] explained, whereas this chapter examines the interdiction of vessels suspected of being about to
perpetrate offensive terrorist acts within maritime zones, Chapter 7 examines the interdiction of “laterally
transiting” vessels passing through maritime zones that are suspected of enabling subsequent terrorist attacks
through transporting WMD materiel, conventional weaponry, terrorist-connected persons or as a means of terrorist
fundraising
7
In relation to UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA treaties, this Chapter addresses the second and third questions posed
in [1.2.2] – namely (2) ‘What are the limitations of the international agreements, and how have these limitations
been addressed to date?’; and (3) ‘What factors are likely to influence the prospects of the international agreements
being successful in preventing maritime terrorism incidents?’. It also addresses the fourth question ‘(4)
Considering how maritime terrorism incidents have previously occurred, and might occur in the future, how might
the international agreements apply in practice in preventing maritime terrorism incidents?’
1
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platforms and submarine cables from terrorist attacks, and shows how some States have sought
to overcome these gaps following 9/11. It also shows the limitations of 1988 SUA treaties, and
the consequences of the current low ratification of the 2005 SUA treaties.8 The chapter
concludes by arguing for greater ratification of 2005 SUA Convention, and for the IMO to
develop guidance on ensuring the security of offshore platforms and submarine cables.

[6.2]

COUNTERING DANGEROUS TERRORIST UTILISATIONS OF VESSELS

[6.2.1]

Threat context: Previous occurrences

This section reviews the range of ways in which terrorists have previously utilised vessels to
perpetrate dangerous actions (which could immediately cause fatalities)9 against other vessels,
and as launching platforms against vessels, as well as cases where they have attempted and
planned to do so, and where maritime security specialists have postulated scenarios of such
attacks. Similarly to Chapter 5, most discussions of such attacks have tended to describe the
locations of previous attacks, attempts and plans in generalised terms (for example ‘in
international waters’ or ‘off the coast of xxx’). Aside from one 1978 hijacking of a Greek
freighter by Fatah off the coast of Israel (which was interdicted before it could be utilised firstly
as a weapons-launching platform and secondly as a floating bomb), all the dangerous
utilisations of vessels reviewed below have involved contemporary terrorist groups. This
illustrates the propensity of contemporary terrorist groups to perpetrate innovative attacks
possibly involving significant casualties and suicide tactics as outlined in [2.5], [3.3] and in
Chapter 5.

Since 9/11 several maritime security specialists have postulated scenarios of terrorists utilising
vessels as ‘weapons’, but without specifying the targets of such attacks. For instance
Richardson postulated that ‘vessels, big and small ... can be used in a number of ways by
terrorists [including] ... as weapons in their own right’;10 and Greenberg et al postulated

8

Chapter 8 considers the extent to which Article 51 of the UN Charter, and the doctrine of Necessity, might
enable States to interdict vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate offensive acts if neither UNCLOS nor
the 2005 SUA Conventions would provide a State with jurisdiction to interdict such vessels
9
In comparison, [6.4] examines disruptive utilisations of vessels by terrorists which could cause disruptions to
the free flow of shipping, or fatalities at a later stage – including disabling vessels near critical chokepoints; laying
sea mines; causing deliberate pollution or interference with submarine cables
10
Michael Richardson A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 8
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terrorists ‘hijacking an LNG carrier that is then detonated as a bomb or used as a collision
weapon’.11

[6.2.1.1]

The vessel as a weapon against land targets

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

At least 1

2

1

2

The utilisation of vessels as weapons could conceivably involve terrorists ramming large
vessels as “kinetic collision weapons” into land targets (such as port facilities, passenger
terminals, popular beaches, transportation infrastructure or iconic targets such as Sydney Opera
House), or utilising smaller vessels as platforms for firing weapons such as rockets or missiles
against land targets. As outlined below, both forms of utilisation have previously been
successfully perpetrated, attempted and planned, through both large freighters and small
speedboats, at a range of locations including Nigeria, the Middle East and Sri Lanka; and have
also been postulated as conceivable maritime terrorism scenarios.

On 12 July 2009, members of MEND successfully utilised a speedboat from which to attack
an oil offloading facility in the Niger Delta, causing five fatalities. 12 Two reported attempts
by terrorists to utilise vessels as weapons-launching platforms against land targets have
involved both large freighters and small speedboats. On 30 September 1978 Fatah had
attempted to offensively utilise the hijacked Greek freighter Agaeus Dimitrius – first as a
platform from which to fire Katyusha-122 rockets at the Israeli Port of Eilat’s oil installations,
and second to detonate it in proximity to an Israeli beach (discussed separately under [6.2.1.2]
below); however the hijacked freighter was interdicted by Israeli naval forces. 13 Twelve years
later in early 1990 the PLF attempted to attack Israeli coastal cities by launching 6 speedboats
painted with radar-absorbent material from a PLF-controlled mother ship. One speedboat sank
upon launching, another returned to Port Said as a tanker and two craft experienced mechanical
failures. Of the remaining two craft, one was interdicted 22 nautical miles off the coast of
11

Michael Greenberg, Peter Chalk and Henry Willis Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability (RAND Corporation:
2006), 27 (Scenario 5)
12
Mikhail Kashubsky ‘A Chronology of Attacks on and Unlawful Interferences with, Offshore Oil and Gas
Installations, 1975 – 2010’ (2011) 5(5-6) Perspectives on Terrorism 139 This is an example of a vessel being
utilised as a weapons-launching platform
13
Martin Murphy Small Boats, Weak States and Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern
World (Hurst & Company 2009), 292
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Gaash, and whilst the other landed at Nitzanim, it was detected by Israeli security forces with
four raiders being killed and seven being captured. According to PLF leader Abu Abbas, this
raid had taken nearly three years to prepare, and cost about $3 million (which was estimated to
be equivalent to US$4.7 million in 2006 terms).14
Vessel-based attacks on land targets have also been reportedly planned by terrorist groups –
an example being the discovery of plans by the LTTE to launch speedboat-based attacks against
Colombo in May 2007.15 Such actions have also been postulated by maritime security
specialists - with terrorism expert Clive Williams envisaging that ‘ ... terrorists could feasibly
take over a large cargo ship and use it as a weapon against military targets or civilian
infrastructure such as bridges’,16 and Bateman and Bergin discussing the scenario of ‘an attack
on an Australian port, either by using a ship as a weapon or by causing an explosion on board
a ship carrying hazardous or dangerous cargo’.17

[6.2.1.2]

The vessel as a bomb against land targets

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

1

1

1

3

Terrorists might conceivably detonate vessels within proximity to land targets. Whilst several
of the ‘WMD transporting scenarios’ reviewed in Chapter 7 have discussed WMD packed into
shipping containers aboard vessels being detonated within “mega-ports”, this section focuses
on conventional explosives, or volatile materials aboard the vessel being detonated in proximity
to land targets. As outlined below terrorists have previously detonated, and attempted and
planned to detonate, both small and large vessels in this manner.

On 18 October 2006, LTTE members disguised as fishermen successfully detonated their
explosives-rigged fishing boats near the Dakshina Naval Base within the Port of Galle in Sri
Lanka. Whilst Sri Lankan naval forces destroyed three of these boats, two successfully
Murphy, above n 13, 295 – 296. This incident is also noted in [7.3.1.2] ‘The Vessel as a Means: Transporting
terrorist-connected persons’
15
Murphy, above n 13, 319
16
Catherine Zara Raymond Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies Paper No. 74, March 2005, 26
17
Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin Future Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime Security
(Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005), 35 (Scenario 1)
14

198

detonated killing sixteen Sri Lankan naval personnel.18 On 30 September 1978, Fatah’s second
planned usage for the hijacked Greek freighter Agaeus Dimitrius discussed above at [6.2.1.1]
was to ram the vessel (which had 3 tonnes of explosives on-board) onto the busy Israeli beach
of Eilat; however this attempt failed when the freighter was interdicted by Israeli naval
forces.19 The detonation of medium sized boats near slips or ports was reportedly planned in
Al Qaeda’s ‘Four Pillars’ maritime terrorism strategy developed by its former chief of maritime
operations Abd al-Rahmin Al Nashiri, nicknamed Al Qaeda's ‘Prince of the Sea’.20 Finally,
maritime security specialists have postulated the terrorist detonation of vessels in proximity
to land targets at least three times – with Richardson postulating that ‘vessels, big and small,
or the cargo containers they carry can be used … to deliver bombs or other means of destruction
to their destination, such as a container set to explode near a port city or other target’,21 Bateman
and Bergin discussing the scenario of ‘an attack on an Australian port … by causing an
explosion on board a ship carrying hazardous or dangerous cargo’,22 and Zara-Raymond
discussing the scenario of a tanker as a floating bomb to strike ports.23

[6.2.1.3]

The vessel as a weapon against other vessels

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

0

0

2

2

Similarly to the use of vessels as weapons against land targets, terrorist usage of vessels as
weapons against other vessels might involve using vessels as kinetic ramming weapons, or as
platforms from which to launch attacks against other vessels. The utilisation of vessels as
kinetic ramming weapons against other vessels could well have devastating consequences. Two
historical examples of catastrophic large vessel accidents include the aircraft carrier HMAS
Melbourne and HMAS Voyager collision off Jervis Bay in New South Wales on 10 February
1964 (killing 82 on-board the Voyager) and the collision between HMAS Melbourne and the
destroyer USS Frank E Evans in the South China Sea on 3 June 1969 (killing 74 on-board the

18

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
19
Murphy, above n 13, 292
20
Richardson, above n 10, 20
21
Richardson, above n 10, 8
22
Bateman and Bergin, above n 17 35 (Scenario 1)
23
Catherine Zara Raymond ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios’ (2006) 14(7) Terrorism
Monitor 2
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Frank E Evans).24 Many larger vessels such as container ships and tankers can take
considerable time to come to a complete stop or to alter course – making other large target
vessels “sitting ducks” for terrorist-controlled vessels intended to be rammed into them. More
recently, the effect of the offensive use of vessels as kinetic weapons against other vessels was
demonstrated in a highly publicised incident on 6 January 2010 when a Japanese whaling vessel
deliberately rammed into the Greenpeace protest vessel MY Ady Gil in the Southern Ocean,
slicing her in half.25

As at January 2013 there have been no recorded instances of terrorists successfully utilising
vessels as kinetic weapons against other vessels, nor attempting to do so. However two
developments in 2003 raised concerns about terrorists planning to utilise vessels as weapons.
On 26 March 2003 the chemical tanker Dewi Madarin was boarded off the coast of Sumatra in
Indonesian waters by ten men who then manoeuvred the ship for almost one hour before
disembarking from the ship with a small sum of money and kidnapping the Captain and First
Officer. This incident was characterised by a 2003 Aegis Terrorism Report as being a ‘dress
rehearsal’ for a terrorist hijacking;26 with terrorism commentators at the time warning ‘ …
[t]here's a strong possibility that we’re looking at the [maritime] equivalent of a flight training
school for terrorists’.27 Later in 2003 the theft of 10 tugs from an Indonesian port for no
apparent purpose further raised concerns about terrorist plans to utilise such vessels as weapons
against other vessels.28 As noted in the [6.2.1] introduction above, the utilisation of vessels as
weapons has been commonly postulated by maritime security specialists, but without
reference to specific types of targets. On the assumption that high profile vessels such as cruise
ships might present attractive targets for terrorists in control of vessels to ram into (similar to
the use of hijacked aircraft in the 9/11 attacks), the two scenarios noted in [6.2.1] are counted
as having been contemplated against other vessels.

24

Tom Frame Where Fate Calls: The HMAS Voyager Tragedy (Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), and Tom Frame The
Cruel Legacy: The HMAS Voyager Tragedy (Allen & Unwin, 2005)
25
Andrew Darby ‘Japanese ship destroys whale protest boat Ady Gil’ The Age, 6 January 2010
http://www.theage.com.au/environment/whale-watch/japanese-ship-destroys-whale-protest-boat--ady-gil20100106-ltp4.html; Natalie Klein Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea Oxford Monographs in International
Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), 142
26
Richardson, above n 10, 32 - 33
27
Donna Nincic ‘The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat Identification, WMD and Regime Response’
(August 2005) 28(4) The Journal of Strategic Studies 629
28
Richardson, above n 10, 32 - 33
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[6.2.1.4]

The vessel as a bomb against other vessels

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

0

6

2

1

Terrorists could conceivably detonate vessels within proximity to other vessels, and have
attempted to do so on at least six recorded occasions with small vessels such as fishing boats,
speedboats and even explosives-rigged life-raft – predominantly off the coast of Israel and
Palestine (which mostly involved attempted suicide attacks), but also around Sri Lanka. 29 In
April 1988, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP–GC)
manoeuvred a fishing boat within proximity to an Israeli naval vessel and detonated an
explosive charge, which failed to inflict either casualties or damage. 30 Subsequently between
1988 and 1997 Fatah, the PFLP,31 PFLP-GC and Shiite Muslim organisation Amal reportedly
attempted five coordinated suicide attacks against Israeli naval vessels utilising small boats, all
of which were unsuccessful.32 A further three attempts by Palestinian groups to detonate
vessels within proximity to other vessels were recorded between 2000 and 2003. These
included a Hamas-controlled-fishing vessel attempting a suicide attack against an Israeli patrol
vessel on 7 November 2000;33 two members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group sailing an
explosives-laden fishing boat into ‘Israeli-controlled waters off northern Gaza’ on 23
November 2002 – which when approached by the Israeli Naval Ship (INS) Daboor, detonated
the boat, killing themselves, injuring 4 sailors, and slightly damaging the INS Daboor;34 and
the location of a suspicious life raft (again by the INS Daboor) floating ‘within proximity of
the Gaza northern maritime security zone’ on 17 January 2003. After sailors from the INS
Daboor fired warning shots towards the life raft, the raft was detonated, and the remains of a
suicide bomber were found inside.35 Finally on 14 February 2007 the Indian Navy discovered
an explosives-laden LTTE boat floating off the coast of South India.36

29

However the UNCLOS maritime zones in which these attacks occurred were not specified
Murphy, above n 13, 295
31
The PFLP was a separate group from the PFLP - GC
32
Murphy, above n 13, 295. However no further details were specified as to how such attacks were planned to
occur
33
Murphy, above n 13, 296
34
Akiva Lorenz The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel (International Institute for Counter Terrorism) 24
September 2007, 18; Murphy, above n 13, 292
35
Lorenz, above n 34, 18; Murphy, above n 13, 296 - 297
36
Murphy, above n 13, 320
30
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In September 2004 members of Jemaah Islamiah were reported to have been planning the
hijacking of a large merchant vessel with the aid of local pirate groups, with the intention of
using it as a floating bomb against other vessels;37 and the use of explosives-packed zodiac
speed boats to ram warships and other ships was reportedly part of Al Qaeda’s ‘Four Pillars’
maritime terrorism strategy developed by its former chief of maritime operations Abd alRahmin Al Nashiri, nicknamed Al Qaeda’s ‘Prince of the Sea’.38 Finally Richardson
postulated that ‘ … vessels, big and small, or the cargo containers they carry can be used in a
number of ways by terrorists … to deliver bombs or other means of destruction to their
destination, such as a container set to explode near a port city or other target’.39

[6.2.1.5]

The vessel as a weapons launching platform against aircraft

Successful
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Planned

Postulated

0

0

0
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Terrorists might conceivably utilise vessels as platforms from which to fire weapons against
aircraft. This would most likely occur in close proximity to land (including internal waters in
proximity to port facilities, territorial seas and within proximity to international straits) given
that aircraft typically only fly at altitudes which could be within the “striking reach” of
weaponry likely to be possessed by non-state actors shortly after take-off and before landing.
It would be almost inconceivable for terrorists to acquire longer-range military weaponry such
as Surface-to-Air Missiles, or naval warships, which are usually very secure and controlled
assets and require significant expertise to successfully utilise, that would be capable of striking
commercial aircraft at cruising altitudes. Thus far this scenario has only been postulated once
by Zara-Raymond who discussed the scenario of a missile launched by terrorists at aircraft
from a vessel.40

Peter Sherwell and Mike Kearney ‘Al Qaeda Terrorists Plan to Turn Tanker into a Floating Bomb’ The
Telegraph 12 September 2004 Cited in Zara-Raymond, above n 16, 18
38
Richardson, above n 10, 20
39
Richardson, above n 10, 8
40
Zara-Raymond, above n 23, 3; See also Robert Bunker ‘Terrorists and Laser Weapons Use: An Emergent
Threat’ (2008) 31(5) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 450
37
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[6.2.2]

Best case / worst case scenario analysis of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 (ISPS

Code) and AIS preventing dangerous terrorist utilisations of vessels

This section analyses the prospects for the preventative security measures mandated and
recommended by the ISPS Code to lessen the scope for terrorists to utilise vessels to perpetrate
dangerous acts such as those noted in [6.2.1] above,41 through applying the “best case / worst
case” scenario factors articulated in [4.2.7] in light of the observations in [6.2.1] about how
such forms of attack have previously been successfully perpetrated, attempted, planned and
postulated by maritime security specialists.

[1]

Larger or smaller vessels? The sections above indicated that most previous

instances of terrorists utilizing, and attempting to utilise, vessels to perpetrate dangerous acts
have involved small vessels. These have included speedboats as weapons-launching platforms,
explosives-rigged fishing boats and even explosives-rigged life raft. Small fishing, recreational
and local transport vessels which would ordinarily be outside the scope of the ISPS Code
commonly (and legitimately) navigate within close proximity to larger vessels, particularly
within proximity to navigational chokepoints. Aside from the planned and postulated examples
noted above, the only recorded instances where terrorists have previously attempted to utilise
large vessels to perpetrate dangerous acts were the 1978 hijacking of the Greek freighter
Agaeus Dimitrius and the 2003 hijacking of the chemical tanker Dewi Madarin. Such large
vessels would (since 2004) be more likely to be subject to ISPS Code or other security
requirements, and if not terrorist-controlled in the first instance, rigorously implemented ship
security measures (possibly combined with the activation of the hijacked vessel’s SSAS) could
lessen the scope for terrorists to gain control over the vessel. Additionally, if terrorists sought
to hijack and utilise a large vessel as either a kinetic “ramming” weapon or as a floating bomb,
it is possible such large vessels might be equipped with AIS.42 In a “best case” scenario,
providing it had not been deactivated by the hijackers, and providing it was functioning
effectively, AIS could provide a uniform basis for alerting other large potential target vessels
in the vicinity of a large vessel approaching at high speed for no apparent reason. This could
enable potentially target vessels to take appropriate evasive collision avoidance measures such
41

That is, through utilising the vessel as a floating bomb, weapons-launching platform or kinetic ramming weapon
As noted in [4.3.1], SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 provides that AIS – which enables the automatic
transmission of a ship's navigational information at regular intervals - must be fitted to ships of 300 GRT and
upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 GRT and upwards not engaged on international
voyages and all passenger ships irrespective of size
42
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as changing course and speed – notwithstanding that many very large commercial vessels might
take considerable time to implement such collision avoidance measures. However a “worst
case” scenario could apply if an AIS transponder was de-activated by those in control of a
vessel being utilised as a kinetic weapon – either by the vessel’s master43 or by hijacking
terrorists. Such actions could remove the early warning of suspicious vessel movements that
AIS would facilitate – notwithstanding the identified operational shortcomings of AIS
identified in [4.3.1].44

[2]

Terrorist-controlled in first instance? As noted above, a “best case” scenario of the

ISPS Code could apply if terrorists sought to hijack large vessels to perpetrate dangerous acts
(as seen in Fatah’s hijacking of the 1978 Greek freighter Agaeus Dimitrius in 1978), and the
plans noted in [6.2.1.3] and [6.2.1.4] to hijack and utilise large vessels for such purposes. As
noted in [1] above, rigorously-implemented ISPS Code security measures could lessen the
scope for such hijacking attempts to succeed; however if terrorists used over-whelming force
such security measures might be less successful in preventing terrorists from gaining control
of the vessel. However a “worst-case” scenario could result if vessels were terrorist-controlled
in first instance - with [6.2.1] indicating that most of the small to medium vessels previously
utilised in an offensive manner being terrorist-controlled in first instance.

[3]

Rigor of implementation of ISPS Code security measures? Rigorously-implemented

ISPS Code (and other nationally-imposed) security measures could lessen the scope for
terrorist hijackings. If the hijacking was attempted whilst the vessel was underway, rigorouslyimplemented Ship Security Plans, possibly with the aid of embarked Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel45 could ensure “security vigilance” throughout vessel – particularly
maintaining a careful watch on small vessel activity in surrounding waters. Such rigorously[4.3.1] noted with concern anecdotal evidence of scepticism about the “maritime security value” of AIS – and
that masters of vessels have the ability and discretion to turn off AIS systems due to security and safety concerns.
This could ultimately detract from the “preventative value” of AIS in countering threats of vessels being utilised
as kinetic weapons against other vessels
44
These practical problems include (i) the limited range of AIS systems; (ii) the less than universal implementation
of AIS – meaning that AIS cannot facilitate the identification of all vessels; (iii) the potential for AIS system
malfunctions to lead to the transmission of incorrect and/or misleading information; (iv) the limited coverage of
AIS in certain parts of the world; (v) the possibility that AIS may contribute to the "information overload" that
affects ship's bridge teams; and most significantly (vi) concerns that the accessibility of AIS might increase the
risk of unauthorised access to AIS information by maritime terrorist and pirate groups – leading to many vessel
masters turning off AIS transmitters within areas with maritime security problems – such as the waterways of
Southeast Asia.
45
[5.2.2] provided an overview of the value, as well as restrictions on the permissible activities of Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel aboard commercial vessels
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implemented security measures could reduce the scope for terrorists to access vessels whilst
underway. [5.2.2] explained, with reference to numerous case studies, that vigilant crews and
the implementation of preventative security measures have enabled many vessels to deter
attacks by pirates and armed robbers (which have occurred far more than vessel-based terrorist
attacks). To draw an analogy to the 9/11 aircraft hijackings, it has been suggested that more
rigorously-implemented preventative security measures firstly at the passenger screening gates,
and secondly aboard the planes (including more secure cabin doors and more effective
screening for metal knives and other implements) might have reduced the scope for the 19 Al
Qaeda terrorists to forcibly take over the commercial airliners and utilise them as kinetic
weapons.46

If terrorists succeeded in gaining access onto a vessel whilst it was underway, which as [6.2.1.3]
noted occurred in the 2003 Dewi Madarin hijacking, the activation of the vessel’s SSAS could
alert the vessel’s flag state, and then possibly nearby coastal, or other state(s) of the security
threat to the vessel – and then prompt appropriate responses for threatened vessels. However,
as [4.2.5] and [5.2.2.6] reasoned, it should not automatically be assumed that SSAS will be the
“automatic panacea” for responding to terrorist attacks on vessels – due to problems of false
activations, and delays and uncertainties in the division of responsibilities between responding
states.

In summary, rigorously-applied ISPS Code preventative security measures could ensure
several “layers” of preventative security47 for vessels - firstly preventing unauthorised access
onto the vessel; secondly in preventing access to the ship’s bridge; and thirdly enabling the
activation of the targeted vessel’s SSAS. Additionally the implementation of appropriate safety
measures for vessels carrying potentially explosive or volatile materials could further lessen
the scope for such vessels to be utilised as floating bombs against various targets.

[4]

Did the maritime terrorism incident involve a security-regulated port? If terrorists

attempted to hijack a larger vessel whilst it was in port (for example [6.2.1.4] noted the theft

Brian Ross and Matthew Bland ‘Ten Years Later: Could We Prevent Another 9/11?’ ABC News 6 September
2011 http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ten-years-prevent-911/story?id=14457689; ‘Mid-air craziness: The lessons
of 9/11’ The Economist 15 May 2011
47
The first layer would be preventing access onto the vessel; the second layer would be preventing access to the
ship’s bridge; and the third layer would be in the activation of the vessel’s SSAS
46
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of ten tug boats from an Indonesian port during 2003 for no apparent purpose), 48 rigorously
implemented Ship Security Plans and Port Facility Security Plans49 could reduce the scope for
such hijackings (particularly through controlling access to sensitive areas such as ships'
bridges) and also through enabling targeted vessels to summon and receive assistance from
land-based authorities to counter the hijacking attempt. However, Appendix I notes at least five
recorded cases of security alerts from vessels under threat from pirates or armed robbers whilst
alongside in port not being responded to by port security personnel or local authorities. Whether
and to what extent preventative security measures were applicable around land targets
(including port facilities) that might be the focus of vessel-based terrorist attacks would be a
matter for individual contracting governments and port facility operators to determine.
Monitoring and controlling small vessel movements could be extremely challenging even for
the ports with the most rigorously Port Facility Security Plans; and could also be challenging
in and around land targets other than port facilities subject to the ISPS Code.

[5]

Form of maritime terrorist attack: Similarly to Chapter 5, a “worst case” scenario

of ISPS Code security measures lessening the scope for maritime terrorist attacks could result
if terrorists sought to utilise large (terrorist-controlled) vessels as kinetic ramming weapons, or
explosives-rigged craft, to perpetrate dangerous actions.

[6]

Government oversight arrangements: SSAS, Changes to security levels; Vessel

movement restrictions: In addition to ISPS Code security measures being rigorouslyimplemented within ship and port facilities, effective government oversight arrangements
could also significantly lessen the scope for terrorists to utilise vessels offensively. In
particular, the arrangements in place between contracting governments for monitoring and
responding to SSAS alerts would be significant if terrorists sought to hijack larger vessels. As
as [4.2.5] and [5.2.2.6] reasoned, it should not automatically be assumed that SSAS will be the
“automatic panacea” for responding to terrorist attacks on vessels – due to problems of false
activations, and delays and uncertainties in the division of responsibilities between responding
States. Finally as [4.3.2] explained, LRIT provides a basis for States to obtain information
about larger vessels navigating within specified distances or times from their coastlines, and
has now been implemented internationally and is functioning satisfactorily. However LRIT
48

As noted in [6.2.1.3] above - Richardson, above n 10, 32 - 33
That is, carefully tailored to the vessel’s particular physical and crewing characteristics in the first instance, reevaluated where necessary and regularly rehearsed
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information would be more relevant in enabling states to monitor the longer-range movements
of vessels suspected of being utilised as a means of transporting weapons and persons, or
fundraising, which are examined in Chapter 7.

Although [6.2.1] showed there were relatively few examples of terrorists utilising vessels to
perpetrate dangerous acts to draw upon, this section has reasoned that rigorously-applied ISPS
and other security measures could lessen the scope for terrorists to utilise vessels to perpetrate
dangerous acts. However if such security measures did not prevent terrorists gaining control of
vessels, or if terrorists controlled vessels in the first instance, States in whose waters such acts
were about to be committed might need to interdict such vessels to prevent potentially deadly
attacks – with [6.2.3] examining the prospects for UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA Convention to
enable States to interdict such vessels.

[6.2.3]

Overview of interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels

The following sections examine the prospects for UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA Convention to
enable States to prevent maritime terrorism incidents through interdicting vessels suspected of
being about to perpetrate the range of dangerous acts outlined in [6.2.1]. As [3.6.2] explained,
this involves considering both the coverage50 and the acceptance51 of these instruments.
UNCLOS is examined in [6.2.3], followed by the 1988 SUA Convention in [6.2.4],52 and the
2005 SUA Convention in [6.2.5]. After examining the respective threat contexts, [6.3]
undertakes a similar analysis of the prospects for these instruments to enable States to protect
offshore platforms through interdicting suspected terrorist vessels, and [6.4] considers the
prospects for these instruments to enable States to interdict vessels suspected of being about to
perpetrate disruptive terrorist acts including acts of deliberate pollution, the laying of sea mines,
interference with submarine cables and disabling vessels within proximity to navigational
chokepoints.

As [3.6.2] explained, assessments of the ‘coverage’ of the international agreement consider: ‘To what extent do
the relevant provisions of the international agreement enable States prevent the maritime terrorism incident from
occurring?’
51
As [3.6.2] explained, assessments of the ‘acceptance’ of the international agreement consider: ‘To what extent
has the international agreement become accepted internationally?’
52
Although the 1988 SUA Convention does not enable state parties to interdict vessels, [6.2.4] provides an
overview of its provisions to provide a foundation for the subsequent analysis of the vessel boarding provisions
under the 2005 SUA Convention in [6.2.5]
50
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[6.2.3.1]

Overview of interdiction powers across the UNCLOS maritime zones

Since at least the seventeenth century, the customary international law of the sea had
traditionally been characterised by respect for the principle of freedom of the seas, best
expressed in Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius’s concept of mare liberum. Under the mare liberum
principle, aside from narrow strips of seas immediately adjacent to land territories, the world’s
oceans were regarded as open to all users, with any claims to restrict the navigational freedoms
of vessels being regarded as encroachments on freedoms of the seas. Respect for this principle
was seen in the 1927 SS Lotus case, which held that ‘… jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it
cannot be exercised by a state outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived
from international custom or from a convention’.53

However as the twentieth century progressed, the mare liberum concept came under challenge.
Following the 1945 Truman Proclamation over the continental shelf adjacent to the United
States coast, several States began to assert jurisdictional claims over surrounding oceans
through claiming exclusive rights over living and non-living marine resources, and in several
instances the right to control the navigation of foreign vessels. In response to concerns about
such “creeping jurisdiction”, the International Law Commission (ILC) embarked on the
codification of customary practices relating to the international law of the sea in 1949. The
ILC’s draft report in 1956 formed the basis of the First UN General Assembly Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) held in early 1958. Whilst UNCLOS I resulted in the
conclusion of four conventions and an optional protocol,54 these instruments failed to gain the
support of developed States – which regarded these agreements as conceding too much in
favour of developing States. A second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II)
was held in 1960 to revisit some of the provisions of the four conventions concluded at
UNCLOS I – but UNCLOS II failed to garner the support of developing States.55
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Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A No 10 Cited in Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens The
International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, 2010), 150
54
These included the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (entered into force 10 September
1964) 516 UNTS 205; the Convention on the High Seas (entered into force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 11;
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (entered into force 23
March 1966) 559 UNTS 285; the Convention on the Continental Shelf (entered into force 10 June 1964) 499
UNTS 311; and the Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (entered
into force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 169: Rafiqul Islam International Law: Current Concepts and Future
Directions (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2014), 433
55
Islam, above n 54, 433
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Following further negotiations, a third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
was held between 1973 and 1982, which resulted in the conclusion of the UN Law of the Sea
Convention in 1982. UNCLOS provides a framework of rules for governing the world’s oceans
– including the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the management of living and non-living
marine resources, maritime navigation and pollution control, and marine scientific research,
and arrangements for the resolution of disputes, including the creation of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).56 Through its 320 substantive provisions, UNCLOS
aims to balance the “inclusive interests” of the international community in the common use of
the oceans with the “exclusive interests” of individual States in exerting control over the
resources of waters within proximity to their coasts.57

A key achievement of UNCLOS was the formalisation of several maritime jurisdictional zones,
within which coastal States have progressively decreasing jurisdictional rights the further the
distance away from the coastlines. Within their internal waters,58 coastal states have absolute
sovereignty.59 Within their territorial seas,60 foreign ships enjoy the right of innocent passage subject to the (limited) rights of coastal states to take the ‘necessary steps’ to ‘prevent’ passage
deemed to be ‘non-innocent’.61 Within their contiguous zones62 coastal states have powers to
prevent and punish infringements of their customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws.63
Within their exclusive economic zones64 coastal states have jurisdiction over offshore
platforms,65 including the powers to establish ‘safety zones’ around such platforms 66, and
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For an overview of the history and development of the international law of the sea leading to the formalization
of UNCLOS in 1982, see Rothwell and Stephens, above n 53, 1 – 18; Donald Rothwell and Natalie Klein
‘Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea’ in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald Rothwell (eds) Maritime
Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (Routledge, 2010), 22 –
27; Klein, above n 25, 2 – 3; and Islam, above n 54, 431 – 435
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Klein, above n 25, 3
58
UNCLOS Article 8(1) defines ‘Internal waters’ as the waters on the landward side of the territorial sea baseline
59
UNCLOS Article 2(1)
60
Under UNCLOS Article 3, the breadth of the territorial sea may not extend beyond 12 nautical miles from the
baselines established in accordance with UNCLOS
61
Coastal state powers regarding innocent passage are analysed in [6.2.3.2] (examining the prevention of
dangerous and disruptive acts by suspected terrorist vessels within the territorial sea), and [7.2.5.1] and [7.3.3.2]
(examining the prevention of the lateral transit through the territorial sea of suspected terrorist vessels transporting
weaponry or persons, or financing terrorist activities).
62
UNCLOS Article 33(2) provides that ‘the contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured’
63
These provisions are examined in Chapter 7
64
UNCLOS Article 57 provides that ‘The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured’
65
UNCLOS Article 56(b)(i) – which UNCLOS terms ‘artificial islands, installations and structures
66
UNCLOS Article 60(5) - which are examined in [6.3.3]
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powers to protect and preserve their marine environments.67 On the high seas,68 UNCLOS
recognises traditional customary high seas freedoms of navigation and the exclusive
jurisdiction of flag states.69 It prohibits ‘interference’ by warships against foreign ships,70
except where powers of interference derive from treaty, or where the ship is engaged in piracy,
the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, or where the ship is “stateless”.71 Finally within
straits used for international navigation72, UNCLOS recognises the right of transit passage,73
subject to (vaguely defined) restrictions on certain activities and rights of states bordering the
straits over ships undertaking transit passage – with most of these provisions applying mutatis
mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage.74
The vast majority of the world’s States have ratified UNCLOS, which entered into force in
1994.75 Scott accounts for the wide ratification of UNCLOS by reasoning that most States have
recognised the benefits of increased international peace and security through agreeing to be
bound by a common framework of rules with respect to the governance of maritime spaces.76
Whilst this Study is limited to examining the provisions of UNCLOS which enable States to
interdict suspected terrorist vessels, similar observations about why States seek to adhere to
rules of international law more generally have been made by international legal scholars. For
instance, Triggs explains that the effectiveness of the “compliance pull” of international law
(that is, the extent to which international law influences State behaviour) depends on how a
State calculates its interests in abiding by the rule.77 Along similar lines, Islam reasons that
67

Which are examined in [6.4.3.1]
UNCLOS Article 86 defines the high seas to encompass ‘ ... all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of
an archipelagic State’
69
UNCLOS Article 92 ‘Status of ships’
70
However under UNCLOS Article 95, warships have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any other state
except for their flag state, and under UNCLOS Article 96, ships used only for government, non-commercial
purposes also have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any other state except for their flag state
71
UNCLOS Article 110 ‘Right of visit’ The UNCLOS high seas provisions are examined in [6.2.3.3], [7.2.5.3]
and [7.3.3.4]. [6.4.3.2] examines the UNCLOS provisions addressing the protection of submarine cables.
72
UNCLOS Article 37 defines these as ‘straits which are used for international navigation between one part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone’
73
UNCLOS Article 38
74
The provisions of UNCLOS Articles 39, 40, 42 and 44 apply mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage
75
Whilst UNCLOS was finalised in 1982, and entered into force internationally in 1994, several States which
either have coastal State jurisdiction over navigational chokepoints, or are otherwise have a significant influence
on maritime affairs are not as at 1 October 2013 parties to UNCLOS. These states include the United States (but
US generally accepts UNCLOS as reflecting the customary international law of the sea); North Korea; Iran; Syria;
Libya; Cambodia; United Arab Emirates; Turkey; and Ethiopia
76
Shirley Scott ‘The LOS Convention as an International Regime: A Political Science Perspective’ in Alex Oude
Elferink (ed) Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea Convention (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 23; Rothwell and
Klein, above n 56, 26
77
Triggs above n 58, 5
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given the interdependence of the international community, the elements of practical necessity,
reputational costs, reciprocity, mutual gains and some belief in the common good go a long
way to explain why States find it strategically beneficial to seek to comply with international
law, and why they have more to lose from non-compliance than from compliance.78

As a result of having to carefully balance the interests of more than 150 states with divergent
interests (including land-locked States, coastal and archipelagic States interested in protecting
their marine environments, and major shipping States interested in maintaining maximum
freedom of navigation), the final text of UNCLOS was a delicate compromise, with many of
its provisions being worded in a highly generalised and ambiguous manner.79 At the conclusion
of the negotiations for UNCLOS in 1983, Singapore’s Ambassador Tommy Koh, as President
of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea explained the nature of UNCLOS as a
“package deal” of rights and obligations:
‘Although [UNCLOS] consists of a series of compromises, they form an integral whole.
This is why [UNCLOS] does not provide for reservations. It is therefore not possible
for States to pick what they want and disregard what they do not like. In international
law, rights and duties go hand in hand. It is therefore impermissible to claim rights
under [UNCLOS] without being willing to assume the correlative duties’.80

As Scott explains, although UNCLOS made use of vagueness, ambiguity and silence at certain
points in respect of certain controversial matters (examples of which are discussed in this
Chapter and in Chapter 7), the key achievement of UNCLOS is to provide a framework for
oceans governance rather than dealing with all substantive matters.81 Grunawalt has aptly
characterised the ambiguities within UNCLOS as “constructive” through allowing more than
150 States with divergent interests to find common ground through agreeing on a common set
of principles to govern the world’s oceans.82
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Because of the inherent ambiguity throughout UNCLOS, as this Chapter and Chapter 7 explain,
the question of whether interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels will be regarded as legal
within the various UNCLOS maritime zones will depend on whether a restrictive or liberal
view of the relevant UNCLOS provisions is adopted. As [1.6.2] noted, because there have not
as yet been any instances of interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels being challenged in
ITLOS or the ICJ, there is no relevant jurisprudence to analyse. As a result, the analysis of the
legality of interdicting suspected terrorist vessels in this chapter and in Chapter 7 is a
hypothetical one based on analyses of scholarly arguments.

[6.2.3.2]

Interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels within territorial seas

[6.2.1] indicated that the small number of previous instances of terrorists utilising vessels to
perpetrate dangerous acts have mostly occurred in close proximity to land - although the precise
locations of most of these interdictions could not be ascertained. If terrorists sought to utilise
vessels as weapons or bombs against land targets, interdicting such vessels would not present
any jurisdictional challenges for a coastal State as such acts would occur within the coastal
State’s internal waters – in which as [6.2.3.1] noted, the jurisdiction of coastal States is
absolute. UNCLOS specifies that ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea,83 with Article 19(1) providing that such passage will be innocent as long as
it is not ‘prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state’. UNCLOS Article
19(2) further provides, inter alia, that:

'Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in ... (inter alia)84:
(a) ‘any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the UN Charter’;
(b) ‘any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind’;
...

83

Subject to the other provisions of UNCLOS: UNCLOS Article 17
Other provisions of UNCLOS Article 19(2) that are relevant to the powers of coastal states in relation to the
innocent passage are more relevant to the activities of “State-controlled” military vessels – including (b) any
exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; (f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;.
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(k) ‘any act aimed at interfering with any … facilities or installations of the coastal state’.
(l) ‘any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’; and

The activities listed above would encompass terrorists utilising vessels as weapons or floating
bombs against vessels, land targets, and as platforms from which to launch short-range
weapons against aircraft. Chapter 7 considers the application of Article 19(2)(a) in less straightforward situations involving the interdiction of foreign vessels laterally transiting the territorial
sea that are suspected of transporting weaponry or terrorist-connected persons to enable the
perpetration of subsequent terrorist attacks on land.85

Whilst UNCLOS Article 21 also allows coastal states to adopt laws and regulations relating to
the innocent passage of foreign vessels through the territorial sea,86 it is silent on the ability of
coastal states to enforce such laws and regulations. However UNCLOS Article 25 enables
coastal states to take the ‘necessary steps’ to ‘prevent’ (non-innocent) passage, but stops short
of providing guidance on what may (and may not) be involved in the taking of such ‘necessary
steps’. This broadly-drafted term creates scope for a potentially wide range of actions by the
coastal state.87 The three leading international legal cases on the use of force by states in the
maritime law enforcement context hold that uses of force by “enforcing” States should be
minimised, and warnings to offending vessels maximised - and that any uses of force must be
reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.88 However these three cases (which are
overviewed below)89 arose out of the use of force by States against “less threatening”
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Vessels could be utilised to enable subsequent terrorist attacks through transporting WMD materiel,
conventional weaponry, terrorist-connected persons or as a means of terrorist fundraising
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These include laws and regulations may address (inter alia) ‘the safety of navigation and the regulation of
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in Article 21(f). Furthermore, UNCLOS Article 21(4) specifies that foreign ships undertaking innocent passage
‘shall comply’ with laws and regulations made by coastal states in accordance with UNCLOS Article 21(1) - as
well as ‘all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea’
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delinquent vessels that were suspected of depriving the “enforcing” states of revenue, fisheries
resources, and illegally smuggling alcohol, compared to the potentially deadly acts that might
be perpetrated by terrorist-controlled vessels as discussed in [6.2.1].
The I’m Alone case involved the deliberate sinking by the US Coastguard of an “escaping”
Canadian vessel suspected of illegally importing alcohol into the United States of America.
The Joint Commission established to adjudicate the dispute between the US and Canada held
that ‘reasonable force’ might be used to board, search, seize and bring a delinquent vessel into
port for inspection – and if such a vessel were to sink in the course of such an arrest, that
consequence might be acceptable – providing the sinking was incidental to the ‘necessary and
reasonable’ action by the “enforcing” State. However the deliberate sinking of the unarmed
Canadian vessel which posed no threat to the US coastguard vessel was found to be an
excessive use of force contrary to international law.90 In the Red Crusader case, the
International Commission of Inquiry held that the firing upon the fleeing (and unarmed)
Scottish fishing trawler Neils Ebsen by a Danish fisheries patrol vessel directly into the
trawler’s mast, radar scanner, lights and stern, without warning and in a manner endangering
human life to also constituted an excessive use of force contrary to international law.91 In the
MV Saiga (No. 2) case, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea held that excessive
force was used by a Guinean patrol vessel against the St Vincent and the Grenadines-registered
tanker MV Saiga which was engaged in illegal “bunkering” off its coast through firing without
warning at the Saiga.92 At paragraph 156, the Tribunal outlined the constraints that should be
adhered to by law enforcement vessels, explaining that:
‘The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to give an auditory or visual signal
to stop, using internationally recognized signals. Where this does not succeed, a variety
of actions may be taken, including the firing of shots across the bows of the ship. It is
only after the appropriate actions fail that the pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use
force. Even then, appropriate warning must be issued to the ship and all efforts should
be made to ensure that life is not endangered.’

I’m Alone (Canada v. USA) (1935) 3 UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1609
The Red Crusader (Commission of Enquiry Denmark v United Kingdom) (1962) 35 ILR 485 at 497 - 499
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More recently, in 2008 an Arbitral Tribunal established to adjudicate a maritime boundary
dispute between Guyana and Suriname also considered the legality of what Guyana alleged to
be a threat of force by Suriname against the American-owned and operated C.E. Thornton oil
drilling rig operating under licence from Guyana in disputed waters in June 2000.93 Two
Suriname Naval patrol boats had approached the C.E. Thornton and directed it to immediately
vacate the area. The Suriname naval commander reportedly warned the C.E. Thornton that if
she failed to comply with this direction, that ‘the consequences will be yours’. In compliance
with this direction, the C.E. Thornton departed the area.94 In relation to this incident, the
Arbitral Tribunal acknowledged whilst the I’m Alone, Red Crusader and M/V Saiga (No. 2)
cases had confirmed that force could be used in law enforcement activities on the proviso that
such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary, it characterised the actions of Suriname
navy as ‘more akin to a threat of military action rather than a mere law enforcement activity’ thereby constituting a threat of the use of force in contravention of UNCLOS, the UN Charter
and general international law.95

International legal scholars have recognised that attacks by contemporary terrorist groups such
as those discussed in [6.2.1] could very well have significantly more profound consequences
to States than those resulting from the contraventions in the I’m Alone, Red Crusader and MV
Saiga (No. 2) cases noted above.96 It is conceivable that the only measures likely to prevent
terrorists from utilising hijacked vessels in a manner similar to the 9/11 attacks could involve
the use of potentially lethal force.97 Within Australia, this unpalatable post-9/11 maritime
terrorism possibility has been recognised through the 2006 reforms to the Defence Act 1903
(Cth). A new Part IIIAAA98 has provided broad powers to the Australian Defence Force to take
a range of measures against terrorist-controlled vessels or aircraft under s 51SE99 including the
use of force up to and including destroying vessels or aircraft.100
93
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[6.2.3.3]

Interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels on the high seas

As noted in the introduction to [6.2.1], most of the reports of terrorists successfully utilising
(and attempting to utilise) vessels to perpetrate dangerous acts against other vessels 101 have
described the location of such incidents in generalised terms (for example, ‘off the coast of
xxx’). However as discussed in [5.2.1] the MV Limburg was attacked by an explosives-laden
dinghy on the high seas off the coast of Yemen, so it is relevant to examine the extent to which
UNCLOS might enable States to interdict vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate
dangerous acts against other vessels on the high seas.

Outside the territorial sea, UNCLOS provides limited guidance on the capacity of states to
interdict vessels suspected of being about to be used in a dangerous manner by terrorists, where
high seas navigational freedoms apply.102 Whilst UNCLOS Article 88 provides that ‘the high
seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes’, and does not elaborate on what the term ‘peaceful
purposes’ entails, it has been confirmed this does not mean the complete de-militarisation of
the high seas.103 The relevant provisions of UNCLOS relating to collisions and navigational
incidents on the high seas, Articles 94(7)104 and 97(3),105 are expressed as applying after such
incidents have occurred – rather than enabling States to intervene to prevent the occurrence of
such incidents. As [6.4.3.1] below explains, UNCLOS Article 221 (covering coastal State
powers in relation to pollution from maritime casualties) has a similar ex-post-facto focus.
It might be argued that UNCLOS Article 56(1)(b)(iii), which allows coastal states to ‘preserve
and protect’ the marine environments of their EEZs could enable a coastal State to interdict
vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate dangerous acts against other vessels through
preventing vessel-based pollution that could follow from such an attack. However in the M/V
101

As [6.2.1] explained, if terrorists sought to utilise vessels to perpetrate dangerous acts against land targets, such
vessels would need to traverse the 12 nautical mile territorial sea – where [6.2.3.2] explained the UNCLOS
innocent passage provisions would clearly enable coastal States to interdict such vessels
102
UNCLOS Article 87(1)(a)
103
Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, September 2011,
Appendix 1 ‘Applicable Legal Principles’ paragraph 13
104
Article 94 (1) requires flag states to ‘effectively exercise jurisdiction and control’ over ships flying their flags;
which includes (under Article 97(3)) ‘causing inquiries’ to be held in relation to marine casualties or other
navigational incidents on the high seas causing loss of life, serious injury to persons or serious damage to ships or
installations of another State, or to the marine environment.
105
UNCLOS Article 97 (‘Penal jurisdiction in matters of collision or any other incident of navigation’), and most
relevantly Article 97(3) re-affirms the exclusive jurisdiction of flag states over vessels flying their flag – providing
that no arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other
than those of the vessel's flag State in relation to maritime casualties or other navigational incidents.
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Saiga (No. 2) (1999) case, the ITLOS held that the UNCLOS EEZ provisions do not contain
any express provisions dealing with the boarding and arrest of foreign ships for violations of
coastal state laws.106 In Australia, Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (discussed in
[6.2.3.2] above) allows for the proclamation of an ‘offshore general security area’ within
Australia’s EEZ – however a leading international legal scholar has described the consistency
of such measures with international freedoms of navigation as ‘questionable’. 107 As [6.4.3.2]
notes, similar questions have also been raised about whether Australia’s post-9/11 legislation
allowing for ‘protection zones’ around submarine cables located outside of its territorial sea is
consistent with UNCLOS.

[6.2.3.4]

Interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels within international straits

Although none of the previous instances of terrorists utilising vessels in a dangerous manner
reviewed in [6.2.1] involved international straits, [5.2.1] noted reports of Al Qaeda’s intent to
target merchant and naval vessels transiting the Straits of Gibraltar around 2002. Within
international straits108 all ships enjoy the right of transit passage – meaning the ‘continuous and
expeditious’ transit of the strait between two parts of the high seas and/or EEZ.109 UNCLOS
alludes to, but is not entirely clear on, the ability of “bordering states”110 to interdict vessels
suspected of being about to perpetrate dangerous acts within international straits. UNCLOS
imposes several obligations on ships exercising the right of transit passage - including
proceeding without delay;111 refraining from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of “bordering states”, or in any other manner in
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the UN Charter;112 and refraining
from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and
expeditious transit, unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress.113 Furthermore,
whilst UNCLOS provides that ships undertaking transit passage ‘shall comply’ with generally-
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Noted in Mikhail Kashubsky Offshore Petroleum Security: Analysis of Offshore Security Threats, Target
Attractiveness, and the International Legal Framework for the Protection and Security of Offshore Petroleum
Installations (PhD thesis, University of Wollongong, 2011), 231
107
Kaye, above n 117, 137 - 138
108
UNCLOS uses the term “straits used for international navigation”. The term ‘international straits’ is used here
for brevity
109
UNCLOS Article 38(2)
110
This term is used for the sake of brevity instead of ‘states surrounding international straits’ as used in UNCLOS
Article 37
111
UNCLOS Article 39(a)
112
UNCLOS Article 39(b)
113
UNCLOS Article 39(c)
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accepted international rules114 for the prevention of collisions, and the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution,115 it is silent on the measures that “bordering states” may take to
enforce compliance with such rules.

Whilst UNCLOS provides that activities which are not an exercise of the right of transit passage
remain subject to the other applicable provisions of UNCLOS,116 it is silent on what these
‘other applicable provisions’ include. UNCLOS Article 42(a)117 authorises “bordering states”
to adopt118 non-discriminatory119 laws and regulations pertaining to (inter alia) the safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic. UNCLOS further provides that foreign ships
exercising the right of transit passage ‘shall comply’ with such laws and regulations120 – but is
silent on the measures “bordering states” may take in response to non-compliance. Similar
provisions apply in relation to foreign ships exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes
passage121 - meaning that archipelagic states could also interdict suspected terrorist vessels
transiting archipelagic sea lanes122 – notwithstanding the uncertainties noted above.

[6.2.3.5]

Summary: Prospects for UNCLOS to enable the interdiction of suspected

terrorist vessels

The above sections explained that whilst UNCLOS would clearly enable coastal States to
interdict vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate dangerous acts within the territorial sea,
it is far less clear on coastal State powers outside of the territorial sea. It also noted some
examples of how Australia has sought to overcome these limitations following 9/11, although
the consistency of such measures under UNCLOS has been questioned. This highlights the
importance of having in place specific international rules regarding vessel interdictions. The
UNCLOS Article 39(2) uses the terms “regulations, procedures and practices”
UNCLOS Article 39(2)
116
UNCLOS Article 38(3)
117
Laws and regulations of States bordering straits relating to transit passage
118
And give due publicity to such laws: UNCLOS Article 42(3)
119
UNCLOS Article 42(2)
120
UNCLOS Article 42(4)
121
UNCLOS Article 53 (Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage) provides that all ships enjoy the right of
archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP) within archipelagic sea lanes. UNCLOS Article 53(3) provides that ASLP
means the exercise (in accordance with UNCLOS) of the rights of navigation in the vessel's normal mode solely
for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between two parts of the High Seas and/or
EEZ. UNCLOS Article 54 provides that (inter alia) UNCLOS Article's 39 (duties of ships and aircraft during
transit passage), 42 (laws and regulations of States bordering straits relating to transit passage) and 44 (duties of
States bordering straits) apply mutatis mutandis to ASLP
122
However [6.2.1] did not identify any instances of terrorists committing, attempting or planning dangerous acts
within archipelagic waters
114
115

218

above sections also noted that UNCLOS is silent on the use of force, and that the small number
of international legal cases on this point originated from markedly more benign security threats
than those which might be involved with terrorists in control of vessels. The following sections
examine the extent to which the 1988 and 2005 SUA treaties overcome the inadequacies of
UNCLOS noted above.

[6.2.4]

1988 SUA Convention

The 1988 SUA Convention was developed in response to the Achille Lauro 1985 hijacking,
which was overviewed in [3.3.1]. The Achille Lauro incident highlighted the limitations of the
UNCLOS piracy provisions in situations involving violence aboard ships that had the potential
to prejudice the safety of maritime navigation which were not committed for ‘private ends’
and which did not involve two ships.123 In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11, but before the
development of the 2005 SUA Convention124 several studies, noting the limitations of the 1988
SUA Convention in allowing States to interdict suspected terrorist vessels before an incident
occurred, considered whether the UNCLOS piracy provisions might enable the prevention of
such incidents.125 However since the development of the 2005 SUA Convention such inquiries
have not been undertaken, and hence are not examined in this Study.
The 1988 SUA Convention is one of the sixteen ‘sectoral’ counter-terrorism conventions noted
in [2.2.1]. As [2.2.1] explained, while these conventions do not directly mention the prevention
or suppression of ‘terrorism’, they enable State Parties to arrest, prosecute or extradite persons
who have committed specific acts of terrorism, thereby overcoming problems arising from the
absence of directly applicable extradition treaties.126 The 1988 SUA Convention addresses
terrorist acts which have been committed in the maritime domain. It applies to ships navigating
123

UNCLOS Article 101(a). On the limitations of the UNCLOS piracy provisions against acts of maritime
terrorism, see Klein, above n 25, 151 – 154; and Jose Luis Jesus ‘Protection of Foreign Ships Against Piracy and
Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects’ (2003) 18(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 373 - 381
For a comprehensive overview of the negotiating processes involved in the 1988 SUA Convention, see Natalino
Ronzitti Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1990)
124
Which is examined in [6.2.5] below
125
See for example Leticia Diaz and Barry Hart Dubner ‘On the Problem of Utilizing Unilateral Action to Prevent
Acts of Sea Piracy and Terrorism: A Proactive Approach to the Evolution of International Law’ (2004) 32
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 1 and Justin Mellor ‘Missing the Boat: The Legal and
Practical Problems of the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism’ (2002) 18 American University International Law
Review 341
126
Ted McDorman ‘Maritime Terrorism and the International Law of Boarding of Vessels at Sea: Assessing the
New Developments’ in David Caron and Harry Scheiber (eds) Oceans in the Nuclear Age: Legacies and Risks
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 240 - 241
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or scheduled to navigate into, through or from, waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial
sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States.127 It will also
apply when an actual or alleged offender is found within the territory of a State party, and
requires State Parties to exercise arrest and prosecute persons who have committed, or who
have been involved in committing, an offence that has had the effect of endangering the safety
of maritime navigation; or extradite them to the custody of another State Party.128

Article 3(1) of the 1988 SUA Convention provides that that it is a SUA offence to unlawfully
or intentionally seize or exercise control over a ship by force or threat thereof, or by any other
form of intimidation;129 perform an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act
is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship;130 destroy a ship or cause damage to a
ship or its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; 131 place or cause
to be placed on a ship by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy
that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the
safe navigation of that ship;132 destroy or seriously damage maritime navigational facilities or
seriously interfere with their operation, if such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of
a ship;133 or communicate information known to be false, thereby endangering the safe
navigation of a ship.134 Article 3(2) also makes it a SUA offence to attempt to commit any of
these offences;135 to abet or abet their commission;136 or to threaten a person to do or refrain
from doing any act.137

The 1988 SUA Convention requires state parties to establish their jurisdiction over the Article
3 offences when the offence is committed against or on board a ship flying the flag of the state
at the time the offence is committed;138 within the territory of that state, including its territorial
sea;139 or by a national of that State.140 It also enables state parties to arrest, prosecute or
127

1988 SUA Convention Article 4(1)
1988 SUA Convention Articles 4(2) and 7
129
1988 SUA Convention Article 3(1)(a)
130
1988 SUA Convention Article 3(1)(b)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 3(1)(c)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 3(1)(d)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 3(1)(e)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 3(1)(f)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 3(2)(a)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 3(2)(b)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 3(2)(c)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 6(1)(a)
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1988 SUA Convention Article 6(1)(b)
140
1988 SUA Convention Article 6(1)(c)
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extradite SUA offences committed by stateless persons whose habitual residence is in that
state;141 where a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or killed;142 where the SUA
offence is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act.143
Although Article 3(1)(c)144 might enable state parties to arrest, prosecute and/or extradite
persons who have been involved in dangerous acts such as those outlined in [6.2.1], due to its
ex-post-facto application, it does not enable state parties to interdict foreign vessels suspected
of being about to perpetrate such acts. This has been noted as a significant limitation of the
1988 SUA Convention, particularly in light of the propensity of contemporary terrorist groups
to perpetrate significant casualty attacks involving the suicide of the perpetrators who might
well not survive such attacks for States to arrest, prosecute and/or extradite.145 Relevantly, [2.5]
and [3.3] showed how mass-casualty and suicide attacks have come to be characteristic of the
worst forms of contemporary terrorism; and [2.5.2] showed that “negotiable” aerial hijackings
(analogous to the Achille Lauro hijacking),146 whilst prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s,
declined significantly from the 1990s onwards.
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1988 SUA Convention Article 6(2)(a)
1988 SUA Convention Article 6(2)(b)
143
1988 SUA Convention Article 6(2)(c)
144
Which makes it a SUA offence to ‘ ... destroy a ship or cause damage to a ship or its cargo which is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship’
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Klein, above n 25, 152 – 154. Jesus, above n 140 at 395 - 396 argued that: ‘One cannot protect lives unless
states are allowed to intervene before human tragedy happens. That is when it makes sense to recognise to any
state the right to board, search, seize and arrest ships and offenders in the context of maritime terrorism in all
maritime space with the exception of internal, maritime and inland waters. This is more so in the case of suicidal
terrorist attacks for which the current [ie, 1988] SUA regulations strategy of prosecuting or extraditing offenders
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ships or from ships that may be carried out by persons who themselves are supposed to die in the attack, as
witnessed recently in the 11 September 2001 New York City attack. The only to address this situation with respect
to shipping, from the standpoint of legal protection, is by taking a preventative approach, allowing any state party
to assert police jurisdiction, including in territorial waters, to board, inspect, and seize the ship and equipment and
arrest persons on board. In other words, in order to effectively prevent acts of sea terrorism from happening and
address in legal terms this kamikaze-style terrorist attack against ships and other targets, states should be able
to enjoy not only a judicial jurisdiction over offenders by claiming after fait accompli, that they be prosecuted or
by prosecuting them themselves, but also a police jurisdiction that will allow them to prevent and stop terrorist
ships from making terrorist attacks against other ships or against other targets such as port or pipeline facilities,
platform structures, or that may be directed at blocking straits used for international navigation or causing major
environmental damage’. [Emphasis added]
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[2.5.2] explained how a many such hijackings involved demands being made by the hijackers (for example the
release of political prisoners) and the movements across State borders – which are therefore analogous to the
Achille Lauro hijacking. Appendix E includes a complete summary of the 323 recorded aerial hijackings.
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Writing before the finalisation of the 2005 SUA Convention, Jesus noted several ‘maritime
terrorism scenarios’ not addressed by the 1988 SUA Convention. These included the utilisation
of ships as weapons to perpetrate terrorist attacks; acts of deliberate pollution; the spreading or
dumping of hazardous or nuclear material or waste; and the smuggling of potential offenders,
equipment or material to other States to perpetrate terrorist attacks. 147 The 1988 SUA
Convention would therefore not enable the interdiction of vessels such as the Aegus Dimitrius
noted in [6.2.1].

Whilst as Appendix H shows, as at 1 October 2013, the 1988 SUA Convention has been ratified
by 161 of the 196 SOLAS contracting governments (82 per cent) representing 94.51 per cent
of world tonnage,148 it has not been ratified by several significant maritime States including
North Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Somalia and Thailand. This could potentially mean that
persons who have committed offences under the 1988 SUA Convention within these territories
may not be subject to the possibility of apprehension.

[6.2.5]

2005 SUA Convention

Following the 9/11 attacks, in addition to developing the new SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and ISPS
Code which [4.2.1] overviewed, the IMO resolved in November 2001 to update the 1988 SUA
Convention, with three years of negotiations commencing following IMO Assembly
Resolution 924(22) on 22 January 2002. These negotiations, which have been comprehensively
reviewed by other studies,149 resulted in the formalisation of the 2005 SUA Convention. As
explained below, the 2005 SUA Convention expanded the range of offences from those in the
1988 SUA Convention, and introduced provisions to facilitate the boarding of vessels by state
parties where grounds exist for suspecting that an offence under the 2005 SUA Convention is
about to be committed.
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Jesus, above n 140, 394
IMO ‘Summary Status of Conventions’ as at 31 July 2013:
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx; Accessed 1 October 2013
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Christopher Young ‘Balancing Maritime Security and Freedom of the High Seas: A Study of the Multilateral
Negotiation Process in Action’ (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 355 at 356. Young provides an
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to the 1988 SUA Convention and Platforms Protocol, noting the concerns expressed by various State parties over
certain aspects of the various proposals during the IMO’s negotiation process. Useful overviews have also been
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Article 3bis(1)(a) of the 2005 SUA Convention makes it an offence for a person to unlawfully
and intentionally, undertake (or threaten to undertake) three broadly-drafted offensive acts with
or from a ship.150 First, using against or on a ship, or discharging from a ship any explosive,
radioactive material or [Biological, Chemical or Nuclear (BCN)] Weapon151 in a manner that
causes or is likely to cause death, serious injury or damage; 152 with Chapter 7 examining the
definition of BCN weapon under the 2005 SUA Convention in more detail. Second,
‘discharging from a ship oil, liquefied natural gas or other hazardous or noxious substance, in
such quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or
damage’,153 (which is examined in [6.4.3.1]);154 and third, ‘using a ship in a manner that causes
death or serious injury or damage’.155 Chapter 7156 examines other offences under the 2005
SUA Convention including the utilisation of ships to transport explosives, BCN weapons and
related materials for “terrorist-like” purposes;157 to transport persons broadly connected with
terrorist acts;158 and being broadly involved in the perpetration of maritime and other terrorist
acts.159
The broadly-expressed SUA offence of ‘using a ship in a manner that causes death or serious
injury or damage’ would “capture” all the dangerous uses of vessels examined in [6.2.1] –
including the planned offensive utilisations of the hijacked Greek freighter Agaeus Dimitrius.
Although no specific information could be found regarding the location at which the Agaeus
Dimitrius was hijacked, if it was engaged on an international voyage (for example from Greece

150

Although following the approach of the sectoral counter-terrorism conventions through not mentioning
‘terrorism’, Article 3bis(1)(a) includes the conditional phrase ‘when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context
is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or international organisation to do, or abstain from doing
any act’
151
The definition of what materials will, and will not constitute, ‘BCN weapons’, and the offences of trafficking
such BCN weapons (with the 2005 SUA Convention using this abbreviated term), are examined in [7.2.8], which
examines how the 2005 SUA Convention might enable States to interdict vessels suspected of transporting WMD
for terrorist purposes
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Chapter 7 examines the utilisation of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks (on land) through the
transportation of weaponry, operatives or financing – as opposed to this Chapter which examines the offensive
utilisation of vessels by terrorists to perpetrate dangerous or disruptive acts within the maritime domain
157
Whilst the preamble to the 2005 SUA Convention makes several mentions of ‘terrorism’, the substantive text
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to Egypt), if such an incident occurred today, if Greece and Israel were both parties to the 2005
SUA Convention, the Convention might (today) be applicable to such scenarios. Furthermore,
the offence of discharging substances from ships in Article 3bis(a)(ii) would “capture” terrorist
acts of deliberate pollution from vessels - which are examined in [6.4.3.1].

The 2005 SUA Convention also requires state parties to ensure that legal entities (such as
companies) subject to their jurisdiction may be held liable where the persons responsible for
the management or control of the legal entity have, in that capacity, committed an offence
under the 2005 SUA Convention.160

A significant innovation of the 2005 SUA Convention is its incorporation of provisions
enabling the “anticipatory” boardings of suspect ships. Article 8bis sets out detailed procedures
for state parties seeking to board ships flagged to other state parties where there are grounds
for suspected an offence under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater is, has been, or is about to be
committed.161 Articles 3ter (transporting terrorist-connected persons) and 3quater (being
broadly involved in terrorist acts) are examined in [7.3.5].

The 2005 SUA Convention provides that in situations where the law enforcement or other
authorised officials of a state party encounter a ship that is either flying the flag, or displaying
the markings of another state party that is located seaward of any state’s territorial sea, and
have reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship, or a person on-board the ship is, has been or
is about to be involved in the commission of an offence under Articles 3, 3bis or 3quater, the
state party may firstly request confirmation of the nationality of the ship and/or person; and if
such nationality is confirmed, request authorisation to take ‘appropriate measures’ with regard
to that ship.162 Such ‘appropriate measures’ may include stopping, boarding and searching the
ship, its cargo and persons on board, and questioning persons on board in order to determine if
an offence under Articles 3, 3bis or 3quater has been, or is about to be committed.163 In response
to such requests, the state party to which the ship is flagged may authorise the requesting party
to board the suspect ship, conduct the boarding and search of the vessel with its own law
enforcement officials, or deny the request to board.164 State parties may also grant permission
160

2005 SUA Convention Article 5bis
2005 SUA Convention Article 8bis(2)
162
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164
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for such boardings to be undertaken in situations where there is no response from the State
Party that is the vessel’s flag State within four hours.165

Article 8bis also specifies that such boardings may only be undertaken with the consent of the
ship’s flag state,166 and requires the use of force employed in such boardings to be
minimised.167 It also imposes obligations on officials carrying out such boardings, including
not endangering the safety of life at sea; treating all persons on a boarded vessel with dignity
and respecting human rights; conducting boarding and searches in accordance with
international law; taking due account of the safety and security of the ship and its cargo; taking
due account of the need not to prejudice the commercial or legal interests of the flag state;
ensuring that all measures undertaken in relation to the ship and its cargo are environmentally
sound; and taking reasonable efforts to avoid a ship being detained or delayed.168 Article 11bis
maintains the extradition provisions from the 1988 SUA Convention, but by virtue of the
expanded range of SUA offences, also includes several safeguards, specifying that a state
party’s extradition obligation need not apply if the request for extradition is believed to have
been made for the purposes of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s
race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion or gender, or that compliance with
the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of these reasons.169

Although it entered into force on 28 July 2010, the 2005 SUA Convention currently has a low
level of international acceptance. As Appendix H notes, as at 1 October 2013, only 24 out of
the 196 SOLAS contracting governments (12 per cent) have ratified the 2005 SUA Convention.
Current state parties include Algeria, Austria, Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Cook Islands,170
Dominican Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Latvia, Lichtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Nauru,
Netherlands, Palau, Panama, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Serbia,
St Kitts & Nevis,171 Spain, Switzerland, Turkey172 and Vanuatu. Whilst even these ratifications
(which represent 30.74 per cent of world tonnage)173 are encouraging, from this number of 24
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states, Algeria, Bulgaria, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Spain and Turkey are the only States that
border key navigational chokepoints that might present attractive locations for terrorist attacks
against or with vessels, and the Marshall Islands and Panama are the only ‘key registry’ States
with significant numbers of ships flagged to them. This could well mean that the 2005 SUA
Convention may only be applicable in a limited range of circumstances - for example the
interdiction of a Panamanian-flagged vessel suspected of being about to be utilised in an
offensive manner within proximity to the Gibraltar Straits (where Spain and Algeria would
have coastal State jurisdiction). The current low acceptance of the 2005 SUA Convention
thereby detracts from its overall prospects to successfully enable the prevention of dangerous
acts by terrorists in control of vessels.

[6.2.6]

Conclusion: Interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels

Overall, [6.2] has reasoned that whilst adequately enabling coastal States to interdict vessels
suspected of being about to perpetrate dangerous acts within the territorial sea, UNCLOS is
less than clear regarding the powers of States to do so outside the territorial sea. Whilst the
2005 SUA Convention has significantly improved upon the limitations of the 1988 SUA
Convention, its current low level of ratifications may mean that States seeking to interdict
vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate dangerous acts outside the territorial sea may
need to look to their ‘inherent’ self-defence rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter, or the
doctrine of Necessity, which are examined in Chapter 8.

[6.3]

COUNTERING TERRORIST ATTACKS ON OFFSHORE PLATFORMS

The 9/11 attacks raised concerns about the vulnerabilities of offshore platforms to terrorist
attacks. This section examines the prospects for the international agreements to prevent terrorist
attacks against offshore platforms. It discusses the potential consequences of the inconsistent
application of the ISPS Code to offshore platforms (which [4.2.4] examined), and highlights
the inadequacies of the 500 metre ‘safety zones’ allowed under UNCLOS Article 60 for
offshore platforms located outside of the territorial sea.
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[6.3.1]

Threat context: Previous occurrences

Whilst attacks by non-state actors against offshore platforms have largely been confined to the
Niger Delta region, and have perpetrated by insurgent groups such as the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Africa Marine Commando, and the Niger Delta
Liberation Force, this section still examines those attacks to illustrate the vulnerabilities of
offshore platforms to attacks by terrorists.

[6.3.1.1]

The vessel as a weapon against offshore platforms
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Terrorists could conceivably utilise vessels as “weapons” against offshore platforms through
ramming them into offshore platforms; utilising vessels as platforms from which to launch
rockets and/or missiles against offshore platforms; or to transport operatives to undertake
terrorist acts aboard offshore platforms such as bombings, kidnappings or hostage-takings. As
Appendix G shows, since around 2006, at least 25 vessel-based attacks on offshore platforms
have been successfully perpetrated by MEND and other insurgent groups against offshore
platforms around the Niger Delta – commonly involving the firing of rockets or machine guns
at the platforms from speedboats. Several of these attacks have occurred against offshore
platforms up to 65 nautical miles from shore. Most of these vessel-based attacks have involved
few or no fatalities, and several have involved the abduction of platform workers, most of
whom have been released upon the payment of ransoms. Exceptions to these typical attack
patterns were seen in two vessel-based attacks by MEND against the Forcados offshore oil
loading terminal in late June 2009 which resulted in 20 and 25 fatalities respectively, and an
earlier attack against the Shell Beniside Flow Station in January 2006 causing 16 fatalities.174
Whilst in early 2002, Saudi Arabian authorities disrupted an attempt by Al Qaeda to attack the
Ras Tanura offshore oil export terminal in the Persian Gulf (the largest offshore platform in
the world),175 aside from the two instances of terrorist-controlled vessels being detonated
alongside offshore platforms discussed in [6.3.1.2] below, vessel-based attacks against offshore
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platforms by non-state actors have thus far been confined to the Niger Delta region. Finally
while attacks on offshore platforms have not featured prominently amongst the scenarios
postulated by maritime security specialists, it is worth noting for completeness that Greenberg
et al envisaged a scenario of terrorists using ‘ ... small, high-speed boats to attack … offshore
energy platforms to affect international petroleum prices or cause major pollution’.176

[6.3.1.2]

The vessel as a bomb against offshore platforms

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

2

0

1

0

Terrorists could also detonate vessels within proximity to offshore platforms. On 24 April
2004, members of the Al Qaeda-linked Zarqawi network perpetrated two near-simultaneous
suicide attacks against offshore platforms off the Iraqi coast utilising explosives-laden dhows,
fishing boats and speed boats. The first attack was against the Al Basrah Oil Terminal, and the
second attack about 20 minutes later was against the Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal, killing
three US Navy sailors.177 An Al Qaeda statement signed by Al Zarqawi and published on
Muntada al-Ansar Islamist website released shortly afterwards evidences the extremist
ideology of Al Qaeda, and its willingness to perpetrate significantly disruptive attacks that were
noted in [2.3.4] and [3.3]:
‘We give you good tidings... your brothers with their boats targeted oil tankers in Mina
al-Amiq and Mina al-Bakr. As what your brothers, the al Qaeda lions, did to the
destroyer Cole in Aden port, they have repeated this attack in a new garb and with
stubborn determination by striking vital economic links of the infidel and atheist states
which came to raise the Christian banner in Muslim countries … We tell you enemies
of God, robbers of oil and riches and drug traders... O snakes of evil, we will
exterminate and debilitate you by land, sea and air until God makes us victorious or
until we die’.178
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Similar plans to detonate explosives-laden vessels alongside offshore petroleum installations
off the coast of India were reportedly discovered by the Indian Intelligence Bureau in June
2011.179

[6.3.1.3]

Offshore platforms as bombs against the marine environment

Successful
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0

0

0

As explained in this Chapter’s introduction, for the sake of completeness, the Threat Matrix
has been modified slightly to incorporate attacks that terrorists might perpetrate from within
offshore platforms – either by the detonation of explosives, or through causing a fire aboard
the offshore platform. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico, caused by
an on-board explosion, produced the largest oil spill in the history of the offshore petroleum
industry, and had devastating consequences for the surrounding marine environment. It is
conceivable that profound damage could result from a deliberate terrorist explosion from onboard offshore platforms. Although on 21 June 2009, members of MEND attached a bomb to
the Afremo oil platform in the Niger Delta, destroying the platform but not causing any
fatalities, this incident is still counted in the “Vessel as weapon” category because a vessel was
utilised to perpetrate the attack. Whilst the present author’s research has not identified any
reported instances of terrorists bombing offshore platforms from within, nor of harming
persons on-board, this does not rule out such actions as having been planned by terrorists.

[6.3.2]

Best case / worst case scenario analysis of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 (ISPS

Code) and AIS preventing terrorist attacks on offshore platforms

This section analyses the prospects for the preventative security measures mandated and
recommended by the ISPS Code to lessen the scope for terrorists to attack offshore platforms
(both from vessels, and by causing explosions on board platforms) through considering the
relevant “best case / worst case” scenario factors articulated in [4.2.7] in light of the
observations in [6.3.1] about how such forms of attack have previously been successfully
perpetrated, attempted, planned and postulated by maritime security specialists.

179

Kashubsky, above n 123, 41

229

[1]

Larger or smaller vessels? All of the recorded attacks on offshore platforms noted in

[6.3.1] have involved small speedboats, all of which would be outside the scope of the ISPS
Code. However if terrorists sought to utilise large vessels as kinetic ramming weapons, whilst
as [6.2.2] reasoned rigorously-implemented security measures might lessen the scope for the
hijacking of such vessels, offshore platforms are not equipped with AIS systems that would
enable personnel on board platforms to be warned of the approach of such vessels.

[2]

Terrorist-controlled in first instance? All of the smaller vessels noted in [6.3.1.1] and

[6.3.1.2] to have perpetrated attacks against offshore platforms were terrorist-controlled in the
first instance.

[3]

Rigor of implementation of ISPS Code or other applicable preventative security

arrangements: [4.2.4] noted the ISPS Code only applies to Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
(MODUs) engaged in international voyages, and not to fixed platforms nor to vessels servicing
offshore platforms, unless additional security requirements are imposed by coastal states.
[4.2.4] also noted that in comparison to the comprehensive guidance it has developed for ship
and port facility security, the IMO has developed little guidance in relation to offshore platform
security. Even if an offshore platform was not subject to the ISPS Code, basic preventative
security measures involving the screening of workers and visitors for weapons and explosives
- firstly at the port of embarkation towards such platforms, and secondly upon arrival aboard
such offshore platforms – could well prevent weapons and/or other explosive materials being
introduced onto offshore platforms by terrorists in the first instance; notwithstanding that
[6.3.1.3] did not identify any instances of terrorists having attempted or planned such actions.
However it is questionable whether ISPS Code or other preventative security measures on
board offshore platforms could prevent, or minimise the impact of, targeting by terroristcontrolled vessels. [6.3.1.1] noted at least 23 recorded instances of MEND and other insurgent
groups attacking offshore platforms around the Gulf of Guinea from small speedboats – which
in at least five cases resulted in disruption to production. Such attacks, and also the ramming
of offshore platforms by large terrorist-controlled vessels, could prove impossible to prevent
from within the offshore platform.180 Therefore, preventing terrorist attacks on offshore

Mikhail Kashubsky ‘Offshore Energy Force Majeure: Nigeria’s Local Problem with Global Consequences’
(2008) 160 Maritime Studies 20, 24; Kashubsky, above n 123, 297
180
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platforms may well depend on States having the ability to control vessel movements in the
vicinity of offshore platforms – which is considered in [6.3.3] below.

[4]

Did the maritime terrorism incident involve a security-regulated entity?181 As

noted in [4.2.4], the ISPS Code is applicable to MODUs engaged on international voyages, but
not to fixed platforms. However, in light of the reasoning in [3] above, the contribution of the
ISPS Code to the protection of offshore platforms from attack has been questioned.

In light of the above reasoning about the limited contribution of preventative security measures
in protecting offshore platforms from attack, the following sections examine the prospects for
UNCLOS and the SUA treaties to succeed in enabling States to protect offshore platforms from
vessel-based terrorist attacks through interdicting suspected vessels within proximity to
offshore platforms - highlighting the jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS.

[6.3.3]

UNCLOS protection powers: Offshore platforms

For offshore platforms located within a coastal State’s territorial sea, UNCLOS Article 19(2)(k)
would allow the coastal state to interdict vessels deemed to constitute security threats to such
platforms. UNCLOS does not limit the permissible breadth of safety zones around offshore
platforms within territorial seas.182 Outside the territorial sea, but within their EEZ, coastal
States have exclusive jurisdiction over offshore platforms183 - including the ability to make
laws and regulations pertaining to ‘safety matters’.184 This jurisdiction includes the power to
establish and give due notice of ‘reasonable safety zones’ around offshore platforms – within
which the coastal state may take ‘appropriate measures’ to ensure the safety of navigation and
offshore platforms.185 UNCLOS specifies that the breadth of such safety ‘shall not exceed a
distance of 500 metres’ around offshore platforms ‘ ... except as authorized by generally
The title of this heading has been modified from referring to ‘security regulated ports’ to ‘entities’ to enable
the non-application of the ISPS Code to offshore platforms to be discussed. Furthermore, in light of the reasoning
in [3] above, the final two factors noted in [4.2.7] , specifically [5] whether the form of the maritime terrorist
attack was manageable, and the [6] the effectiveness of government oversight arrangements (monitoring of SSAS,
promulgation of changes to security levels, and control over vessel movements) are not examined in this section
182
Kashubsky, above n 123, 210. For a comprehensive overview of the development of the UNCLOS regime
relating to the protection of offshore platforms, see Stuart Kaye ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms,
Pipelines, and Submarine Cables from Attack’ (2007) 31 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 379 - 389
183
Whilst UNCLOS uses the terms ‘artificial islands, installations and structures’, the term ‘offshore platform’ is
used here for the sake of brevity
184
UNCLOS Article 60(2)
185
UNCLOS Article 60(4)
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accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent international
organization’ (discussed below).186 UNCLOS requires all ships to respect such safety zones,
and to comply with ‘generally accepted international standards’ pertaining to navigation in the
vicinity of offshore platforms.187 However UNCLOS is silent on the ‘appropriate measures’
coastal States may take to ensure the safety of navigation and offshore platforms – and does
not specifically preclude the installation of protective security devices around offshore
platforms.188

It has been noted that fishing vessels frequently infringe 500 metre safety zones surrounding
offshore platforms located outside territorial seas.189 Additionally, [6.3.1.1] noted several
instances of vessel-based attacks on offshore platforms by MEND and other insurgent groups
since around 2006 in the Niger Delta at ranges up to 65 nautical miles from shore. It has been
noted that the 500 metre safety zones allowable under UNCLOS Article 60(5) may very well
not be sufficient to protect offshore platforms from deliberate attacks;190 and furthermore that
protecting offshore platforms from terrorist attacks may prove extremely challenging. As Kaye
explains, ‘ … were terrorists intending to ram an installation with a large vessel, it is doubtful
that any action on the platform, including firing at or into the vessel could prevent a collision,
to say nothing of the legality of opening fire on the vessel before the intention to ram was clear
and unequivocal’.191

The specification of 500 metres as the generally permissible breadth of safety zones around
offshore platforms outside the territorial sea under UNCLOS Article 60(5) was reportedly
driven more by considerations of facilitating navigational safety (that is, lessening the scope
for accidental collisions from large vessels, without unduly restricting their freedom of
movement), than by security considerations (that is, protecting offshore platforms from vesselbased attacks).192 In early 2008 Brazil and the United States submitted a proposal to the IMO

UNCLOS Article 60(3) The ‘Competent International Organisation’ for such matters would be the IMO
UNCLOS Article 60(6)
188
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for the development of guidelines for assessing requests to extend safety zones around offshore
platforms greater than 500 metres – albeit on safety rather than security grounds.193 This
proposal was actively considered by the IMO’s sub-committee on Safety of Navigation at its
55th session in July 2009.194 However the subsequent 56th session of the sub-committee Safety
of Navigation in August 2010 concluded that any extensions to the 500 metre breadth of safety
zones could actually compromise navigational safety. Whilst the sub-committee determined
there was no demonstrated need to establish safety zones greater than 500 metres, it
acknowledged the possibility of re-visiting the issue should the need arise.195

Kashubsky explains that some States have already declared safety zones of greater than 500
metres around offshore platforms. Examples include a 4.3 mile ‘restricted area’ around an
offshore platform off the coast of Equatorial Guinea,196 and 3,000 metre ‘security warning
zones’ and 2,000 metre ‘exclusion zones’ established around the Iraqi Khawr Al Amaya and
Al Basrah oil terminals in the Persian Gulf.197 [6.3.1.2] noted the latter two platforms in the
Persian Gulf were both attacked in closely coordinated suicide bombings by explosives-laden
vessels in 2004. In light of post-9/11 security threats, and acknowledging the IMO’s current
rejection of calls for safety zones around offshore platforms to be extended beyond 500 metres,
at least two recent commentators have called for States to be permitted to establish ‘security
warning zones’ of up to 3,000 metres where deemed appropriate.198 In June 2012, a review of
the security arrangements for Australia’s offshore oil and gas facilities flagged the option of
‘exclusion zones’ of 1 to 2.5nm around facilities – within which the movements of vessels not
connected with the operation of the facility would be prohibited without the approval of the
facility operator.199 However the legality of such proposed ‘exclusion zones’ under Article
60(5) of UNCLOS, without direct authorisation from the IMO, has been questioned.200 In light
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of these concerns, Chapter 9 outlines some suggestions for how the IMO might work to
facilitate improved arrangements for protecting offshore platforms from terrorist interference,
including through developing guidance ‘security warning zones’ as proposed above.

[6.3.4]

1988 SUA Protocol

The 1988 SUA Platforms Protocol was developed in parallel to the 1988 SUA Convention to
enable state parties to arrest, prosecute or extradite persons within their territories who have
been involved in the perpetration of unlawful acts committed on or against fixed ‘fixed
platforms’ – defined as meaning artificial islands, installations or structures permanently
attached to the sea-bed for the purpose of exploration or exploitation of resources or for other
economic purposes.201 It sets out a range of offences including unlawfully and intentionally
being involved in seizing or exercising control over a fixed platform by use or threat of force
or intimidation;202 acts of violence against persons on board a fixed platform likely to endanger
its safety;203 destroying or damaging fixed platforms;204 placing explosives on fixed
platforms;205 and/or injuring or killing any person in connection with such acts or attempts.206
It also includes offences of attempting to commit, threatening, abetting or being an accomplice
to any such acts.207 As at 1 October 2013, the 1988 SUA Platforms Protocol has been ratified
by 149 of the 192 SOLAS contracting governments (76 per cent), representing 88.51 per cent
of world tonnage.208

However similarly to the 1988 SUA Convention, the 1988 SUA Platforms Protocol is limited
to having an ex-post-facto application, and focuses on the perpetration of attacks from aboard
offshore platforms, rather than attacks involving the offensive utilisation of vessels within
proximity to offshore platforms. This means that the only form of maritime terrorism noted in
the Threat Matrix likely to be “captured” by the 1988 SUA Platforms Protocol would be the
targeting of offshore platforms from within – but only once such acts had been committed. This
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reinforces importance of preventative security measures before embarkation of persons onto
offshore platforms, as reasoned in [6.3.2] above.

[6.3.5]

2005 SUA Platforms Protocol

The 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol was developed in parallel to the 2005 SUA Convention, and
expanded the offences included in the 1988 SUA Platforms Protocol. Similarly to the 2005
SUA Convention, the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol proscribes illegal actions committed with
a “terrorist-like” intent.209 These offences include using any explosive, radioactive material or
BCN weapon on or against a fixed platform; and also discharging oil, liquefied natural gas, or
other hazardous or noxious substance from a fixed platforms in a manner causing (or being
likely to cause) death or serious injury or damage’.210 It is also an offence to attempt to commit,
participate as an accomplice, or organise and direct others to commit such offence unlawfully
and intentionally injure or kill persons in connection with the commission of any of the
offences.211

Whilst these expanded offences have extended the range of illegal actions over which state
parties might arrest, prosecute and/or extradite offenders, the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol
does not expand the rights of states to interdict suspicious vessels in the vicinity of offshore
platforms.212 As at 1 October 2013, the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol has only been ratified by
20 of the 196 SOLAS contracting governments (10 per cent), representing 20 per cent of world
tonnage.213 Current state parties include Algeria, Austria, Bulgaria, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican
Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Latvia, Lichtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Netherlands, Palau,
Panama, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland,
and Vanuatu. Of these parties, only Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Saudi Arabia and Spain have
offshore platforms within proximity to their coasts. Similarly to the 2005 SUA Convention,
this means that the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol would most likely only be applicable in a
small number of cases.
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[6.3.6]

Conclusion

Although this section has shown that attacks on offshore platforms have thus far been limited
to the 2004 attacks on two Iraqi platforms by Al Qaeda-linked groups, and to attacks by MEND
and other insurgent groups around the Gulf of Guinea, given the innovativeness of
contemporary terrorist groups outlined in the preceding chapters, future attacks on offshore
platforms cannot be entirely ruled out. Whilst the section reasoned that UNCLOS would
adequately enable coastal States to protect platforms located within the 12 nautical mile limits
of their territorial seas, the 500 metre safety zones under UNCLOS Article 60(5) would be less
than adequate in enabling states to safeguard offshore platforms located outside of the territorial
sea from potential terrorist attacks.

[4.2.4] and [6.3.2] noted concerns about the lack of IMO guidance on preventative security
measures for offshore platforms, and the current low levels of acceptance of the 2005 SUA
treaties. Chapter 9 outlines suggestions for addressing these concerns – including increased
ratification of the 2005 SUA treaties, further IMO guidance on offshore platform security and
the declaration of ‘security warning zones’.

It is for these reasons that coastal States seeking to protect offshore platforms outside the
territorial sea, may need to look to their inherent self-defence rights under Article 51 of the UN
Charter, or alternatively the doctrine of Necessity in seeking to interdict suspicious vessels in
the vicinity of such platforms.214 Both of these exceptional “last resort” grounds are considered
in Chapter 8.

[6.4]

[6.4.1]

COUNTERING DISRUPTIVE TERRORIST UTILISATIONS OF VESSELS

Threat contexts: Previous occurrences

In addition to utilising vessels to perpetrate dangerous acts as discussed in [6.2] and [6.3],
terrorists could also utilise vessels to perpetrate disruptive acts which might not result in
fatalities until a later time (for example laying sea mines); cause significant delays to the free
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flow of shipping (for example disabling large vessels in heavily-trafficked routes); cause
damage to the marine environment (through deliberate pollution); or through damaging
submarine cables. Such disruptive actions might also follow from one or more of the forms of
attacks discussed in [6.2] and [6.3]. Although as at 1 October 2013 such disruptions have
mostly only been postulated amongst maritime security specialists, this section highlights
several jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS enabling States to interdict vessels suspected of
being about to perpetrate such disruptive actions.

[6.4.1.1]

The vessel as a disruption tool: Disabling near chokepoints

Successful

Attempted
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Postulated

1
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0
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Terrorists could conceivably disable large vessels through exploding, crashing or sinking them
within proximity to navigational chokepoints such as harbour or channel entrances, or
significant navigational straits. Whilst several maritime security specialists have concluded
such actions would be unlikely to completely block such chokepoints,215 such actions could
nevertheless cause significantly disruption to the efficient flow of maritime traffic.
The only recorded successful attack of this kind was perpetrated on 13 November 1981 by the
Mozambique National Resistance Movement, which attacked and damaged harbour entrance
buoys at the Port of Beira in Mozambique.216 However the disabling of large vessels by
terrorists in proximity to chokepoints has been postulated at least six times by maritime security
specialists – with Richardson pointing out that ‘ … Oil and chemical tankers could be sunk or
set ablaze in a busy strait, waterway or port to .... disrupt shipping’;217 Bateman and Bergin
postulating the ‘the sinking of a vessel in a channel or in a berth;’ 218 both Zara-Raymond and
Bateman discussing the scenario of ‘a ship sunk to block the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’,
but with Bateman describing this as a ‘less credible’ scenario;219 and Greenberg et al
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postulating the ‘scuttling of a ship in a narrow SLOC in order to block or disrupt maritime
traffic’.220

[6.4.1.2]

The vessel as a disruption tool: Laying sea mines

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

0

0

0

3

Terrorists could conceivably utilise vessels to facilitate the laying of sea mines, which have
been utilised against both military and commercial vessels since the American Civil War. They
were used extensively during the Second World War, the Korean War, the Iran-Iraq War of the
1980s, the Gulf War of 1990, and were also laid by the CIA around Nicaraguan waters during
the early 1980s. Because their effective functioning is limited to water depths around 200
metres, the only UNCLOS maritime zones in which they could be successfully deployed would
be internal waters, territorial seas and/or international straits. Sea mines can vary in their sizes
– the smallest being around one cubic metre in diameter, and in their sophistication – ranging
from simple contact mines that detonate upon contact with any vessel passing over it on the
water’s surface, to more sophisticated mines which will only be activated by the signatures of
specific vessels. It has been reported that simple sea mines are as cheap as US$1,000 to
assemble.221

Thus far such terrorist actions have only been postulated by maritime security specialists. Both
Bateman and Zara-Raymond discussed scenarios of navigational choke points within Southeast
Asia being blocked by sea mines, with Bateman classifying this as a ‘more credible scenario’
and noting that the Western Pacific Naval Symposium had previously planned exercises around
such scenarios;222 and Bateman and Bergin postulating the scenario of ‘mining or the threat of
mining to close an entrance channel to an Australian port’.223 Whilst the vessel types and sizes
were not specifically noted in these scenarios, as [6.4.2] below reasons, it is only conceivable
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that smaller, more manoeuvrable (and less noticeable) vessels could be utilised by terrorists to
lay sea mines.

[6.4.1.3]

The vessel as a disruption tool: Deliberate pollution
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Terrorists might conceivably cause damage to the marine environment through deliberate
pollution, or through dumping substances from vessels which could have the end effect of
causing pollution. Over the last fifty years there have been several significant marine pollution
incidents – notable examples including the 1967 Torey Canyon disaster, the 1989 Exxon Valdez
oil spill, and the deliberate discharge of oil by Iraqi forces during the 1990 – 1991 Gulf War
oil from Kuwait’s oil fields (albeit not from vessels) by Iraqi forces which caused considerable
marine pollution.224
Thus far such terrorist actions have only been postulated by maritime security specialists – all
of which have involved large vessels. For example, terrorism expert Clive Williams opined
that ‘ ... terrorists could feasibly take over a large cargo ship ... [and] ... a seized ship could be
used to cause large scale pollution’;225 Bateman discussed the deliberate discharge polluting
substances from terrorist-controlled vessels as a ‘more credible’ scenario;226 Richardson
postulated that ‘ … oil and chemical tankers could be sunk or set ablaze in a busy strait,
waterway or port to cause pollution and disrupt shipping’;227 similarly Zara-Raymond
envisaged terrorists attacking large tankers to create a burning oil slick;228 and Greenberg et al
discussed the scenario of terrorists ‘ ... using small, high-speed boats to attack an oil tanker or
offshore energy platform to … cause major pollution’.229

[6.4.1.4]

224

The vessel as a disruption tool: Against submarine cables
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Terrorists could conceivably utilise large vessels to damage submarine cables. Submarine
cables facilitate a very significant proportion of the world’s international communications. On
30 January 2008, the South East Asia–Middle East–Western Europe 4 (SEA-ME-WE 4) and
FLAG Europe-Asia submarine telecommunications cables were damaged by a vessel dragging
its anchor off the coast of Egypt – causing disruption to internet services in India, Egypt, Dubai,
the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.230 Shortly after this incident, Flag
Telecom advised on 1 February 2008 that its Falcon submarine cable had been cut at a point
approximately 56 kilometres offshore between Muscat, Oman and Dubai in the United Arab
Emirates, apparently by an abandoned ship’s anchor weighing around 5 – 6 tonnes.231 On 3
February 2008, Qatar Telecom reported that its DOHA-HALOUL submarine cable connecting
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had also been damaged – but that this incident was
understood to result from a fault with the power system rather than damage from a ship’s
anchor.232 Whether the earlier three submarine cable disruptions might have contributed
towards this power system fault is unclear. Later that year on 19 December 2008, France
Telecom advised that damage to its SEA-ME-WE3, SEA-ME-WE4 and FLAG submarine
cables had been caused either by a ship’s anchor or by bad weather, which resulted in disruption
to internet services from Zambia to India and Taiwan, and reducing Egypt’s internet capacity
by around eighty per cent.233 Whilst this pattern of disruptions to submarine cables, several of
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which occurred in close proximity to the others, raised suspicions about acts of deliberate
sabotage,234 this has not been conclusively established.

Thus far terrorist interference with submarine cables has only been postulated in generalised
terms by international lawyers discussing the limitations of coastal state protection powers
under UNCLOS - rather than maritime security specialists discussing maritime terrorism
scenarios – so whether this means submarine cables have not been “within the sights” of
terrorists remains to be seen. First, Kaye explained that submarine cables and pipelines are
particularly vulnerable to terrorist interference because their locations are clearly marked on
commercially-available navigation charts, and noted how attacks by insurgent groups in Iraq
and Nigeria against pipelines on land have caused significant increases in oil prices, and
postulated that attacks against submarine pipelines would have the added difficulties of causing
widespread environmental harm to the marine environments of a number of states, and would
be very expensive and difficult to repair. He further explained that fibre optic submarine cables
carry the bulk of the world's telephonic data, and that their disruption could have a significant
disruptive effect on international communications.235 Beckman has also acknowledged the
possibility of terrorists deliberately interfering with submarine cables.236

[6.4.2]

Best case / worst case scenario analysis of SOLAS Chapter XI (ISPS Code)

and AIS preventing disruptive terrorist utilisations of vessels

This section analyses the prospects for the preventative security measures mandated and
recommended by the ISPS Code to lessen the scope for terrorists to utilise vessels to perpetrate
disruptive acts, through considering the six “best case / worst case” scenario factors articulated
in [4.2.7] in light of the observations in [6.4.1] about how such disruptive acts have postulated
by maritime security specialists. This “best case / worst case scenario” analysis is shorter than
[6.2.1] because thus far such disruptive actions have remained as hypotheticals – with most

‘Saboteurs May Have Cut Mideast Telecom Cables: UN Agency’ Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February 2008
http://news.smh.com.au/technology/saboteurs-may-have-cut-mideast-telecom-cables-un-agency-200802191sv3.html
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scenarios envisaging such vessels being terrorist-controlled in the first instance. Additionally,
several of the observations from [6.2.1] and [5.2.3]237 can be applied to the present analysis.

[1]

Larger or smaller vessels? Disruptive acts such as disabling a vessel around a

navigational choke points and deliberate pollution could only be perpetrated by large vessels –
which the scenarios noted in [6.4.1] reflect. Similarly, interference with submarine cables
through deliberately dropping a ship’s anchor would most conceivably involve large vessels
due to the sizes and weights of their anchors. Such larger vessels would be more likely to be
subject to the ISPS Code or other security requirements imposed by national governments. If
rigorously applied, such preventative security measures could lessen the prospects of such
vessels either being attacked, or taken over to cause deliberate pollution, as three of the
scenarios noted in [6.4.1.3] envisage (a “best case” scenario).

However the laying of sea mines by terrorists would more likely involve smaller vessels, due
to their greater manoeuvrability within shallow waters where sea mines could function.
Furthermore smaller vessels would have a lower public profile than large vessels, and an
attempt to covertly smuggle a sea mine onto a larger vessel within a port could be extremely
challenging to achieve without attracting attention. Larger vessels subject to the ISPS Code are
usually the focus of attention as they transit within proximity to navigational chokepoints –
where they are frequently assisted by tug and pilot boats. Smaller vessels would be far less
likely to be subject to the preventative security requirements of the ISPS Code or those imposed
by national governments.

[2]

Terrorist-controlled in first instance?

Most of the postulations of terrorists

utilizing vessels to perpetrate disruptive actions noted in [6.4.1] have envisaged the vessels
being terrorist-controlled in the first instance (a “worst case scenario”), apart from the three
scenarios noted in [6.4.1.3] of tankers or large cargo ships being attacked, or taken over to
cause deliberate pollution. In such cases, the observations from [6.2.1], and also [5.2.3]238 about
rigorously-applied preventative security measures lessening the scope for such terrorist attacks
to occur may be directly applied here.

‘Best case / worst case analysis of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 / ISPS Code in preventing vessel-based maritime
terrorist attacks on vessels’
238
‘Best case / worst case critical analysis of SOLAS Chapter XI / ISPS Code in preventing vessel-based maritime
terrorist attacks on vessels’
237
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[3]

Did the maritime terrorism incident involve a security-regulated entity?239

Although concerns have been expressed about the lack of preventative security measures
applicable to submarine cables and pipelines,240 it must be queried what preventative security
measures could actually be implemented apart from monitoring movements of vessels within
proximity to submarine cables and pipelines. As [6.4.2.2] below explains, outside of the
territorial sea, the provisions of UNCLOS relating to coastal state jurisdiction over submarine
cables are considered to be less than adequate. Furthermore, vessels frequently navigate
through waters with submarine cables and pipelines beneath; and they might also have
legitimate reasons for slowing or stopping around such locations (such as engine failures),
making the continual surveillance of vessel movements within proximity to submarine cables
or pipelines very challenging.

[4]

Government oversight arrangements: SSAS, Changes to security levels; Vessel

movement restrictions: Similarly to the conclusion in [6.2.2], government oversight
arrangements and the monitoring of small vessel activity within proximity to navigational
chokepoints could lessen the scope for terrorists to utilise vessels to lay sea mines; as could
controls over the supply and transfer of sea mines in the first instance.

[6.4.3]

State protection powers under UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA Convention

With respect to the powers of coastal States to interdict vessels suspected of laying sea mines,
the analysis of UNCLOS from [6.2.3] may be applied to such maritime terrorist threats.
Similarly, the points from [6.2.3] would be applicable to the disabling of large vessels within
proximity to a navigational “chokepoints”. Such actions would be “captured” by several of the
offences under the 1988 and 2005 SUA Convention examined in [6.2.4] and [6.2.5] above.
However different UNCLOS provisions would apply to acts of deliberate pollution and
interference with submarine cables. These UNCLOS provisions are discussed below together
with the relevant provisions of the 2005 SUA Convention.

[6.4.3.1]

Deliberate pollution of the marine environment

The title of this heading has been modified from referring to ‘security regulated ports’ to ‘entities’ to enable
the non-application of the ISPS Code to submarine cables to be discussed
240
Kaye, above n 252 , 195
239
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If terrorists sought to perpetrate an act of deliberate pollution from a vessel within the territorial
sea - perhaps by taking control of it as several of the scenarios in [6.4.1.3] envisaged - UNCLOS
would enable coastal states to take the ‘necessary steps’ under Article 25 to prevent such
actions, because Article 19(2)(h) would render ‘any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary
to [UNCLOS]’ as non-innocent.

Outside the territorial Sea, UNCLOS could also enable the interdiction of such terroristcontrolled vessels suspected of being about to deliberately cause pollution under the UNCLOS
Part V EEZ provisions. Within the 200 nautical mile EEZ,241 UNCLOS enables coastal states
to protect and preserve their marine environment,242 subject to having ‘due regard’ to the rights
(and duties) of other states243 including the high seas freedoms of navigation244 - insofar as the
exercise of these navigational freedoms are not incompatible with UNCLOS Part V.245 Section
6 of Part XII of UNCLOS provides for the enforcement of the provisions of UNCLOS in
relation to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Regarding pollution
through dumping,246 UNCLOS Article 216 provides that laws and regulations for the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment by dumping shall be
enforced by coastal states in relation to dumping within their territorial seas, EEZs, or onto its
continental shelf; by flag states in relation to vessels flying its flag; and lastly by any state with
regard to acts of loading of wastes or other matter occurring within its territory or at its offshore terminals. The reference to the ‘prevention’ of dumping might arguably enable States to
interdict vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate such acts – rather than only responding
after dumping has occurred. 247

Section 6 of Part XII of UNCLOS also enables flag, port and coastal states to take a range of
measures to control vessel-sourced pollution. UNCLOS Article 217 obliges flag states to
‘ensure compliance’ by their flagged vessels with applicable international rules248 for the
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UNCLOS Article 57
UNCLOS Article 56(1)
243
UNCLOS Article 56(2)
244
Set out in UNCLOS Article 88 to 115 – See [6.2.3.3] above
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UNCLOS Article 58(2)
246
UNCLOS Article 1(5)(a) defines ‘dumping’ as meaning any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, and vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea
247
Kaye, above n 106, 204
248
UNCLOS Article 217 also refers to “standards, laws and regulations”. The term “rules” is used here for brevity
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prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from vessels; to ‘take
other measures necessary for their implementation’; and to ‘provide for’ the ‘effective
enforcement’ of such rules, ‘irrespective of where a violation occurs’. If a vessel commits a
violation of anti-pollution rules, UNCLOS provides that flag states, ‘shall provide for’ the
immediate investigation of the alleged violation, irrespective of where the violation occurred
or where the pollution caused by such violation has occurred or has been spotted – and to
commence investigations when requested by another State.249 Through the introductory words
‘if a vessel commits’, UNCLOS may well restrict the abilities of states to only interdict
polluting vessels after the polluting incident has occurred. Other provisions of Section 6 of
Part XII of UNCLOS show a similar indication towards enforcement measures being
contemplated as applying after act of pollution (in a responsive sense), rather than before an
act of pollution (in a preventative sense); however UNCLOS is not entirely clear on this point.
First, UNCLOS Article 218 enables port states to undertake investigations in relation to any
discharges by vessels within its ports that occurred in the port state’s EEZ – arguably limiting
this power to having an ex-post-facto application. Second, UNCLOS Article 220 enables
coastal states to ‘undertake physical inspections’ of vessels navigating in the territorial sea
where there are ‘clear grounds’ for believing that the vessel has, during its passage through the
territorial sea violated the coastal state’s laws or applicable international rules, in relation to
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels – and to detain such vessels for
further investigations and/or proceedings. Third, UNCLOS Article 220(3) authorises coastal
states to require foreign vessels to provide specified information where pollution has occurred
within its EEZ,250 and UNCLOS Article 220(4) requires flag states to ensure cooperation with
such requests for information. Finally, UNCLOS Article 220(5) authorises coastal states to
undertake inspections of vessels that have refused to provide information - or which have
provided false information; and UNCLOS Article 220(6) provides that where there is ‘clear
objective evidence’ that a foreign vessel navigating in a coastal state’s EEZ has, whilst in the
EEZ, committed a violation resulting in a discharge causing major damage or threat of major
damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal state, or to any resources of its
territorial sea or EEZ, that state may ‘inspect and detain’ that vessel. Through being expressed
in the past tense, the reference to ‘has committed’ in UNCLOS Article 220(6) appears to
contemplate actions by coastal states after acts of pollution have occurred – rather than enabling
249

UNLOS Art 217(4) and (6)
This information includes the ship’s identity, port of registry, last and its next port of call and other relevant
information requested
250
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coastal states to interdict vessels suspected of being about to perpetrate acts of deliberate
pollution. Similarly, UNCLOS Article 221 – which addresses measures to avoid pollution
arising from maritime casualties251 on the high seas, is expressed to apply after a vessel
collision or other navigational incident causing or threatening pollution has occurred.252

Within international straits, UNCLOS alludes to, but is not entirely clear on, the ability of
“bordering” states to interdict vessels suspected of being about to cause deliberate pollution
within international straits. First, UNCLOS Article 42(b)253 authorises “bordering” states to
‘adopt’254 non-discriminatory255 laws and regulations pertaining to the ‘prevention, reduction
and control of pollution’ – but is silent on the ability of such bordering states to enforce such
laws and regulations. Second, UNCLOS Article 43(b)256 provides that user states and bordering
states ‘should by agreement’ cooperate for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
from ships – but here again is silent on the measures that bordering states may take if such
cooperation does not occur.

[6.4.3.2]

Protection of submarine cables

UNCLOS would allow coastal States to protect submarine cables located within their territorial
seas from acts of deliberate interference by terrorists. Because UNCLOS Article 19(2)(k)
renders ‘any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities
or installations of the coastal State’ by a foreign-flagged vessel as non-innocent, coastal States
could take the ‘necessary steps’ under Article 25 to ‘prevent’ such passage. Additionally,
UNCLOS Article 21(1)(c) enables coastal States to adopt laws and regulations relating to the
protection of cables and pipelines located within the territorial sea.257

UNCLOS Article 221(2) defines the term ‘maritime casualty’ as meaning ‘a collision of vessels, stranding or
other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in material damage
or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo’
252
UNCLOS Article 221 provides that ‘Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of states, pursuant to
international law, both customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests ... from pollution or
the threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably
be expected to result in major harmful consequences.’ [Emphasis added] Kaye, above n 106, 204 – 205 also notes
this point
253
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254
And give due publicity to such laws: UNCLOS Article 42(3)
255
UNCLOS Article 42(2)
256
Navigational and safety aids and other improvements and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
257
But as [6.2.3.2] noted, it is silent regarding the abilities of coastal states to enforce such laws
251

246

However outside the territorial sea, UNCLOS is less clear on the powers of coastal (or other
authorised) states to interdict vessels suspected of being about to damage submarine cables and
pipelines. Whilst UNCLOS Article 113258 obliges all states to adopt laws and regulations
making the ‘breaking or injury’ of submarine cables259 or pipelines ‘wilfully or through
culpable negligence’ by ships controlled by persons subject to their jurisdiction a punishable
offence, it is unclear whether such ‘breaking or injury’ must have already occurred before a
coastal state could interdict offending vessels.260 Additionally, whilst UNCLOS Article 79
enables coastal states to ‘establish conditions’ for the establishment and operation of submarine
cables, it does not grant coastal states complete jurisdiction over such submarine cables or
pipelines.261 Although UNCLOS Article 56(1)(b)(iii), which enables coastal States to ‘preserve
and protect’ the marine environment of their EEZ, might possibly be relied upon by a coastal
State to interdict vessels suspected of being about to interfere with submarine cables, the
application of this provision to the protection of submarine cables is unclear. 262 Davenport
notes that domestic legislation allowing for the establishment of ‘cable protection zones’
outside territorial seas exists in Australia263 and New Zealand264 - in which activities such as
fishing and anchoring may be prohibited. However she characterizes the international legal
basis for the establishment of such zones as questionable.265 Relevantly, similar observations
were noted in [6.2.3.3] about Australian legislation providing for the declaration of ‘offshore
general security areas’ within its EEZ – which indicates that in the post-9/11 context, some
States may take a broader, more flexible view of the maritime security measures that might be
undertaken under UNCLOS.

Whilst as [6.2.4] explained the 1988 SUA Convention includes offences of being involved in
‘the destroying or seriously damaging maritime navigational facilities or seriously interfering
258

Breaking or injury of a submarine cable or pipeline
That causes interruption or obstruction to telegraphic or telephonic communications, or high-voltage power
cable
260
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with their operation, if such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship’,266 submarine
cables and pipelines might not ordinarily constitute ‘maritime navigational facilities’ under
Article 3(1)(e) – unless the interference with these submarine cables and/or pipelines had the
effect of prejudicing the safety of maritime navigation. As [6.2.5] explained, whilst the 2005
SUA Convention makes it an offence to use a ship in a manner that causes death or serious
injury or damage’,267 it is unclear whether it could enable the interdiction of ships suspected of
being about to interfere with submarine cables. As Chapter 9 notes, various options have been
proposed to address the limitations of UNCLOS in enabling States to protect submarine cables
located outside the territorial sea from acts of deliberate interference. These include
establishing a new international convention modelled on the SUA treaties and the other sectoral
counter-terrorism conventions noted in [2.2] enabling States to establish jurisdiction over acts
of interference with submarine cables;268 prohibiting ships from loitering and anchoring within
the vicinity of submarine cables, and expanding coastal State powers to protect submarine
cables from acts of deliberate interference.269 However due to the jurisdictional gaps under
UNCLOS, it has also been suggested that States seeking to protect submarine cables outside
the territorial sea might have no other jurisdictional basis for interdicting vessels other than its
inherent rights of self-defence recognised under Article 51 of the UN Charter,270 or on the basis
of Necessity.271 Both of these exceptional “last resort” grounds are examined in Chapter 8.

[6.5]

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has further illustrated the practical application of the Threat Matrix for analysing
the threat contexts of how terrorists might utilise vessels to perpetrate dangerous or disruptive
acts. It showed that aside from the 23 recorded utilisations of small speedboats by MEND and
other insurgent groups as “weapons-launching platforms” against offshore platforms, the
majority of the small number of cases where terrorists have utilised vessels to perpetrate
dangerous acts have involved contemporary terrorist groups, and the use of suicide tactics.
Furthermore, many of the maritime terrorism incidents examined in this Chapter have thus far
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remained in the “planned” and “postulated” categories, as opposed to having been successfully
perpetrated or attempted by terrorists.272

Whilst this chapter showed that most of the previous successful, attempted, planned and
postulated instances of vessels being utilised offensively have involved vessels being terroristcontrolled in the first instance (as opposed to being forcibly taken over), it still reasoned the
prospects for the “preventative” SOLAS maritime security and vessel identification / tracking
provisions to succeed in preventing such forms of maritime terrorism will depend on the “best
case / worst case” factors articulated in [4.2.7]. Regarding the interdiction of suspected terrorist
vessels, it highlighted several jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS relating to the protection of
submarine cables and offshore platforms, and dangerous navigational activities outside
territorial seas. It also explained that whilst the 2005 SUA treaties have improved the abilities
of state parties to interdict suspected terrorist vessels before terrorist attacks have been
perpetrated, the present low levels of their international acceptance detracts from the overall
prospects of these instruments to prevent maritime terrorism incidents. Given these
jurisdictional gaps, Chapter 8 considers the extent to which a “threatened” state might in
exceptional circumstances, interdict suspected terrorist vessels on the basis of its ‘inherent’
rights of self-defence recognised under Article 51 of the UN Charter; or on the basis of
Necessity.
Chapter 7273 analyses the prospects for the SOLAS maritime security and vessel identification
and tracking provisions, and UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA Convention (regarding vessel
interdictions) to succeed in preventing vessels from being utilised to enable subsequent terrorist
attacks through transporting WMD materiel, conventional weaponry, terrorist-connected
persons and financing terrorist activities. It shows how the WMD interdiction measures alluded
to in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles (whilst
not a formal international agreement) have prompted critical re-thinks about the powers of
States under UNCLOS to interdict laterally-transiting vessels, and the influence that post-9/11
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counter-terrorism Security Council resolutions should have on interpretations of these
UNCLOS provisions.

CHAPTER 7
COUNTERING UTILISATIONS OF VESSELS TO ENABLE SUBSEQUENT
TERRORIST ATTACKS

[7.1]

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the prospects for the international agreements to prevent terrorists from
utilising vessels to enable subsequent attacks on land through transporting WMD materiel,
conventional weaponry, terrorist-connected persons and financing terrorist activities.1 It
explains how the WMD interdiction measures alluded to in the PSI Statement of Interdiction
Principles have prompted considerable debate about the legality under UNCLOS of interdicting
laterally transiting vessels suspected of transporting WMD materiel.2 From analysing this
scholarly debate, it is the first study to articulate “restrictive” and “liberal” views of the legality
of the interdiction of laterally transiting vessels under UNCLOS. It shows these two views
diverge regarding the influence that post-9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council resolutions
have on the interdiction powers of States under UNCLOS. Whilst it reasons the liberal view
better enables States to (unilaterally) interdict suspected WMD shipments, it argues for the
further development of more specific agreements between States to facilitate such interdictions
and reduce scope for conflict. It argues in first preference for increased ratification of the 2005
SUA Convention;3 in second preference for further formalisation of bilateral ship-boarding
agreements similar to those formalised between the US and key registry states under the PSI;
and in third preference for increased institutionalisation of the PSI. 4 The chapter reasons there
is also scope for restrictive and liberal views of States’ interdiction powers under UNCLOS in

As [1.4] explained, the use of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks on land would involve a longer “lead
warning time” than terrorist attacks on vessels (examined in Chapter 5) and offensive utilisations of vessels
(examined in Chapter 6). It also explained that subsequent terrorist attacks on land enabled through the provision
of weaponry, operatives or funding on land possibly occurring months or even years after being transported to a
land location by the vessel (that is, the least imminent of all the forms of maritime terrorism) – hence why this
form of maritime terrorism is examined after those in Chapters 5 and 6. This Chapter addresses the fourth subquestion posed in [1.2.2], namely ‘(4) Considering how maritime terrorism incidents have previously occurred,
and might occur in the future, how might the international agreements apply in practice in preventing maritime
terrorism incidents?’
2
The chapter also explores the identified uncertainties about the PSI - including how the PSI interdiction measures
might be applied against vessels of non-consenting states; how many states “support” the PSI; and what “support”
for the PSI actually entails
3
This chapter explains how the 2005 SUA Convention objectively defines key terms, and details interdiction
procedures
4
As [7.2.8] explains, this has been called for by several international legal scholars and by President Obama
1
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relation to vessels suspected of being utilised for “other than WMD transporting” purposes5 which have not received as much scholarly analysis as the legality of WMD interdictions. The
chapter also shows the importance of ISPS Code and other security measures being rigorously
and continuously applied (both at the ship/port interface and across broader supply chains) to
reduce the scope for vessels to be utilised to enable subsequent terrorist attacks.

[7.2]

COUNTERING THE UTILISATION OF VESSELS FOR TRANSPORTING

WMD MATERIEL

The illicit maritime transportation of WMD materiel is one of the most challenging of all the
21 forms of maritime terrorism conceptualised by the Threat Matrix for States to prevent. Such
activities are operationally challenging to counter because detecting very small amounts of
“WMD materiel” (possibly concealed within shipping containers) may be likened to “finding
a needle in a haystack”. As this Chapter explains, such activities are also legally challenging
for States to prevent because many materials that might be regarded as “WMD materiel”
commonly have legitimate, peaceful dual uses; and because UNCLOS has traditionally been
understood as safeguarding against coastal State interferences with freedoms of navigation including vessels carrying nuclear weapons.

[7.2.1]

Threat context: Previous utilisations of vessels to transporting WMD

materiel for terrorist purposes

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

1 – but see below

6

Many reports

Numerous - 6

[2.5.3] noted the widely expressed concerns following the end of the Cold War, and particularly
following 9/11, about terrorists acquiring WMD materiel and utilising vessels to enable such
acquisitions. These concerns took on increased urgency following the 2002 So San interdiction
incident (reviewed below), which provided the impetus for the development of the PSI (which
is discussed in [7.2.3] below). Although as at 1 October 2013 there have only been five
publicly-reported interdictions of suspected illicit shipments of WMD materiel, in practice the

5

That is, for transporting conventional weaponry or terrorist operatives to a land location to perpetrate an attack,
or utilising vessels to finance terrorist activities
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number of un-reported attempts, and also terrorist plans, to transport WMD materiel aboard
vessels might conceivably be higher – given that as [7.2.6] explains, information about WMD
interdictions undertaken by States is likely to remain classified on national security grounds.6
The only “successful” instance of a vessel being utilised to transport WMD materiel was not
done for terrorist purposes, but by ABC News – which in early 2003 borrowed 15 pounds of
clearly marked depleted uranium from an environmental group, packed it into a shipping
container and shipped it undetected from Turkey to New York. This incident highlighted the
scope for terrorists to illicitly ship WMD materiel aboard vessels.7

As outlined below, as at 1 October 2013, four out of the five publicly reported interdictions of
the suspected attempts to illicitly transport WMD materiel aboard vessels have been
undertaken with the consent of the flag state and crews of the suspect vessels – with only the
So San having been forcibly interdicted on the high seas. First, on 21 December 2001, British
naval forces intercepted and boarded the Indian-owned bulk carrier MV Nisha in the English
Channel following an intelligence tip-off that the vessel was carrying “terrorist material”. The
Nisha had sailed from Mauritius but had stopped in Djibouti - which raised suspicions it may
have taken on “terrorist material”. However after three days of searching with the cooperation
of Nisha’s crew, no suspicious “terrorist material” was found, and the Nisha was allowed to
dock and unload its cargo at its intended destination – a sugar refinery on the River Thames
near London’s Canary Wharf financial district.8 Second on 10 December 2002, a Spanish
warship stopped and boarded the Cambodian-registered So San cargo ship 600 miles off the
coast of Yemen. The So San, which was purportedly transporting cement from North Korea to
Yemen, flew no flag and took evasive measures to avoid inspection. When Spanish and US
naval forces boarded the So San on the basis of it being a stateless vessel, their searches
discovered fifteen Scud missiles concealed beneath 40,000 sacks of cement. However the So
San was later released and allowed to continue sailing on to Yemen because, according to the
United States, there was no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from
accepting delivery of the missiles from North Korea. Yemen was not party to a treaty requiring

6

Craig Allen Maritime Counter-proliferation Operations and the Rule of Law (Praeger Security International,
2007), 56 - 57
7
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8
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it to refuse the shipment, nor was it at war with Spain or the United States – meaning she could
not be lawfully detained nor her cargo seized.9 The fact that the So San was released due to the
lack of an international legal basis for detaining the vessel is an example of how international
law influences the behaviour of States through constraining actions they might otherwise be
inclined to take. As discussed under [7.2.3] below, these international legal gaps led the United
States to announce the formation of the PSI on 31 May 2003.

Third, on 12 April 2003 German and French authorities directed the French cargo ship Ville de
Virgo towards the Egyptian port of Alexandria after having tracked it from Hamburg where it
had taken on a cargo of aluminium pipes which were supposedly bound for China. However
after German police arrested the owner of the export company, it was discovered these pipes
were destined for North Korea, allegedly as part of the making of centrifuges for making
highly-enriched uranium. These aluminium pipes were removed from the Ville de Virgo and
shipped back to Hamburg.10 Fourth, in early October 2003 the German-owned, Antigua and
Barbuda-flagged cargo ship BBC China was transporting thousands of aluminium gas
centrifuge components capable of being used for uranium enrichment from Dubai to Libya.
After learning of this suspected shipment in late September, American and British authorities
contacted the German government, which in turn requested that the ship's owner, a German
charter company, divert the vessel to the Italian port of Taranto for inspection. This inspection
found the BBC China’s container number to have been fabricated, and the aluminium tubes
were confiscated. Shortly after this operation, on 19 December 2003 Libya renounced its
nuclear development program.11 Fifth, on 4 October 2003 the Greek-owned cargo ship Athena
was searched for WMD materiel in the port of Lyttleton in Christchurch, New Zealand
following a tip-off from US intelligence; however no WMD materiel was found. It was again
checked on arrival in the South Korean port of Kunsan, again with no WMD materiel being
found.12 Sixth, in May 2011 the US Navy tracked the Belize-flagged (but North Koreancrewed) cargo ship MV Light off China – which was suspected of transporting missile
technology from North Korea to Myanmar. However as there were no indications of terrorist
linkages in this shipment, this incident is discussed in [7.2.7], which examines the prospects

Samuel Logan ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges’ (Spring 2005) 14(2)
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, 253
10
Richardson, above n 8, 102
11
Richardson, above n 8, 103 - 104; Yann-Huei Song ‘The US-led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS:
Legality, Implementation, and an Assessment’ (2007) 38 Ocean Development and International Law 101 at 121
12
Richardson, above n 8 , 13
9
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for the PSI ship boarding agreements to succeed in preventing vessels from being utilised to
illicitly transport WMD materiel.

There have been numerous reports of terrorists planning to acquire WMD materiel. For
instance the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is reported to
have offered $200,000 to invest in an export firm in exchange for access to the firm’s
containers, which were used to ship garments to the port of Newark, New Jersey; and
documents seized from Al Qaeda operatives revealed plans to use containers ‘packed with
sesame seeds to smuggle radioactive material into the United States’.13 Whilst one study cited
reports of as many as 175 plans by terrorists to acquire or smuggle radioactive material, most
of those reports tend to be generalised, with no evidence of such plans succeeding.14

Lastly the utilisation of vessels to transport WMD materiel has been widely postulated
amongst maritime security specialists since 9/11 – including by Richardson,15 Bateman and
Bergin,16 and Greenberg et al – who discussed the ‘use of a commercial container ship to
smuggle chemical, biological or radiological materials for an unconventional attack carried out
on land or at a major commercial port such as Rotterdam, Hong Kong, Dubai, New York or
Los Angeles’.17

[7.2.2]

Best case / worst case scenario analysis of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 (ISPS

Code) and LRIT preventing utilisations of vessels for transporting WMD materiel

This section analyses the prospects for the preventative security measures mandated and
recommended by the ISPS Code to lessen the scope for vessels to be utilised to illicitly transport
WMD materiel for terrorist purposes. It considers the relevant “best case / worst case” scenario
factors articulated in [4.2.7] in light of the observations in [7.2.1] about how vessels have

Donna Nincic ‘The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat Identification, WMD and Regime Response’
(August 2005) 28(4) Journal of Strategic Studies, 625; Richardson, above n 8 , 13
14
Nincic, above n 13, 626
15
Richardson, above n 8, 8 - who postulated that ‘ ... vessels, big and small, or the cargo containers they carry can
be used in a number of ways by terrorists to further their aims … to deliver bombs or other means of destruction
to their destination, such as a container set to explode near a port city or other target’.
16
Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin Future Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime Security
(Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005), 35 - with their scenario 10 postulated the ‘smuggling of weapons or
equipment, perhaps including WMD, into an Australian port’
17
Michael Greenberg, Peter Chalk and Henry Willis Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability (RAND Corporation,
2006), 27
13
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previously been suspected of being utilised for such purposes. It also considers the prospects
for the LRIT requirements under SOLAS Chapter V to lessen the scope for vessels to be utilised
for such purposes.

[1]

Larger or smaller vessels?18 All the six recorded interdictions of vessels suspected

of being utilised to illicitly transport WMD materiel reviewed in [7.2.1] involved large vessels
engaged on international voyages, which from 2004 would most likely be subject to the ISPS
Code. In addition to the ISPS Code’s requirements to restrict the scope for weaponry to be
introduced onto SOLAS ships (which were discussed in [4.2.1] and [5.3.5]), a significant
contribution of would be the ship identification requirements mandated under SOLAS Chapter
XI-2 and the ISPS Code,19 which when combined with other intelligence about such vessels,
could enable States to identify vessels suspected of being utilised for illicit purposes. If such
vessels sought to enter port, as [4.2.1] noted the ISPS Code authorises contracting governments
to undertake ‘control measures’ in relation to SOLAS ships20 proposing to enter their port
facilities – which might include denying permission, or requesting further information prior to
authorising such entry) in situations where there are security-related concerns.21

[2]

Terrorist-controlled in first instance? The reports of the six recorded interdictions of

suspected illicit WMD materiel shipments in [7.2.1] did not specifically note these vessels as

18

The fifth factor regarding the likely success of the ISPS Code from [4.2.7] (the effectiveness of government
oversight arrangements) has been incorporated into this point
19
Such identification requirements include non-erase-able Ship Identification Numbers: SOLAS Chapter XI
Regulation 3, and to maintain Continuous Synopsis Records of their ownership and registration: SOLAS Chapter
XI Regulation 5 – including information about the ship's flag state; date of registration; identification number;
port of registration; registered owner of the ship; and details regarding the ship's International Ship Security
Certificate. Furthermore, the ISPS Code enables port states to require ships subject to the ISPS Code to provide
certain security and safety-related information as a condition of their entry into a designated port facility subject
to the ISPS Code – including but not limited to information from the ship’s Continuous Synopsis Record; the
location of the ship at the time of reporting; the ship’s expected time of arrival into port; the ship’s crew list;
details of the ship’s cargo; and the ship’s passenger list: ISPS Code Part B section 4.39
20
And possibly other ships if the Contracting Government extended the application of the ISPS Code to ships
below SOLAS Convention size: ISPS Code Part A, Section 3.2; ISPS Code Part B Section 4.46
21
These “security related concerns” might arise from one or more of the following: (i) the validity of the ship's
ISSC; (ii) the effectiveness of the ship's preventative security measures; (iii) concerns regarding the effectiveness
of security measures at the ship's previous ports of call – or with other ships with which it may have interfaced
with; (iv) concerns regarding the cargo or passengers embarked on the ship; (v) concerns regarding the accuracy
of the information contained in the ship's Continuous Synopsis Record; and/or (vi) concerns regarding those
responsible for the ship and its security. Additionally, Relevantly, ISPS Code Part B section 4.34 notes that ‘ …
[SOLAS] regulation XI-2/9 does not prejudice the Contracting Government from taking measures having a basis
in, and consistent with, international law to ensure the safety or security of persons, ships, port facilities and other
property in cases where the ship, although in compliance with Chapter XI-2 and part A of [the ISPS] Code, is still
considered to present a security risk’.
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being terrorist-controlled in the first instance. However aside from the MV Light (which as
[7.2.7] explains, evaded the US Navy’s attempts to board it, and returned back to North Korea),
all of the inspections of these vessels occurred consensually, with the vessels diverting to
nearby ports for inspection.

[3]

Rigor of application of ISPS Code? and [4] Did the maritime terrorism incident

involve a security-regulated port?

The reports of the six interdictions of vessels suspected

of illicitly transporting WMD materiel in [7.2.1] did not specify whether the suspected WMD
materiel was introduced onto the vessels within a port facility subject to the ISPS Code, or
further up the supply chain (for example being packed into a shipping container). However it
may be inferred from the size and types of vessels noted in [7.2.1] being cargo ships engaged
on international voyages, that the suspected WMD materiel would have passed through a port
facility that from 31 July 2004 would most likely be subject to the ISPS Code. This reinforces
the importance of the IMO continuing to provide input into the ship/port interface aspects of
supply chain security in cooperation with the WCO as noted in [4.2.2].

It is most likely that all six of the vessels noted in [7.2.1] would be subject to the LRIT
requirements by virtue of their size and engagement in international voyages. [4.3.2] noted
that since early 2011, the international LRIT system has been shown to be functioning as
required. It also showed that naval force commanders around Gulf of Aden have reportedly
found LRIT information to be “invaluable” in developing a more accurate picture of
commercial vessels transiting the Somali High Risk Area – with unexpected delays or
diversions possibly indicating commercial vessels being targeted by Somali pirates. However
as [5.2.2.6] reasoned, counter-piracy operations around the Gulf of Aden involve protecting
commercial vessels from pirate attacks within a defined geographical area; whereas terrorist
attacks on shipping, or the utilisations of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks, could
occur at a wider range of maritime locations. As [4.3.2] noted, LRIT information22 is limited
in the details it includes, and as [4.3.2] noted, whilst it has been concluded the receiving of
LRIT information would be consistent with UNCLOS, it is less clear what actions “receiving”
states might take based on LRIT information. Relevantly, whilst the US Navy was reported to
have tracked the MV Light from North Korea in May 2011 with the use of satellite information,

Being the ship’s identity, its latitudinal and longitudinal location, and the date and time of the position reported
SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19-1/5
22
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it is unclear if LRIT information played a part in this, or whether the MV Light was tracked
through US military satellites.

In summary, this section has reasoned that if rigorously applied at all levels, the preventative
SOLAS vessel security, identification and tracking measures might lessen the scope for
terrorists to illicitly transport WMD materiel aboard vessels. However given the challenges of
screening 100 per cent of shipping containers before being loaded onto vessels, States might
well need to consider interdicting vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel.

The following sections examine the prospects for UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA Convention to
enable States to interdict vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel, and thereby
prevent terrorists from receiving such materials. They explain how the WMD interdiction
measures outlined in the PSI have prompted considerable debate about the legality under
UNCLOS of interdicting “laterally transiting” vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD
materiel.

[7.2.3]

The Proliferation Security Initiative

The So San incident noted in [7.2.1] above raised significant concerns within the US and other
Western governments about the lack of an international legal basis for interdicting and
confiscating suspected of illicit shipments of WMD materiel. Shortly after this incident, the US
government, in co-operation with fourteen other “participant” governments,23 announced the
formation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on 31 May 2003 as a cooperative effort
to facilitate interdictions of shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials
– (which as [2.5.3] noted, are termed ‘WMD materiel’ in this Study) flowing to and from ‘states
and non-state actors of proliferation concern’.
The objectives of, and activities envisaged under, the PSI are expressed in the ‘PSI Statement
of Interdiction Principles’,24 which is not a formally binding international agreement, but a
political statement of intention by participant governments, expressing how they plan to

23

The governments initially expressing their support for the PSI included Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain and the United Kingdom
24
United States State Department ‘Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles’, 4
September 2003 http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm Accessed 1 October 2013

258

cooperate and consider exercising their jurisdictional rights under UNCLOS25 to interdict
vessels suspected of carrying WMD or related equipment to non-state actors.26 Whilst the PSI
Interdiction Principles (hereafter ‘Interdiction Principles’) cover information exchange
amongst participants27, and strengthening existing national laws,28 the aspects pertaining to the
interdiction of vessels at sea are outlined in paragraph 4, under which PSI participants commit
[in principle] to:
‘Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD,
their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities
permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to
include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states
or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject
to their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state,
to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal
waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state,
that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or
non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are
identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to
the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the
seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by
such states.

25

Although the Interdiction Principles do not refer specifically to UNCLOS, they make mention of UNCLOS
maritime jurisdictional zones and concepts – such as flag state jurisdiction
26
Stuart Kaye and Lowell Bautista ‘The Naval Protection of Shipping in the 21st Century: An Australian
Perspective’ (2011) 34 Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, 42
27
Under Paragraph 2 of the Interdiction Principles, participants commit in principle to ‘Adopt streamlined
procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the
confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate
appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among
participants in interdiction efforts’.
28
Under Paragraph 3 of the Interdiction Principles, participants commit in principle to ‘Review and work to
strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to
strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these
commitments’
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d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters,
territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably
suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to
enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or
territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as
requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such
cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another
state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are
transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that
are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f.

If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as trans-shipment points for
shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation
concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably
suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified’.

[7.2.3.1]

Ambiguous aspects of the PSI Interdiction Principles

In addition to questions of the legality under UNCLOS of the measures alluded to in the
Interdiction Principles (which is the focus of the bulk of this section’s analysis in [7.2.5]), and
despite the US State Department’s publication of ‘Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently
Asked Questions’ (PSI FAQs),29 several key terms in the Interdiction Principles have been
identified as ambiguous.
First, Paragraph 1 of the Interdiction Principles explains that ‘[the term] ‘States or non-state
actors of proliferation concern’ generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI
participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are
engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or
29

Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Non-proliferation, Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently
Asked Questions 24 May 2004, revised 22 May 2008 www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105213.htm Accessed 2 January
2010
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nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or
facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.’ Although the term ‘States
of proliferation concern’ is widely presumed to refer to those States described by the former
Bush administration as constituting the “Axis of Evil”,30 the term has been criticised for its
subjectivity, with the PSI possibly exceeding the ambit of Security Council Resolution 1540
(examined below in [7.2.4] – which is restricted to ‘non-State actors’) - notwithstanding that
several so-called ‘States of proliferation concern’ have previously been the subjects of specific
Security Council Resolutions regarding WMD proliferation.31
Second, the vagueness of the terms ‘WMD’, ‘their delivery systems’ and ‘related materials’
within the Interdiction Principles has been criticised as subjective, as has the lack of clear
exceptions for “dual-use” materials from being subject to interdiction. It has been estimated
that around 95 per cent of what the Interdiction Principles might class as ‘WMD-related
materials’ could also have legitimate peaceful uses - for instance uranium that could be used in
the manufacture of nuclear weapons has a range of medical uses, and chemicals that could be
used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons are also commonly used in the
manufacture of plastics and to process foodstuffs.32 Relevantly, the three multilateral nonproliferation treaties specifically recognise the rights of States to utilise for peaceful purposes

Former US President George W. Bush coined the ‘Axis of evil’ term in his State of the Union Address on 29
January 2002 referring to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as sponsors of terrorism trafficking WMD – and
subsequently used this term throughout his presidency. Secondly, 6 May 2002, then-Undersecretary of State John
R. Bolton in a speech titled ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ referred to Libya, Syria, and Cuba as ‘state sponsors of
terrorism that are pursuing or who have the potential to pursue WMD or have the capability to do so in violation
of their treaty obligations’. Thirdly in January 2005 the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a
speech regarding the newly termed outposts of tyranny, a list of six countries deemed most repressive - included
the two remaining Axis members, as well as Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe and Myanmar
31
See for example, UNSC Res 1696 (31 July 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1696 in relation to Iran, and UNSC Res 1718
(14 October 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718 in relation to North Korea: Douglas Guilfoyle ‘Maritime Interdiction of
Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (2007) 12 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 14
32
Song, above n 11 , 115
30
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nuclear energy,33 biological agents and toxins34 and toxic chemicals.35 On this point, the PSI
FAQs explain that ‘ ... the intent of the PSI is to only take action based on solid information
regarding shipments that are believed to be destined for states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern’; and that ‘legitimate dual-use commerce will very rarely be affected by
PSI activities’.36 Guilfoyle points out that in the absence of specific treaty obligations, there
are no international legal prohibitions on possessing WMD; and also notes while the
multilateral non-proliferation treaties oblige parties to reduce or destroy weapon stockpiles,
they do not criminalise trade in WMD materiel.37
Third, and following on from the second point, the reference to ‘good cause’ for interdictions
has been criticised for its vagueness and subjectivity. 38 The PSI FAQs provide minimal further
insight on this point, merely explaining that ‘ … in responding to such [interdiction] requests,
each state will, of necessity, decide for itself whether the information provided by the
requesting state warrants acceding to the request’.39

33

Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, open for signature 1 July 1968 729
UNTS 161 (entered into force 5 March 1970) provides that (1) ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty’ and
furthermore that (inter alia) (2) ‘All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy’.
34
Article X of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, open for signature 10 April 1972 1015
UNTS 163 (entered into force 26 March 1975) provides that (1) ‘The States Parties to this Convention undertake
to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.
Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with
other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in
the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes’.
35
Article VI of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature 3 September 1992, 1974 UNTS 45 (entry into
force 29 April 1997) provides (inter alia) that (1) ‘Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this
Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention’.
36
Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Non-proliferation, Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently
Asked Questions 24 May 2004, revised 22 May 2008 www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105213.htm Accessed 2 January
2010
37
Guilfoyle, above n 31, 17; See also Allen, above n 6, 27 - 45
38
See for example Jack Garvey ‘The International Institutional Imperative for Countering the Spread of Weapons
of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Proliferation Security Initiative’ (2005) 10 Journal of Conflict & Security
Law, 137; Michael Becker ‘The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction
of Ships at Sea’ (2005) 46 Harvard Journal of International Law, 162
39
Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Non-proliferation, Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently
Asked Questions 24 May 2004, revised 22 May 2008 www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105213.htm Accessed 2 January
2010
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Fourth, the reference within paragraph 4(d) to the taking of ‘appropriate actions’ for stopping
and searching vessels has also been criticised both for its ambiguity and subjectivity. On this
point, the PSI FAQs explain that ‘ … PSI participants define “interdiction” broadly as any
action, based on sufficient information and consistent with national authorities and
international legal frameworks, that results in the denial, delay or disruption of a shipment of
proliferation concern’;40 and further note that ‘PSI participants [will] seek to interdict
shipments of proliferation concern at the moment of maximum legal authority and will employ
any appropriate lever of national power – possibly including diplomatic requests, customs
inspections in port, law enforcement measures, or (in rare cases) military measures such as
naval boardings on the high seas’.41 [Emphasis added] The vague reference to ‘military
measures’ might indicate PSI participants envisaging the interdiction of suspected WMD
shipments on the basis of their self-defence rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter if there
were no other available international legal grounds, which Chapter 8 examines.

Fifth, the legality of seizures of materials from interdicted vessels has been questioned. Becker
explains that ‘ ... even if the PSI has helped to expand interception capacities it is less clear
whether the PSI has enhanced the options for seizure of cargo after a boarding has taken place.
The lawfulness of seizing cargo, not stopping and boarding the vessel, was the real issue in the
So San incident’.42 However, he also critically questioned whether the decision by the US
authorities to release the So San was actually motivated by respect for the principles of
international law embodies in UNCLOS, or political desires to keep Yemen “on side” as an
ally of the US in the “Global War on Terror”.43

As [7.2.6] notes, since its formation in 2003, PSI participants are reported to have conducted
numerous cooperative military and naval exercises, and meetings of operational experts.
Additionally PSI participants have actively pursued other efforts to strengthen the international
counter-proliferation legal framework – particularly the negotiations within the UN Security
Council leading to the passing of Resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004. As [7.2.4] below explains,

40

Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Non-proliferation, Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently
Asked Questions 24 May 2004, revised 22 May 2008 www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105213.htm Accessed 2 January
2010
41
Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Non-proliferation, Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently
Asked Questions 24 May 2004, revised 22 May 2008 www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105213.htm Accessed 2 January
2010
42
Becker, above n 38 , 154
43
Becker, above n 38 , 154
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whilst recognising the threat to international peace and security posed by WMD proliferation,
Resolution 1540 stopped short of specifically authorising vessel interdictions. As [7.2.5]
explains, this has led international legal scholars to express divergent views on the legality of
WMD interdictions across the UNCLOS maritime jurisdictional zones – which this Study
terms the “restrictive” and “liberal” views of UNCLOS.

[7.2.4]

Security Council Resolution 1540

In comparison to the extensive obligations imposed by the post-9/11 counter-terrorism
resolutions discussed in [2.7.1], efforts within the UN Security Council to achieve international
support for interdictions of suspected illicit shipments of WMD materiel amongst non-state
actors have not achieved the same consensus. Whilst as a starting point, Security Council
Resolution 1456 recognised the ‘ … serious and growing danger of terrorist access to and use
of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and [the] need to
strengthen controls on these materials’,44 Resolution 1540 has been the most significant
pronouncement by the Security Council about seriousness of the threat to international peace
and security posed by the proliferation of WMD materiel amongst non-state actors.
Following five months of informal negotiations,45 the final text of Resolution 1540 affirmed
that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of
delivery46 constitutes a threat to international peace and security; and also affirmed the Security
Council’s resolve to take ‘ … appropriate and effective actions against any threat to
international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as
provided for in the [UN] Charter’. The preamble of Resolution 1540 also expressed the
Security Council’s grave concerns about the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State
actors47 … may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and their means of delivery; as well as its grave concerns regarding the threat of illicit
44

UNSC Res 1456 (20 January 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1456, Preamble
Guilfoyle, above n 31, 15
46
UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540, Notes to Preamble defined ‘Means of delivery’ as
‘missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
that are specially designed for such use’
47
UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540, Notes to Preamble defined ‘Non-State actor’ as
‘individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities within the scope
of [Resolution 1540]’ – taken to mean those individuals and groups originally listed by Security Council
Resolution 1267, and to whom Security Council Resolution 1373 applied
45
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trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related
materials48 which added a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also
poses a threat to international peace and security. It imposed several significant positive and
negative obligations upon on all States;49 and emphasized that none of the obligations it
enunciated should be interpreted so as to conflict with, nor alter, the rights of States under
existing non-proliferation treaties,50 nor alter the responsibilities of non-proliferation
institutions.51 It also called upon states to increase cooperation and dialogue in relation to nonproliferation through a number of measures.52

However the closest Resolution 1540 came to authorizing interdictions of suspected WMD
shipments was within paragraph 10 - which call[ed] upon all States: ‘ … in accordance with
their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take
cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their
means of delivery, and related materials’. [Emphasis added] Through merely ‘call[ing] upon’
states to ‘take cooperative action’, Resolution 1540 has been characterised as changing from
“obligation-imposing” in the bulk of the its text to “invitation-making” in paragraph 10; and
therefore neither conferring additional jurisdiction upon states to enforce laws against foreign

UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540, Notes to Preamble defined ‘Related materials’ as
‘materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on
national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons and their means of delivery’.
49
UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540. These obligations include ‘refraining from providing
any support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery’: para 1; ‘adopting and enforcing appropriate
effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery for terrorist purposes - as well as
attempting to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance
them’: para 2; ‘taking and enforcing effective measures to establish domestic laws and controls to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials’: para
3; and ‘developing effective national control lists’: para 6
50
These instruments include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention See [7.2.3.1] above
51
These non-proliferation institutions include the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540, para 5. See also
Song, above n 11 , 115
52
UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540. These measures included ‘promoting the universal
adoption and implementation of relevant multilateral treaties’: para 8(a); ‘adopting appropriate rules and
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vessels,53 nor creating any new rights of visit enabling interference with foreign flag vessels.54
The absence of specific references to interdictions has been characterised as a setback for the
efforts of the PSI’s proponents to achieve international legal authority for interdicting
suspected illicit shipments of WMD materiel.55

During the negotiations for Resolution 1540, China is reported to have opposed the inclusion
of specific references to interdictions.56 A possible explanation for this might have been its
desire to avoid antagonising North Korea, thereby causing Resolution 1540 to be far less direct
in the obligations it imposes than the post-9/11 counter terrorism Security Council resolutions
reviewed in [2.7.1].
Although passed unanimously, during Security Council deliberations in April 2004, the
representatives of several States expressed concerns about the Security Council assuming a
“law-making” role. For example, the representative of India declared that ‘although resolutions
such as Resolution 1373 were adopted unanimously, the limitations in their implementation
underscore the need for caution on the [Security Council] being used as a route to short-circuit
the process of creating an international consensus’.57 The UK representative emphasised that
Resolution 1540 did not, on its own, authorise enforcement action.58 Along similar lines,
Talmon noted that during an earlier Security Council meeting the representative of Pakistan
had declared that his country ‘ … strongly adheres to the position that the Security Council,
despite its wide authority and responsibilities, is not empowered to unilaterally amend or
abrogate international treaties and agreements freely entered into by sovereign States’; 59 and
in another Security Council meeting the representative of South Africa asserted that ‘the
[Security Council’s] mandate leaves no room either to re-interpret or even to amend treaties
that have been negotiated and agreed by the rest of the UN membership’.60 Similar observations
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were made by Guilfoyle when discussing Resolution 1540, who opined that ‘ ... Security
Council “legislation” cannot, of itself, create either effective law, or law enforcement [and that]
… realistically, a variety of jurisdictional bases will continue to be used to affect interdictions
of [WMD materiel] for the conceivable future’.61 The next section [7.2.5] examines how since
around 2004, international legal scholars have expressed divergent views on the implications
of Resolution 1540 on the powers of States interdict vessels suspected of transporting WMD
materiel for terrorist purposes across the various UNCLOS maritime zones.

[7.2.5]

Analysis of the legality of WMD interdictions across the UNCLOS

maritime jurisdictional zones

This section analyses the legality under UNCLOS of the WMD interdiction measures outlined
in the Interdiction Principles, in the absence of formal agreement between the “interdicting”
coastal (or other) state and the flag state of the vessel suspected of illicitly trafficking WMD
materiel. States noted to “support” the PSI (and which are not parties to the PSI bilateral ship
boarding agreements discussed in [7.2.7]) have not formally stated their interpretations of
UNCLOS regarding WMD interdictions – but as [7.2.6] explains, have only expressed their
(political) “support” for the vaguely-stated Interdiction Principles. As the publicly-reported
WMD interdictions noted in [7.2.1] have all taken place with the consent of flag states and/or
vessel owners, and have not (as at 1 October 2013) been challenged in international bodies
such as ITLOS or the ICJ, the contending scholarly analyses reviewed below are the best
available indicators of the legality of WMD interdictions under UNCLOS. As explained below,
these academic analyses have expressed what this Study terms “restrictive” and “liberal” views
of UNCLOS. As noted in [1.7], this Study is the first to specifically articulate these two
contending views amongst international legal scholars.

[7.2.5.1]

Legality of WMD interdictions in internal waters and territorial seas

Paragraph 4(d) of the Interdiction Principles discuss the taking of ‘appropriate actions’ to stop
and/or search within (inter alia)62 their territorial seas vessels that are reasonably suspected of
carrying WMD materiel to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to
61
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seize such cargoes that are identified’. As [6.2.3.2] noted, UNCLOS Article 19(2) provides
that: ‘Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in ... (inter alia) (a) any threat
or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the
coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the UN Charter’ [Emphasis added]. It has been noted that delineation of a specific
list of “non-innocent” activities in UNCLOS Article 19(2) was intended to increase objectivity,
and reduce subjectivity, for coastal state determinations about when the passage of foreign
vessels within their territorial sea will be considered “non-innocent”.63 However since the
announcement of the PSI, international legal scholars have been divided on whether the “noninnocent” activities under UNCLOS Article 19(2) should be understood as being an exhaustive
“once-and-for-all” list - or a generalised description providing guidance – of activities causing
a foreign vessel’s passage to be “non-innocent”.

Scholars favouring a restrictive view of UNCLOS hold that its text should be interpreted
strictly according to the views expressed within the UNCLOS III negotiations; and characterise
the UNCLOS innocent passage provisions as safeguarding freedoms of navigation from
arbitrary coastal state interference – described as “hard-won” international legal certainties and
norms.64 Such scholars also point out that the United States and others have traditionally
opposed the development of “prohibitive” interpretations of UNCLOS, instead preferring
interpretations that maximise freedom of navigation.65 Proceeding from this basis, Logan
argues that suspected shipments of WMD materiel would not “fit” within any of the “noninnocent” activities specified in UNCLOS Article 19(2).66

Similarly, Guilfoyle argues that coastal states could only interdict suspected WMD shipments
where the presence of such WMD materiel constituted a direct threat to that coastal state –
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rather than another State against which such materials might be used at some point in the future
– arguing that ‘ … it is hard to see that a latent threat in the vessel’s hold, destined elsewhere,
has any “external” manifestation capable of affecting the character of [innocent] passage’.67
Support for this restrictive view can be found in the ICJ’s conclusion in the Corfu Channel case
– which held that the “innocence” of the vessel’s passage turns on the nature of the passage –
not the vessel’s end motive.68 He similarly contends the presence of “delivery system
components” would not render a foreign vessel’s transit non-innocent, arguing that ‘ … an
unassembled Scud missile without a payload is not, in itself, threatening. The “prejudice” it
may represent to [another State’s) security is heavily contingent on its intended end use: a “nonState actor” could be interested in it for scrap metal or as an exhibit’.69

Proponents of the restrictive view have distinguished the national focus of the references in
UNCLOS Article 19(2)(a) to the ‘sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
the coastal State’ from Resolution 1540’s references to international peace and security; and
therefore dismiss arguments that if the maritime trafficking of WMD threatens international
peace and security, it must also threaten national security as unsatisfactory, relying on an
“indirect threat” to meet a “direct nexus” requirement.70 Such scholars have also pointed out
that other UNCLOS provisions restrict coastal states from preventing the passage of nuclearpowered vessels. These provisions include Article 23,71 which specifically recognises the
innocent passage rights of vessels, and Article 24,72 which prevents coastal States from
hampering the innocent passage of foreign ships in a discriminatory manner.73 They also regard
UNCLOS Article 27(1)74 – which provides that the criminal jurisdiction of coastal States
‘should not’ be exercised on board “laterally transiting” foreign vessels except inter alia (a) if
the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; (b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb
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the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea’ - as a mandatory prohibition
on the powers of coastal states to interdict laterally transiting foreign vessels.75 By contrast, as
discussed below, those favouring a liberal view of UNCLOS regard the ‘should not’ within
Article 27(1) as only a hortorary restriction.76

By contrast, scholars favouring a liberal view of UNCLOS argue that because it would be
politically challenging to amend,77 UNCLOS should be interpreted flexibly and
contemporaneously,78 taking account of post-9/11 international security challenges.79 Liberal
view proponents argue that whilst Resolution 1540 did not specifically authorise interdictions,
through affirming the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of
WMD amongst non-state actors, it nevertheless adds justification to coastal state interdictions
of suspected shipments of WMD materiel under UNCLOS Article 19(2)(a). For example, Allen
opines that whilst none of the travaux prepatoires from the UNCLOS III negotiations suggested
that threats to third states were considered to be “prejudicial” to the security of the coastal state
during the drafting of UNCLOS Article 19, Resolution 1540 helps address this uncertainty, by
giving rise to a presumption that shipments of WMD materiel to non-state actors threatens
international peace and security.80 He further reasons that whilst the 1989 USA/USSR Joint
Statement on Uniform Acceptance of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage81
(frequently cited as an authoritative statement on the practical meaning of UNCLOS Article
19) did not address situations where Security Council resolutions are involved, arguments
expressed by Professor Alfred Soons that ‘ … it would seem beyond doubt that the coastal state
would not be acting unlawfully if it took action against foreign ships violating a [Security
Council embargo] while they are in innocent passage or transit passage through an international
strait’82 help justify coastal state interdictions of laterally transiting vessels suspected of
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transporting WMD materiel to non-state actors.83 Following a similar line of reasoning, Song
argues the innocent passage rights of foreign-flagged vessels are “conditioned” on the peaceful
uses of the cargoes carried within the vessel where there are reasonable grounds for believing
such materials will be used for non-peaceful purposes.84 Likewise, Joyner regards Article
19(2)(a) as being ‘ ... wide enough to include threats of force against states other than the coastal
state’ and could therefore enable coastal states to interdict suspected shipments of WMD
materiel laterally transiting their territorial sea en route to third states.85 In relation to UNCLOS
Article 27 (discussed above), Allen argues that the question of “innocence” does not turn on a
violation of the laws of the coastal state, with such a violation being neither necessary nor
sufficient to render a vessel’s passage non-innocent.86

The legality of the interdiction measures alluded to in the Interdiction Principles has neither
been challenged nor adjudicated at ITLOS or the ICJ since the announcement of the PSI in
2003.87 However several post-9/11 UN resolutions and reports which have recognised the
increasingly inter-dependent nature of international security, and the transnational nature of the
threat of contemporary terrorism, lend support to the liberal view. In 2003, Resolution 1456
recognised that ‘it has become easier, in an increasingly globalized world, for terrorists to
exploit sophisticated technology, communications and resources for their criminal objectives’
[emphasis added]; and ‘that terrorism can only be defeated … by a sustained comprehensive
approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, international and
regional organizations, and by redoubled efforts at the national level’.88 [Emphasis added] The
2004 UN High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Changes recognised the
international and inter-dependent nature of 21st century security when noting that ‘Today’s
threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global
and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own
83
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efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every
State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and
not to harm its neighbours’.89 The UN General Assembly’s 2005 In Larger Freedom Report,
which recognised that ‘ ... catastrophic terrorism on one side of the globe, for example an
attack against a major financial centre in a rich country, could affect the development prospects
of millions on the other by causing a major economic downturn and plunging millions into
poverty’ and furthermore that ‘ ... a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or Europe
would have devastating effects on the whole world’.90 The UNGA’s recognition of the potential
impact of terrorist attacks on the inter-dependent global economy stand in contrast to the strict
distinctions between national and international favoured by proponents of the restrictive view
noted above.91

If a coastal state determined the passage of a foreign vessel to be non-innocent on the basis of
it being suspected of transporting WMD materiel for terrorist purposes, UNCLOS Article 25(1)
would enable the coastal state to take the ‘necessary steps to prevent such passage’ –
notwithstanding that as [6.2.3.2] explained, UNCLOS is silent on what such ‘necessary steps’
might entail.

[7.2.5.2]

Legality of WMD interdictions within contiguous zones

As noted in [7.2.3], Paragraph 4(d) of the Interdiction Principles also mentions PSI participants
taking ‘appropriate actions’ to interdict suspected shipments of WMD materiel within their
contiguous zones. UNCLOS Article 33(1) provides that within the contiguous zone coastal
states may ‘exercise the necessary control’ to (a) ‘prevent infringement of its customs,
immigration92 laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea’ and (b) ‘punish
infringements of such laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea’.
The powers of coastal states to interdict foreign vessels within their contiguous zones to
safeguard their security interests are generally accepted to be limited, with UNCLOS Article
89
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33(a) applying only to “inward-bound” ships,93 and that powers to ‘exercise the necessary
control’ are limited to inspections and warnings rather than the apprehension of such vessels.
Coastal states are held to have greater interdiction powers under UNCLOS Article 33(b) over
“outward-bound” ships, because an offence would have already been committed within the
coastal state’s territory or territorial sea.94 Kaye points out that ‘Whether ‘prevention’ could be
stretched to permit a boarding is a moot point, but it seems clear that such a boarding could not
lead to the arrest of a vessel and its crew without the ship having entered the territorial sea at
some point’.95
Scholars favouring both restrictive96 and liberal97 views of UNCLOS concur that UNCLOS
does not enable coastal states to interdict suspected WMD materiel shipments within their
contiguous zones. Nevertheless, with the broadening of concepts of security over recent years
beyond primarily military threats when UNCLOS was negotiated to contemporary times where
“security” is understood to also include illegal immigration, drug smuggling, serious pollution
and acts of terrorism, there might be cause for the long-held views to be re-visited.98 Similarly
to the liberal view of UNCLOS Article 19(2)(a) discussed above in [7.5.2.2], a liberal view of
UNCLOS Article 33 might hold Resolution 1540 to add justification to coastal state
interdictions of suspected shipments of WMD materiel involving non-state actors on the basis
of ‘exercising the control necessary to prevent infringements of its (inter alia) customs laws
and regulations’. However it appears there would need to be a “direct nexus” between the
shipment of WMD materiel and the security of the coastal state for UNCLOS Article 33 to
apply – that is, a vessel being destined towards, or away from, the coastal state – as opposed to
a vessel that is laterally transiting the contiguous zone in question.

That is, ships that are heading “inward” towards the coastal state’s territory or Territorial Sea
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[7.2.5.3]

Legality of WMD interdictions on the high seas

Paragraph 4(b) of the Interdiction Principles mention participants giving consideration to
boarding and searching any vessel flying their flag in ‘in areas beyond the territorial seas of
any other state’. As outlined below, whilst UNCLOS does not constrain the ability of flag states
to allow other States to board their vessels, scholars have also analysed the legality of WMD
interdictions involving vessels flagged to “non-consenting” states which do not “support” the
PSI.

As noted in [6.2.3.3], UNCLOS recognises the rights of all States to sail their ships on the high
seas.99 UNCLOS Article 88100 states that the high seas shall be ‘reserved’ for ‘peaceful
purposes’, but provides no guidance on what ‘peaceful purposes’ entail. UNCLOS Article
92(1) codifies the rule from the SS Lotus (1927) case (which was discussed in [6.2.3.1]) by
providing (inter alia) that on the high seas ‘ … ships shall sail under the flag of one state only
and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in [UNCLOS],
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas’. Finally, UNCLOS Article 110
provides that ‘ … except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty’,
foreign ships shall not be subject to interdiction unless the engaged in piracy, the slave trade,
unauthorised broadcasting, or the vessel is stateless’. Scholarly opinion has been divided on
the extent to which the vaguely-worded UNCLOS high seas provisions allow States to interdict
vessels suspected of transporting WMD materiel to non-state actors.

Following a similar approach to the restrictive view of the UNCLOS innocent passage
provisions noted in [7.3.2.2], scholars favouring the restrictive view regard the reference to
‘peaceful purposes’ in Article 88 as limited to prohibiting “non-peaceful” activities on the high
seas (for example the actual detonation of a WMD), rather than the maritime shipment of WMD
materiel across the high seas. For example, Valencia regards forcible interdictions of suspected
shipments of WMD materiel on the high seas as possibly being “non-peaceful” activities
offending the long-enduring freedom of navigation on the high seas.101 Along similar lines,
Logan regards UNCLOS Article 92 as prohibiting interdictions without the express consent of
the vessel’s flag state, and views Article 110 as containing an exhaustive list of exceptions to
99
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the sole jurisdiction of the flag state.102 Although none of the studies by scholars favouring a
restrictive view of UNCLOS have specifically addressed the point, the restrictive view would
presumably regard the reference to ‘treaties’ in Article 110 as only meaning formalised treaties,
rather than informal political agreements such as the PSI.

In contrast, proponents of the liberal view have regarded Resolution 1540 as influencing
interpretations of UNCLOS Article 88. Song argues that since Resolution 1540 affirmed the
proliferation of WMD materiel constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and has
called upon all states to cooperate to address this threat, together with UNCLOS Articles 88,
300,103 and 301,104 Resolution 1540 ‘ … can be cited as a defence of any [WMD] interdiction
undertaken within the EEZ’,105 on the grounds that ‘ … any use of the sea for a purpose the
Security Council has deemed to pose a threat to international peace and security may be deemed
to be inconsistent with the reservation of the seas for peaceful purposes’.106 Such scholars also
characterise the four exceptions to the freedom of navigation on the high seas in Article 110 as
indicative rather than exhaustive. For example, Joyner argues that through the inclusion of the
phrase ‘except when acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty’ within Article
110, the drafters of UNCLOS intended to allow scope for states to conclude further agreements
allowing for the interdiction of vessels.107 Byers regards the interdiction measures alluded to
in the Interdiction Principles as consistent with UNCLOS, noting that UNCLOS does not stop
flag States authorising other States to board and search their vessels on the high seas,108 a
conclusion shared by Becker.109 Similarly, Allen opines that ‘ … the flag State may authorise
interference or even waive primary jurisdiction over its vessels by agreement. Such agreement
may take the form of standing treaties or ad hoc agreement by exchange of notes’ ... and
furthermore ‘ ... although some sources limit the term “treaty” to written agreement between
states, there is no reason to conclude that Article 110 was meant to exclude oral, ad hoc
agreements between states, or Security Council Resolutions. Oral international agreements,
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while rare, can be valid and binding “treaties”’.110 On this point, Article 311(3)111 recognises
the ability of States Parties to UNCLOS to conclude agreements that modify the operation of
UNCLOS applicable to the relations between them.112

[7.2.5.4]

Legality of WMD interdictions in straits used for international navigation

[6.2.3.4] overviewed the UNCLOS straits transit regime provisions and the (limited) measures
that “bordering states”113 may take against foreign vessels laterally transiting international
straits. Although the Interdiction Principles do not mention WMD interdictions within
international straits, the legality of WMD interdictions within international straits has been
subject to consideration by international legal scholars, resulting in restrictive and liberal views
of UNCLOS.
Proponents of the restrictive view emphasise both the “non-discriminatory” character of the
UNCLOS transit passage regime and its reference to the ‘freedom of navigation’ in Article
38(2) through international straits as prohibiting “bordering states” from interdicting suspected
shipments of WMD materiel aboard vessels laterally transiting international straits.114 They
also regard the terms ‘any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of bordering states, or in any other manner in violation of the principles
of international law embodied in the UN Charter’ within Article 39 as being limited to acts that
have a “direct nexus” to peace and security of the bordering state – as opposed to other states
that the vessel may be transiting towards.115
By contrast proponents of the liberal view have argued that UNCLOS enables “bordering
states” to interdict suspected WMD shipments passing through international straits. For
example, Song argues whilst UNCLOS specifies rights of innocent passage should not be
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suspended116, nor the rights of transit passage of foreign vessels impeded117 through
international straits, UNCLOS allows “bordering states” such as Singapore to interdict
suspected WMD shipments because Article 34(1) provides that straits transit passage ‘should
not’ in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise,
by the states bordering the straits, of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters.118

[7.2.5.5]

Summary: Legality of WMD interdictions under UNCLOS

In summary, the above sections have outlined how the vaguely-worded provisions of UNCLOS
may be interpreted restrictively or liberally. On balance, the restrictive view could be criticised
for taking a literal, “once and for all” interpretation of UNCLOS that better reflects the Cold
War national and international security priorities of 1982 (where possession of WMD was
strictly controlled, and the maintenance of unfettered freedom of navigation for the opposing
superpowers were prime concerns) rather than those of the post-9/11 security environment
where as Chapter 2 explained, transnational terrorism presents a very serious threat. The
steadfast distinction between national and international security underpinning the restrictive
view119 could also be criticised as overlooking both the transnational threat of contemporary
post 9/11 terrorism to international security as outlined in [2.7], the ever-increasing interdependence of the global economy, and the potential “contagion” that could result from a
significant disruption to significant “nodes” within the maritime system such as “mega-ports”
and navigational chokepoints as outlined in [3.2].

Over recent years international legal scholars have called for UNCLOS to be interpreted with
greater flexibility. For instance, Allen argues that ‘ … it is important to bear in mind that
[UNCLOS] was never intended to provide an exhaustive international code covering all aspects
of [international] maritime law. Rather, it provides an overarching framework, within which
other international agreements provide more detailed provisions, which can be adapted to meet
new or changed problems’.120 More recently, Klein has argued for greater flexibility in
understanding the law of the sea in the post-9/11 maritime security context, noting that the
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authority of the Security Council might provide an avenue to trump existing law of the sea
principles relating to the sovereign immunity of vessels.121

The liberal view of UNCLOS better enables coastal and other states to interdict vessels
suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel. The liberal view might be further supported
by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 122 which provides
(inter alia) that:
‘(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
...
(3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’
The references to ‘any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ within VCLT Article 31(3)(a), and to ‘any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation’ in VCLT Article 31 (3)(b) might be taken to include
informal, ad-hoc agreements between States to allow other “PSI participants” to board and
inspect their vessels as mentioned in the Interdiction Principles.123 The ‘relevant rules of
international law’ noted in VCLT Article 31(3)(c) could include the obligations under
Resolution 1540.

Whilst the liberal view of UNCLOS better enables States to interdict suspected WMD
shipments, as at 1 October 2013 none of the publicly-reported WMD interdictions discussed in
121

Klein, above n 68, 325
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into
force 27 January 1980) Article 31 ‘General rule of interpretation of treaties’
123
As noted in [7.2.3], paragraph 4(c) of the Interdiction Principles mentions PSI participants indicate they will
‘ ... seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its
own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be
identified by such states’.
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[7.2.1] have as yet tested how the liberal or restrictive views of UNCLOS might play out in
practice. Therefore, it is considered preferable have in place specific agreements between
States about when, and how, WMD interdictions should occur. The following section [7.2.6]
critically considers what “support” for the vaguely-worded Interdiction Principles actually
entails, and explains it is very challenging to assess the extent to which the PSI has become
“accepted” internationally. This highlights the importance of developing more specific
agreements between States regarding the maritime interdiction of WMD materiel – with [7.2.7]
examining the PSI bilateral ship boarding agreements which have been progressively
formalised between the US and major shipping registry states since 2004, and [7.2.9]
examining the “WMD interdiction aspects” of the 2005 SUA Convention.

[7.2.6]

International “support” for the PSI Interdiction Principles

The PSI has been commonly referred to as ‘an activity, not an organization’, with its flexible,
non-institutional character being emphasised by its proponents. As at 1 October 2013, the US
State Department listed 49 international workshops and naval exercises, and 26 meetings of
operational experts having been held at a range of locations since the commencement of the
PSI in early 2003.124 Since its inception in May 2003, the United States has progressively
publicised the States that “support” or more recently, “endorse” the PSI – with Thailand
became the 102nd state125 to “endorse” the PSI on 19 November 2012.126
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United States State Department Proliferation Security Initiative Calendar of Events
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27700.htm Accessed 1 October 2013
125
The US State Department lists PSI Participants as: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Belize,
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Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Republic of,
Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Marshall
Islands, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, San
Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu and Yemen http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm US State
Department Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation ‘Proliferation Security Initiative Participants’, 21 May
2013 ; Accessed 1 October 2013. This list is also included in Appendix H.
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US State Department Media Note ‘Thailand Endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative’
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200849.htm’ 19 November 2012 Accessed 1 October 2013
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However it is difficult to ascertain what “support” for the PSI actually entails, with the ‘PSI
FAQs’ addressing the question of how States might “participate” in the PSI quite vaguely.127
“Support” for the PSI could conceivably encompass several positions or actions by States,
including (in descending order of the seriousness of the commitment by “supporting” states)
actively participating in interdictions; providing assistance to the conduct of interdictions; not
actively opposing interdictions; or not criticising interdictions. However as “participants” only
express their political support for the PSI, rather than providing their formal legal commitment
to treaty obligations, it has been argued that such “support” for the PSI could ‘evaporate in a
flash’.128
Relevantly, several key maritime States are not listed as “participants” nor supporters of the
PSI - including China, most Middle Eastern states, India, Indonesia and Malaysia – which have
either resisted joining the PSI, or expressed hostility to its expansion.129 China has expressed
concerns about the informal nature of the PSI circumventing the UN’s multilateral processes.130
North Korea has been particularly hostile to the formation of the PSI – with a radio broadcast
on 19 June 2003 warning that ‘[t]he U.S. imperialists and their following forces should clearly
bear in mind that if they provoke us, they will not be able to escape a resolute and merciless
retaliation’ and that North Korea viewed the PSI as a strategy of blockading ‘with intention of
isolating and crushing’ North Korea, which it viewed as ‘ … a grave violation of sovereignty
and a violent infringement of international law for one specific country to blabber about
unreasonable pretexts and impose containment and pressure against other countries and to
inspect and restrict other countries' vessels and planes operating in accordance to procedures

127

Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Non-proliferation, Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently
Asked Questions 24 May 2004, revised 22 May 2008 www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105213.htm Accessed 2 January
2010 address the question ‘How can States participate in the PSI?’ by stating: ‘A: States can become involved in
the PSI in multiple ways: Endorsing the PSI and Statement of Interdiction Principles and indicating willingness
to support PSI efforts; Undertaking a review and providing information on current national legal authorities to
undertake interdictions at sea, in the air, on land, and indicating willingness to strengthen authorities, where
appropriate; Identifying specific national “assets” that might contribute to PSI efforts (eg military and law
enforcement capabilities, technical experts, legal advisors etc); Providing points of contact for PSI assistance
requests and other operational activities, and establishing appropriate internal government processes to coordinate
PSI response efforts; Being willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises and actual
operations as opportunities arise; and Being willing to conclude relevant agreements (eg boarding arrangements)
or otherwise to establish a concrete basis for cooperation with PSI efforts. Cooperation by flag, coastal or
transhipment states, and states along major air shipment corridors is particularly essential to counter-proliferation
efforts involving cargoes in transit’
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set by international law’, and has also stated that any interdiction of its vessels or planes under
the PSI would be regarded as an ‘act of war’ and that it would respond accordingly.131

Perry helpfully explores two hypothetical versions of how the interdiction measures outlined
in the Interdiction Principles might be applied against the vessels of non-consenting states. The
first “weak version” would only involve the vessels and/or waters of PSI participants, rather
than invoking the Interdiction Principles against non-participants - which he illustrates with the
following scenario:
‘ ... a security agency [of a PSI participant] would detect that members of Al Qaeda had
loaded a ship in Indonesia with re-enriched plutonium. The ship, flying a Panamanian
flag, would then leave port. At this point, US officials would call Panama and either
ask Panama to interdict the ship or, more likely, ask that Panama permit the United
States to interdict the ship. Panama would assent, and the US Navy would interdict the
ship at a place and time it deemed appropriate, regardless of the ocean zone’.132
Perry’s ‘weak version’ accurately describes how four out of the five previous WMD
interdictions discussed in [7.2.1] occurred. Writing along similar lines when discussing the
BBC China interdiction, Becker opines that this incident ‘ ... could hardly have been scripted
better ... as a German-flagged vessel, the BBC China presented an easy legal case for
intervention; Germany would have had the authority to stop and search the vessel on the high
seas had the ship's owner been uncooperative’.133

However, Perry went on discuss scenarios where terrorists might utilise vessels flagged to
states other than PSI participants, or states which might not “support” the PSI, or even be “states
of proliferation concern”, leading him to conclude (albeit in 2006) that ‘ … as a counterproliferation drag-net, the PSI has some rather large holes’.134 He discusses an alternative
“strong version” of the PSI where PSI participants might forcibly interdict suspected WMD
shipments, and argued this “strong version” more accurately reflects the political thinking of
the PSI’s key founders including former US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and
131
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International Security John Bolton. Perry concluded that ‘ ... the PSI’s resemblance to the use
of ambiguity as a weapon of war suggests the strong version’. 135 Garvey (who as noted in
[7.2.5] favours the restrictive view of UNCLOS), argues that forcible, non-consensual
interdictions would not accord with UNCLOS or customary international law.136

Since 9/11, numerous international legal scholars have opined that in the absence of consent
from the flag states of suspected terrorist vessels or a Security Council resolution specifically
authorising interdictions,137 the only international legal basis for interdicting vessels suspected
of proliferating WMD materiel amongst non-state actors might be as a self-defence measure
under Article 51 of the UN Charter,138 or alternatively on the basis of the doctrine of Necessity
– which are examined in Chapter 8.

The next section [7.2.7] examines the PSI bilateral ship-boarding agreements that have been
formalised between the United States and “key registry” states progressively since 2004. It
shows that whilst these agreements have added greater certainty to the processes for
interdicting vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel over the generally-stated
PSI Interdiction Principles, several subjective and uncertain aspects of these agreements have
been identified.

[7.2.7]

The PSI Bilateral Ship Boarding Agreements

In addition to reportedly gaining the political ‘support’ of participants, the counter-proliferation
objectives of the PSI have been formalised through ship-boarding agreements progressively
concluded since 2004 between the United States and nine States with significant numbers of
ships registered in their jurisdiction. Such agreements have been formalised between the United
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States and Liberia,139 Panama,140 the Marshall Islands,141 Croatia,142 Cyprus,143 Belize,144
Malta,145 Mongolia146 and the Bahamas.147 By number of vessels registered according to the
most recently available statistics, Panama ranked first with 6,413 vessels. Liberia second with
2,771, Malta fourth with 1,650, Marshall Islands seventh with 1,593, the Bahamas tenth with
1,160, Cyprus thirteenth with 838, Belize 33rd with 247, Croatia 57th with 77, and Mongolia
68th with 57 vessels.148 As outlined in [7.2.7.1], these ship-boarding agreements are more
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specific in comparison to the vaguely-expressed Interdiction Principles, through defining key
terms (albeit subjectively),149 specifying procedures for ship boardings,150 standards to govern
the use of force, and dispute resolution and claims provisions. Aside from some minor
differences, the ship-boarding agreements are largely similar in their format and content, with
four of the agreements also including provisions for the agreements to be enforced by ‘third
States’ as agreed between the state parties.

[7.2.7.1]

Provisions of the PSI Bilateral Ship-boarding Agreements

Whilst the following overview is based on the US-Liberia Agreement, significant differences
between the agreements (for instance timeframes for consent to board) are noted. The term
‘suspect vessel’ is defined as a vessel ‘used for commercial or private purposes in respect of
which there are reasonable grounds to suspect it is engaged in proliferation by sea’.
‘Proliferation by sea’ is defined as meaning ‘the transportation by ship of [WMD], their
delivery systems, and related materials to or from States or non-state actors of proliferation
concern’.151 ‘Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)’ are defined as meaning ‘nuclear, chemical,
biological and radiological weapons’ and the PSI ship boarding agreements adopt the same
(arguably subjective) definition of ‘States152 or non-state actors of proliferation concern’ that
is used in the Interdiction Principles - meaning ‘those countries or entities that should be subject
to interdiction activities because they are or are believed to be engaged in efforts to develop or
acquire WMD or their delivery systems; or trafficking (either selling, receiving, or facilitating)
of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials’. ‘Items of proliferation concern’ are
defined as meaning ‘WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials’; and ‘related
materials’ are loosely defined as meaning ‘materials, equipment and technology, of whatever
nature or type, that are related to and destined for use in the development, production,
utilization or delivery of [WMD]’.153 However unlike the 2005 SUA Convention (discussed in

Douglas Guilfoyle Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 247 also
referred to the 2008 version of the CIA World Fact book to make similar observations
149
In comparison to the more objective definitions in the 2005 SUA Convention which is examined in [7.2.9]
150
Including the designation of points of contact for authorising boardings, and specifying timeframes when flag
State consent will be deemed to have been provided in the event of no response from the flag state
151
The US-Belize Agreement and the US-Bahamas Agreement both include in Article 1.1 the additional condition
of ‘illicit’ transportation
152
As noted in [7.2.3.1] above, through targeting ‘states … of proliferation concern’, the PSI bilateral ship
boarding agreements could be criticised for exceeding the authority of Security Council Resolution 1540 (which
only targeted non-state actors – notwithstanding that the UNSC has previously passed non-proliferation
resolutions focusing on so-called ‘states of proliferation concern’ – including North Korea and Iran
153
Article 1 of the US-Liberia Agreement
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[7.2.9]), the ship-boarding agreements do not specify exceptions for legitimate dual-use
materials.154

The ship-boarding agreements outline procedures for the boardings of suspect vessels claiming
their nationality that are located within international waters, 155 with such boardings are to be
carried out by the ‘Security Force Officials (SFOs)’.156 They also designate specific
‘Competent Authorities’ as points of contact for responding to and approving requests for
boardings of suspect vessels.157 Article 4(1) of the US-Liberia Agreement158 provides that if
the SFOs of the ‘requesting party’159 encounter a suspect vessel claiming nationality of another
‘requested party’160 located seaward of any State’s territorial sea, the requesting party may
request,161 through the Competent Authority of the requested party, that it confirm the claim of
nationality of the suspect vessel. If such claims of nationality are confirmed, the requested party
may authorize the boarding and search of the suspect vessel, cargo and the persons found on
board by SFOs of the requesting party; and if evidence of proliferation is found, authorize the
SFOs of the requesting party to detain the vessel, as well as items and persons on board,
pending instructions conveyed through the Competent Authority of the requested Party as to
the actions the requesting Party is permitted to take concerning such items, persons and vessels.

Article 4(3) of the US-Liberia Agreement deals with responses to requests to board and inspect
suspect vessels. It provides that if the nationality of a suspect vessel’ is verified, the requested
party may take one of four actions within two hours of receiving such request. These options
include deciding to conduct the boarding and search with its own SFOs; authorizing the
boarding and search by the SFOs of the requesting party; deciding to conduct the boarding and
154

Regarding the legitimate dual uses of WMD materiel, see [7.2.3.1]
Article 1.9 of the US-Liberia Agreement defines ‘international waters’ as ‘all parts of the sea not included in
the territorial seas, internal waters and archipelagic waters of a State, consistent with international law’
156
Article 1.6 of the US-Liberia Agreement defines ‘Security Force Officials’ as officials of the armed forces or
law enforcement agencies of the United States or Liberia. It also defines ‘Security Force vessels’ as ‘warships and
other vessels of the Parties, or of third States as may be agreed upon by the Parties, on which Security Force
Officials of either or both Parties may be embarked, clearly marked and identifiable as being on government
service and authorized to that effect, including any vessel and aircraft embarked on or supporting such vessels’
157
For example, Article 1(10) of the US-Liberia Agreement specifies the ‘Competent Authorities’ as the
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard or his designate, and the Agent of the Commissioner of Maritime
Affairs appointed under section 13 of Title 21 (the Maritime Law) of the Laws of the Republic of Liberia.
158
‘Authority to Board Suspect Vessels’
159
That is, the state party initiating the request to board and inspect the suspect vessel
160
That is, the state party to which the request to board and inspect is directed
161
Article 4(2) of the US-Liberia Agreement specifies that requests to interdict suspect vessels should contain the
name of the suspect vessel; the basis for the suspicion; the geographic position of the vessel; the vessel’s IMO
number if available; the vessel’s homeport; its port of origin and destination, and any other identifying
information.
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search together with the requesting party; or denying permission to board and search. 162 If the
nationality of a Suspect Vessel is not verified within two hours, the requested party may,
through its Competent Authority either nevertheless authorize the boarding and search by the
SFOs of the requesting party; or refute the claim of the suspect vessel to its nationality. 163
Similar provisions are included in the other ship-boarding agreements – with two hour
timeframes applying for the US-Belize Agreement,164 the US-Mongolia Agreement,165 the USBahamas Agreement,166 and the 2002 US-Panama Agreement;167 and four hour timeframes
applying for the US-Croatia Agreement,168 the US-Cyprus Agreement,169 the US-Malta
Agreement,170 the US-Marshall Islands Agreement.171 With the exception of the US-Croatia
Agreement, the ship-boarding agreements also provide that if there is no response from the
Competent Authority of the requested party within the above specified timeframes of its
acknowledgment of receipt of the request, the requesting party will be deemed to have been
authorized to board and inspect the suspect vessel.172

In addition to confirming the right of visit that all States enjoy under Article 110 of UNCLOS
regarding apparently “state-less” vessels,173 the ship-boarding agreements incorporate
provisions governing the use of force during ship boarding operations. The US-Liberia
Agreement provides that all uses of force shall be in strict accordance with the laws of the party
conducting the boarding and ‘applicable international law’, and that uses of force should be
avoided ‘except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety of SFOs and vessels, or
where SFOs are obstructed in the course of their duties’.174
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Provision for the enforcement of the ship-boarding agreements by third states is included in the
Liberian,175 Marshall Islands,176 Mongolian,177 and Panamanian178 ship-boarding agreements.
Under these clauses, these four States agree to extend, mutatis mutandis, all rights concerning
suspect vessels claiming their nationality under agreements to such third states as they deem
appropriate.179 Guilfoyle notes that in 2005 Belize was reported to be considering formalising
a ship-boarding agreement with the United Kingdom modelled on the US bilateral agreements
reviewed above;180 however as at 1 October 2013 no such agreement has been formalised.181
Overall, the nine PSI ship-boarding agreements can be seen as having contributed a degree of
greater certainty, albeit subjectively defined, to WMD interdiction procedures over the
vaguely-expressed Interdiction Principles.

[7.2.7.2]

Case study: 2011 tracking of the MV Light by the US Navy

Whilst the sixth reported maritime WMD trafficking attempt noted in [7.2.1] was not done for
terrorist purposes, the incident is nevertheless relevant for examining how the PSI ship
boarding agreements might function in practice. On 26 May 2011, the USS McCampbell began
tracking the Belize-flagged, but North Korean–crewed, MV Light in international waters south
of Shanghai, which was suspected of carrying missile technology from North Korea to
Myanmar.182 Whilst Belize (which as [7.2.7.1] noted concluded a bilateral ship-boarding
agreement with the United States in 2005) provided consent for the US Navy to board the MV
Light, the USS McCampbell requested permission from the Master of the MV Light to board
four times – which the Master refused, claiming to be carrying industrial chemicals to
Bangladesh. Singapore and Malaysia reportedly gave assurances that they would detain the
MV Light if she entered one of their ports. However before reaching Southeast Asian waters,
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the MV Light stopped and retraced its course back to North Korea, tracked by US surveillance
aircraft.183

Whilst from this incident it might be concluded that the PSI through the bilateral ship-boarding
agreements provides a workable basis to enable interdictions, given that the MV Light returned
to North Korea, it is plausible that political considerations (such as the desire to avoid
antagonising North Korea) may well have influenced the UN Navy’s decision not to forcibly
interdict the MV Light. However the MV Light incident nevertheless raises the question as to
the jurisdictional basis for an interdiction if the MV Light had been flagged to a state other than
a party to a PSI ship-boarding agreement or a PSI participant. In such a situation only the liberal
view of the UNCLOS high seas provisions as outlined in [7.2.5.4], or alternatively (but less
certainly), Article 51 of the UN Charter, would have enabled the US Navy to interdict the MV
Light.

[7.2.8]

Assessments of the longer-term impact of the PSI

Ten years since its formation, aside from the assessments of the legality of WMD interdictions
under UNCLOS as outlined in [7.2.5], assessments of the effectiveness, impact and suitability
of the PSI as a means of countering the proliferation of WMD materiel amongst non-state actors
have varied considerably.

Effectiveness: On first impressions the five publicly-recorded interdictions and subsequent
inspections of vessels suspected of transporting WMD materiel noted in [7.2.1] might be
regarded as evidence of the effectiveness of the PSI. Through contact with flag states and vessel
owners, the Ville de Virgo (in April 2003), BBC China (in October 2003)184 and Athena
(October 2003) were all voluntarily directed to nearby ports for inspections. The 2011 MV
Light incident reviewed in [7.2.7.2] might also be seen to indicate the effectiveness of
arrangements put in place through the PSI ship-boarding agreements. Additionally the 49
international workshops and naval exercises, and 26 meetings of operational experts may well
have developed and refined operational linkages between the navies and other authorities of
David Sanger ‘US Said to Turn Back North Korea Missile Shipment’ New York Times 12 June 2011
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/world/asia/13missile.html?_r=0; Barbara Starr ‘U.S. Wanted to Board
North Korean Merchant Vessel, Pentagon Says’ CNN – US 13 June 2011 http://articles.cnn.com/2011-0613/us/north.korea.ship_1_vessel-navy-ship-pentagon?_s=PM:US
184
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183
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PSI participants. However it has been noted that the sensitive nature of PSI operations,
information regarding locations, methods, intelligence sources for, and outcomes of, PSI
interdictions may well remain classified for national security reasons to prevent those engaged
in or planning the proliferation of WMD materiel to non-state actors from learning about the
PSI’s methods.185 Accordingly, apart from the publicising of cooperative military exercises and
operational meetings, it has been noted there may be little by which to measure the “success”
of the PSI.186 Most recently, the PSI Tenth Anniversary High Level Political Meeting held in
Warsaw on 28 May 2013 declared that the PSI had played a ‘critical role in countering the
spread of WMD’ – but did not mention any specific interdictions, and the summaries of this
meeting were expressed in highly generalised terms.187
Development of customary norms of WMD interdiction: The 2004 UN Secretary General’s
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes encouraged all states to join the PSI,188
and senior UN officials are on record as encouraging the objectives of the PSI. 189 Whilst its
proponents have emphasised that the PSI is “an activity and not an institution”,190 some
scholars have suggested the PSI may be challenging existing norms, and even developing new
norms, of international law regarding WMD counter-proliferation generally and maritime
interdiction specifically.191 Writing in 2006, Perry suggested the pattern of PSI interdictions
might, over time, contribute to “blurring” distinctions between the UNCLOS jurisdictional
zones192 and described the PSI as bearing the markings of global multilateralism’.193 Guilfoyle
185
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opined that while the PSI is not a formal organisation, it ‘ ... is certainly a means of organisation
... [which] ... may well remain the best political forum for the effective coordination of [WMD]
interdictions within existing legal frameworks’ and that ‘... while still not an institution, the
PSI appears to be generating increasingly organised and formal legal structures’.194

However other scholars have explained that whilst the political popularity of the PSI might
suggest the emergence of “norms of WMD interdiction”, the development of customary
international legal norms are based on the consent of “specially affected” states 195 and that
“states of proliferation concern” such as North Korea and Iran could challenge the development
of such norms through openly and consistently dissenting.196 As noted in [7.2.6], North Korea
expressed its objection to the PSI most vociferously. Other scholars argue that customary
“norms of WMD interdiction” could only develop through Security Council resolutions
specifically authorising interdictions.197 However as [7.2.4] noted, the reluctance of several
States to support specific references to interdictions in Resolution 1540 may well make this
unlikely in the near future.
The suitability of the PSI’s current informal “cooperative activity” nature has also been
questioned. The secrecy, absence of publicised interdiction procedures and standards (and
indeed double standards),198 and lack of transparency has been criticised, particularly by
China199 and argued to increase the scope for international conflict.200 The political nature of
the PSI has been criticised as a significant limitation through being more vulnerable to change
than formalised legal commitments, leading some scholars to query the long-term effectiveness
of the PSI if it remains anchored only on political commitments.201
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Several scholars have called for the PSI to be formally institutionalised, arguing that open
dialogue and awareness of its operating methods could increase the PSI’s legitimacy and
consequently international support.202 Becker suggests six measures to increase the PSI’s
transparency with a longer-term view towards its institutionalisation – including clarified
statements of materials considered eligible for seizure, harmonised standards for the
identification of suspect vessels, harmonised standards for interdictions in internal waters and
the territorial sea, re-statements of flag state rights of pre-emption and continued engagement,
dispute resolution and compensation procedures, and interdiction reporting arrangements with
external oversight.203 Although in a 2009 speech US President Obama spoke of in favour of
‘turning efforts such as the PSI ... into durable institutions’204 as at 1 October 2013 there are no
further indications of intentions to institutionalise the PSI.205

[7.2.9]

2005 SUA Convention

As explained in [6.2.5], following the 9/11 attacks the IMO facilitated amendments to the 1988
SUA Convention, resulting in the development of the 2005 SUA Convention. [6.2.5] and
[6.4.3.1] explained how the 2005 SUA Convention introduced new offences relating to
offensive acts from or against ships, and [6.2.5] also explained how a significant innovation of
the 2005 SUA Convention was the introduction of provisions to enable the boarding of vessels
under Article 8bis where grounds exist for suspecting that an offence under the 2005 SUA
Convention has been, is being, or is about to be committed. Proceeding from this background,
this section examines how the 2005 SUA Convention enables state parties to interdict suspected
shipments of WMD materiel for “terrorist-like” purposes206 – which it carefully and objectively
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defines as ‘BCN weapons’. From this basis, [7.3.5] examines how the 2005 SUA Convention
enables state parties to interdict vessels suspected of being utilised to transport conventional
weaponry, terrorist-connected persons and for financing terrorist activities.
In comparison to the subjective definition of ‘WMD’ in the PSI ship-boarding agreements
examined at [7.2.7.1], Article 1(d) of the 2005 SUA Convention comprehensively and
objectively defines what materials will, and will not, constitute Biological, Chemical and
Nuclear (BCN) weapons. It defines ‘biological weapons’ as ‘microbial or other biological
agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities’ with
the proviso that such materials ‘have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes’; and ‘weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.’207 It defines ‘chemical weapons’ as being
‘together or separately’ materials which fall into one or more of three categories. Firstly, toxic
chemicals208 and their precursors209 - except where intended for industrial, agricultural,
research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes, namely
those purposes directly related to the protection against toxic chemicals and to protection
against chemical weapons; military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons
and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; or
law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes; as long as the types and quantities
are consistent with such purposes.210 Secondly, ‘munitions and devices, specifically designed
to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those chemicals, which would be
released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices’.211 Thirdly, ‘any
equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of
munitions and devices’ referred to in Article 1(d)(ii)(2).212 ‘Nuclear weapons’ and ‘other
nuclear explosive devices’ also fall within the definition of ‘BCN weapons’.213
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Article 3bis(1)(b) of the 2005 SUA Convention incorporates offences of knowingly
transporting214 on board a ship any explosive or radioactive material for “terrorist-like”
purposes;215 any BCN weapon;216 any source material, special fissionable material, or
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of
special fissionable material;217 or any equipment, materials or software or related technology
that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon.218
However Article 3bis(2) provides that it will not be an offence to transport such materials in
situations where the materials will be used in manner complying with the various safeguards
and controls specified in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT
Treaty).

Whilst the 2005 SUA Convention provides a detailed and objective regime for enabling the
interdiction of maritime shipments of WMD materiel, it has not been immune from criticisms.
During the IMO negotiating processes for the 2005 SUA Convention, concerns about the
“reach” of the BCN weapon transporting provisions were expressed by representatives of
Pakistan, India and the Russian Federation, being States understood to possess nuclear
capabilities, and through not being parties to the NPT treaty, are not subject to its restrictions,
such as prohibitions on shipment of nuclear materials.219 Furthermore, as [6.2.5] noted, as at 1
October 2013, the 2005 SUA Convention has only been ratified by 24 out of the 196 SOLAS
contracting governments, which means it would only be applicable in a very narrow range of
circumstances.

[7.2.10]

CONCLUSION

This section has explained that countering the illicit maritime trafficking of WMD materiel
would be one of the most challenging of all the 21 forms of maritime terrorism conceptualised
Article 1(b) of the 2005 SUA Convention broadly defines ‘transport’ to mean ‘initiate, arrange or exercise
effective control, including decision-making authority, over the movement of a person or item’.
215
2005 SUA Convention Article 3bis(1)(b)(i) – which whilst not mentioning terrorism, incorporates the mental
element of ‘knowing that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without a condition, as
is provided for under national law, death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population,
or compelling a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’
216
2005 SUA Convention Article 3bis(1)(b)(ii)
217
2005 SUA Convention Article 3bis(1)(b)(iii) – which includes the mental element of ‘knowing that it is
intended to be used in any nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant
to a comprehensive safeguards agreement’
218
2005 SUA Convention Article 3bis(1)(b)(iii)
219
Becker, above n 38 , 138
214

293

by the Threat Matrix for States to prevent. It explained how the 2002 So San interdiction
incident raised concerns that terrorists might seek to acquire WMD materiel through the use of
vessels, with these concerns prompting the announcement of the PSI in April 2003. Whilst not
a formal international agreement creating or extending maritime jurisdiction, the PSI as an
informal political expression of how participants might consider exercising their existing
jurisdictional rights under UNCLOS, when combined with Security Council Resolution 1540,
has prompted critical re-thinks about the powers of States to interdict laterally-transiting
vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel. Significantly, this section has been
the first to specifically articulate the “restrictive” and “liberal” views of UNCLOS. Whilst the
liberal view of UNCLOS would better enable States to interdict suspected illicit shipments of
WMD materiel, and thereby lessen the scope for acts of WMD terrorism to occur, a preferable
approach would be to develop more specific agreement amongst States as to how WMD
interdictions should occur. This section showed that whilst on initial impressions the PSI might
be seen to have developed such agreement amongst States, several uncertainties remain by
virtue of its informal, political status – particularly what “support” for the Interdiction
Principles actually entails, and it also noted calls for the PSI to be formally institutionalised. It
also noted that whilst the PSI ship-boarding agreements have contributed greater certainty to
WMD interdiction efforts, their subjective wording creates scope for uncertainty. Finally, it
noted that although the 2005 SUA Convention contains “model” provisions to facilitate the
interdiction of suspected illicit WMD shipments, its current low ratification levels means it
would only be applicable in a very limited range of circumstances. Chapter 8 considers the
extent to which Article 51 of the UN Charter, and the doctrine of Necessity, might enable States
to interdict suspected illicit WMD shipments in exceptional circumstances where no other
jurisdictional basis existed.

[7.3]

COUNTERING UTILISATIONS OF VESSELS FOR TRANSPORTING

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY, TERRORIST OPERATIVES AND TERRORIST
FINANCING

This section examines the prospects for the international agreements to prevent the utilisation
of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks on land through transporting conventional
weaponry, terrorist operatives or financing terrorist activities – which are collectively referred
to as “other than WMD transporting” terrorist utilisations of vessels. [7.3.1] shows there have
been far more previous examples of vessels being utilised for these purposes than the six
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reported instances of vessels suspected of being utilised to illicitly transport WMD materiel
noted in [7.2.1]. [7.3.3] extends the rationales underlying the restrictive and liberal views of
UNCLOS noted in [7.2.5] to enunciate restrictive and liberal views of UNCLOS pertaining to
the interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting conventional weaponry, terrorist operatives
or financing terrorist activities.220

[7.3.1]

Threat context: Previous occurrences

[7.3.1.1]

The vessel as a means: Transporting conventional weaponry

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

8

6

None identified

1

Allen explains that there is considerable scope for overlap between the forms of explosives that
should be regarded as conventional weapons and those which should be characterised as WMD,
explaining that many international legal definitions of WMD do not include extremely
explosive conventional devices. He points out that the ammonium nitrate explosives used in
the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing (which destroyed a US federal government building, killed
168 and injured more than 600 persons) would fall within the definition for ‘WMD’ under US
federal legislation applicable at the time,221 but would not be a ‘Weapon of Mass Destruction’
under common international legal definitions.222 Whilst highly explosive devices might fall
within various definitions of ‘WMD materiel’, other forms of conventional weaponry,
including small arms such as rifles, pistols, grenades and rocket launchers, and potentially
explosive materials like ammonium nitrate (which is commonly used for agricultural and
construction purposes) would be unlikely to fall within most definitions of WMD materiel. In
comparison to the six recorded interdictions of suspected illicit transfers of WMD materiel
examined in [7.2.1], there have been more recorded cases of terrorists successfully
transporting, and attempting to transport, conventional weaponry by vessels.223 A wider range
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This is because in comparison to the interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting WMD materiel examined
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of vessels - including large freighters, cargo ships and passenger ferries and small fishing
vessels have been utilised to transport conventional weaponry over both long international
distances and shorter intra-state transfers. In contrast to the WMD interdictions discussed in
[7.2.1],224 several interdictions of suspected transfers of conventional weaponry for terrorist
purposes have occurred confrontationally on the high seas.

There have been eight reported instances of terrorist groups successfully transporting
conventional weaponry by vessels. Palestinian groups such as the Force 17 commando unit of
Fatah reportedly utilised large mother ships to support small zodiac boats to supply weapons
to raiding parties which carried out several attacks in Tel Aviv in 1975, 225 and the PFLP-GC
and Palestinian National Front received support from Yugoslavia to train teams of frogmen and
swimmers to transport arms from Egypt into Gaza, and also to infiltrate Israeli coastal areas.226
The Provisional IRA reportedly took delivery of arms sent from Libya aboard the cargo ships
MV Claudia in 1973, MV Casamara in 1985, and MV Villa in 1986; and also took delivery of
weaponry from Boston in 1984 using the fishing trawler Valhalla, with these weapons being
transferred to the Marita Ann fishing trawler off the coast of County Kerry. 227 The LTTEcontrolled freighter The Swene transported 60 tons of TNT explosives from the Ukraine, which
were landed off the northeast coast of Sri Lanka and later used in an attack against the Central
Bank building in Colombo in August 1994. On 23 May 1997, the LTTE hijacked and diverted
the Sri Lankan government-controlled freighter Stillus Limassul transporting weapons between
Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka into LTTE control.228 Finally it has been widely reported229 that
explosives used in four of the most deadly terrorist bombings over the past fifteen years by Al
Qaeda-linked groups were transported by sea - including the 1998 bombings of the US
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embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,230 the 2002 Bali bombing,231 and the November
2002 bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya which killed 223.232

Whilst there have been at least seven specifically recorded attempts by terrorists to transport
conventional weaponry by vessel, other reports of such attempts are expressed in a more
generalised manner. For example the Israeli Navy is reported to have disrupted ‘around 30
attempts’ to infiltrate personnel and weaponry into Israel between 1979 and 1984, with several
of these interdictions taking place within Lebanese territorial waters.233 Additionally, the wellknown 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking (discussed in [3.3.1]) was actually caused when crew
members unintentionally discovered four members of the Palestinian Liberation Front cleaning
their weapons in their cabins whilst transporting them aboard the vessel. Aside from the 1999
discovery by a US Customs inspector of a ‘mini bomb factory’ inside a vehicle on a ferry
travelling from Victoria, British Columbia to Port Angeles, Washington a US Customs
inspector (which raised concerns of terrorist connections),234 all the recorded interdictions of
attempts to transport conventional weaponry aboard vessels have been destined for Palestinian
and/or Islamic groups aboard large vessels, and took place on the high seas – apparently without
protest as to their legality.235

First, on 6 May 2001 an Israeli naval vessel interdicted the 40 tonne Santorini fishing vessel
‘outside of Israeli territorial waters’ in the Mediterranean Sea en route from Tripoli, Libya to a
point off the Gaza Strip – finding a large cache of weaponry including Katyushas, anti-aircraft
rockets, mortars of various calibres, and large quantities of ammunition, estimated to be worth
around $10 million.236 Sinai explains that two separate versions of how these weapons were to
be delivered to their intended recipients appeared in the Israeli media – firstly through dropping
watertight barrels containing the weapons into the sea for collection by Palestinian personnel;
and secondly through transfers involving a number of fishing vessels.237 Second, on 3 January
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2002 Israeli commandos seized the 4000-tonne Karine A freighter in the Red Sea, 300 nautical
miles off the Israeli coast, which was carrying 83 watertight containers of mainly Iranian-made
weaponry – including long- and short- range Katyusha rockets, anti-tank missiles, mortars,
mines, 1500 kilograms of high explosives, sniper rifles, shot guns and other equipment
including inflatable Zodiac boats, cylinders and diving equipment. There were reports of plans
for Palestinian terrorists disguised as fishermen to collect the weaponry. 238 Third, on 5 July
2002 Indian coastguard officials intercepted the abandoned Lebanese dry bulk cargo vessel Al
Murtada about 170 kilometres off the Maharashtra coast in the Arabian Sea (which was still
full of fuel) finding a large cache of weaponry on board – including AK 47 rifles inscribed with
‘Allah’ and ‘Yusuf’.239 Fourth, on 22 May 2003 Israeli naval commandos boarded the 16 metre
Egyptian-registered fishing vessel Abu Hassan 35 nautical miles off Haifa – which was found
to be carrying weapon components including surface-to-surface rockets destined for Hezbollah
groups.240

Fifth, on 22 June 2003, Greek authorities interdicted the Comoros-flagged tanker Baltic Sky en
route from Tunisia to Sudan within the Greek territorial sea (specifically the Ionic Sea) and
seized nearly 700 tonnes of explosives, mainly TNT, as well as 18,000 detonators and fuses
from vessel. The Baltic Sky’s crew were detained and an investigation by Greek authorities into
this suspected illegal transportation of explosives and the captain’s failure to notify Greek
authorities of the carriage of dangerous cargo followed. However as authorities determined
there was no evidence indicating the explosives were destined for terrorist uses, but rather for
legitimate construction purposes, the Baltic Sky and her crew were released.241

Most recently, on 31 May 2010 Israeli forces interdicted a flotilla of six vessels constituting
the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” travelling in a widely-publicised convoy from Turkey to Gaza to
challenge Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip, and deliver humanitarian supplies and
construction materials to Gaza. After the flotilla ignored four warnings from Israeli authorities
to change course away from Gaza, Israeli forces launched a surprise raid on the flotilla under
238
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the cover of darkness at 4:26am whilst it was 72 nautical miles from the Israeli coast and 64
nautical miles (approximately 5 hours’ sailing time) from the Gaza blockade zone. Whilst five
of the six vessels were apprehended without loss of life or serious injury, the interdiction of the
Mavi Mamara (on which flares, rods, axes, knives, tear gas, gas masks, protective vests and
night-vision goggles were located)242 resulted in nine crew members being killed, and extensive
injuries to both its crew and Israeli forces.243

Whilst versions of events during this interdiction (and the subsequent treatment of detainees)
vary between Israeli forces and Mavi Mamara crew members, this interdiction resulted in
extensive international criticism and lead to the establishment of a UN Panel of Inquiry into
this incident (UN Panel). The UN Panel received and reviewed reports of the Turkish and
Israeli national investigations into this incident, as well as further information and clarifications
from points of contact appointed by each government. Whilst not acting as a Court nor
apportioning legal liability relating to the incident, the UN Panel compiled recommendations
to avoiding similar incidents in the future, and also summarised the Panel’s account of the
principles of international law applicable to this incident in order to base its recommendations
on a secure legal foundation. The recommendations244 of relevance to the interdiction of
suspected terrorist vessels generally (as opposed to the enforcement of the Israeli blockade of
Gaza specifically) are discussed in [7.2.7] below.
Whilst the present author’s research has not identified any specific reports of terrorists
planning to transport conventional weaponry by vessels, this is not to say they have not
previously planned to do so. Furthermore, whilst most postulated scenarios of terrorists
transporting weaponry aboard vessels have focused on the transportation of WMD materiel
rather than conventional weaponry, the UN’s 2005 In Larger Freedom Report expressed
concerns about terrorists acquiring conventional weaponry such as ballistic and shoulder-fired
missiles, and urged States to ensure effective controls over such weaponry.245
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[7.3.1.2]

The vessel as a means: Transporting terrorist-connected persons

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

6

12

1

2

Vessels have previously been utilised to transport terrorists into and out of ports (including
through shipping containers); to covertly insert and retrieve swimmers and divers and as
‘mother-ships’ to launch speedboats carrying terrorist operatives and weaponry.

The six reported cases of terrorist operatives being successfully transported by vessels have
included four short-range movements involving Palestinian terrorist groups during the 1970s
and 1980s, and two long-range international movements by Al Qaeda-linked groups following
9/11. The Force 17 commando unit of Fatah utilised large mother ships to support small zodiac
boats to launch raiding parties and weaponry to perpetrate several attacks in Tel Aviv during
1975;246 Abu Jihad landed operatives on a beach near Tel Aviv intending to kidnap hostages
from a nearby hotel on 11 March 1978 (but landed too far from their intended location);247 Abu
Abbas Group members landed by small boat in Nahariya, Israel on 22 April 1979, sustaining
two fatalities in a fire fight with Israeli security forces;248 and in July 1986, four heavily armed
PFLP terrorists in a Zodiac speedboat evaded an Israeli patrol craft, landed on the outskirts of
Nahariya and set up a defensive position where they held off a heavy Israeli assault for 3 hours
before being killed. Documents found in their possession indicated plans to attack holidaymakers on the city’s seafront.249

On 19 February 2002, eight Pakistani men jumped off the Nova freighter The Twillinger at an
Italian port after having travelled from Cairo, with US officials claiming ‘ ... the men – who
lied about being crew members an carried false identification documents and large sums of
money – had been sent by Al Qaeda’.250 Two months later in May 2002, the US Coastguard
announced that 25 Islamic extremists had entered the US aboard cargo ships into the ports of
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Murphy, above n 225, 290 (This is also an example of the vessel as a means of transporting conventional
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247
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Murphy, above n 225, 294
250
John Mintz ‘15 Freighters Believed to be Linked to Al Qaeda’ Washington Post 31 December 2002, 3. Cited
in Zara-Raymond, above n 7 , 15
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Savannah, Long Beach and Miami.251 Additionally on 14 March 2004, two Palestinian suicide
bombers emerged from behind a false wall in a shipping container in the Israeli port of Ashdod
and detonated their bombs killing five people. Hamas and Fatah (Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigade)
claimed responsibility for this attack.252 Whilst this shipping container entered Ashdod port
from the landward rather than seaward side,253 this incident nevertheless illustrates the
vulnerabilities of port facilities to terrorist targeting – in fact Israeli media reports indicated
these two bombers evaded port security measures stricter than those imposed by the ISPS
Code.254

Similarly to the six successful cases reviewed above, the twelve recorded attempts to transport
terrorist operatives aboard vessels have also involved both large and small vessels (including
fishing vessels), shipping containers and the use of mother-ships. Whilst most of the maritime
jurisdictional locations of these vessel interdictions have not been stated, indications are that
suspected terrorist vessels have been interdicted within ports, and also on the high seas. Israeli
naval forces interdicted four attempts by Fatah to transport operatives for attacks on Israeli
coastal cities – including freighters The Ginan and The Stephanie on 30 September 1978 whilst
transiting a regular sea lane between Cyprus and Egypt, which had attempted to launch raiding
parties from ‘international waters’;255 two yachts in 1985 that were transporting operatives
within proximity to Israeli coastal cities; and the freighters SS Anton in 1986 and the Maria R
in 1987.256 Three similar attempts by the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) were also disrupted
by the Israeli Navy. In April 1985 (one month before Achille Lauro hijacking), an attempt to
transport operatives from Algeria to Israel aboard the 1,000 tonne Attaviros was disrupted.257
In 1990 PLF members launched six speedboats painted with radar-absorbent material from a
mother ship, with one sinking upon launching, another returning to Port Said as a tanker, two
experiencing mechanical failure, and of the remaining two craft in which all the operatives
crammed into, one was interdicted 22 nautical miles off Gaash, and although the last speed
boat landed at Nitzanim, it was detected by Israeli security forces with four raiders being killed
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and seven being captured. PLF leader Abu Abbas was later reported as explaining this raid had
taken nearly three years to prepare, and cost around $3 million (estimated as equivalent to $4.7
million in 2006).258 In 1992 four PLF swimmers launched by boat 2.5 nautical miles from shore
attempted an armed raid on Coral Beach at Eilat, however one drowned and the remaining three
were killed before they could fire on tourists.259 Twelve years later on 25 March 2004, three
armed members of Hamas wearing diving gear and armed with an RPG rocket launcher, rifles
and grenades emerged under the cover of darkness from a small vessel in the Mediterranean
Sea – but were killed in a gun battle with Israeli security forces; 260 and finally three attempts
were made by a (non-specified) ‘terrorist group’ were reportedly made to infiltrate the southern
Israeli settlement of Dugit between 20002 and 2004.261

Recorded attempts by Al Qaeda-linked groups have involved movements over longer
international distances. In October 2001, Italian authorities discovered an alleged Egyptian Al
Qaeda operative hiding in a fully-equipped shipping container bound for Halifax, Nova
Scotia262 with an independent power source, lap top, satellite phone, flight manual and ‘other
indicative items’263 including a Canadian passport, airport maps and airline security passes for
Canada, Thailand and Egypt.264 However no further information regarding this man’s possible
linkages and motives was determined because he disappeared after having been granted bail
by Italian authorities.265 In August 2002 the freighter Sara radioed Italian authorities in
reporting that fifteen Pakistani men taken aboard in Casablanca, Morocco were ‘menacing the
ship’s crew’. Subsequent investigations found them to be carrying tens of thousands of dollars,
false identification documents, maps of Italian cities and other evidence linking them to
extremist European Islamic groups, raising concerns of a planned Al Qaeda terrorist attack.266
Later in April 2004 the US Department of Homeland Security confirmed that stowaways found
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detained on an Algerian-registered LNG tanker coming into Boston may have had ties to Al
Qaeda-linked terrorists.267
Whilst the present author’s research has only identified one reported instance of terrorists
planning to transport operatives aboard vessels - being the disruption by Jordanian security
services in August 2002 of Hamas’ plans to insert swimmers onto Coral Beach in Eilat, Israel
to launch an attack268 - in practice it is likely many more terrorist plans may have been made.
Finally the use of vessels to transport terrorist-connected persons has also been postulated by
maritime security specialist with Richardson noting that ‘vessels big and small, or the cargo
containers they carry can be used in a number of ways by terrorists to further their aims … to
covertly transport operatives’;269 and Bateman and Bergin discussing the scenario of ‘ ...
infiltration of terrorists and/or their materials into Australia by sea, either by clandestine
landing or the use of fraudulent seafarer documentation’.270

[7.3.1.3]

The vessel as a means: Terrorist financing

Successful

Attempted

Planned

Postulated

At least 2

2

0

3

Terrorist groups could utilise vessels to finance their activities through illicit activities such as
people or narcotics smuggling, or through apparently legitimate maritime trade. Such activities
are challenging to statistically record because they do not involve high profile incidents, and
as explained below, the small number of reports of such activities have been quite generalised
in their details.

There have been two recorded instances of terrorists successfully utilising vessels to finance
their activities. On 10 August 2003, pirates hijacked the Malaysian fuel tanker Penrider in the
Malacca Straits, with the $100,000 ransom monies for the crew’s release being subsequently
traced to the Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (GAM) Free Aceh Movement, which has been reported
to be linked to Al Qaeda (however assertions of such linkages have been challenged).271 More
267
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generally, several vessels alleged to have been successfully utilised by the LTTE for
fundraising were interdicted during the late 1990s and early 2000s by authorities around
Malaysia, India and Sri Lanka. For instance, in July 2003 a North Korean-flagged ship operated
by a Sri Lankan company was seized off the Indian coast with 254 migrants on board; and in
November 2005 the Kosmo was seized by authorities in Thai waters, with evidence indicating
the LTTE’s involvement in people smuggling to Australia.272

Two recorded attempts by terrorist groups to utilise vessels for fundraising purposes have been
recorded. Firstly on 7 November 2001, Irish customs officers discovered 20 million smuggled
cigarettes aboard the Cambodian freighter Maria M upon its arrival from Estonia – with
investigations indicating proceeds from their sale would finance the operations of the Real
IRA;273 and secondly in December 2003, US and allied naval forces interdicted several dhows
in the Persian Gulf, confiscating three drug shipments – with further investigations linking
these dhows and the seized drugs with Al Qaeda-linked groups.274
Whilst the present author’s research has not identified any specific reports of terrorists
planning to utilise vessels for fundraising, this does not mean terrorist groups have not
contemplated such actions. However such actions have been widely postulated by maritime
security specialists. A widely-cited article on page one of the Washington Post 31 December
2002 titled ‘15 freighters believed to be linked to Al Qaeda’ contained reports about ‘Al
Qaeda’s Navy’ – involving Al Qaeda-linked groups transporting sesame seeds and cement for
fundraising purposes.275 Richardson noted that ‘ … vessels, big and small, or the cargo
containers they carry can be used in a number of ways by terrorists to further their aims … to
raise money, through legal or illegal trade, to finance their activities’; 276 and Greenberg et al
discussed the ‘hijacking of a vessel as a fund-raising exercise to support a campaign of political
violence directed toward ethnic, ideological, religious or separatist designs’.277
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[7.3.2]

Best case / worst case scenario analysis of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 (ISPS

Code) and the 2003 SID Convention preventing “other than WMD transporting”
utilisations of vessels

This section analyses the prospects for the preventative security measures mandated and
recommended by the ISPS Code to lessen the scope for vessels to be utilised to illicitly transport
conventional weaponry, terrorist operatives or to finance terrorist activities. It considers the
relevant “best case / worst case” scenario factors articulated in [4.2.7] in light of the
observations in [7.3.1.1], [7.3.1.2] and [7.3.1.3] about how vessels have previously been
utilised for such purposes. It also considers the prospects for the LRIT requirements under
SOLAS Chapter V to lessen the scope for vessels to be utilised for such purposes; and also
considers the contribution of the 2003 SID Convention in lessening the scope for terrorist
operatives to travel internationally by vessels through the use of fraudulent seafarer identity
documentation.

[1]

Larger or smaller vessels?278 [7.3.1.1], [7.3.1.2] and [7.3.1.3] showed that a wide

range of vessels, including large freighters, cargo ships, passenger ferries and small fishing
vessels have been utilised for “other than WMD transporting” purposes by terrorists. These
sections also indicated vessels have been utilised for such “enabling” activities both over long
international distances, and shorter intra-state transits. If terrorists sought to utilise larger
vessels subject to the ISPS Code for these purposes, both the access control and ship
identification aspects of the ISPS Code that were noted in [7.2.2] could lessen the scope for
such utilisations, provided ISPS Code security measures were consistently and rigorously
implemented by all relevant entities. Furthermore, larger vessels engaged on international
voyages would also be likely to be subject to the LRIT tracking requirements under SOLAS
Chapter V – in which case the reasoning about the “preventative contribution” of LRIT noted
in [7.2.2] could also be applicable to lessening the scope for “other than WMD transporting”
utilisations of vessels. However a “worst case” scenario could apply if terrorists sought to
utilise smaller vessels such as fishing vessels that were outside the scope of the ISPS Code’s
application were utilised for such activities.

278

The fifth factor articulated in [4.2.7] that would be likely to influence the prospects of the ISPS Code lessening
the scope for maritime terrorism incidents (the effectiveness of government oversight arrangements) has been
incorporated into this point
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[2]

Terrorist-controlled in first instance? If terrorists controlled vessels being utilised

for “other than WMD transporting” purposes in the first instance, this could render the
contribution of ISPS Code security measures almost nugatory – with [7.3.1.3] noting reports
about ‘Al Qaeda’s Navy’ comprising up to 15 freighters. However [7.3.1.1], [7.3.1.2] and
[7.3.1.3] noted several reported instances of terrorists hijacking vessels for the purposes of
utilizing them to transport conventional weaponry, terrorist operatives or financing terrorist
activities. In such cases as reasoned in [4.2.7], [5.2.3] and [6.2.3], rigorously-implemented ship
security plans could reduce the prospects of terrorists accessing and gaining control over larger
vessels.

[3]

Rigor of implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 / ISPS Code? In addition to

lessening the scope for terrorists to hijack and utilise vessels to transport conventional
weaponry, terrorist operatives or finance terrorist activities, the rigor of ISPS Code security
measures within ports would be a significant factor in lessening the scope for terrorists to load
and offload weaponry and operatives through port facilities. Indeed there are indications of
rigorous port security measures detecting and disrupting terrorist attempts to transport
weaponry and operatives through ports. As [7.3.1.1] noted, in 1999 US customs inspectors
identified a ‘mini bomb factory’ in a passenger's vehicle on a ferry from Victoria, British
Columbia to Port Angeles, Washington, and as [7.3.1.2] noted, in 2004 US Homeland Security
personnel identified and apprehended several suspected terrorist stowaways on an Algerian
LNG tanker upon its entry into the port of Boston.

[4]

Did the maritime terrorism incident involve a security-regulated port? A “best

case” scenario of the ISPS Code could apply if terrorists sought to transfer weaponry or persons
from ship through port facilities subject to the access control and screening preventative
security requirements and recommendations of the ISPS Code,279 as opposed to introducing
weaponry or persons into shipping containers further along supply chains.280 As explained in
[3] above, rigorously-applied port security measures could lessen the scope for such activities
to occur. Whilst apart from the Gaza Flotilla, where the Turkish inquiry report noted the vessels
279

As noted in [4.2.1.3], the ISPS Code requires operators of port facilities that interface with ships subject to the
ISPS Code to have in place PFSPs – which are required to address, at least “ … measures designed to prevent
weapons or other dangerous substances and devices intended for use against persons, ships or ports and the
carriage of which is not authorised from being introduced: ISPS Code Part A, Section 16.3
280
As [4.2.2.1] noted, whilst several supply chain security initiatives have developed in the years following the
9/11 attacks, because such initiatives have been voluntary rather than mandatory it is difficult to assess the extent
to which such measures have become accepted internationally
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had departed from a port facility subject to the ISPS Code, the reports noted in [7.3.1.1] and
[7.3.1.2] did not indicate where the interdicted weaponry and persons were loaded onto the
vessels. Nevertheless [7.3.1.1] noted reports of fishing vessels being utilised to transport
conventional weaponry over some long international distances by the IRA during the early
1980s and by Hezbollah and other Palestinian groups in 2001 and 2003. Smaller ports that
interface with fishing vessels might well not be subject to the ISPS Code. Also, [7.3.1.2]
indicated that terrorists are only recorded to have attempted clandestine insertions of operatives
around Israel and Gaza (including through the use of mother-ships); and that Al Qaeda-linked
groups have (thus far) attempted to transport operatives over longer distances though shipping
containers – which can only be loaded and offloaded within large ports – which (since 2004)
would be more likely to be subject to the ISPS Code.

Finally, [7.3.1.2] noted two instances of terrorist connected-persons travelling internationally
by sea in 2002 being found with false identification documentation. It also noted that outside
of the Eastern Mediterranean with the on-going Arab-Israeli conflicts (where vessels have been
utilised to transport operatives over short-range distances – including through clandestine
insertions), most utilisations of vessels to transport terrorist operatives have had involved larger
vessels (and shipping containers) which inevitably must move through large ports. As [4.4]
noted, providing it is implemented thoroughly and consistently by the state parties, the 2003
SID Convention could contribute to harmonising international efforts to lessen the scope for
terrorists to utilise fraudulent identification documentation to facilitate their movements
internationally.

[7.3.3]

Analysis of the legality of “other than WMD” interdictions across the

UNCLOS maritime jurisdictional zones

[7.2] explained how the WMD interdiction measures alluded to in the Interdiction Principles
have prompted debate about the legality of WMD interdictions under UNCLOS, leading to
“restrictive” and “liberal” views of UNCLOS. However the legality under UNCLOS of the
interdictions of vessels suspected of being utilised for “other than WMD transporting” terrorist
utilisations of vessels has not received a similar level of scholarly analysis. Therefore, this
section applies the reasoning outlined in [7.2.5] to formulate “restrictive” and “liberal” views
of UNCLOS regarding the interdictions of vessels suspected of being utilised by terrorists for
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these activities. While the studies noted in [7.2.5] analysed the implications 281 of Resolution
1540 for vessel interdictions under UNCLOS, this section considers whether other post-9/11
counter-terrorism Security Council Resolutions reviewed in [2.7] – particularly Resolution
1390 – might add further justification to interdictions of such suspected terrorist vessels. It
reasons that because Resolution 1390 is “more powerful” than Resolution 1540, and because
“readily assembled” conventional weaponry would be more threatening than raw WMD
materiel which could have legitimate dual uses, a liberal view of UNCLOS in relation to the
interdiction of such “other than WMD” transporting utilisations of vessels would be on a
stronger legal footing than the liberal view of UNCLOS with respect to WMD interdictions
articulated in [7.2.5].

[7.3.3.1]

“Other than WMD” interdictions in internal waters and territorial seas

[7.3.1.1] and [7.3.1.2] noted several recorded instances of terrorist groups offloading weaponry
and operatives within the territorial sea to enable the perpetration of subsequent attacks on land.
If a foreign vessel within the territorial sea was suspected of being utilised to transport
conventional weaponry, terrorist-connected persons or prohibited items such as drugs (for
terrorist fundraising) directly towards or away from a coastal state, such activities would be
likely to fall within the ambit of UNCLOS Article 19(2)(a), which as [7.2.5.1] noted, specifies
that ‘any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the UN Charter’ shall render passage non-innocent. This would
enable the coastal state take the ‘necessary steps to prevent such passage’ under Article 25. 282
Furthermore UNCLOS Article 19(2)(g), which specifies that the ‘loading or unloading of any
commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations of the coastal State’283 could enable coastal states to interdict suspected terrorist
vessels transferring weaponry or terrorist-connected persons within the territorial sea.

281

That is, whether UNCLOS, when read in light of Resolution 1540, should be understood as enabling or
prohibiting interdictions of laterally transiting foreign vessels
282
For an analysis of what the ‘necessary steps’ under UNCLOS Article 25 may involve, see [6.2.3.2]
‘Interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels within territorial seas’
283
Providing the “interdicting” coastal state had such laws in place - UNCLOS Article 21 authorises coastal states
to adopt and give due publicity to laws and regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in
respect of (inter alia) the prevention of infringement (inter alia) the immigration laws and regulations of the coastal
State
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However, the legality of interdictions of laterally transiting foreign vessels would be less
straightforward. Whilst as at 1 October 2013 there is no global treaty specifically addressing
the trafficking of small arms, a number of treaties address the manufacture and trafficking of
small arms more generally.284 On 26 September 2013, Security Council Resolution 2117,
which addressed the trafficking of small arms and light weaponry generally, required States to
eliminate the supply of small arms and light weaponry to terrorists, but did not specifically
authorise interdictions.285

Following a similar approach to the interpretations of UNCLOS noted in [7.2.5], a restrictive
view of UNCLOS would presumably distinguish the national focus of UNCLOS Article
19(2)(a)286 from the international focus of Resolution 1390287 in paragraphs 2(a),288 2(b)289 and
2(c)290 – which re-affirmed that acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to
international peace and security, and emphasise the importance of a direct nexus between the
presence of terrorist weaponry, persons or financing activities and the security of the coastal
state. It could also interpret the “should not” within UNCLOS Article 27(1) as a mandatory
(rather than hortorary) prohibition on coastal states’ ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction
against foreign vessels. By contrast a liberal view might hold that UNCLOS Article 19(2)(a) when considered in light of the obligations imposed by Resolution 1390 in paragraphs 2(a),291
2(b)292 and 2(c)293 – could enable a coastal state to interdict such suspected shipments. In
particular, the specific obligations within Resolution 1390 paragraph 2(b) to ‘prevent the transit
UN Report of Secretary-General ‘Oceans and the Law of the Sea’ (10 March 2008) UN DocA/63/63, para 75.
Cited in Klein, above n 68, 318
285
UNSC Res 2117 (26 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2117, para 9
286
Guilfoyle, above n 31, 16
287
Although Security Council Resolution 1390 was titled ‘The Situation in Afghanistan’, it followed the approach
of the post-9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council resolutions reviewed in [2.7.1] through imposing obligations
that were neither geographically nor temporally constrained. [2.7.1] also noted that the obligations imposed under
Resolution 1390 have been re-affirmed in ten subsequent Security Council resolutions
288
Which as [2.7.1] noted, obliged states to ‘ … freeze the funds and other financial assets or economic resources
of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities - including funds derived from property owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensuring
that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or
indirectly, for such persons’ benefit, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory
289
Which as [2.7.1] noted, obliged states to ‘ … prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories of
[the specified] individuals’
290
Which as [2.7.1] noted, obliged states to ‘ … [prevent] the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer, to these
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories,
or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition,
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292
For terrorist uses of vessels to transport persons connected with their groups
293
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through their territories’294 and in paragraph 2(c) to ‘prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale
and transfer of weaponry from their territories’ contrast to the mere “invitation” in paragraph
10 of Resolution 1540,295 could strengthen this liberal view. A liberal view could also interpret
the ‘should not’ within UNCLOS Article 27(1) as a hortorary, rather than mandatory,
prohibition on coastal states’ ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction against foreign vessels.

The 2003 interdiction of the Baltic Sky whilst transiting the Greek territorial sea seems to
evidence a liberal view of UNCLOS. After this interdiction, the Greek Merchant Marine
Minister George Anomeritis explained to reporters that ‘[t]he team discovered 680 tonnes of
explosives and 18,000 detonators on board the ship, making it a floating “nuclear bomb” and
that ‘[n]o one would call legal such a cargo that is going around the Mediterranean for a month’.
Vasilis Kapralos, an explosives specialist, also said that ‘[i]f one detonator had gone off, . . . it
would have caused the whole load to explode, resulting in a 2.5 kilometre shock wave and the
disappearance of a small city from the map’296 – leading Song to characterise this interdiction
as legal under UNCLOS.297

[7.3.3.2]

“Other than WMD” interdictions within Contiguous Zones

As noted in [7.2.5.2], the generally-accepted view of coastal state interdiction powers under
the UNCLOS Contiguous Zone provisions is a restrictive one – holding that coastal states enjoy
greater powers over outward-bound foreign vessels under Article 33(1)(b) than inward-bound
foreign vessels under Article 33(1)(a). A restrictive view of UNCLOS Article 33 would
presumably emphasise the references to ‘territory or territorial sea’ within both limbs of Article
33(1) as imposing a “direct nexus” requirement which would prohibit coastal states from
interdicting foreign vessels laterally transiting the contiguous zone. Conversely a liberal view
might hold that when considered in light of the obligations imposed by Resolution 1390 in
paragraphs 2(a),298 2(b),299 and 2(c),300 UNCLOS Article 33(1) could enable a coastal state to
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interdict foreign vessels suspected of transporting weaponry, terrorist connected persons or
financing terrorist activities. In particular, the specific obligations within Resolution 1390 in
paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) to ‘prevent the transit through their territories’301 and in paragraph
2(c) to ‘prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of weaponry from their
territories’ could add further support to a liberal view of coastal state interdiction powers.
Again, whichever view is taken, UNCLOS is silent on what actions the ‘exercise ... of the
necessary control’ under UNCLOS Article 33 might entail – meaning coastal state interdictions
of foreign vessels laterally transiting their Contiguous Zones could be controversial.

[7.3.3.3]

“Other than WMD” interdictions on the High Seas

[7.3.1.1] noted several instances of terrorist groups transporting conventional weaponry over
long distances by sea – one of the longest ranges being the 1994 shipment of 60 tonnes of
explosives from the Ukraine to Sri Lanka by the LTTE. It also noted five out of the seven
reported interdictions of suspected conventional weaponry shipments occurring on the high
seas. From these five interdictions, three suspected terrorist vessels – the Santorini, the Karine
A, and the Abu Hassan – were interdicted on the high seas by Israeli naval forces through being
suspected of transporting weaponry to Palestinian groups and to Hezbollah. Given the longrunning conflicts between Israel and these Palestinian groups, international legal rules other
than those examined in this Study such as rights of blockade could be applicable to the
interdiction of such vessels. But similarly to the Baltic Sky interdiction, it is plausible that Israel
may have determined these weapons shipments to constitute a direct threat to its national
security, and as Chapter 8 notes, the absence of international protest about these high seas
interdictions has been noted by international legal scholars.302

The 2002 interdiction by Indian authorities of the abandoned Lebanese dry bulk cargo vessel
Al Murtada approximately 170 kilometres off the Indian coast, where a large cache of
weaponry was found (suspected of being for destined for terrorist purposes) – was not linked
to a long-running conflict similarly to that between Israel and Palestinian groups. Whilst the
details of this incident (for example how it first came to the attention of the Indian coastguard),
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are quite scant, because the Al Murtada had been abandoned the interdiction might be justified
as the interdiction of a stateless vessel under UNCLOS Article 110.

The review in [7.3.1.2] showed that terrorist groups have successfully utilised, and have
attempted to utilise, a range of vessels (and also shipping containers aboard vessels) to transport
operatives over various distances. Long international voyages have included one successful
case of suspected Al Qaeda operatives travelling under false seafarer identification from Egypt
to Italy; one recorded attempt of an Al Qaeda operative attempting to travel in a shipping
container from Italy to Canada; and an attempt by the PLF to transport operatives from Algeria
to Israel. The short range distances have been mostly in the Eastern Mediterranean with the
intention of launching attacks against Israel. Whilst the sources reviewed for [7.3.1.2] tended
to be generalised about the locations of interdictions, there are were at least two recorded
attempts of terrorists launching operatives from mother ships whilst in international waters –
with one such recorded attempt being interdicted 22 nautical miles off the Israeli coast.
A restrictive view of UNCLOS could interpret the reservation of the high seas for ‘peaceful
purposes’ in Article 88 as referring to the activities of vessels whilst actually on the high seas
– rather than enabling “non-peaceful” activities such as terrorist attacks at a later time on land
through the provision of weaponry, operatives or funds. It could also take a restrictive
interpretation of Article 92303 and a literal interpretation of Article 110 as containing an
exhaustive list of exceptions to the jurisdiction of flag states over their vessels on the high seas
– with the terrorist utilisation of vessels to transport conventional weaponry, persons or
fundraising would not “fit”,304 and could interpret ‘treaties’ in Article 110 in a formalised sense.
Finally it could deny the application of Resolution 1390 paragraphs 2(a),305 2(b)306 and 2(c)307
to the high seas, which do not constitute the ‘territories’ of any state, 308 as prohibiting the
interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels.

By contrast, a liberal view of the powers of coastal states under UNCLOS to interdict suspected
illicit shipments conventional weaponry could arguably be stronger than the liberal view with

That is, prohibiting interdictions without the consent of the vessel’s flag state
See for example Logan, above n 9, 268
305
For terrorist uses of vessels as a means of raising funds
306
For terrorist uses of vessels to transport persons connected with their groups
307
For terrorist uses of vessels to transport conventional weaponry
308
UNCLOS Article 89 ‘Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas’
303
304
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respect to WMD materiel for terrorist purposes for three reasons. First, Resolution 1390
paragraph 2(c)309 imposed several obligations (which have been re-affirmed in 27 subsequent
Security Council resolutions) on States to prevent the supply of weaponry and related materials
to terrorists, compared to the mere “invitation” within Resolution 1540.310 Second, except for
explosives such as Ammonium Nitrate (which are widely used for construction and agricultural
activities), it is far less likely that more readily usable311 conventional weaponry would have
legitimate peaceful dual uses to the same extent that many forms of WMD materiel might.
Third, whilst several scholars favouring the restrictive view of UNCLOS have cited UNCLOS
Article 23312 as disallowing coastal states from interdicting laterally transiting nuclear-powered
vessels, no similar provisions would apply to the maritime trafficking of “more readily usable”
conventional weaponry. Such a liberal view could also interpret the list of exceptions to the
sole jurisdiction of the flag state under UNCLOS Article 110 as indicative rather than
exhaustive, and possibly cite the obligation of all States to cooperate in the suppression of drug
trafficking on the high seas313 as further support for interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels.

[7.3.3.4]

“Other than WMD” interdictions within international straits

Following the reasoning in [7.2.5.4], a restrictive view of the interdiction powers of “bordering
states” under UNCLOS over vessels suspected of being utilised to enable the perpetration of
subsequent terrorist attacks would presumably emphasise both the ‘non-discriminatory’
character of the UNCLOS transit passage regime and its references to the ‘freedom of
navigation’ through international straits as prohibiting “bordering states” from interdicting
laterally transiting suspected terrorist vessels.314 It could also view the terms ‘any threat or use
of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of [bordering
As noted [2.7.2], UNSC Res 1390 (16 January 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1390 para 2(c) obliged states to ‘ …
[prevent] the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer, to these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms
and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary
equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned and technical advice, assistance, or training related to military
activities’.
310
As [7.2.4] noted, UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540, para 10 merely ‘call[ed] upon all
States: ‘ … in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international
law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means
of delivery, and related materials’.
311
More “readily usable” conventional weaponry would most likely present a more imminent security threat than
(possibly dual use) WMD materiel - which would require highly specialized skills, time and resources to assemble
and utilise
312
Which specifically recognizes the innocent passage rights of vessels carrying nuclear materials
313
[7.3.1.3] noted previous reports of terrorists utilising such activities to raise funds
314
See for example Garvey, above n 38 , 131 - 132; Logan, above n 9, 264
309
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states], or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the UN Charter’ in UNCLOS Article 39 as being limited to acts that have a “direct nexus” to
peace and security of the “bordering state” – not to other states that such vessels might be
transiting towards.
By contrast a liberal view could hold that UNCLOS enables “bordering states” to interdict
suspected terrorist vessels laterally transiting international straits. It could hold that whilst
UNCLOS specifies that the rights of innocent passage should not be suspended,315 nor the
rights of transit passage of foreign vessels impeded,316 “bordering states” such as Singapore to
could interdict laterally transiting suspected terrorist vessels because Article 34(1) provides
that straits transit passage ‘should not’ in other respects affect the legal status of the waters
forming such straits or the exercise, by the states bordering the straits, of their sovereignty or
jurisdiction over such waters.317

[7.3.4]

Contribution of the PSI to “other than WMD” interdictions

Whilst the PSI, through the political and operational linkages developed amongst ‘participants’
and through the ship-boarding agreements reviewed in [7.2.7] are understood to focus on
countering the proliferation of ‘WMD and related materials’, Becker opined that whilst ‘related
materials’ presumably refers to WMD components such as chemical weapon ingredients or
sensitive dual-use equipment and technologies, there were indications that PSI interdictions
may have other cargoes in mind, including the illegal drugs or conventional arms that help keep
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern financially afloat’.318 It is also conceivable
that the political and operational linkages developed amongst participants might also facilitate
the interdiction of vessels where there were grounds for suspecting the presence of terroristconnected persons on-board. Paragraph 4(f) of the Interdiction Principles supports this view. It
calls upon participants to ‘take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding
cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials … and consistent with their
obligations under international law and frameworks, to not transport or assist in the transporting

315

UNCLOS Article 38
UNCLOS Article 45
317
Song, above n 11 , 116
318
Becker, above n 38, 159 - 160
316
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of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to
allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so’ [emphasis added].

[7.3.5]

2005 SUA Convention

This section examines the extent to which the 2005 SUA Convention would enable States to
prevent vessels being utilised to enable subsequent terrorist attacks through transporting
conventional weaponry, operatives or financing terrorist activities. In relation to the
transportation of conventional weaponry by vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks, as
noted in [7.2.9], the 2005 SUA Convention makes it an offence to knowingly transport for
“terrorist-like” purposes319 (inter alia) ‘ ... any explosive … material’.320 Whilst the review of
previous instances of terrorists transporting conventional weaponry by vessels in [7.3.1.1]
noted several cases of explosives being transported by vessels, it also noted several cases where
only small arms were transported. It is not clear whether such weaponry would also constitute
‘explosives’ under the 2005 SUA Convention, as this term is not defined in the Convention.

In relation to the utilisation of vessels to transport operatives or finance terrorist activities,
Article 3ter makes it an offence to unlawfully and intentionally transport a person on board a
ship knowing that the person has committed an offence under Articles 3,321 3bis322 and 3quater,
or any of the nine counter-terrorism treaties listed in its Annex.323 The combined effect of
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See Note 206 above
2005 SUA Convention Article 3bis(1)(b)(i) – which whilst not mentioning terrorism, incorporates the mental
element of ‘knowing that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without a condition, as
is provided for under national law, death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population,
or compelling a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’
321
[6.2.4] examined the Article 3 offences
322
[6.2.5] and [7.2.9] overviewed the offences under Article 3bis of the 2005 SUA Convention
323
The nine treaties listed in the Annex of the 2005 SUA Convention are the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at the Hague on 16 December 1970; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979; the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 26 October 1979; Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on
24 February 1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997; and the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 9 December 1999. These treaties are cited here in the same format as they appear in the
2005 SUA Convention, with [2.2.1] providing the precise citations for these treaties.
320
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Article 3ter (through including the nine sectoral counter-terrorism treaties), and Article 3quater,
which includes offences of being broadly involved in terrorist activities, is that the 2005 SUA
Convention would “capture” a very broad range of both terrorist-connected persons, and also
the utilisation of vessels as a means of financing terrorist activities. In relation to offences under
Articles 3, 3bis or 3ter of the 2005 SUA Convention, Article 3quater makes it an offence to
unlawfully and intentionally injure or kill any person in connection with such offences; 324
attempt to commit such offences;325 participate as an accomplice;326 organize or direct others
to commit an offence;327 or contribute to the commission of such offences.328

If a state party suspected a vessel flagged to another state party was suspected of being utilised
to commit one or more of these offences, the Article 8bis boarding provisions which were
overviewed in [6.2.5] could be invoked. However as [6.2.5] also noted due to the low levels of
ratifications as at 1 October 2013, the 2005 SUA Convention would only be applicable in a
very limited range of circumstances – for example enabling the interdiction of a Panamanianflagged vessel by Spanish authorities.

[7.4]

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has further illustrated the practical application of the Threat Matrix for analysing
the threat contexts for the utilisations of vessels to enable subsequent terrorist attacks. It showed
the small number of publicly-reported interdictions of suspected illicit shipments of WMD
materiel have involved large vessels engaged on international voyages, and have been
cooperatively inspected in port rather than being confrontationally interdicted at sea. It also
showed how there have been considerably more reported instances of terrorists successfully
transporting conventional weaponry by sea, and attempting to do so; and that such transfers
have involved both large and small vessels, and both lengthy international voyages and shortdistance transfers. It showed how several significant terrorist attacks, including the 1998
African embassy bombings and the 2002 Bali bombings, have been “enabled” through
weaponry and explosives transported by sea. It also showed how both large and small vessels
have been utilised by terrorists to transport operatives over both long international distances,
324

2005 SUA Convention Article 3quater(a)
2005 SUA Convention Article 3quater(b)
326
2005 SUA Convention Article 3quater(c)
327
2005 SUA Convention Article 3quater(d)
328
2005 SUA Convention Article 3quater(e)
325
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and over short ranges to perpetrate subsequent attacks on land; and finally that both large and
small vessels have been utilised to finance terrorist organisations. Although most of the
previous successful and attempted instances of vessels being utilised for these purposes have
been terrorist-controlled in the first instance, this chapter noted some instances of vessels being
forcibly taken over, so taking account of the “best case” / “worst case” scenario analysis
articulated in [4.2.7], it reasoned that rigorously-applied ISPS Code security measures might
well lessen the scope for such forcible take overs to occur.

The chapter showed how the WMD interdiction measures outlined in the PSI Interdiction
Principles have prompted extensive debate regarding the powers of States under UNCLOS to
interdict laterally-transiting vessels. Significantly, this Study has been the first to articulate the
“restrictive” and “liberal” views of UNCLOS, which largely diverge on the implications that
post-9/11 counter terrorism Security Council resolutions should have in understanding the
ambiguous provisions of UNCLOS. The chapter also extended the reasoning underlying these
“restrictive” and “liberal” views of UNCLOS to interdictions of “other than WMD
transporting” utilisations of vessels. It explained the difficulties in assessing international
“support” for the PSI, even following the formalisation of nine PSI bilateral ship boarding
agreements between the US and key registry states. Finally it explained that while the 2005
SUA Convention objectively and clearly enables interdictions of vessels suspected of illicitly
transporting WMD materiel, its current international acceptance is quite low, thereby lessening
its prospects for enabling the interdiction of vessels suspected of enabling possible future
terrorist attacks.

Given these jurisdictional uncertainties of UNCLOS (and ambiguities with the PSI) and the
low acceptance of the 2005 SUA Convention, Chapter 8 considers the extent to which States
might, in exceptional circumstances where there was no jurisdictional basis under UNCLOS
or the 2005 SUA Convention, interdict suspected terrorist vessels on the basis of countering an
‘armed attack’ on the basis of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. After explaining
the challenges in defining what constitutes an ‘armed attack’, and the actions States may take
to defend against armed attacks (similarly to this chapter), it formulates a “restrictive” and
“liberal” view of ‘armed attack’ in the post-9/11 maritime terrorism context. It also explores
the possibility of States interdicting suspected terrorist vessels on the basis of the doctrine of
Necessity.
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Chapter 9 examines options for refining the current international legal framework noted above.
It argues in first preference for increased ratification of the 2005 SUA Convention; in second
preference for further development of bilateral ship-boarding agreements similar to those
formalised between the US and key registry states under the PSI; in third preference for
increased institutionalisation of the PSI; and in fourth preference for developing further support
for the liberal view of UNCLOS.

CHAPTER 8
COUNTERING MARITIME TERRORISM IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE DOCTRINE OF
NECESSITY

[8.1]

INTRODUCTION

Chapters 6 and 7 highlighted several jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS for States to interdict
suspected (foreign-flagged) vessels deemed to constitute terrorist threats in the absence of
specific agreement with the foreign vessel’s flag state.1 In such exceptional circumstances, the
only international legal basis to enable States to interdict suspected terrorist vessels could be
their ‘inherent’ rights of self-defence against an ‘armed attack’ under Article 51 of the UN
Charter (‘Article 51’), or alternatively on the basis of the doctrine of Necessity.2 The possibility
of States interdicting suspected terrorist vessels on the basis of self-defence has been briefly
acknowledged (but not yet comprehensively examined) by several of the international legal

1

Such specific agreements could include the 2005 SUA Convention, the 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol, the PSI
Bilateral Ship Boarding Agreements, or ad-hoc agreements between the vessel’s flag state and the “interdicting”
state. This Chapter addresses the fourth sub-question posed in [1.2.2], namely ‘(4) Considering how maritime
terrorism incidents have previously occurred, and might occur in the future, how might the international
agreements apply in practice in preventing maritime terrorism incidents?’
2
Stuart Kaye ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines, and Submarine Cables from Attack’
(2007) 31 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 416 – 418; Douglas Guilfoyle ‘Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of
Mass Destruction’ (2007) 12 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 13; and Craig Allen Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law (Praeger Security International, 2007), 173 - 174
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scholars cited in both Chapter 63 and Chapter 7;4 and may also be inferred from key policy
statements by the United States and other States.5
Article 51 provides (inter alia) that: ‘Nothing in the [UN] Charter shall impair the inherent 6
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security ...’.7 This Chapter explains that whilst traditionally understood
in the context of “State vs State” conflicts, since 9/11 Article 51 has been increasingly (although
not universally8) recognised as allowing States to defend against armed attacks by non-state

Kaye, above n 2, 413 – 414; Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe The Law of the Sea 3rd Edition (Manchester
University Press, 1999), 99 note that ‘ States enjoy a general right of self-defence in international law: thus, if
they are facing an imminent attack from foreign vessels in their territorial sea and have no other means of
protection, they may use any necessary force against the vessels in order to defend themselves’
4
Matthew Fitzgerald ‘Seizing Weapons of Mass Destruction from Foreign-Flagged Ships on the High Seas Under
Article 51 of the UN Charter’ (2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 473; Michael Byers ‘Policing the
High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law, 532 (who used
the example of a North Korean merchant vessel carrying WMD 13 nautical miles from Los Angeles); Michael
Becker ‘The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea’
(2005) 46 Harvard Journal of International Law, 193; Joel Doolin ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative:
Cornerstone of a New International Norm’ (Spring 2006) 59(2) Naval War College Review, 46 – 48 (who argued
for Article 51 to be used selectively as a “trump card” to justify the interdiction of suspected illicit shipments of
WMD materiel in exceptional circumstances); Douglas Guilfoyle ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative:
Interdicting Vessels in International Waters to Prevent the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction?’ (2005) 29
Melbourne University Law Review, 760; Douglas Guilfoyle ‘Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass
Destruction’ (2007) 12 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 13; Samuel Logan ‘The Proliferation Security
Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges’ (2005) 14 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, 269 – 270; Stuart
Kaye ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative in the Maritime Domain’ (2006) 81(141) US Naval War College
International Legal Studies Series, 153 – 155; Craig Allen Maritime Counter-proliferation Operations and the
Rule of Law (Praeger Security International, 2007) at 43; 90 – 91; and 138 – 140; and Natalie Klein Maritime
Security and the Law of the Sea Oxford Monographs in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), 298
5
For example, Matthew Fitzgerald ‘Seizing Weapons of Mass Destruction from Foreign-Flagged Ships on the
High Seas Under Article 51 of the UN Charter’ (2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law, 476 – 477 notes
that former US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton (one of the
principal architects of the PSI) stated that if the US lacked a jurisdictional basis for interdicting suspected WMD
shipments, it could look to Article 51 to justify such interdictions. The United States’ contemplation of interdicting
under Article 51 can also be inferred from Bolton’s remarks at a November 2003 PSI meeting, where he explained
that ‘ … where there are gaps or ambiguities in our authorities, we may consider seeking additional sources for
such authority, as circumstances dictate. What we do not believe, however, is that only the [UNSC] can grant the
authority we need, and that may be the real source of the criticism we face’; and earlier that year during the July
2003 PSI meeting in Brisbane, he declared the United States had a “general right of self-defence if there was a
serious belief that North Korean vessels were carrying material for use in weapons of mass destruction’: Cited in
Michael Byers ‘Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative’ (2004) 98 American Journal of
International Law, 541
6
As explained in [8.2.1], the reference to “inherent” rights of self-defence are generally taken to encompass the
two Caroline Principles of necessity and proportionality
7
Article 51 further provides ‘Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security’
8
As [8.4.1] explains, the US-led intervention into Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom from October
2001 onwards has prompted considerable debate on this question
3
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actors such as terrorists. Several scholars have pointed out that while Article 51 specifies a
State must be the target of an armed attack, it does not specify that an armed attack can only
be perpetrated by States.9 Through a historically progressive analysis of relevant UN
pronouncements,10 ICJ judgements, Security Council resolutions, State practice11 and scholarly
writings, it examines how meanings of ‘armed attack’, and the international legal rules
governing the use of force by States to defend against armed attacks, have been developed, and
also criticised. This analysis draws upon the approaches of the most recent and comprehensive
study on Article 5112 which considered the meaning of ‘armed attack’ through three questions.
Firstly, the ratione materiae (materiality threshold) of armed attacks, asking ‘what acts count
as armed attacks?’; second, the ratione temporis (temporal threshold) of armed attacks, asking
‘when does an ‘armed attack’ occur, and at what point may States take measures to defend
against such armed attacks?’; and third, the ratione personae of armed attacks, asking ‘who can
perpetrate or threaten an armed attack?’. In particular, the ratione personae question considers
whether non-state actors can perpetrate armed attacks, and if so, whether such attacks must be
attributable to a State? Through focusing its analysis on these three ‘ratione’ questions, this
Chapter develops (similarly to Chapter 7) “restrictive” and “liberal” views of ‘armed attack’
for enabling States to interdict suspected terrorist vessels. Significantly, this chapter undertakes
the first detailed analysis about how Article 51 might be applied to justify the interdiction of
suspected terrorist vessels. While this chapter reasons the liberal view would best enable States
to interdict suspected terrorist vessels, it also argues that recourse to Article 51 should be an
absolute last resort option. This chapter also explores the possibility of States interdicting
suspected terrorist vessels on the basis of the doctrine of Necessity.

[8.2]

[8.2.1]

9

FOUNDATIONAL MEANINGS OF “ARMED ATTACK”

The Caroline criteria

Yoram Dinstein War Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 2005)
Particularly the UNGA Definition of Aggression (examined in [8.2.3]), and more recently (although more
implicitly than explicitly) the 2004 High Level Report (examined in [8.4.2])
11
The term ‘State practice’ here refers to the uses of force by states that have led to debate within the UN Security
Council. But as this Chapter explains, many instances of states using force under the purported justification of
Article 51 of the UN Charter are not formally reported to the Security Council as envisaged under Article 51
12
Tom Ruys ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice
(Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 2010) - which as at 1 October 2013 is the most recent
and comprehensive (584 pp.) study on the meaning of armed attack under Article 51of the UN Charter
10
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Article 51 refers to States’ ‘inherent’ rights of self-defence, with ‘inherent’ having been held
to refer to customary international law which pre-dates the UN Charter.13 Customary
international law on the use of force by States in self-defence largely derives from the principles
enunciated during a diplomatic exchange between the United States and Britain between 1837
and 1842 following the sinking of the Caroline steamboat over Niagara Falls during the Upper
Canadian Rebellion against the British colonial government in 1837. Whilst the United States
remained officially neutral during this conflict, American sympathisers provided supplies and
weapons to the Canadian rebels – including through the use of the steamboat Caroline. In
response to this activity, a British force based in Canada crossed the Niagara River into US
territory at night, seized the Caroline, set it on fire and sent it crashing over Niagara Falls.14
This incident prompted a diplomatic protest by the US government to the British Ambassador
about what it regarded as an excessive and illegal use of force against the territorial integrity
of the United States. In the final letter to the British, the United States asserted that to be legally
justifiable, uses of force by States in self-defence needed to establish ‘ ... a necessity of self–
defence was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation
... and that the British force, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to
enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the
act, justified by the necessity of self–defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it’.15 Following a British apology in response to this letter, the above principles have
been synthesised into the well-established customary international legal principles of Necessity
and Proportionality.16 As [8.3] below explains, these two customary international legal
principles have been repeatedly confirmed by the ICJ to govern the use of force by States in
self-defence, and more recently have been acknowledged in the San Remo Manual of
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea,17 and the UN High Level Panel Report
on the 2010 Gaza Flotilla incident. However as the following sections explain, scholarly
opinion has been divided on the practical application of these necessity and proportionality
principles.

13

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ Reports 14, 94
(‘Nicaragua [1986]’) – which is examined in [8.3.1] below
14
Thomas Nichols The Coming Age of Preventive War (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 2
15
Nichols, above n 14, 3
16
[8.4.3] below provides an outline of these concepts have been understood in the post-9/11 counter-terrorism
context
17
Louise Doswald-Beck (ed) San Remo Manual On International Law Applicable To Armed Conflicts At Sea
(International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 1995)

322

[8.2.2]

Foundational academic writings: Temporal aspects of Article 51

Since 1945, the UN Charter has governed the use of force by States, with Article 2(4) obliging
member states to ‘ ... refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations’. Accordingly, Article 51 has become widely understood as being the only
permissible exception to the general UN Charter prohibition on the use of force by States. In
the years following 1945 and before 9/11, international legal scholars remained divided on the
ratione temporis question of whether Article 51 self-defence rights can only be lawfully
invoked following an actual armed attack, or whether Article 51 allows the use of force to
defend against a threatened attack. Although since 1945 numerous terminological distinctions
have been made for the various conceptions of the temporal lawfulness of self-defence amongst
international legal scholars, Ruys helpfully summarises the various conceptions of the temporal
lawfulness of self-defence from the most restrictive to the most liberal.18
The first (and most restrictive) ‘reactive self-defence’ conception covers self-defence measures
that follow after an armed attack has struck the territory of the defending state, or its external
manifestations abroad. The attack may be completed or may still be on-going – but its material
nature is to some extent an observable fact of reality. The second ‘interceptive self-defence’
conception19 covers situations where an attack has been launched, and whilst not having struck
the “defending” state, there is clear and compelling evidence of the aggressor embarking upon
an apparently irreversible course of action. An example of this would where be a missile has
been launched against the territory of a State, but is still in the air.20 The third ‘anticipatory
self-defence’ conception is an “umbrella” term for two “future-assumptive” forms of selfdefence. Firstly pre-emptive self-defence, being directed towards an attack which has not yet
been launched, but which is deemed to be imminent – presupposing that certain preparations
for an attack (such as the mobilisation of armed forces) have already been made. 21 Secondly
preventive self-defence, being self-defence actions that seek to counter a future threat which
has not yet fully materialised, but which is suspected of becoming imminent at some point in

Ruys, above n 12, 253 – 254
Ruys, above n 12, 253 – describes this category as ‘ ... located on the fault line between reactive and anticipatory
self-defence’, and also notes Dinstein as being the key proponent of this doctrine
20
Ruys, above n 12, 253
21
Ruys, above n 12, 253 - 254
18
19
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the future.22 Interdictions of suspected terrorist vessels before they are utilised in in an offensive
manner to perpetrate dangerous or disruptive acts (as examined in Chapter 6), or before they
enabled the perpetration of subsequent terrorist attacks on land (as examined in Chapter 7)
would involve self-defence measures being exercised in a pre-emptive sense.
Critics of anticipatory self-defence have been termed ‘restrictionists’,23 with Ian Brownlie
regarded as the founding proponent of this school of thought - who regarded “preventive” selfdefence actions as contrary to Article 51 as such an interpretation it would allow forcible action
in self-defence to destroy a putative enemy’s capacity to mount a possible future attack.24 Other
restrictionists have regarded Article 51 as being ‘limited to an actual armed attack, which is
clear, unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open to interpretation or fabrication’, and
have cautioned against States being allowed to strike under the pretext of preventative or preemptive self-defence.25 International legal scholars favouring a restrictive view of UNCLOS
(as noted in [7.2.5]) generally also take a restrictive view of the ability of States to interdict
suspected shipments of WMD materiel under Article 51 – with Garvey cautioning that ‘…
without the limits of imminence and necessity, the doctrine of self-defence could be used to
justify virtually any use of force, in the most volatile international contexts, including by India
against Pakistan and by China against Taiwan’.26 Along similar lines Guilfoyle argues that
anticipatory self-defence may be criticised for being highly presumptive as to future events.27
By contrast, proponents of anticipatory self-defence have been referred to as ‘counterrestrictionists’ and ‘expansionists’. Bowett, who is generally regarded as the founding
proponent of this school of thought, argued it was unrealistic for states to await an initial attack,
particularly given the growing prevalence of nuclear armaments during the early decades of
the Cold War capable of threatening a state’s very existence in order to justify self-defence
measures.28 As noted in [8.4], more recent ‘counter-restrictionists’ have argued the absurdity

22
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of only permitting self-defence measures once missiles have already hit the territory of the
attacked State.29

[8.2.3]

Pre-9/11 state practice30 and the 1974 UNGA Definition of Aggression

The foundational perspectives noted above from the “1945 to 9/11” period reflected
predominant state practice of the Cold War being the use or threat of force in a “State vs State”
context. For the purposes of this Chapter, “state practice” refers to demonstrated uses of force
by States on the stated grounds of self-defence, and the consequent Security Council dialogues
relating to the uses of such force31 - notwithstanding that not all uses of force by States
purportedly in self-defence are publicised or reported to the Security Council as required by
Article 51.32 As this Chapter shows, there is a very fine and subjective line between the uses of
force that will constitute permissible acts of self-defence, and impermissible reprisals or acts
of aggression against other states, with several anticipatory uses of force since 1945 having
been sharply criticised by the international community.33 One heavily criticised incident
involving the use of force purportedly in pre-emptive self-defence was Israel’s 1981 bombing
of the Osirak nuclear reactor inside Iraq in 1981 at which Israel feared Iraq was developing of
nuclear weapons. Israel’s strike was unanimously condemned by the Security Council in
Resolution 487 on 19 June 1981, with the UK representative declaring ‘ … [Israel’s bombing]
was not a response to an armed attack on Israel by Iraq. There was no instant nor overwhelming
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necessity for self-defence; nor [could] it be justified as a forcible measure of self-protection’.34
Israel’s strike on the Osirak reactor has been cited by several international legal scholars as an
example of an unjustified use of force to counter threats of future development of nuclear
weapons, and ipso facto, the interdiction of vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD
materiel.35

The threat of the use of nuclear weapons during the first decades of the Cold War added impetus
to the formulation of an international definition of “aggression” (which had been occurring
since 1923) in order to reduce the scope for subjective assessments of when uses of force by
States should be warranted. Following negotiations between 1968 and 1974, the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) passed the UNGA Definition of Aggression on 14 December 1974
(UNGA Definition).36 Article 3 of the UNGA Definition outlined six acts which subject to
Article 2,37 would qualify as acts of aggression. Four out of these six acts referred to actions
by the armed forces of States,38 reflecting the predominantly “East vs West”, state-centric
international security environment of the Cold War. Nevertheless, in several cases, the
superpowers and their allies provided various levels of overt and covert support to non-state
actors such as rebel groups to destabilise the influence of governments to which they were
ideologically opposed – which was also addressed by the UNGA Definition in Article 3(f).39
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However for this Chapter’s purpose of examining the extent to which Article 51 might justify
self-defence measures against non-state actors, the most directly relevant paragraph of the
UNGA Definition is Article 3(g), which includes as acts of aggression: ‘The sending by or on
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein’. [Emphasis added] The italicised aspects of Article 3(g) reflect
the predominantly state-centric international security environment of the Cold War, in which
as [2.7] noted, terrorism was a “mere sideshow” to the greater “East vs West” confrontation.
[2.6.2] also noted the general consensus amongst terrorism scholars that most contemporary
terrorist groups operate with little or no support from states as envisaged by the Article 3(g) of
the UNGA Definition. As outlined in [8.3], Article 3(g) of the UNGA Definition has been cited
with approval by the ICJ in Nicaragua v United States (1986)40 and DRC v Uganda (2005).41
It has also been cited with approval by several of the scholars favouring restrictive views of
UNCLOS and Article 51 in relation to the interdiction of WMD shipments.42
However, as reasoned in [8.5], through Article 4 of the UNGA Definition noting that ‘The acts
enumerated [within Article 3] are not exhaustive, and the Security Council may determine that
other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter’, a “liberal view” of ‘armed
attack’ might, similarly to the liberal view of UNCLOS enunciated in Chapter 7, regard the
post-9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council resolutions noted in [2.7] as supporting preemptive self-defence measures by States to counter imminent armed attacks by contemporary
terrorist groups.

[8.3]

ICJ JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING ARTICLE 51

This section examines how four key ICJ cases have shaped understandings of the term ‘armed
attack’. International legal scholars have criticised the ICJ for strictly confining its attention to
only determining the specific questions put to it by state parties on a case-by-case basis, rather
than enunciating generalised criteria for the lawfulness of force in self-defence. Whilst ICJ
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judgements43 are adjudicative on the specific issues before the court as opposed to being
advisory, and the ICJ may be extremely cautious not to grant its imprimatur to the unbridled
use of force by states, this reluctance, and also certain aspects of the reasoning in the ICJ cases
has been extensively criticised by international legal scholars. Indeed some scholars argue the
cases examined below no longer reflect the realities of twenty-first century international
security.44 Nevertheless, these four ICJ decisions are useful in terms of articulating a
“restrictive” view of Article 51, which if followed would be less likely to enable States to
interdict suspected terrorist vessels in exceptional circumstances.

[8.3.1]

Nicaragua v United States [1986]

Notwithstanding the criticisms of it, Nicaragua [1986] is significant for defining the hostile
actions which will, and will not, constitute an ‘armed attack’ in three respects. First, it
specifically acknowledged for the first time that customary international law regarding the use
of force45 coexists alongside the UN Charter. Second, the ICJ it made inroads into the ratione
materiae question (that is, the materiality threshold of what degrees of force will constitute an
armed attack) – through conceptualising “more grave” and “less grave” uses of force. Third,
and following from this second point, it distinguished an ‘armed attack’ from States’ protection
of their “essential security interests”.

This case arose from actions by the United States during the last decade of the Cold War. Under
the “Reagan Doctrine”, the United States provided both overt and covert support to antiMarxist rebel and guerrilla movements to “roll back” the influence of communism in
Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. Within Nicaragua, between 1981 and 1984 the United
States provided various levels of support to the Contras – a rebel group opposed to the Marxist
Sandinista National Liberation Front which had seized power to govern Nicaragua in 1979.
The United States viewed the Sandinistas as aiding the left wing Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) in neighbouring El Salvador, which it also viewed as a Marist threat
to the security of the Central American region.
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In 1984, Nicaragua instituted proceedings in the ICJ against the US alleging, inter alia, breaches
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter - which prohibits the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State.46 Nicaragua alleged47 (and the ICJ
held)48 that whilst not directly controlling the actions of the Contras (which the CIA codenamed
Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets (UCLAs), the United States had directed and supported
them through providing weapons, training and logistical support to the Contras, directing
UCLAs to attack Nicaraguan naval bases, and also to lay sea mines in Nicaraguan harbours.

However, the United States subsequently withdrew from these proceedings, following
President Reagan’s withdrawal of the US from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, and through
its influence within the UN Security Council, vetoed the enforcement of the ICJ’s decision. A
subsequent post-FSLN Nicaraguan government under Violeta Chamorro withdrew
Nicaragua’s complaint before the ICJ in 1992, leading the ICJ to decide the case ex parte.
However before its withdrawal, in its reply to Nicaragua’s claim, the United States argued it
was acting under Article 51 in collective self-defence of El Salvador, and also submitted that
it had responded to similar requests for assistance from El Salvador, Costa Rica and
Honduras.49 The ICJ’s judgement, which found for Nicaragua against the United States on 16
counts,50 made four key declarations regarding the meaning of ‘armed attack’ under Article 51.

First, the ICJ recognised the co-existence of customary international law and the UN Charter.
It held that Article 51 ‘ ... by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use of
force in international relations’;51 that ‘ ... a definition of the “armed attack” which if found to
exist, authorises the exercise of the “inherent right” of self-defence, is not provided in the
Charter, and is not part of treaty law. It cannot therefore be held that Article 51 is a provision
which “subsumes and supervenes” customary international law’, but rather demonstrated that
46
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‘… customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law’; 52 and that ‘ ... it was
never intended that the [UN] Charter should embody written confirmation of every essential
principle of international law in force’.53 Whilst these passages do not specifically mention the
Caroline criteria of necessity and proportionality discussed in [8.2.1], it is generally understood
as referring to them.54

Second, the ICJ addressed the ratione materiae (materiality threshold) question (albeit in a
highly generalised manner) through declaring the uses of force that will and will not amount to
an ‘armed attack’55 through enunciating the concept of “most grave” and “less grave” uses of
force.56 As the question of the legality of self-defence in relation to imminent attacks (which
this Chapter focuses on) was not raised, the ICJ refrained from expressing a view on the legality
of uses of force in such circumstances, limiting its consideration to the legality of self-defence
measures in response to armed attacks which had already occurred.57
After referring to Article 3(g) of the UNGA Definition58 (which it regarded as constituting
customary international law), the ICJ enunciated the actions which would constitute an ‘armed
attack’ under Article 51. It declared that ‘... an armed attack must be understood as including
not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also ‘the sending
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries [ie non-state
actors]59 which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount
to’ (inter alia) ‘an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its substantial
involvement therein’.60 [Emphasis added]. The ICJ also inferred that an armed attack in
contravention of international legal prohibitions on the use of force may result from the actions
of armed bands sent by a State into the territory of another State, if the “scale and effects” of
attacks by of such armed bands would be more significant than what the ICJ termed a ‘mere
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frontier incident’.61 However, the ICJ did not elaborate further on the practical meaning of
these ‘scale and effects’ and ‘mere frontier incident’ concepts.
The ICJ also noted other hostile actions which would not constitute ‘armed attacks’ as
including ‘... assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other
support’, which the ICJ explained ‘... may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to
intervention in the interna1 or external affairs of other States’.62 Later in its judgment, the ICJ
reiterated that an ‘armed attack’ would not include the provision by a State to rebels of
weaponry,63 logistical support64 and financial support.65 These declarations by the ICJ have
been cited by international legal scholars taking a restrictive view of both UNCLOS and Article
51 with respect to the WMD vessel interdictions examined in Chapter 7.66
The ICJ emphasised that an “attacked State” seeking collective self-defence assistance from
another State needed to formally declare itself to have been attacked, and that an “assisting”
State could not validly exercise the right of collective self-defence based on its own assessment
of the situation.67 From this basis the ICJ criticised the failure by the United States to report the
purported taking of collective self-defence measures to the Security Council,68 leading it to
conclude that US support to the Contras exceeded the principles of Necessity and
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Proportionality.69 It also held the United States’ plea of collective self-defence against alleged
armed attacks on El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica could not be upheld.70
Third, at the ICJ quite briefly considered71 the international legal consequences of the United
States’ laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters – which it did not characterise as an armed attack,
but rather as an ‘infringement of Nicaragua’s freedom of communications and maritime
commerce’.72 Fourth, the ICJ distinguished between the terms ‘armed attack’ and the
infringement of ‘essential security interests’73 – a term included in the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation concluded between the United States and Nicaragua in 195674 –
which Nicaragua also claimed to have been breached by the actions of the United States. The
ICJ noted that whilst self-defence against an armed attack would encompass measures
necessary to protect essential security interests, ‘... the concept of essential security interests
certainly extends beyond the scope of an armed attack, and has been subject to very broad
interpretations in the past’.75 However the ICJ did not elaborate further on what these ‘broad
interpretations’ included; nor did it further explain its conception of ‘essential security
interests’. Relevantly for the purposes of this Study, on a restrictive view of Article 51,
“disruptive but not deadly” maritime terrorism incidents such as interference with submarine
cables could constitute interference with ‘essential security interests’, but not qualify as an
‘armed attack’.

[8.3.2]

Oil Platforms (Iran v United States) (2003)

The second significant ICJ decision on Article 51, Oil Platforms (Iran v United States)
(2003),76 is particularly relevant for this Chapter’s analysis of the meaning of ‘armed attack’
both because it results from uses of force purportedly in self-defence at sea (albeit in a “State
69
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vs State” context that did not involve non-state actors), and because it illustrates the ICJ’s very
restrictive conception of ‘armed attack’. As explained below, the ICJ held that a State seeking
to justify uses of force in self-defence needed to demonstrate a very high standard of proof77
regarding an aggressor’s intent to specifically target that State, and also responsibility for
having specifically targeted that State. The ICJ also reiterated the vague “most grave” vs “less
grave” test enunciated in Nicaragua [1986]. As explained below, several aspects of this
judgement have been criticised – particularly the ICJ’s apparent addition of a “third Caroline
requirement” of ‘legitimate military targets’,78 and the ICJ’s statement of the negative aspect
of what an armed attack is not – without defining the positive aspects of what will constitute
an armed attack.
This case originated out of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, where Iraq’s attacks on Iranian
tankers and an Iranian oil terminal in 1984 prompted retaliatory attacks by Iran on tankers
carrying Iraqi oil from Kuwait, and later tankers of other States trading with Iraq. The ensuing
series of attacks between 1984 and 1988 on merchant shipping by Iraq and Iran became known
as the “Tanker War”,79 with both Iran and Iraq declaring exclusion zones within various
vicinities of their coastlines.80 It has been estimated that around 546 merchant vessels were
damaged, and around 430 civilian sailors were killed during the Tanker War. In response to
concerns about Iranian targeting of its merchant vessels, in late 1986 Kuwait requested the
United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to re-flag Kuwaiti merchant vessels
to ensure their protection from attacks.81 In response to this request, the US Navy began
escorting Kuwaiti tankers through the Persian Gulf from 7 March 1987 – with the Soviet Union
and the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium also providing naval
escorts to ships flying their flags within the Persian Gulf around this time.82
The US Navy’s protective escorts of US-flagged merchant vessels were undertaken under the
rubric of Operation Earnest Will between 24 July 1987 and 26 September 1988.83 On several
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occasions, which are discussed below, US naval forces launched military strikes against Iranian
oil platforms and vessels which it deemed to have been involved in the perpetration of attacks
against US-flagged shipping. In response to these military strikes, Iran instituted proceedings84
in the ICJ against the United States for what it regarded as a breach of a 1955 bilateral economic
relations treaty.85 In reply to Iran’s complaints, the United States claimed its strikes against the
oil platforms were justified as self-defence measures under Article 51.86
In eleven separate judgements, the ICJ did not find entirely for either party – Iran did was not
entitled to claim a breach of the 1955 bilateral treaty, and the United States could not rely upon
self-defence as a justification for its naval strikes against the Iranian oil platforms.87 In
dismissing the United States’ claim to be acting in self-defence, the ICJ reiterated the necessity
and proportionality tests from Nicaragua [1986], holding uses of force to protect essential
security interests must be ‘necessary’ for that purpose, with the determination of ‘necessity’
not being a question for the subjective judgement of the party taking such measures. 88 It also
followed Nicaragua [1986] in holding that the right of a State to use force in self-defence would
depend upon that State having been the victim of an armed attack89 - thereby favouring what
[8.2.2] termed a “reactive self-defence” conception of ‘armed attack’.

The first significant incident argued (unsuccessfully) by the US to constitute an armed attack
by Iran occurred on 16 October 1987 when the Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City (which had been
reflagged to the United States), was hit by a Silkworm missile near Kuwait harbour – an attack
which the United States attributed to Iran.90 Three days later on 19 October 1987, the US
launched Operation Nimble Archer, consisting of a naval attack on the Iranian Reshadat and
Resalat offshore oil production installations, which resulted in two platforms forming the
Reshadat installation being destroyed.91 The US argued these naval strikes were justified on
the basis of self-defence, alleging Iranian military forces stationed on these platforms had
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facilitated attacks on US and other neutral ships and aircraft through collecting intelligence on
vessel movements, laying sea mines, assisting small boat attacks, and firing at US military
helicopters.92 Iran acknowledged stationing its military forces on these platforms, but claimed
this stationing was to defend against attacks by Iraqi forces. 93 The ICJ held the United States
had not proven the attack on the Sea Isle City was an ‘armed attack’ that could be attributed to
Iran.94 It imposed a very high evidentiary threshold upon the United States to prove the
Silkworm missiles were deliberately fired at the Sea Isle City by Iran – which the United States
had not satisfied due to Iran casting significant doubt on the shortcomings in the United States’
evidence about the capabilities of the Silkworm missiles (with Iran arguing the missiles could
have been fired by Iraq);95 the United States’ failure to recover and produce as evidence
fragments of the missile;96 and disagreement between the parties on the range and tracking
patterns of Silkworm missiles.97 It also cast doubt on the United States’ argument of an
announcement by the Iranian president that Iran would attack US ships if it did not ‘leave the
region’ indicating Iran’s responsibility for this attack, holding that ‘ ... this [statement] is
evidently not sufficient to justify the conclusion that any subsequent attack on the United States
in the Persian Gulf was indeed the work of Iran’.98 It based this high “attribution threshold” on
similar remarks in Nicaragua [1986]99 – with this aspect of the ICJ’s determination being
criticised as overly restrictive.100
The ICJ also considered and dismissed101 several other claims by the US to have acted in selfdefence regarding attacks on US-flagged, and US-owned, vessels and aircraft.102 First, the
mining of the US-flagged tanker Bridgeton on 24 July 1987103 - with the ICJ concluding the
US had not proved that the mine struck by the Bridgeton was laid ‘with the specific intention
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of harming that ship, or other United States vessels’.104 In response to the mining of the
Bridgeton, and several other US vessels striking mines, the US Navy launched Operation Prime
Chance in August 1987, which resulted in the interdiction of the Iranian mine-laying craft Iran
Ajr on 21 September 1987. The ICJ accepted Iran’s explanation that the Iran Ajr was
transporting these mines to another location, holding that ‘ ... there is no evidence that the minelaying alleged to have been carried out by the Iranian Ajr, at a time when Iran was at war with
Iraq, was aimed specifically at the United States’.105 Second, the mining of the US-owned
Texaco-Caribbean on 10 August 1987, with the ICJ holding ‘ ... the Texaco-Caribbean,
whatever its ownership, was not flying a United States flag, so that an attack on the vessel is
not in itself to be equated with an attack on that State’.106 The ICJ has been criticised for not
further analysing the issue of the nationality of this ship or the “genuine link” requirement. 107
Third, the firing on US military helicopters by Iranian gunboats and from the Reshadat oil
platform on 8 October 1987, with the ICJ finding no evidence that Iran had specifically targeted
US shipping or helicopters from these platforms.108

Based on the above findings, the ICJ reached an extremely restrictive conclusion, holding that
‘Even taken cumulatively, and reserving, as already noted, the question of Iranian
responsibility, these incidents do not seem to the Court to constitute an armed attack on the
United States, of the kind that the Court, in [Nicaragua (1986)], qualified as a “most grave”
form of the use of force’.109

The second significant incident argued (again unsuccessfully) by the US to constitute an armed
attack by Iran occurred on 14 April 1988 - when the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine in
international waters near Bahrain while returning from an escort mission as part of Operation
Earnest Will.110 On account of intelligence gained through its own sources, and also through
Belgian and Dutch mine-clearing forces in the Persian Gulf at the same time, the US regarded
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Iran as responsible for laying these mines in an effort to target neutral shipping.111 In response,
four days later on 18 April 1988, the US Navy launched Operation Praying Mantis, during
which it attacked and destroyed simultaneously the Nasr and Salman oil platforms. The United
States reported its actions to the Security Council, arguing these strikes were justified as an
exercise of its Article 51 self-defence rights112 – as it regarded these platforms as being used
by Iran to collect and report intelligence about passing US vessels, act as a military
communications link, and serve as staging bases from which to launch helicopter and small
boat attacks on neutral commercial shipping.113 However Iran similarly denied responsibility
for laying the mines that struck the USS Samuel B Roberts, asserting these mines were laid by
Iraq.114 Whilst acknowledging the presence of military forces on these oil platforms, Iran
insisted their purpose was purely defensive, and was justified by previous Iraqi attacks on its
oil production facilities.115

The ICJ concluded that since both Iran and Iraq as belligerents had engaged in mine laying
during the Tanker War, the US had failed to prove that US-flagged vessels had been specifically
targeted by Iran, noting evidence presented by the US that the mine which had struck the USS
Samuel B Roberts bore serial numbers matching those found aboard the Iran Ajr116 as being ‘
... highly suggestive but not conclusive’.117 It concluded the United States was not justified in
111
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attacking the Salman and Nasr platforms.118 Through reiterating its previous determinations
regarding necessity and proportionality in a State’s exercise of its self-defence rights in both
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion [1996]119 and
Nicaragua [1986]120 decision, the ICJ concluded that it was not satisfied that the USN’s strikes
against the oil platforms during Operation Praying Mantis were necessary to respond to armed
attacks by Iran.121 It also determined the US Navy’s strikes against the platforms were not
proportionate to the mine damage (without loss of life) sustained by the USS Samuel B
Roberts.122 Overall, the ICJ concluded the US strikes against the Iranian oil platforms
constituted acts of armed force not qualifying as acts of self-defence.123
Raab criticises this conclusion for its undue strictness, arguing that ‘ ... mine-laying in
international waters, even before it has resulted in injury or damage, may justify the exercise
of the right of self-defence. Mine-laying may be interpreted as the commencement of the
commission of an actual armed attack justifying self-defence or, alternatively, as amounting to
an imminent attack justifying the exercise of the right of anticipatory self-defence. It would
seem unduly strict to require a mine to hit a ship before protective measures can be taken’.124
He also notes that through the above reasoning, the ICJ implied (but did not explicitly state)
that an attack on a state’s merchant shipping could, in principle, be regarded as an armed attack
against that flag State125 - a proposition which he noted as well established under customary
international law. He also criticised the ICJ’s reasoning as not considering whether self-defence
rights apply if crews of merchant vessels are injured,126 and for adding a “mental element” to
the definition of armed attack (that is, an intention to attack the particular state injured) in its
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remarks in relation to the mining of the Bridgeton.127 He also criticised the ICJ’s failure to
analyse the rights of states to protect their nationals abroad under Article 51.128

The Oil Platforms [2003] decision has also been criticised for holding that in addition to
requiring the United States to show its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed
attack made on it, it also needed to ‘that the platforms were a legitimate military target open to
attack in the exercise of self-defence’.129 This passage has been criticised by legal scholars,
firstly for adding a third “legitimate military targets” criterion to necessity and proportionality,
which was not mentioned in Nicaragua [1986].130 It has also been criticised because whilst
reaffirming the Nicaragua [1986] necessity and proportionality tests, the ICJ restricted itself to
negative conclusions about the actions being faced by the United States as not amounting to
armed attacks, without any explanation of what level or kind of force, within the maritime
context, would constitute an armed attack.131

[8.3.3]

Palestinian Walls Advisory Opinion (2003)132

On 9 July 2004 the ICJ handed down its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in response to UNGA Resolution
10/14 on 8 December 2003.133 This Advisory Opinion was its first decision or advisory opinion
discussing Article 51 following the 9/11 attacks, and also considered (albeit very briefly) the
influence of Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 which were examined in [2.7]. After
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determining that Israel’s construction of the Palestinian Wall violated aspects of both
international humanitarian law international human rights law,134 the ICJ considered whether
there were any possible justifications for Israel’s actions in erecting the Wall. 135 In its
submission, Israel had argued that the original report of the UN Secretary General had been
one-sided, and had failed to acknowledge the effect of Resolutions 1368 and 1373.136 In
rejected Israel’s argument, the ICJ held (with what has been characterised as ‘surprising - and
perhaps disturbing – brevity’)137 that:
‘Article 51 of the Charter recognises the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the
case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that
the attacks against it are attributable to a foreign State. The Court also notes that Israel exercises
control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that as Israel itself states, the threat which it
regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that
territory. The situation is thus different from that contemplated by Resolutions 1368 (2001)
and 1373 (2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support
of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defence. Consequently, the Court concludes that
Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case’.138

However the ICJ did not further explain its reasoning for concluding that Article 51 and
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 are confined to threats originating from States. In their Separate
Opinions, Judges Higgins and Kooijmans were critical of the ICJ’s reasoning on this point. In
her separate opinion, Judge Higgins opined that ‘there is, with respect, nothing in the text of
Article 51 that thus stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is made
by a State’,139 and noted the majority’s conclusion appeared to have directly applied para [195]
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of the Nicaragua judgement to the facts before the ICJ.140 Furthermore, but less directly
relevant to the purposes of this Chapter,141 Judge Higgins was also critical of the majority’s
contention that because the threatened use of force which Israel sought to defend itself against
emanated from within an occupied territory, as opposed to a State, this would not constitute an
‘armed attack’.142 Similarly, in his Separate Opinion, Judge Kooijmans relevantly143 noted the
significance and focus of Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and their influence on interpreting Article
51, which he reasoned was not confined to threats emanating from within States – explaining
that:
‘Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) recognize the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence without making any reference to an armed attack by a State. The
Security Council called acts of international terrorism, without any further qualification, a
threat to international peace and security which authorizes it to act under Chapter VI1 of the
Charter. And it actually did so in resolution 1373 (2001) without ascribing these acts of
terrorism to a particular State. This is the completely new element in these resolutions. This
new element is not excluded by the terms of Article 51 since this conditions the exercise of the
inherent right of self-defence on a previous armed attack without saying that this armed attack
must come from another State even if this has been the generally accepted interpretation for
more than 50 years. The Court has regrettably by-passed this new element, the legal
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implications of which cannot as yet be assessed but which marks undeniably a new approach
to the concept of self-defence.’144 [Underlined in original]

Judge Kooijmans last sentence is particularly interesting because he recognises the significance
and focus of the post-9/11 counter terrorism Security Council Resolutions (analysed in [2.7]),
and because he recognises ‘a new approach to the concept of self-defence ... the legal
implications of which cannot yet be assessed’. As [8.4.2] shows, the 2004 UN High Level
Report has taken a similar ‘new approach to the concept of self-defence’. However Judge
Kooijmans overall agreed with the Court’s conclusion that Israel’s justification for constructing
the Wall on the grounds of self-defence against armed attacks under Article 51 (and therefore
also the application of Resolutions 1368 and 1373) ought to be rejected – as these related to
international terrorism – as opposed to terrorist acts emanating from within an occupied
territory.145
The ICJ also briefly considered, and rejected, Israel’s argument that a state of Necessity (which
[8.6] below examines) could preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall,146
before concluding that Israel could not rely upon either the right of self-defence or a state of
necessity to preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall – which it concluded was
contrary to international law.147
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[8.3.4]

DRC v Uganda (2005)

As at 1 October 2013, the most recent ICJ case on Article 51 is DRC v Uganda (2005).148 In
this case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) instituted ICJ proceedings against
Uganda for what it alleged were unlawful military incursions into its territory by Ugandan
military forces under Operation Safe Haven. The DRC argued that Uganda could not justify its
military actions as self-defence measures against armed attacks by cross-border armed bands
in the lawless and uncontrollable north-eastern part of its territory. 149
Rejecting Uganda’s liberal reading of Article 3(g) of the UNGA Definition, the ICJ determined
that through Operation Safe Haven Uganda was not acting in self-defence against armed
attacks, but in the protection of its ‘legitimate security interests’ – which the ICJ found did not
equate to an armed attack.150 The ICJ held the attacks by anti-Ugandan rebels did not originate
from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on behalf of the DRC for the purposes of
Article 3(g) of the UNGA Definition of Aggression.151 It concluded that ‘ ... the legal and
factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defence by Uganda against the DRC
were not present’ and that accordingly, the Court ‘… had no need to respond to the contentions
of the parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides
for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces’.152

Furthermore, the ICJ rejected a pre-emptive conception of armed attack (that is, a reaction to a
latent threat153), concluding with a very restrictive interpretation of Article 51, holding that it
‘… may justify a use of force in self-defence only within the strict confines there laid down. It
does not allow the use of force to protect perceived security interests beyond those parameters.
Other means are available to a concerned state, including, in particular, recourse to the Security
Council’.154 [Emphasis added]
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However following a similar reasoning process to his Separate Opinion in the Palestinian Walls
Advisory Opinion, in his Separate Opinion Judge Kooijmans criticised the ICJ’s restrictive,
state-centric view of Article 3(g) of the UNGA Definition which was applied in Nicaragua
(1986). In his view ‘ ... [the Nicaragua (1986)] threshold has been subject to increasingly severe
criticism ever since it was established in 1986. The Court thus has missed a chance to fine-tune
the position it took 20 years ago in spite of the explicit invitation by one of the Parties to do
so’.155 After reiterating the criticisms he previously expressed in his separate opinion in the
Palestinian Walls Advisory Opinion (2003), he concluded that ‘If the activities of armed bands
present on a State’s territory cannot be attributed to that State, the victim State is not the object
of an armed attack by it. But if the attacks by the irregulars would, because of their scale and
effects, have had to be classified as an armed attack had they been carried out by regular armed
forces, there is nothing in the language of [Article 51] that prevents the victim State from
exercising its inherent right of self-defence’.156 Judge Kooijmans’ reasoning in both the above
decision and the Palestinian Walls Advisory Opinion (2003) evidences a liberal view of the
ratione personae question on the meaning of “armed attack”, and also acknowledges the
influence of the post-9/11 counter terrorism Security Council Resolutions (analysed in [2.7])
in providing a contemporaneous expression that threats to international peace and security (and
therefore “armed attacks”) may emanate from non-state actors such as terrorist groups. As [8.4]
shows, post-9/11 State practice and the arguments of several international legal scholars lend
support to this liberal view.

[8.4]

[8.4.1]

POST 9/11 STATE PRACTICE REGARDING ARTICLE 51

Post-9/11 state practice and academic reactions

Following the 9/11 attacks, there have been several instances of States using force against nonstate actors under the justification of Article 51 – which have lead to varied assessments by
international legal scholars about the legality of self-defence measures against non-state
actors.157 These actions have included the US-led intervention into Afghanistan from October
2001 under Operation Enduring Freedom to neutralise the Taliban (which was understood to
155
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have provided support to the Al Qaeda movement)158 – with the underlying rationale behind
this intervention being expressed in the 2002 US National Security Strategy;159 Israel’s widelycriticised intervention into Syria in 2003 to counter attacks by Islamic Jihad;160 Israel’s
intervention into Southern Lebanon in 2006 to repel attacks by Hezbollah militants (which
attracted less international criticism than its 2003 intervention into Syria);161 and Turkish
military raids into northern Iraq to counter attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). 162
Given that these actions involved more “full scale” uses of military force against, and
interventions into, other States to counter threats of armed attacks from non-state actors – as
opposed to the “more limited” measures of interdicting of suspected terrorist vessels which are
the focus of this Study, these examples of state practice are only mentioned here to provide
context, and are not analysed in further detail.

Several of the international legal scholars whose writings were analysed in Chapter 7 have
expressed divergent views about the influence of that post-9/11 counter terrorism Security
Council Resolutions should have on interpretations of Article 5 – which generally “mirror”
their interpretations on the influence of these resolutions on interdiction powers under
UNCLOS that were noted in [7.3.3]. For instance, Guilfoyle (who as [7.3.3] noted adopts a
restrictive view of UNCLOS in relation to the legality of WMD interdictions), pointed out that
whilst characterizing the 9/11 attacks as a ‘threat to international peace and security’,
Resolution 1373 stopped short of specifically characterizing 9/11 as an ‘armed attack’ – thereby
lessening the extent to which States might take self-defence measures to defend against terrorist
threats under Article 51.163 By contrast Allen, who as [7.3.3] noted favors a liberal view of
UNCLOS in relation to the legality of WMD interdictions argues that through passing
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 which affirmed and re-affirmed that terrorism constitutes a serious
threat to international peace and security, the Security Council implicitly found that attacks by
non-state actors can trigger the right of self-defence under Article 51, and notes that no States
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objected to the passing of Resolutions 1368 and 1373.164 Similarly Schmitt points out that UN
Article 39 of the UN Charter165 ‘ … is similarly devoid of reference to State action when
charging the Security Council with responsibility for deciding on the measures to take in the
face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’, 166 with Ronzitti makes
similar conclusions.167 The next section explains how two significant post-9/11 UN reports
tend to implicitly follow a more liberal view of Article 51.

[8.4.2]

2004 UN High Level Report on Threats, Challenges and Changes168

In a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
commented that as a result of international divisions and paralysis developing within the
Security Council surrounding the Iraqi crisis, the UN had reached ‘a fork in the road’ in terms
of maintaining an international consensus on collective security for the twenty-first century.
Whilst acknowledging contemporary security threats confronting States from clandestine
groups, possibly involving the use of WMD, and also acknowledging arguments expressed in
some quarters that States have the right, under Article 51 to strike pre-emptively (unilaterally
or in ad hoc coalitions) against such threats before such weapons systems develop, he also
expressed concern that the unbridled uses of such force could lead to lawlessness at the
international level.169
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the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security’
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Michael Schmitt Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law (George C Marshall Center
Papers, No. 5 (2002), 26 - 27
167
Ronzitti, above n 153, 348 - 349
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United Nations A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Report of the Secretary-General High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change GA 59th session, Agenda Item 55 UN Doc A/59/565 (2 December 2004)
169
In his address the Secretary General commented that: [Article 51] prescribes that all States, if attacked, retain
the inherent right of self-defence. But until now it has been understood that when States go beyond that, and
decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique legitimacy
provided by the United Nations. Now, some say this understanding is no longer tenable, since an “armed attack”
with weapons of mass destruction could be launched at any time, without warning, or by a clandestine group.
Rather than wait for that to happen, they argue, States have the right and obligation to use force pre-emptively,
even on the territory of other States, and even while weapons systems that might be used to attack them are still
being developed. According to this argument, States are not obliged to wait until there is agreement in the Security
Council. Instead, they reserve the right to act unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalitions. This logic represents a
fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for
the last fifty-eight years. My concern is that, if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a
proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without credible justification: UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan Address to the General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2003 [Emphasis added]
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As a result, a High Level Panel of eminent persons was formed to assess contemporary threats
to international peace and security; to evaluate how existing international policies and
institutions had addressed those threats; and to make recommendations for better preparing the
UN’s collective security framework for the twenty-first century.170 In its report to the UN
General Assembly, the High Level Panel recognising that the international security
environment had expanded beyond states waging aggressive war;171 identified “six clusters” of
twenty-first century international security threats (including terrorism),172 and outlined
recommendations that should guide the international system in addressing these threats. 173
Part Three of the Panel’s report addressed the use of force in the maintenance of international
security. The Panel acknowledged the Caroline criteria (discussed above in [8.2.1]) as
regulating uses of force by States, noting that ‘a threatened State, according to long established
international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other
means would deflect it174 and the action is proportionate. The problem arises where the threat
in question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with
allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability’.175 [Emphasis in original] In
this last sentence the Panel acknowledges the frequently subjective judgements that are
involved in determining the lawfulness of uses of force in self-defence – which whilst
presumably being intended to apply to military strikes against, and interventions into, other
States, could arguably also encompass measures such as interdicting suspected terrorist-related
WMD shipments (and indeed other terrorist utilisations of vessels) that are examined within

http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sgeng030923.htm This passage was also noted in Ruys, above n 12,
327 – 328
170
UN General Assembly Fifty-ninth session Agenda item 55 A/59/565: Follow-up to the outcome of the
Millennium Summit, Note by the Secretary General 2 December 2004, 1 enclosing ‘A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’
171
United Nations A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Report of the Secretary-General High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change GA 59th session, Agenda Item 55 UN Doc A/59/565 (2 December 2004),
11
172
These security threats included economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and
environmental degradation; inter-State conflict; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized
crime.
173
The High Level Panel’s discussion of how terrorism ought to be countered focused more on the longer-term,
preventative approaches for states to adopt – for example addressing the root causes of terrorism, public education
and debate etc – and are therefore outside the scope of this Study
174
Here the High Level Panel was referring to the Caroline criterion of Necessity
175
United Nations A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Report of the Secretary-General High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change GA 59th session, Agenda Item 55 UN Doc A/59/565 (2 December 2004),
para 188
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this Study. The Panel went on to note (but without giving an indication of approving)
arguments in favour of States exercising their self-defence rights in an anticipatory manner
against non-imminent threats not just pre–emptively (against imminent or proximate threats)
but preventively176 (against a non–imminent or non-proximate threats),177 which again could
be relevant considerations in the interdiction of suspected terrorist-related WMD shipments on
the basis of Article 51. On this point, the Panel acknowledging international concerns about
the possibility of ‘nightmare scenarios’ of terrorist groups acquiring WMD,178 which the Panel
noted ‘ ... may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and
before a latent threat becomes imminent’.179 However the Panel emphasised the importance of
such measures only being undertaken as a last resort, and on the best available evidence of
capability and specific intent of would-be acquirers of WMD.180
The Panel concluded its analysis by enunciating five generalised criteria of legitimacy181 to
guide the Security Council’s future considerations182 when authorising uses of military force,
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This was the same categorisation as Ruys, above n 12, noted above in [6.2.2]
At [189], the Panel questioned (but only answered in an indirect manner) ‘Can a State, without going to the
Security Council, claim in these circumstances the right to act, in anticipatory self -defence, not just pre –
emptively (against an imminent or proximate threat) but preventively (against a non –imminent or non -proximate
one)? Those who say “yes” argue that the potential harm from some threats (e.g., terrorists armed with a nuclear
weapon) is so great that one simply cannot risk waiting until they become imminent, and that less harm may be
done (e.g., avoiding a nuclear exchange or radioactive fallout from a reactor destruction) by acting earlier’.
178
The following year on 21 March 2005, the UN’s In Larger Freedom Report noted similar concerns at para
[84], declaring that ‘We must act to ensure that catastrophic terrorism never becomes a reality. This will require
a new global strategy, which begins with Member States agreeing on a definition of terrorism and including it in
a comprehensive convention. It will also require all States to sign, ratify, implement and comply with
comprehensive conventions against organized crime and corruption. And it will require from them a commitment
to take urgent steps to prevent nuclear, chemical and biological weapons getting into the hands of terrorist groups.’
In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All Report of the Secretary-General
A/59/2005 UN General Assembly Fifty-ninth session Agenda items 45 and 55
179
At [194] the Panel noted: ‘In the world of the twenty -first century, the international community does have to
be concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible
States, and much more besides, which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively
and before a latent threat becomes imminent. The question is not whether such action can be taken: it can, by the
Security Council as the international community’s collective security voice, at any time it deems that there is a
threat to international peace and security. The Council may well need to be prepared to be much more proactive
on these issues, taking more decisive action earlier, than it has been in the past’.
180
At [195] the Panel noted ‘Questions of legality apart, there will be issues of prudence, or legitimacy, about
whether such preventive action should be taken: crucial among them is whether there is credible evidence of the
reality of the threat in question (taking into account both capability and specific intent) and whether the military
response is the only reasonable one in the circumstances’
181
United Nations A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility - Report of the Secretary-General High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change GA 59th session, Agenda Item 55 UN Doc A/59/565 (2 December 2004)
at [207]
182
The Panel Report at p. 53 noted that ‘the adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat, proper purpose,
last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences) will not produce agreed conclusions with push button predictability, but should significantly improve the chances of reaching international consensus on what
have been in recent years deeply divisive issues’.
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involving considerations of the seriousness of the threat;183 the proper purpose for the use of
force;184 whether the use of force was a last resort measure;185 whether the force was used in a
proportional manner;186 and whether the State using force balanced the consequences of such
actions.187 It is submitted that these five criteria of legitimacy, whilst contemplating more “full
scale” uses of force such as military strikes and interventions, nevertheless provide useful
principles for assessing the legality of the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels in
exceptional circumstances under Article 51. [8.5] applies these five criteria of legitimacy to
post-9/11 scholarly arguments about how the Caroline Principles should be applied in the
context of countering armed attacks by contemporary terrorist groups which are examined
below in [8.4.3].

[8.4.3] Scholarly opinions: Caroline principles in the post-9/11 counter-terrorism context

Before [8.5] draws together all of the above points in this Chapter to enunciate restrictive and
liberal views of Article 51 in enabling (or at the very least justifying) the interdiction of
suspected terrorist vessels, two leading international legal scholars have made some relevant
arguments about how the Caroline Principles of necessity and proportionality should be
understood in the context of countering contemporary post-9/11 terrorist threats. These
arguments provide further, more practical pointers than the five generalised criteria of
legitimacy noted in the 2004 High Level Panel Report, and acknowledge the potentially serious
threat of contemporary terrorism that was explained in Chapter 2.
Regarding the meaning of imminence188 in the contemporary terrorism context, Ronzitti opines
that: ‘In the past, the imminence of attack was much more visible because it consisted of the
mobilisation of armies, navies and air forces. Nowadays, terrorist movements operate
183

Which asks: Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to
justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other
large -scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently
apprehended?
184
Which asks: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in
question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved?
185
Which asks: Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable
grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed?
186
Which asks: Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to
meet the threat in question?
187
Which asks: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in
question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?
188
Whilst the Caroline Principles noted above in [8.2.1] use the terms ‘instant and overwhelming’, the High Level
Panel Report used the term ‘imminent’
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underground, ready to hit … not deterred by Nuclear Weapon States lawfully detaining nuclear
weapons’.189 Along similar lines Schmitt argues that armed attacks by terrorists will be
“imminent” when the potential victim state must immediately act to defend itself because a
potential aggressor has irrevocably committed itself to the attack, and that ‘in the context of
[contemporary] terrorism, this point may occur well before the planned attack due to the
difficulty of locating and tracking terrorists … [Imminence] is not measured by an objective
time differential between the act of self-defence and the attack it is meant to prevent, but instead
by the extent to which the self-defence occurred during the last “window of opportunity”.’190
[emphasis added] Schmitt’s ‘last window of opportunity’ concept provides a helpful practical
test addressing the ratione temporis question noted by Ruys in [8.2] for analysing the
“imminence” of terrorist threats involving vessels being utilised as a means of transporting
weaponry and people, and fundraising for terrorist purposes and also for countering the
offensive utilisation of vessels.

Regarding the first Caroline principle of necessity, Schmitt argues (similarly to the 2004 High
Level Panel Report, which reasoned that States should consider whether the use of force was a
last resort measure191) that ‘ ... necessity requires an absence of reasonable alternatives to the
use of force. In this context, then, the State may only act against the terrorists if classic law
enforcement reasonably appears unlikely to net those expected to conduct further attacks before
they do so ... there is no requirement for an expectation that law enforcement will fail; rather
the requirement is that success is not be expected to prove timely enough to head off a
continuation of the terrorist campaign’.192 [Emphasis added] Regarding proportionality, he
opined that: ‘ ... in the context of [contemporary] terrorism, the proportionality standard allows
only that degree of force necessary to fend off a terrorist attack and protect oneself from a
future continuation thereof. But the force necessary to achieve this purpose may far exceed that
employed in the [terrorist] attack. Terrorists often operate in loose networks from dispersed
locations, receiving logistic support in many ways intended to mask its nature. Further, they
may be fanatical devotees willing to die for their cause; this makes it extremely difficult to
meaningfully affect their cost-benefit calculations. Taking then on is a daunting task that
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Ronzitti, above n 153, 347
Schmitt, above n 166, 65
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Which asks: Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable
grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed?
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typically requires extremely aggressive measures’.193 As noted above, Schmitt’s remarks
recognise the demonstrated propensity of contemporary terrorist groups to perpetrate
significant casualty attacks, frequently through the use of suicide tactics

[8.5]

Restrictive and liberal views of ‘armed attack’ for interdicting suspected terrorist

vessels on the basis of self-defence

Situations where the jurisdictional gaps and uncertainties identified in Chapters 6 and 7 might
(in the absence of specific agreement with a suspected terrorist vessel’s flag State) leave a State
seeking to interdict suspected terrorist vessels with no other jurisdictional option than
exercising its ‘inherent’ self-defence rights recognised under Article 51, or alternatively on the
basis of Necessity which [8.6] examines. To recap, the jurisdictional gaps identified in Chapter
6 included the lack of specific powers for coastal states to interdict vessels suspected of being
about to be utilised as weapons or as floating bombs against other vessels outside the territorial
sea;194 as weapons or as floating bombs against offshore platforms outside of the territorial sea,
and outside of the 500 metre safety zones allowed under UNCLOS Article 60(5); 195 and as
“disruption tools” to interfere with submarine cables located outside the territorial sea.196
Chapter 7 identified several jurisdictional uncertainties197 regarding the powers of States to
interdict foreign vessels suspected of being utilised to enable the perpetration of subsequent
terrorist attacks on land through transporting WMD materiel,198 transporting conventional
weaponry, terrorist connected persons or as a means of terrorist financing.199
Drawing together the contending views about the meaning of ‘armed attack’ from the analysis
in [8.2] to [8.4], this section enunciates the grounds for “restrictive” and “liberal” views of
‘armed attack’ relating to the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels – similarly to the
“restrictive” and “liberal” views of UNCLOS articulated in Chapter 7. To add structure to the
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Schmitt, above n 166, 22
See [6.2.3.3]
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See [6.3.3]
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See [6.4.3.2]
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The term ‘jurisdictional uncertainties’ is used in preference to ‘jurisdictional gaps’ here because Chapter 7
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See [7.3.3]
194

351

enunciation of these views, it utilises the three ‘ratione’ considerations articulated by Ruys as
noted in [8.1].200
The first ratione personae question considers who may perpetrate ‘armed attacks’; and if nonState actors are involved, whether and to what extent their actions must be attributable to a
State. A restrictive view could hold firm to Article 3 of the “state-centric” 1974 UNGA
Definition of Aggression, Article 3(g) of which was cited with approval by the ICJ in
Nicaragua v United States (1986), the Palestinian Walls Advisory Opinion (2003) and DRC v
Uganda (2005), which emphasised that Article 51 was intended to justify armed attacks
emanating from States, as opposed to non-State actors. Relevantly, in Nicaragua v United
States (1986) the ICJ noted that the supply of arms or other support to hostile non-state actors
could not be equated with an ‘armed attack’ – which could therefore mean that interdictions of
vessels suspected of transporting weaponry or operatives to enable subsequent terrorist attacks
would not be justified on the grounds of self-defence. By contrast, a liberal view could take
account of more recent sources such as the post-9/11 counter terrorism Security Council
Resolutions (reviewed in [2.7]), the separate opinions of Judge Kooijmans in Palestinian Walls
(2003) and DRC v Uganda (2005), the 2004 High Level Report and post-9/11 scholarly
opinions to hold that ‘armed attacks’ might also be perpetrated or threatened by non-State
actors – and therefore justify the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels in exceptional
circumstances where the State otherwise lacked clear jurisdiction under UNCLOS to do so. 201

The second ratione materie criterion considers the materiality threshold that must be satisfied
for an ‘armed attack’. A restrictive view could strictly apply the criteria enunciated in
Nicaragua v United States (1986) in holding that whilst the sending of “armed bands” by sea
might constitute an ‘armed attack’ – providing such an attack was significant in its ‘scale and
effects’ (although the ICJ did not elaborate further on that test). A restrictive view could also
hold that the utilisation of vessels to provide arms, logistical or financial support to enable
subsequent terrorist attacks might constitute a ‘less grave’ use of force not amounting to an
‘armed attack’. Similarly the ICJ in Nicaragua v United States (1986) held that Article 51 did
As [8.2] noted these include firstly the ratione materiae (materiality threshold) of armed attacks, asking ‘what
acts count as armed attacks?’; secondly, the ratione temporis (temporal threshold) of armed attacks, asking ‘when
does an ‘armed attack’ occur, and at what point may States take measures to defend against such armed attacks?’;
and thirdly, the ratione personae of armed attacks, asking ‘who can perpetrate or threaten an armed attack?’ – in
particular, can non-state actors perpetrate armed attacks - and if so, must such acts be attributable to a State?
201
Natalie Klein Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea Oxford Monographs in International Law (Oxford
University Press, 2011), 308
200
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not justify uses of force by States to protect their ‘essential security interests’ which did not
constitute ‘armed attacks’.202 Oil Platforms (2003) also supports a very restrictive view of the
ratione materie criteria – adopting a very reactive concept of armed attack. As [8.3.2] noted,
this decision has been criticised for its addition of a mental element to the definition of armed
attack – that is, a specifically evidenced intention to target a specific targets of a State, and also
its imposition of a ‘legitimate military targets’ criterion. Additionally, the restrictive reasoning
in both Nicaragua [1986] and Oil Platforms found the laying of sea mines did not constitute
an ‘armed attack’. By contrast a liberal view of the ratione materiae criteria could place greater
weight on the post-9/11 international security context – particularly the post-9/11 counter
terrorism Security Council Resolutions reviewed in [2.7] rather than strictly applying the
criteria formulated in the ICJ decisions reviewed in [8.3]. Additionally, it could have regard to
five legitimacy criteria203 enunciated in the 2004 High Level Report regarding the use of force
in self-defence.
The third ratione temporis question considers when an ‘armed attack’ occurs, and following
from this, at what point States may take self-defence measures to counter armed attacks. A
restrictive view would most likely adopt a reactive or interceptive conception of self-defence
as explained in [8.2.2]. Although the temporal threshold question was not specifically tested in
the ICJ decisions reviewed in [8.3], a restrictive view could follow the very strict intent
thresholds set out in the Oil Platforms (2003) decision in limiting the circumstances in which
States might use force in self-defence. A restrictive view could also strictly follow the
reasoning in Nicaragua v United States (1986) that the supply of arms or other support to hostile
non-state actors by vessels could not amount to an ‘armed attack’ – in other words an armed
attack would not commence until the bombs were detonated or the weapons were fired. By
contrast, a liberal view could be supported by the post-9/11 counter terrorism Security Council
Resolutions noted in [2.7], which have confirmed the seriousness of the threat of contemporary
terrorism to international peace and security, and both obligated and invited states to take
various measures to counter contemporary terrorist threats. A liberal view of the ratione
temporis criterion could also be based on arguments that state practice against contemporary
terrorism supports self-defence measures being undertaken in an anticipatory manner.
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A conclusion which was also cited with approval in Oil Platforms (2003) and DRC v Uganda (2005)
As [8.4.2] noted, the five legitimacy criteria included of the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose for
the use of force; whether the use of force was a last resort measure; whether the force was used in a proportional
manner; and whether the State using force balanced the consequences of such actions.
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However this could be a tenuous argument – given international criticism of state practice noted
in [8.4.1] – which was in fact the main reason for the convening of the 2004 High Level Panel.
As [8.4.2] noted, whilst the High Level Panel acknowledged increasing state practice involving
anticipatory self-defence, it stopped short of specifically endorsing this doctrine. Relevantly,
in the case of Israel’s interdictions of the Santorini and Karin-A in 2001 and 2002 respectively
which as [7.3.1.1] noted were both conducted on the high seas, no international agreements
were specifically invoked by the Israeli authorities, leading to the inference that Israel’s rights
to self–defence under Article 51 would be the only applicable source of international law in
these situations. Several international legal scholars including Byers,204 Kwast,205 Fitzgerald206
and Klein207 have opined that Israel was justified in interdicting these vessels on the basis of
self-defence, and point out there were no reported international protests regarding Israel’s
actions.
In conclusion, the above analysis has shown that both restrictive and liberal views of ‘armed
attack’ under Article 51 may be formulated. Given the almost complete lack of warning of
attacks by contemporary terrorist groups, and their independence from state support (as noted
in Chapter 2), a restrictive view of ‘armed attack’ in the contemporary post-9/11 maritime
terrorism context would most likely significantly restrict the abilities of States to interdict
suspected terrorist vessels before attacks occurred. It would also most likely not allow States
to interdict laterally transiting vessels suspected of enabling the perpetration of subsequent
terrorist attacks on land, meaning that potentially serious terrorist attacks might take place on
land - with Chapter 7 noting the 1998 East African embassy bombings and the 2002 Bali
bombings as having been “enabled” through explosives transported by sea. By contrast, a
liberal view of ‘armed attack’ would allow the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels, as
well as vessels suspected of enabling the perpetration of subsequent terrorist attacks. However
States seeking to interdict suspected terrorist vessels on the basis of their Article 51 selfdefence would need to carefully weigh up the political consequences of doing so – with Chapter
7 noting North Korean radio broadcasts warning that any interferences with its vessels would
be considered an act of war. For these reasons, it is submitted that resort to Article 51 to justify
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the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels should be an absolute last resort, as it could well
lead to conflict and possibly retaliatory actions from the flag States of interdicted vessels.

[8.6]

INTERDICTING SUSPECTED TERRORIST VESSELS ON THE BASIS OF

NECESSITY

An alternative basis upon which a State might justify the interdiction of suspected terrorist
vessels is the doctrine of Necessity, which has been acknowledged in Article 25 of the
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts.208 Article 25 provides that an otherwise unlawful act of a State can be justified
if the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave
and imminent peril; and the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards
which the obligation existed. 209 Kaye explains that the identical predecessor of Article 25,
Article 33 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,210 was cited with approval by the ICJ
in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case,211 and was also acknowledged (but not applied) by
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in M/V Saiga (No. 2).212

Kaye explains that Necessity has previously been invoked by States to justify environmental
protection measures that would otherwise have been contrary to international law. Examples
of such actions include Russia’s closure of its offshore sealing grounds in 1893, Britain’s 1967
bombing of the stricken Liberian-flagged Torrey Canyon whilst she was foundering on the high
seas in order to protect the coast of Cornwall from pollution (with no States protesting against
this action), and Canada’s arrest of the European Estai fishing vessel during the ‘Turbot War’
fisheries dispute in 1995.213 He opines that the interdiction of vessels suspected of being about
Kaye, above n 2 377 at 416 – 418 See also James Crawford The International Law Commission’s Articles on
State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002), 179 – 180
209
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
UN Doc A/56/10 (2001), http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/drafl/o20articles/9 6_2001 .pdf .
Cited in Kaye, above n 2, 416
210
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 33, UN Doc
CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (part 2) (1996)
211
Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),
Judgment, 1997 ICJ Reports, para 51 and 52
212
M/V “Saiga” (No 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) ITLOS Case No 2; (1999) 38 ILM 1323,
paras 133 - 139
213
Kaye explains that Canada sought to invoke a similar justification for its arrest of the Spanish vessel Estai on
the basis that it faced an environmental crisis from the collapse of the Newfoundland cod fisheries that were being
exacerbated by the actions of Spanish and Portuguese fishing vessels; however the ICJ found it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 1998 ICJ Reports 431: Kaye, above n 2,
417
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to perpetrate or facilitate an attack against offshore platforms where the “interdicting” State
otherwise lacked jurisdiction (for example, outside the limits of the 500 metre safety zones
allowed under UNCLOS Article 60(5) (which [6.3.3] examined) would be a valid use of the
doctrine of Necessity – due to the grave consequences of environmental harm that could follow
from such an attack.214 He also opines that Necessity could be invoked by coastal States seeking
to interdict vessels suspected of being about to cause deliberate damage to submarine cables
located outside the limits of the territorial sea215 - with [6.4.3.2] explaining the inadequacies of
UNCLOS in enabling States to protect submarine cables outside the territorial sea from terrorist
interference.

Whilst it has been noted that Necessity might be invoked to justify the interdiction of suspected
illicit shipments of WMD materiel where a State otherwise lacked a jurisdictional basis under
UNCLOS,216 (see the analysis in [7.3.3]) Kaye notes that Necessity has not been invoked by
PSI participants as a basis for interdicting suspected illicit shipments of WMD materiel for
fears that doing so would acknowledge such interdictions as being an ‘otherwise unlawful
act’.217

[8.7]

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explained that defining what constitutes an ‘armed attack’, and the measures
States may permissibly take to defend against armed attacks, is very challenging and will most
likely always be disputed. However through applying the three ‘ratione’ criteria enunciated by
Ruys, following a historically progressive analysis of the ICJ jurisprudence on the meaning of
‘armed attack’, this chapter enunciated “restrictive” and “liberal” views of ‘armed attack’
within the post-9/11 maritime terrorism context. Significantly, through this analysis this
chapter undertook the first detailed review of how Article 51 might justify interdictions of
suspected terrorist vessels. Whilst the chapter concluded a liberal view would better enable
States to interdict suspected terrorist vessels, it reasoned that recourse to Article 51 should be
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an absolute last resort measure, with concomitant political risks of retaliation from other States
to consider. The chapter also considered the alternative, albeit less well-developed, basis for
interdicting suspected terrorist vessels under the doctrine of Necessity – noting whilst this could
justify measures to protect maritime infrastructure such as offshore platforms and submarine
cables from attack, it has not been favoured as a basis to justify the interdiction of vessels
suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel for terrorist purposes.

The next concluding Chapter 9 argues in favour of formalising more specific agreements
between States (including through greater ratification of the 2005 SUA Convention), and for
refinements (through IMO guidance) to the protective powers of States under UNCLOS to
reduce the scope for States to need to have recourse to self-defence or Necessity in order to
justify the interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels.218
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS

[9.1]

INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarises the significance of this Study and its principal findings in addressing
the research question noted in [1.2.2]: “To what extent are the international agreements noted
at [1.1] likely to be successful in enabling the prevention of contemporary forms of maritime
terrorism?”. It then outlines proposals for refining the international legal framework (that is,
ensuring the existing instruments are best utilised in order to prevent maritime terrorism
incidents from occurring), and recommends areas for further research based on the approaches
and findings of this Study.1

[9.2]

SIGNIFICANCE AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Chapter 1 explained that although since 9/11 discrete aspects of the threat of contemporary
terrorism in the maritime domain, and the range of international agreements that are applicable
to countering it, have been studied to varying degrees, this Study has been the first to undertake
an overall assessment of the extent to which the international agreements are likely to succeed
in enabling the prevention of contemporary post-9/11 maritime terrorism incidents.

Chapter 2 explained that because maritime terrorism has accounted for only two per cent all
of recorded terrorist attacks since 1968, it is important to understand maritime terrorism in its
broader global context. From the basis of Rapaport’s Four Waves theory, it formulated the
generalised distinguishing terms “contemporary terrorism” and “pre-contemporary terrorism”
to distinguish the dominant forms of terrorism that have been perpetrated by both Al Qaedainfluenced groups, and groups such as the LTTE over the last two decades from older, more
restrained forms of terrorism. It demonstrated how contemporary terrorism has been
characterised by the perpetration of infrequent yet very deadly mass-casualty attacks,
frequently involving the suicides of the attackers. It also explained that such forms of terrorism
This chapter addresses the fifth and final of the research sub-questions noted at [1.2.2], namely ‘(5) Going
forward, what should be done to maximise the prospects for the international agreements being successful in
preventing contemporary post-9/11 maritime terrorism incidents?’
1
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contrast to the “more constrained” and negotiable hostage takings of attacks by precontemporary terrorist groups (which Chapter 2 termed the ‘operational profile’). Chapter 2
also noted how terrorist attacks over the last two decades have been perpetrated by fanaticallydriven, transnational, increasingly independent and home-grown groups (which Chapter 2
termed the ‘organisational profile’). It concluded that contemporary forms of terrorism are
likely to remain a significant international security challenge for many years to come and are
not able to be “defeated” in traditional military terms. Lastly it showed how recognition of the
seriousness and extensiveness of contemporary terrorism has influenced a paradigm shift in
post-9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council resolutions, through imposing of counterterrorism obligations on States that have been neither geographically nor temporally
constrained.

Chapter 3 explained how maritime attacks by contemporary terrorist groups over the last two
decades have involved significant casualty and suicide attacks – reflecting the global trend
articulated in Chapter 2. It reasoned that the disruptive consequences following from a
significant maritime terrorism incident2 could be very profound, and argued the importance of
preventing attacks from occurring in the first instance, rather than responding after the event.
It articulated the coverage and acceptance criteria for assessing the prospects for the
international agreements to prevent maritime terrorism threats. Most significantly, Chapter 3
developed the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix to provide the most structured general
framework to date for statistically analysing all of the ways in which contemporary maritime
terrorism incidents could conceivably occur. As [9.4] explains, the Threat Matrix provides the
foundations for a structured database on maritime terrorism that can be regularly updated over
future years. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 showed the practical application of the Threat Matrix, and
how it “captures” all of the maritime terrorism scenarios that have been postulated by maritime
security specialists – thereby demonstrating that it is the most comprehensive framework
developed to date. Through providing a basis for considering how maritime terrorism incidents
have previously occurred, and might occur in the future, the Threat Matrix provided the most
well-informed basis for analysing how the international agreements might apply in practice in
preventing maritime terrorism incidents.

As [1.2] explained, this Study used the “umbrella” term ‘maritime terrorism incident’ to encompass both
maritime terrorist attacks, and the utilisation of vessels to enable the perpetration of subsequent terrorist attacks
through transporting weaponry, operatives or financing terrorist activities
2
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Chapter 4 explained how the ISPS Code and other SOLAS Chapter XI maritime security
measures have developed a framework for consistently managing maritime security risks by
States, and within maritime industries. Significantly, it undertook the first major review of how
the recognised limitations of the ISPS Code have been addressed within the IMO since its entry
into force in July 2004. It highlighted the preference amongst contracting governments to
address these limitations through the development of voluntary guidance rather than extending
the mandatory application of the ISPS Code. It also explained that it is impossible to make an
overall assessment the extent to which ISPS Code security measures have become accepted
and ingrained internationally, due to unreliability of information provided by contracting
governments to the IMO, and the confidential nature of ISPS Code security arrangements and
compliance levels. Instead, the chapter identified the factors that could influence the likelihood
of “best case” and “worst case” scenarios of ISPS Code security measures lessening the scope
for the occurrence of maritime terrorism incidents. These factors were applied against the threat
contexts in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 consider how the ISPS Code might apply in practice. Chapter
4 also concluded that there are both strengths and inevitable shortcomings of AIS in the
maritime security context, and also undertook the first in-depth examination of how LRIT
arrangements have functioned internationally since progressively becoming operational from
early 2011 onwards. It showed that audits by the LRIT Coordinator indicate LRIT systems
function according to requirements, and that LRIT information has proven valuable to naval
force commanders in protecting commercial shipping from pirate attacks around the Gulf of
Aden. However it also noted that unanswered questions remain regarding the actions States
might permissibly take based on LRIT information. Lastly it explained that whilst ratifications
of the 2003 SID Convention have been slow, it has encouragingly has been ratified by
significant “seafarer supplying” states - thereby potentially minimising the scope for terrorists
and criminals to freely move under the guise of fraudulent seafarer identity documentation.3

Chapter 5 demonstrated the increased lethality of attacks on vessels by contemporary terrorist
groups compared to attacks by pre-contemporary terrorist groups. It also showed that large
vessels (which would be more likely to be subject to the ISPS Code) have been the targets of
most recorded terrorist attacks. Through exploring “best case” and “worst case” scenarios of
how the ISPS Code (and AIS in relation to vessel-based attacks) might apply, it highlighted the

However – Chapter 7 reasoned the 2003 SID Convention would be less relevant to situations where terrorists
were inserted clandestinely by small vessels – as opposed to entering States through seaports
3
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importance of contracting governments, ships and port facilities continuously applying ISPS
Code security measures in a rigorous manner. It reasoned that terrorist attacks from within
vessels are the most “preventable” through rigorously-implemented security measures. It also
explained that since around 2005, vessel-based attacks on high profile vessels by pirates around
the Gulf of Aden have assumed greater prominence over maritime terrorist attacks. Through
showing how the combination of various preventative security measures have been
demonstrably effective in countering vessel-based attacks by economically-motivated pirates,
it reasoned there are both positive and negative inferences that may be drawn from this
demonstrated effectiveness for countering maritime terrorist attacks. It concluded by arguing
that pirate and terrorist targeting of vessels should not be “conflated”, as the two are very
distinct phenomena, and emphasised the importance of vigilance and continued rigorous
implementation of ISPS Code security measures by large high profile vessels that might be
potential targets of terrorist attacks.

Chapter 6 showed that aside from the 23 recorded uses by insurgent groups around the Gulf
of Guinea of vessels as “weapons-launching platforms” for attacks on offshore platforms, the
majority of the small number of instances of terrorists utilising vessels to perpetrate dangerous
acts have involved contemporary terrorist groups. It also reasoned that whilst several of the
offensive utilisations have thus far only been planned and postulated (rather than having been
actually perpetrated or attempted), it is still important to consider (and plan against) such
scenarios. The chapter highlighted several jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS relating to the
powers of States to protect submarine cables and offshore platforms from terrorist attacks, and
to control dangerous activities by vessels outside territorial seas. It also explained the
consequences of the current low ratification levels of the 2005 SUA treaties, which it noted
have significantly improved the abilities of States to interdict suspected terrorist vessels.

Chapter 7 explained how the WMD interdiction measures alluded to in the PSI Interdiction
Principles (whilst not a formal international agreement, but rather a non-binding, political
expression of how “participants” might consider exercising their jurisdictional rights and
obligations under UNCLOS) have prompted debate about the powers of States under UNCLOS
to interdict laterally-transiting vessels suspected of illicitly transporting WMD materiel.
Significantly, from its analysis of this debate, this Study was the first to specifically articulate
the contending “restrictive” and “liberal” views on the legality of WMD interdictions under
UNCLOS made by international legal scholars, which diverged on reasoning about the
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implications of post-9/11 counter terrorism Security Council resolutions. It was also the first
to apply these contending “restrictive” and “liberal” views to assessing the legality of
interdicting the three “other than WMD trafficking” utilisations of vessels to enable subsequent
terrorist attacks on land through transporting conventional weaponry, terrorist-connected
persons and financing terrorist activities. Chapter 7 showed that although these utilisations and
interdictions of vessels have not been subject to the same amount of scholarly analysis as WMD
trafficking, they have occurred more times – with several significant terrorist attacks having
been “enabled” through weaponry and operatives transported by sea. It also noted several cases
where vessels suspected of transporting conventional weaponry for terrorist purposes have
been interdicted on the high seas – without international protest. It reasoned the liberal view of
UNCLOS better enables States to interdict laterally transiting vessels, with this conclusion
supporting the calls by scholars such as Klein on the need for greater flexibility in
understanding the law of the sea.4 However overall Chapter 7 argued that specific international
agreements should be further developed between States to facilitate interdictions of vessels,
and reduce the scope for disagreements and conflict. It showed that whilst objectively defining
key terms and detailing interdiction procedures with appropriate safeguards, the 2005 SUA
Convention is currently less than adequate due to its current low level of 21 ratifications. It also
explained how it is difficult to assess international “support” for the PSI, even though several
formal bilateral ship boarding agreements have been concluded between the United States and
key registry states. Chapter 7 also reasoned that the scope for vessels to be utilised to enable
subsequent terrorist attacks on land can be reduced through rigorously-applied “preventative”
SOLAS maritime security measures, and applied the “best case / worst case” scenario analysis
articulated in Chapter 4.

Chapter 8 examined the extent to which in exceptional circumstances (due to the jurisdictional
gaps and uncertainties articulated in Chapters 6 and 7) States might, in the absence of specific
agreement with the suspected terrorist vessel’s flag State, interdict suspected vessels on the
basis of their ‘inherent’ right of self-defence recognised under Article 51 of the UN Charter, or
alternatively the doctrine of Necessity. It explained that since 9/11 there has been increased
(although not universal) acknowledgement of Article 51 applying to non-state actors such as
terrorists. It explained the challenges of defining what constitutes an ‘armed attack’ and the

4

Natalie Klein Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea Oxford Monographs in International Law (Oxford
University Press, 2011)
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measures States may permissibly take to defend against armed attacks. Through a historically
progressive review of academic analyses, ICJ judgments, UN reports and State practice, it
enunciated “restrictive” and “liberal” views of ‘armed attack’ around the three key questions
posed by Ruys. These questions were by whom can an armed attack be perpetrated?; what
materiality threshold must be satisfied; and when does an armed attack occur? It explained
that a “restrictive” view might be supported by the majority of the relevant ICJ cases, and that
a liberal view might be supported by minority ICJ jurisprudence, post-9/11 state practice and
(by inference) the 2004 High Level Panel Report. Whilst it reasoned a liberal view would better
enable States to interdict suspected terrorist vessels, recourse to self-defence rights under
Article 51 should be an absolute last resort measure. It also reasoned that whilst the doctrine of
Necessity might arguably justify the interdiction of vessels suspected of being about to be
utilised to attack offshore platforms or submarine cables, it has been concluded to be less likely
to be invoked to justify the interdiction of suspected illicit shipments of WMD materiel.

[9.3]

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFINING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING MARITIME TERRORISM

Whilst this Study concluded overall that the international legal framework enabling the
prevention of maritime terrorism threats has been significantly improved in the years following
9/1, it also identified several jurisdictional gaps and uncertainties under UNCLOS, and several
concerns regarding the extent to which ISPS Code security measures have become accepted
and ingrained internationally.

It also identified the factors likely to influence the prospects for the international agreements
to succeed in preventing maritime terrorism incidents. Whilst the Study does not advocate
sweeping reforms such as expanding the scope of the ISPS Code (with contracting governments
preferring to address the ISPS Code’s limitations through non-mandatory guidance) nor the
formulation of new international agreements, it argues for continual refinement to ensure the
best utilisation of the current international agreements. As outlined in [9.3.1] below, it argues
first for preventative security measures to lessen the scope for maritime terrorism incidents to
occur, then for cooperation (through greater formalisation of agreements between States), and
lastly if those measures do not succeed in preventing the occurrence of maritime terrorism
incidents, for flexible interpretation of UNCLOS, and (as a last resort) Article 51 of the UN
Charter or the doctrine of Necessity in exceptional cases.

363

[9.3.1] Recommendations to refine preventative security arrangements
Chapter 4 reasoned that a “best case” scenario of the ISPS Code lessening the scope for
maritime terrorism incidents would be more likely when these measures are rigorously
implemented by all entities – that is, contracting governments, shipping companies, operators
of port facilities and most importantly, personnel aboard individual ships. Chapters 5, 6 and 7
also reasoned that rigorously implemented preventative security measures could significantly
lessen the scope for maritime terrorism incidents to occur. Chapter 4 also explained how the
IMO has facilitated the development of extensive guidance for contracting governments,
shipping companies and operators of port facilities to implement the ISPS Code both around
the time of its entry into force, and since that time. It is recommended the IMO should continue
to facilitate the provision of this guidance to ensure that knowledge about maritime security
best practice is shared internationally.

[4.2.6] noted concerns regarding delays in the reporting of updates and changes to maritime
security arrangements to the IMO by contracting governments; and it is recommended that the
IMO should continue to assist and encourage contracting governments to report updates to such
information in a timely manner. Chapter 4 also noted slow responses by contracting
governments to invitations to respond to voluntary questionnaires about maritime security
arrangements – which calls into question the extent to which SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the
ISPS Code have been taken seriously amongst contracting governments and within maritime
industries. Additionally, while the IMO has emphasised that it does not have an auditing role
in assessing compliance with the requirements of the ISPS Code, it is suggested that there could
be a role for the IMO in evaluating best practice in relation to maritime security arrangements
by SOLAS contracting governments.

In relation to criticisms of the limited application of the ISPS Code to large vessels engaged in
international voyages, Chapter 4 noted the preference expressed by contracting governments
during IMO proceedings to pursue “sub-SOLAS” vessel security arrangements through the
development of voluntary guidance, rather than “extending downwards” the mandatory
application of the ISPS Code. It also noted that several SOLAS contracting governments
including the United States, the United Kingdom and Singapore have contributed information
about their security arrangements for smaller vessels for the information of other contracting
governments, and that the IMO has promulgated guidance to contracting governments. Given
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that Chapter 5 found the majority of vessels that have been targeted by terrorists have been
larger vessels more likely to (since 2004) be subject to the mandatory application of the ISPS
Code, it is recommended that the IMO should continue to formulate voluntary guidance on
“sub-SOLAS” vessel security for promulgation to contracting governments, rather than
“extending downwards” the mandatory application of the ISPS Code internationally.

Chapter 4 explained that since 2004 the IMO has worked cooperatively with the World
Customs Organisation (WCO) to improve supply chain security arrangements beyond the
ship/port interface. The IMO has affirmed the primacy of the WCO over supply chain security,
with the IMO confining its role to issues specifically involving the ship-port interface. As
contracting governments have favoured this approach continuing, rather than expanding the
mandatory scope of the ISPS Code beyond the ‘ship-port interface’, it is recommended that the
IMO should continue its current approach of working cooperatively with the WCO to formulate
voluntary guidance relating to supply chain security.
Chapter 4 noted the paucity of IMO guidance relating to the security of offshore platforms –
both in terms of preventative security measures, and the promulgation of safety zones greater
than 500 metres for offshore platforms located outside the territorial sea (discussed in [9.3.2]
below). Although Chapter 6 noted attacks on offshore platforms have thus far been limited to
attacks by MEND and other insurgent groups around the Gulf of Guinea, and to the two closely
coordinated suicide attacks on the Iraqi offshore platforms in 2004, it is submitted that there is
scope for the IMO to facilitate more detailed guidance on preventative security measures for
offshore platforms similar to that developed for contracting governments, shipping companies
and operators of port facilities. Whilst the future concept of an ‘International Offshore
Petroleum Facilities Security’ (IOPFS) Code has been suggested, 5 taking into account the
preference amongst SOLAS contracting governments for voluntary guidance rather than
extending the mandatory application of the ISPS Code (or indeed developing new Codes), it is
recommended that a similar approach should be followed in relation to preventative security
measures for offshore platforms.

5

Mikhail Kashubsky Offshore Petroleum Security: Analysis of Offshore Security Threats, Target Attractiveness,
and the International Legal Framework for the Protection and Security of Offshore Petroleum Installations (PhD
thesis, University of Wollongong, 2011), 334
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Chapter 4 noted scope for uncertainty regarding the arrangements amongst contracting
governments for responding to activations of SSAS alerts. It also noted that the IMO has thus
far focused on issues relating to the technical functioning of SSAS systems. Although Chapter
5 showed SSAS systems have been demonstrably successful in alerting coalition naval forces
about ships under threat of pirate attack around the Gulf of Aden since 2005, it is submitted
there is scope for the IMO to facilitate discussion amongst contracting governments to improve
coordination between contracting governments in responding to activations of SSAS alerts.

Lastly, in terms of vessel identification and tracking measures, Chapter 4 noted concerns about
unauthorised access to AIS information. It is submitted there is scope for the IMO to encourage
contracting governments to place more stringent controls regarding unauthorised access to AIS
information; and to criminalise the publication of AIS data on the internet. Chapter 4 found
that LRIT arrangements now function effectively as required, so no refinement suggestions are
proffered. Finally it is recommended that the 2003 SID Convention should be ratified more
widely, as this would lessen the scope for terrorists and criminals to travel internationally under
false seafarer identification.

[9.3.2] Recommendations for refining arrangements for interdicting suspected terrorist
vessels

Chapter 6 highlighted three key jurisdictional gaps under UNCLOS. First, it noted that
UNCLOS does not directly address the powers of coastal States to intervene to prevent
dangerous actions by foreign-flagged vessels outside of territorial seas. In first preference for
addressing this, it is recommended that greater ratification of the 2005 SUA Convention which comprehensively addresses the interdiction of vessels suspected of being about to be
used in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage’6 – would add greater certainty
to the abilities of States to interdict offensive utilisations of vessels by terrorists. As a secondary
option, greater discussion about the intervention powers of coastal States under UNCLOS
Article 56(1)(b)(iii), which enables coastal states to ‘preserve and protect’ the marine
environments of their EEZs, could also reduce the scope for uncertainty regarding the powers
of coastal States to interdict vessels suspected of being about to engage in acts that could result

6

2005 SUA Convention Article 3bis(a)(iii)
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in significant pollution – including the offensive utilisations of vessels by terrorists examined
in Chapter 6.

Second, Chapter 6 reasoned that the 500 metre safety zones around offshore platforms within
EEZs and outside of territorial seas would be inadequate to protect offshore platforms from
terrorist attacks. Noting that contracting governments have generally been reluctant to extend
the breadth of such safety zones beyond 500 metres, it is recommended that the IMO should
develop guidance for coastal States to declare and enforce 3,000 metre ‘security warning zones’
around offshore platforms when circumstances require, as Chapter 6 noted Kaye and
Kashubsky suggesting.7 Third, Chapter 6 noted the limitations of UNCLOS in specifically
authorising coastal States to protect submarine cables from terrorist interference outside the
territorial sea. It is recommended that the IMO should facilitate further guidance for States in
protecting submarine cables similarly to the protection of offshore platforms that [9.3.1] argued
for.

Chapter 7 highlighted several jurisdictional uncertainties under the vaguely-worded UNCLOS
provisions regarding the powers of States (without specific agreement with the suspected
terrorist vessel’s flag state) to interdict vessels suspected of being utilised to enable subsequent
terrorist attacks on land. As noted above, Chapter 7 of this Study was the first to articulate the
scope for varying interpretations of States’ interdiction powers under UNCLOS – which were
termed the restrictive and liberal views of UNCLOS.

In order of preference, this Study argues firstly for wider ratification of the 2005 SUA
Convention. As [6.2.5] and [7.2.9] explained, the 2005 SUA Convention objectively defines
key terms and details interdiction procedures with appropriate safeguards – thereby
significantly decreasing the scope for disagreements between States. In second preference, it is
recommended that more bilateral ship-boarding agreements similar to those formalised
between the United States and key registry states should be developed, with Chapter 7 noting

If UNCLOS Article 60(5) were to be amended – it could reflect the wording of Article 41(2) ‘Sea lanes and
traffic separation schemes in straits used for international navigation’ which provides that ‘Such States may, when
circumstances require, and after giving due publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation
schemes for any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed by them; and Article
53(7) Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage , which provides that ‘An archipelagic State may, when
circumstances require, after giving due publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes
for any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed by it’.
7
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that the development of further such agreements has been contemplated by the United
Kingdom. In third preference, it is recommended that consideration be given to the calls from
several

international

legal

scholars

(and

more

recently,

President

Obama)

for

institutionalisation of the PSI to increase its transparency and hence legitimacy (although this
would require a very fine balancing of transparency and the protection of sensitive national
security information about previous WMD interdictions.

In fourth preference, it is suggested that support for the liberal view of UNCLOS articulated in
[7.2.5.1] could be further developed to provide further legitimacy to interdictions of suspected
illicit shipments of WMD materiel. Whilst amending UNCLOS is widely viewed as unlikely
to ever succeed,8 a more achievable solution for developing support for the liberal view could
involve updating the 1989 USA-USSR Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law
Governing Innocent Passage9 - which [7.2.5.1] noted is widely regarded as an authoritative
statement on the interpretation of UNCLOS Article 19. A possible amendment (with the
suggested amendment underlined) might read:
‘3. Article 19 of the Convention of 1982 sets out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of activities
that would render passage not innocent - with the reference to ‘violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’10 including activities declared
to be a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter of the United
Nations’. A ship passing through the territorial sea that does not engage in any of those
activities is in innocent passage.’

This amendment would give greater support to the liberal view of UNCLOS through
confirming the influence of post-9/11 counter-terrorism Security Council resolutions11 on
interpretations of UNCLOS as discussed in [7.2] and [7.3].

See for example David Freestone and Alex Oude Elferink ‘Flexibility and Innovation in the Law of the Sea –
Will the LOS Amendment Procedures Ever be Used?’ in Alex Oude Elferink (ed) Stability and Change in the
Law of the Sea Convention (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), 169
9
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-US: Joint Statement with Attached Uniform Interpretation of Rules of
International Law Governing Innocent Passage (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-US) (signed at Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, 23 September 1989) 28 ILM 1444
10
As [7.2] discussed, this terminology is used in both UNCLOS Article 19(2)(a) relating to the innocent passage
of foreign vessels through the territorial sea, and UNCLOS Article 39(1)(b) relating to transit passage of foreign
vessels through straits used for international navigation
11
Particularly Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1540 and 1390 which were discussed in Chapter 7
8
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As noted above, resort to self-defence rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify the
interdiction of suspected terrorist vessels should be limited to being an absolute last resort
measure, but one which should not be disregarded given the current low ratifications of the
2005 SUA treaties and the jurisdictional gaps and uncertainties under UNCLOS. Given that an
ICJ judgment or advisory opinion on the legality of interdicting suspected terrorist vessels is
unlikely in the foreseeable future, it is recommended that further scholarly dialogue regarding
the meaning of ‘armed attack’ in the maritime terrorism context could assist in more fully
exploring these issues. Indeed as [9.4] reasons, continued scholarly dialogue should help to
keep maritime terrorism “on the radar” of maritime industry and policy agendas – given both
the more immediate contemporary threat of piracy around the Gulf of Aden, and the increasing
passage of time since the 9/11 attacks.

[9.4]

DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

It is hoped the findings of this Study will stimulate a range of further studies. In the field of
terrorism and counter terrorism studies, this Study could stimulate discussion about the
concepts of contemporary and pre-contemporary terrorism as the best descriptive delineators
between terrorism past and present – with [2.4] explaining the considerable debate on these
points. Furthermore, the Successful, Attempted, Planned and Postulated (“SAPP”) approach to
recording and analysing maritime terrorism statistics could also be applied to the analysis of
terrorism statistics more broadly, and will be useful for scholars and commentators. Historical
studies could research further the details of older maritime terrorist attacks and add greater
specificity as to how they occurred.

It is intended for the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix to be developed into an accessible
database that can be updated periodically according to new successful, attempted, planned and
postulated instances of maritime terrorism incidents. The Threat Matrix will enable scholars
(from both the terrorism, international security and strategic studies disciplines; and from
international maritime law disciplines), policy makers, international organisations such as the
IMO, operators of ships, maritime industry organisations, insurers, security companies, law
enforcement agencies and militaries to discuss and analyse maritime terrorism threats with the
benefit of the structured and statistically-informed framework it develops. Similarly to, but
extending upon, the widely-cited actual and attempted piracy statistics contained in the yearly
ICC/IMB Annual Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, the Threat Matrix
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provides a useful framework for analysing politically or ideologically-motivated acts of
maritime violence, with the important addition of planned and postulated previous
manifestations of maritime terrorism – given the more creative and potentially more serious
consequences of maritime terrorism compared to piracy.

Shorter studies will be able to fine tune from the Threat Matrix to focus on particular regions
or countries (for example Southeast Asia or the Middle East); terrorist or insurgent groups
(such as Al Qaeda or the LTTE); categories of vessels targeted or utilised by terrorists (such as
small vessels or container ships); and/or time periods (for example pre- or post-9/11). Within
maritime industries, it is intended that the Threat Matrix will provide the best “conceptual
baseline” to ensure all relevant maritime terrorism scenarios have been addressed within ship
or port facility security plans

In the field of international legal studies, shorter studies could compare the implementation of
SOLAS Chapter XI security arrangements between States. Shorter studies could also examine
domestic laws relating to vessel interdictions and the domestic arrangements for prosecuting
offences and confiscating illicit materials found aboard interdicted vessels. Shorter studies
could also analyse the liability of States and their authorities for wrongful interdictions and
unwarranted delays of ship or injuries to ships’ crews.

It is also hoped this Study will stimulate further discussion and debate about the interdiction
powers of States under UNCLOS and in exceptional circumstances, Article 51 of the UN
Charter. In particular, scholarly debate could focus on the validity and desirability of the
restrictive and liberal views of these instruments, and the influence that Security Council
Resolutions should have on their interpretation of these instruments.

Whichever lines of future inquiry are undertaken into these issues, further studies will now
have a well-informed basis through the approaches of this Study.
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Appendix A:

Designations of terrorist groups by the United Nations and by
selected States as at 1 October 2013

This table summarises the groups designated as terrorist organisations by the United Nations,
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada as at 1 October 2013, showing
the considerable variation in the designations of terrorist organisations even between these
four very similar states.

Organisation
Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group
Afghan Support Committee (ASC)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)
Al-Akhtar Trust International
Al Furqan
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiya (GI)
Al Ghurabaa
Al-Haramain & Al Masjed Al-Aqsa Charity Foundation
Al-Haramain Foundation (Indonesia)
Al-Haramain Foundation (Pakistan)
Al-Haramain Foundation (Union of the Comoros)
Al-Haramain Foundation (United States of America)
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (Somalia)
Al-Haramain: Afghanistan Branch
Al-Haramain: Albania Branch
Al-Haramain: Bangladesh Branch
Al-Haramain: Ethiopia Branch
Al-Haramain: The Netherlands Branch
Al-Haramayn Foundation (Kenya)
1

UN
12671

x
x

AUS2

USA3
x
x

x

UK4

CANADA5

x
x

x

x

x

x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

‘The List established and maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011)
with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida’ Last updated on
20 September 2013 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml; Accessed 1 October 2013
2
Australia Attorney-General’s Department ‘Listing of terrorist organisations’ Last updated on 12 July 2013
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB0
01F7FBD; Accessed 1 October 2013
3
United States of America State Department Bureau of Counter-Terrorism ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisations’
Last updated on 28 May 2013 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm; Accessed 1 October 2013
4
United Kingdom Home Office ‘Proscribed Terrorist Organisations’ Last updated on 19 July 2013
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2; Accessed 1 October
2013
5
Public Safety Canada ‘Currently listed entities’ Last updated on 9 May 2013
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx; Accessed 1 October
2013
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Organisation
Al-Haramayn Foundation (Tanzania)
Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya / AIAI
Al Jihad
Al-Qaida
Al-Qaida in Iraq
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Al Rashid Trust
Al-Shabaab
Ansar al-Islam

UN
12671
x
x
x
x
x
x

USA3

UK4

CANADA5

x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

Ansar al-Dine
Ansar al-Sharia
Ansar Al Sunna (AS)
Ansar Eddine
Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan
Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA)
Army of Islam (AOI)
Asbat Al-Ansar
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)
Babbar Khalsa (BK)
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Benevolence International Foundation
Boko Haram
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Cumann na mBan
Djamat Houmat Daawa Salafia (DHDS)
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement
Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Emarat Kavkaz
Fianna na hEireann
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG)
Global Relief Foundation (GRF)
Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM)
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Hamas
Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya) (Islamic
Resistance Movement)
Hamas’s Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
Haqqani Network (HQN)
Harakat Ul-Mujahidin / HUM
Harakat-ul Jihad Islami
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
Hizballah
Hizballah External Security Organisation
Indian Mujahedeen (IM)

AUS2

x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
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Organisation
International Islamic Relief Organization, Indonesia, Branch
Office
International Islamic Relief Organization, Philippines,
Branch Office
International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)
Irish National Liberation Army
Irish People's Liberation Organisation
Irish Republican Army
Islamic Army of Aden
Islamic International Brigade (IIB)
Islamic Jihad Group
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
Islamic Movement Of Uzbekistan
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force
Jabhat al-Nusra
Jaish-i-Mohammed
Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
Jam’yah Ta’awun Al-Islamia
Jemaah Islamiyah
Jemmad Anshorut Tauhid
Jundallah
Kahane Chai (Kach)
Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)
Khuddam Ul-Islam and Jamaat Ul-Furquan
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
Lajnat Al Daawa Al Islamiya (LDI)
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
Lashkar-E-Tayyiba
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
Loyalist Volunteer Force
Makhtab al-Khidamat
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Orange Volunteers
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Rabita Trust
Rajah Solaiman Movement
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
Red Hand Commando
Red Hand Defenders
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Nuclei
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front

UN
12671

AUS2

USA3

UK4

CANADA5

x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
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Organisation
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of
Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
Sanabel Relief Agency Limited
Saor Eire
Saved Sect or Saviour Sect
Shining Path (SL)
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
Taibah International-Bosnia Offices
Taliban
Tehrik Nefaz-e Shari'at Muhammadi (TNSM)
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Teyre Azadiye Kurdistan (TAK)
Tunisian Combatant Group
Ulster Defence Association
Ulster Freedom Fighters
Ulster Volunteer Force
Ummah Tameer E-Nau (UTN)
United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
Vanguards of Conquest (VOC)
Wafa Humanitarian Organization
World Tamil Movement (WTM)

UN
12671

AUS2

USA3

UK4

CANADA5

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
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Appendix B:

Terrorist Groups: Attacks and Fatalities 1968 - 2011

Based on a review of attacks by the 2,222 terrorist groups listed in the Global Terrorism
Database maintained by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism based at the University of Maryland, with [2.5.1] discussing this database, this
Appendix summarises the total number of recorded attacks by each group, the years in which
each group committed attacks and the total fatalities resulting from all attacks by the group. It
excludes attacks where the perpetrators were listed as ‘Unknown’. Complete details of the
statistics summarised below are held on file by the author.

GROUP
1st of May Group
14 K Triad
14 March Coalition
14th of December Command
15th of September Liberation Legion
16 January Organization for the Liberation of Tripoli
1920 Revolution Brigades
19th of July Christian Resistance Brigade
1st of May Group
2 April Group
20 December Movement (M-20)
22nd of May 1948
23 May Democratic Alliance (Algeria)
23rd of September Communist League
28 February Armed Group
28 May Armenian Organization
28s
28th of December Group
2nd of June Movement
31 January People's Front (FP-31)
4 August National Organization
7 April Libyan Organization
8 March Coalition
9th of February Group
9 May People's Liberation Force
Abd al-Krim Commandos
Abdullah Azzam Brigades
Abstentionist Brigades
Abu Baker Martyr Group
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades
Abu Hassan
Abu Musa Group
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

DATES ACTIVE
1989 - 1992
1998
2007
1990
1980
1989
2004
1980 - 1984
1970 - 1971
1983
1990 - 1992
1988
2009
1977 - 1980
1980
1977
2000
1977
1971 - 1981
1981 - 1982
1982
1985
2008
1988 - 1989
1989
1979
2004 - 2011
1978
1979
2003 - 2005
1980
1987
1987 - 1998
1994 - 2011

TOTAL
ATTACKS
16
4
1
3
1
24
2
1
4
6
16
1
3
44
1
2
1
2
14
17
2
3
1
21
4
2
6
2
1
11
1
1
51
205

TOTAL
FATALITIES
2
0
5
0
0
1
15
0
0
0
1
0
0
16
0
5
0
0
4
0
0
0
5
11
0
0
131
0
0
191
2
0
28
578
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GROUP
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)
Achwan-I-Mushbani
Actiefront Nationalistisch Nederland
Action Directe
Action Front for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries
Action Front Nationalist Librium
Action Group for Communism
Action Group for the Destruction of the Police State
Action Struggle Against the World
Active Espirit de Corps of the Argentina Army
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)
Adivasi National Liberation Army (ANLA)
Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front
AFB
Africa Marine Commando
African National Congress (South Africa)
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)
AGEL
Aghwar "Fire War" Group
Agudat Israel Party
Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea (Somalia)
Ahmad Jibril
Ahrar Al-Jalil (Free People of the Galilee)
Aibed Er-Rahman katibet
Air and Azawak Liberation Front
Akali Dal Party
Al Barq
Al Borkan Liberation Organization
Al Faran
Al Hadid
Al Jehad
Al Jihad
Al Nasirin (India)
Al Zulfikar
Al-Adl Wal Ihsane
al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Al-Arifeen
Al-Badr
al-Da'wah Party
Al-Fajr
Al-Faruo Battalion
al-Fatah
Al-Fatihin Army (AFA)
al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)
Al-Hamas Mujahideen
Al-Haramayn Brigades
al-Intiqami al-Pakistani
Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI)
al-Jub Tribe

DATES ACTIVE
2001 - 2011
1991
1992
1985 - 1992
1977
1992
1978
1991
1985
1987
1999 - 2003
2007 - 2011
2007
1978
2011
1976 - 1996
1988 - 1994
1976
1981
1992
2008 - 2009
1978
2008 - 2010
2007
1992
1982 - 1985
2002
1984
1995
1994
1994 - 1995
1981 - 1985
2009
1981 - 1992
1991 - 1996
2005 - 2006
2000 - 2010
2002 - 2005
1999 - 2008
1980 - 1981
2007
1988
1971 - 2009
2008
1981 - 1997
2001
2003 - 2004
2002
1992 - 2005
2009

TOTAL
ATTACKS
3
1
2
54
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
6
1
1
5
606
6
1
1
1
4
1
4
1
3
2
1
2
2
2
3
10
1
8
5
4
164
4
4
2
1
4
64
1
260
1
3
2
5
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
17
1
0
4
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
6
0
0
7
624
6
0
0
0
25
28
8
0
3
5
5
1
1
0
1
30
0
17
3
18
310
5
9
43
1
0
110
0
500
0
10
9
23
0
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GROUP
Al-Khobar
Al-Madina
Al-Mansoorian
al-Marabitun Revolutionary Committee
Al-Mujahedin Brigades (Palestine)
al-Nadir
Al-Nasireen Group
Al-Nawaz
Al-Qa'ida in Lebanon
Al-Qa'ida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division
Al-Qa`ida
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
Al-Qa’ida in Yemen
Al-Qa’ida Organization for Jihad in Sweden
Al-Qassam Brigades
Al-Sa'iqa
Al-Sadr Brigades
Al-Shabaab
Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin
Al-Shuda Brigade
Al-Sunna wal Jamma
Al-Umar Mujahideen
Albanian Liberation Army
Albanian National Army (ANA)
Albatros Commando
Alcubar group
Alejo Calatayu
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)
Alexander Villalon (YADO)
Alexandros Grigoropoulos Anarchist Attack Group
Alfa 83
Alfaro Vive
Algeisk Wolves
Algerian Moujahideen for Moslems
All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)
All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP)
All for the Fatherland Movement
All India Anna Dravida Munetra Kazgan Party
All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)
All Kamatapur Liberation Force
All Karanataka Youth Council
All Nepal Free Nationalist Students Union
All Nepal National Free Student Union-Revolutionary
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)
All-Party Students Union
Allah's Tigers
Allende Lives Commando
Alliance of Revolutionary Cuban Organizations

DATES ACTIVE
2007 -2010
2002 - 2008
2002 - 2007
1986
2008
2002
2005
1999
2006
2006
1998 - 2011
2004 - 2011
2004 - 2011
2004 - 2011
2004 - 2010
2005
2007
1984 - 1988
1984
2007 - 2011
2005 - 2010
2003
2004
1991 - 2002
2001
2001 - 2003
1994
2007
1987 - 1990
1994 - 2008
1986
2009
1984
1983 - 1991
1995
1992
1991 - 2009
2005
1989
1991 - 2009
1983 - 1986
2008
1996
1991
2002
1992 - 2002
1995
1989 - 1992
1991
1980

TOTAL
ATTACKS
5
5
19
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
124
187
131
145
12
1
1
2
3
312
5
1
1
10
1
5
1
1
2
11
1
1
1
27
3
1
5
1
1
3
5
1
1
1
1
13
1
2
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
11
4
105
0
0
5
8
2
0
0
4,636
2,123
642
555
49
0
0
1
0
871
6
8
3
24
0
2
0
1
0
7
0
0
?
18
1
0
1
0
0
9
1
0
0
0
0
95
1
1
0
0
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GROUP
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Alpha-66 (Cuban counterrevolutionary)
Amal
Amazonas Liberation Front
America Battalion
American Anticommunist Association (AAA)
American Indian Movement
Americans for a Competent Federal Judicial System
Americans for Justice
Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkir
Ana Maria Martinly August 22 Brigade
Ananda Marga
Anarchio Scene
Anarchist Action (CA / United States)
Anarchist Faction
Anarchist Solidarity
Anarchist Struggle
Anarchists Attack Team
Anarkista Jorge Banos Front
Anbar Salvation Council
Andres Castro United Front
Angels
Angolan Defense Force
Angry Brigade (Italy)
Animal Defense League
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Animal Rights Militia
Anonima Sequestri
Anonymous Underground Movement (MCA)
Ansar Al Sunnah (Palestine)
Ansar al-Din
Ansar al-Islam
Ansar al-Jihad
Ansar al-Sunna
Ansar al-Tahwid wal Sunna
Ansar Allah
Ansar Sarallah
Ansar Wa Mohajir (Pakistan)
Ansarul Islam (Pakistan)
Anti Communist Action Alliance
Anti Communist Patriotic Front
Anti Communist Vigilante Patrol
Anti Imperialist Patriotic Union
Anti Imperialist Students Council
Anti Imperialistic Communist Revolutionaries
Anti-American Arab Liberation Front
Anti-Apostate Movement Alliance (AGAP)
Anti-Armenian Organization
Anti-Capitalist Action
Anti-Capitalist Brigades

DATES ACTIVE
1997 - 2010
1984
1980 - 2008
1983
1986 - 1988
1978
1973 - 1975
1989
1974
2007 - 2010
1984
1978
1984
2009
2000
1989
2000
2000
2010
2007
1997 - 1999
1985
1985
1999
1988
1984 - 2011
1982 - 2010
1997
2004
2009 - 2011
2004
2002 - 2009
2004
2004 - 2011
2006
1994
1999
2008
2008 - 2010
1989
1980
1988
1989
1978
1978
1986
2007
1984
1999
1988

TOTAL
ATTACKS
39
1
27
1
8
1
6
6
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
116
3
1
1
5
1
26
1
18
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
294
1
24
0
83
0
2
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
30
62
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
116
0
165
0
21
0
1
38
0
3
1
1
0
0
3
0
0
0
1

422

GROUP
Anti-Capitalist Commando
Anti-Castro Command
Anti-Communist Command (KAK)
Anti-Communist Commando of the South
Anti-Communist Viets Organization
Anti-Communist Vigilante Group
Anti-Establishment Nucleus
Anti-Fascist Territorial Group
Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ)
Anti-Imperialist Commando
Anti-Imperialist Fighters for a Free Palestine
Anti-Imperialist International Brigades
Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)
Anti-Nuclear Society for a Silent Counter-Offensive
Anti-Racist Guerrilla Nuclei
Anti-State Action
Anti-State Justice
Anti-State Proletarian Nuclei
Anti-terrorism ETA (ATE)
Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL)
Anti-Zionist Commandos
Anti-Zionist Movement
Antifascist Action
Antonia Martinez Student Commandos (AMSC)
Antonio
Anya-Nya II Militia
April 6th Liberation Movement
Aqmur
Arab Commando Cells
Arab Communist Organization
Arab Democratic Party
Arab Liberation Army
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
Arab Revenge Organization
Arab Revolution/Liberation Vanguard Organization
Arab Revolutionary Army
Arab Revolutionary Cells
Arab Revolutionary Front
Arab Socialist Baath Party
Arab Socialist Union Members
Arab Steadfastness Front
Arab Struggle
Arab Unionist Nationalist Organization
Arabian Peninsula Freemen
Arakan Rohingy Islamic Front
Arauco Malleco Coordinating Group (CAM) - Chile
Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan
Argentina Libre (Free Argentina)
Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance
Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA)

DATES ACTIVE
1988
1976 - 1977
2000
1980
1981
1989
1995
1980 - 1981
1995
1999
1978
1986 - 1987
2001 - 2003
1996
1999
1999
2006
1999
1975 - 1978
1983 - 1989
1976
1999
1994
1982
1987
1988
1980
2010
1986
1974
1987
1980
1979 - 1980
1984
1981
1978
1986
1986
1985
1982
1981
1986
1985
1989
1991
2009
2005
1983
1974
1975 - 1978

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
3
1
4
1
4
2
2
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
3
5
1
8
20
3
2
1
1
1
1
31
1
1
10
4
1
4
1
6
8
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
18

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
1
1
142
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
19
3
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
3
1
0
1
9
0
5
0
4
0
1
0
3
3
1
1
8
0
8
0
2
53

423

GROUP
Argentine Liberation Front (FAL)
Argentine National Organization Movement
Argentine Youths for Sovereignty
Aric Union Association
Ariska Brodraskapet (Aryan Brotherhood)
Armata Corsa
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN)
Armed Action Force (FADA)
Armed Anti-Imperialist Movement
Armed Brigades
Armed Commandos for Liberation
Armed Commandos Fighting Army of Mario Zichieri
Armed Commandos of Liberation
Armed Commandos of Student Self Defense
Armed Communist Commando
Armed Communist Formations
Armed Communist Front
Armed Communist Nucleus
Armed Communist Struggle
Armed Falange
Armed Fight for Communism
Armed Fight for Workers Power
Armed Fighting Nucleus For Communism
Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (FARF)
Armed Forces for Liberation of East Timor
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)
Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP)
Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
Armed Group for the Liberation of Guadeloupe
Armed Groups for Communism
Armed Groups of Organised Proletariat
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Armed Islamic Movement
Armed Nuclei for Communism
Armed Nuclei for Territorial Counterpower
Armed Nucleus for Popular Autonomy
Armed Nucleus of Communist Workers
Armed People's Units
Armed Proletarian Formations
Armed Proletarian Group
Armed Proletarian Groups for Communism
Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)
Armed Proletarian Patrols
Armed Proletarian Power
Armed Proletarian Squads
Armed Proletariat Fighting Squad
Armed Radical Groups for Communism
Armed Renaissance Group of Ahvaz
Armed Revolutionary Action (Greece)

DATES ACTIVE
1970 - 1974
1970 - 1975
1978
2006
1999
2000 - 2001
1999
1979
1978
1977
1986
1977
1970 - 1971
1982
1977
1978
1986
1977
1976 - 1977
1991 - 1992
1977
1978
1977
1995
1992 - 1995
1976 - 1979
1979 - 1986
2001 - 2005
1998 - 1999
1980
1977
1980
1992 - 2007
1992
1978
1978
1975 - 1978
1977
1989
1978
1978
1978
1973 - 1978
1977
1977 - 1983
1978 - 1979
1979
1977
2005
2010

TOTAL
ATTACKS
7
2
1
1
1
3
7
1
1
1
1
2
13
1
1
5
1
4
3
6
4
1
1
1
2
41
10
12
3
6
1
1
224
1
2
3
6
1
1
1
1
4
30
1
6
6
1
1
1
4

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
60
18
0
102
106
1
0
1
1,366
2
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
1
0
0
0
8
0
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GROUP
Armed Revolutionary Groups
Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement
Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR)
Armed Squads for Communism
Armed Struggle Cells
Armed Struggle for Communism
Armed Struggle for Proletarian Power
Armed Struggle Organization
Armed Vanguards of a Second Mohammed Army
Armed Womens Nuclei
Armed Workers Nuclei
Armed Workers Squads
Armenian Organization for Armed Struggle
Armenian Red Army
Armenian Revolutionary Army
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
Army for Freeing Scotland
Army of God
Army of Islam
Army of State Liberators
Army of the Republic of Ilirida
Arnoldo Camu Command
Arsonists for Social Cohesion
Artigas Guard Commando
Artigas-Giachino Command
Artisans' Cooperative of Fire And Related Products
Arya
Aryan Brotherhood
Aryan Nation
Aryan Republican Army
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq
Asbat al-Ansar
Asif Raza Commandos
Association for the Enhancement of Justice of Great
Japan
Association of Demobilized Armed Forces
Association of Mobil Spill Affected Communities
Association of Students and Pupils in Mali (AEEM)
Association Totalement Anti-Guerre (ATAG)
ATALA
Athens and Thessaloniki Arsonist Nuclei
Attack Teams for the Dissolution of the Nation (Greece)
Aum Shinri Kyo
Autonomen
Autonomous Anarchist Groups
Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (CAA)
Autonomous Decorators
Autonomous Group for Armed Action
Autonomous Collective Against Zionist Presence in
France

DATES ACTIVE
1977
1970 - 1977
1978 - 1988
1977 - 1979
1989
1977
1977
1983
2003
1978
1978
1977 - 1978
1980
1982
1985
1981 - 1988
1975
1982 - 1998
2006 - 2011
2008
2002
1989
1998
1993
1983
2005
1977 - 1984
1978
1986 - 1999
1994 - 1995
2007 - 2010
1995, 2010
2002

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
31
21
3
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
188
3
24
3
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
2
2
6
16
11
2
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
2
101
0
0
0
0
1
24
0
0
0
0
0
1
62
0
3
25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
4
3
5

1992
1995
1999
1994
2001
1978
2007
2009
1990 - 1995
1987 - 1991
1979
1980 - 1985
2000
1979

1
3
1
1
1
1
8
3
8
2
1
10
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
20
2
0
1
0
0

1979

1

0

425

GROUP
Autonomous Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
Autonomous Resistance
Autonomous Revolutionary Brigade
Autonomy (Greece)
Autonomy (Italy)
Autonomy Front
Avenge the Arab Nation
Avengers of Peiper Group
Avengers of the Infants
Awami League
Azadejan (Liberation)
Azania People's Organization (AZAPO)
Ba'adi (on my own behalf)
Baader-Meinhof Group
Babbar Khalsa
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)
Baby Liberation Army
Badr Brigades
Bahujan Samaj Party
Baloch Liberation Army
Baloch Liberation Front
Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)
Baluchi Militant Defense Army
Baluchistan National Army
Bande des Rats (the rat pack) Ukranian Group
Bangladesh Communist Party
Bangladesh National Socialist Party
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
Bangladesh Road Transport Workers Federation
Bangladesh Sarbahara Party
Bangsamoro National Liberation Army
Bani Hilal Tribe
Banner of Islam
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)
Barzani Guerrillas
Basic People's Congresses
Basque Battalion
Basque Country Autonomous Self-Defense Group
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)
Basque Justice
Basque Rectitudes
Basque Refugee Support Group
Bavarian Liberation Army
BAY Bombers
Beaver 55
Begumcans Cell
Beirut Martyrs Battalion
Beirut Martyrs Forces Organization
Beja Congress

DATES ACTIVE
1991
1981 - 1983
1980
1982
1980
1983
1991
1977
2002 - 2003
1981 - 2011
1981
1990 - 1994
1990
1970 - 1977
2007
1988 - 1995
2000
2005
1996
2005 - 2011
2009 - 2011
2007 - 2011
2009 - 2010
2010
2004
1981
1991
1992
1990 - 1997
1992
1986 - 1996
2009
1996
2006
2002 - 2007
1979
1992
1980
1981
1970 - 2011
1979
1977
1984
1995
1971
1970
1978
1988 - 1989
1987
1996 - 2001

TOTAL
ATTACKS
3
3
1
1
11
2
1
1
2
20
1
5
1
55
1
9
1
1
2
62
9
28
8
1
1
1
1
1
32
2
5
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
2,027
1
6
0
3
1
3
1
7
2
4

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
0
12
1
9
6
74
0
2
2
138
17
33
10
0
11
0
3
0
10
0
46
0
0
0
7
0
0
2
1
818
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1

426

GROUP
Belarusian Liberation Army
Beli Orlovi (White Eagles)
Bengali Tiger Force (BTF)
Bersatu
Bharatiya Janata Party
Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTHK)
Bhisan Himali Bag
Bhumi Uchched Pratirodh Committee (BUPC)
Bihar People's Party ( Hindu militants)
Bini-Oru
Black Afro Militant Movement
Black and Red Anarchist and Anti-Authoritarians
Initiative
Black Banner Brigade
Black Berets
Black Brigade
Black Brigade (United States)
Black Cells
Black December
Black Eagles
Black Flag (Bandera Negra)
Black Forest Command
Black Friday
Black Hand
Black Hand (Colombia)
Black Lebanon
Black Liberation Army
Black Liberation Force
Black Liberation Front
Black Malian Group
Black Mambas
Black March
Black Order
Black Panther Group (Palestinian)
Black Panthers
Black Revolutionary Assault Team
Black September
Black September II
Black Star
Black Tigers
Black War
Black Wednesday
Black Widows
Bloque Anti-Guerrillero de Oriente (BAGO)
Blue Archer Group
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)
Bodo People’s Front (BPF)
Boer Republikeinse Leer
Boere Aanvals Troepe (BAT)
Boko Haram

DATES ACTIVE
1995 - 1997
1999
1999
2006
1992 - 1994
1988 - 1992
2009
2007
1994
2003
1970 - 1971

TOTAL
ATTACKS
2
1
1
1
2
9
1
1
1
1
4

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
1
2
1
0
50
0
3
1
1
1

2009
2004
1991
1985
1981
1971 - 1976
1973
2009
1986 - 1987
1989
1988
1983
1988 - 1991
1982
1970 - 1984
1983
1988
1992
1996
1979
1974
1986 - 1995
1970 - 1972
1971
1971 - 1976
1984 - 1988
2000
1990
1986 - 1988
1979
2007 - 2009
1980
1981
1996 - 2008
2009
1992
1997
2009 - 2011

1
1
3
3
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
6
2
37
1
3
1
1
2
6
17
25
3
51
9
7
1
2
3
13
1
1
1
1
1
3
150

0
0
7
29
0
0
2
0
17
0
0
19
32
1
19
0
0
4
0
0
24
16
7
0
77
3
0
1
0
0
56
14
1
78
1
0
0
687

427

GROUP
Bolivarian Army of Liberation
Bolivian Luminous Path
Bolivian Socialist Falange
Boricua Revolutionary Front
Boricuan Armed Anti-Imperialist Commandos
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)
Boz-Ok (Grey Arrow)
Brazilian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAB)
Brazilian Democratic Mobilization Party (PMBD)
Breton Liberation Front (FLB)
Brigadas Rojas
Brigades of Iman Hassan-al-Basri
Broad Commando of National Liberation
Broad Front
Brother Julian
Brunswijk Jungle Commando
Budget for the Popular Prep or Death
Bunda Dia Kongo (BDK)
Burma Communist Party
Bzers
Cali Narcotics Cartel
Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)
Cambodian National Front for National Salvation
Cambodian People's Party (CPP)
Canary Islands Independence Movement
Cannibal Army
Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC)
Carlos Echeverria commando group
Carribbean Revolutionary Independence Army
Catalan Liberation Front (FAC)
Catalonian Resistance
Catholic Reaction Force
Caucasus Emirate
Cell for Internationalism
Cells for Solidarity Against Authority
Central African National Liberation Movement
Central American Movement of Solidarity (MOSCA)
Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC)
Charles Martel Group
Charlot Jacquelin Militant Front
Che Guevara Brigade
Che Guevara Guerrillas
Chechen Lone Wolf Group
Chicano Liberation Front
Children of November
Chilean Anti-Communist Alliance (ACHA)
Chilean Committee of Support for Peruvian Revolution
Chin National Army
Chondaehyop (Radical Student Coalition)
Christ Chaos

DATES ACTIVE
1992
1983
1980 - 1983
1982
1982
1989 - 1997
1992
1976
1986
1974 - 2000
1978
2005
1978
1978
1985
1988 - 1992
1981
2007
1988 - 1989
1992
1989 - 1992
2000
1978
1997
1975 - 1980
2003
1983 - 1985
1981
1985
1971 - 1979
1980
1983 - 2001
2008 - 2011
1995
1989
1981
1995
1979
1975 - 1981
1995
1976 - 1990
1997
1996
1970 - 1975
1996 - 1999
1984 - 1988
1992
2002
1990
1977 - 1978

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
2
8
1
1
29
1
4
1
30
1
1
1
1
1
41
1
1
2
1
3
2
1
4
34
4
25
2
1
26
1
3
18
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
14
5
2
31
2
6
1
1
1
3

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
0
0
46
1
0
0
5
0
3
0
0
0
7
0
12
18
0
3
8
1
48
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
3
55
0
0
3
0
2
0
0
0
0
23
2
0
1
0
0
0
0

428

GROUP
Christian Group for the Respect for Life
Christian Liberation Army
Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction)
Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement
Citizen's Rights Protection Volunteers
Citizens Volunteer Force
Civic Guard
Civil Association for Peace in Colombia, Asocipaz
Civil Cooperation Bureau
Clandestini Corsi
Cleansing Hand (La Mano Que Limpia)
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)
Coalition of National Brigades
Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP)
Colombia Without Guerrillas
Colombian Patriotic Resistance
Colombian Revolution
Colonel Karuna Faction
Column 88
Comando Bautista B
Comando Independiente Revolucionario
Comando Malvinas Argentinas
Comando Vermelho (Red Command)
Combat 18
Combat Brigades
Combat Nucleus of Communist Unity
Combatant Communist Front
Combatant Communist Union Red Brigades
Combatant Nucleus for Communism
Combatent Communists
Comite Argentino de Lucha Anti-Imperialisto
Comite d'Action Viticole
Comite de Liberation et de Detournements
d'Ordinateurs
Command for National Sovereignty
Commander Gonzalo Southern Group
Commander Luciano Varela Antiguerrilla Group
Commando 15th October
Commando 27 September
Commando Adolph Hitler
Commando Delta
Commando Heinz Neumann
Commando Internacionalista Simon Bolivar
Commandos Against Self Destruction of the Universe
Commandos for A Popular alternative
Commandos for the Defense of Western Civilization
Commandos of France
Committee for a National Drive for Peace and
Democracy
Committee for Direct Action Against War

DATES ACTIVE
1982
1991
1978 - 2000
1981 - 1994
2009
1989
1983
2001
1990
1999
1990
2006
1973
2000 - 2001
1994
1999
1990
2004 - 2007
1978
1996
1992
2003
1992
1999 - 2000
1977
1977
1978
1987
1978
1977
1972
1999

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
2
61
24
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
4
1
8
4
3
1
10
4
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
3

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
2
8
3
3
1
9
0
0
2
0
0
0
6
0
6
36
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

1983
1991
1986
1997
1979
1975
1977
1981
1976
1986
1976
1995
1978
1986

1
1
1
1
1
1
6
2
1
1
1
4
1
3

0
0
0
11
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
38
0
0

1992
1991

1
2

19
0

429

GROUP
Committee for the Defense of Italian Workers in France
Committee for the Elimination of Killer Collaborators
Committee for the Safeguard of the Islamic Revolution
Committee of action against bull fights
Committee of Coordination
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East
Political Prisoners (CSPPA)
Commune 1
Communist Anti-Imperialistic Revolutionaries
Communist Anti-Nuclear Front
Communist Armed Nucleus
Communist Attack Brigades
Communist Attack Units
Communist Brigade Dante Dimani
Communist Brigades
Communist Combat Unit
Communist Combattant Cells (CCC) (Belgium)
Communist Fighters Association
Communist Fighters Group
Communist Fighting Corunim- Maria Anna Maria
Communist Fighting Detachments
Communist Fighting Front
Communist Fighting Nuclei
Communist Fighting Unit
Communist Front for Counterpower
Communist Group of Proletarian Internationalism
Communist Guerilla Nuclei
Communist Hunters Command (CCC)
Communist Nuclear
Communist Nuclei of Counter Power
Communist Party of India
Communist Party of India - Maoist
Communist Party of India- Marxist
Communist Party of India- Marxist-Leninist
Communist Party of Malaysia- Marxist-Leninist
Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M)
Communist Party of Nepal- Unified Marxist-Leninist
Communist Party of Thailand
Communist Patrols for Counter Power
Communist Progress
Communist Territorial Nuclei
Communist Territorial Unit
Communist Trade Union Workers
Communist Warrior's Union
Communists Fighting Imperialism and Armaments
Comrades in Arms
Comrades Organized in Partisan Nuclei
Comuneros
Condor
Confederation of Iranian Students/National Union

DATES ACTIVE
1977
1992
1977 - 1980
1977
1995

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
2
1
4

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
1
1
0
6

1986
1970
1978
1980
1977
1978
1980
1976
1977
1977
1984 - 1985
1978
1977
1977
1978
1979
1977
1976 - 1980
1982
1981
1991
1979 - 1980
1981
1979
1989 - 2010
2004 - 2011
1991 - 2001
1999 - 2011
1975
1997 - 2008
1997 - 2009
1979 - 1981
1980
1977
1979 - 1980
1979
1992
1990
1984
1971
1980
1987
1974 - 1978
1977

10
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
2
21
1
1
1
1
1
2
11
2
3
1
3
1
1
4
1,418
2
8
2
23
4
3
2
2
5
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
1

4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
1,892
0
20
0
654
2
6
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

430

GROUP
Congolese Armed Patriotic Group
Congolese Liberation Party (PLC)
Congolese National Movement- Lumumba (MNCL)
Congolese Patriotic Resistence-Patriotic Armed Forces
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)
Congress of Kabardian People
Congress Party Activists
Conqueror Army
Conscientious Arsonists (CA)
Conspiracy of Cells of Fire
Continental Revolutionary Army
Continuing Struggle
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Continuous Struggle
Convention of Liberal Reformers (CLR)
Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace
Coordination for Revolutionary Action
Coordination of Anti-atomic Power Plant Saboteurs
Coordination of the United Revolutionary Organization
Coordination, Offensive, Use, Interruptions, and Cut
Corsican Farmers' Front
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)
Corsican National Liberation Front- Historic Channel
Corsican Revolutionary Brigade
Costa Rican Peoples' Army (EPC)
Council for Popular Justice
Council for the Destruction of Order
Counterrevolutionary Solidarity (SC)
Covenant, Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA)
Crazy Brabant Killers
Croatian Freedom Fighters
Croatian Liberation Army
Croatian Revolutionary Cell-Bruno Busic Dept
CSS Movement
Cuban Action
Cuban C-4 Movement
Cuncolta Naziunalista
Cyprus Turkish People's Movement
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat
Dainihon Yokuko Doshikai
Dark Harvest
David's Sword
Dawn Forces
Death Squad of Organization Zero (Organizacion Cero)
Death to Bazuqueros
Death to Drug Traffickers
Death to Kidnappers (MAS)
Death to Rustlers
Death to the Demobilized Militias
Deccan Mujahideen

DATES ACTIVE
1982
1988
1984
2009
2002
1992
1994 - 1995
2008
1998
2008 - 2011
1975
1989
1977 - 2009
1976
1997
2009 - 2011
1979
1983
1976 - 1977
1992
1994
1974 - 2011
1991 - 1999
1983
1984
1994
2009
1983
1983
1985
1976 - 1980
1980
1981
1999
1970 - 1975
1974
1995
1990 - 1991
2005 - 2010
1979
1981
1994
1990
1979
1989 - 1990
1988
1982 - 1984
1997
1994
2008

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
2
5
45
2
1
26
1
1
2
16
1
13
1
1
574
128
3
1
2
1
1
4
1
5
1
1
1
13
1
1
7
5
1
2
1
1
1
6
1
18
3
1
8

TOTAL
FATALITIES
15
28
2
1
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
4
36
0
0
75
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
7
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
13
0
0
1
2
6
0
2
43
21
1
184

431

GROUP
December 13 Independent Group
Defenders of the Fatherland
Delta Group
Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Democratic Iraqi Opposition of Germany
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)
Democratic Movement for Liberation of Eritrean
Kunamas
Democratic Party
Democratic Party of Talal Arslan
Democratic Progressive Party
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE)
Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR)
Democratic Revolutionary Party
Deniers of Holidays
Dev Genc
Dev Sol
Dev Yol
Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C)
Dignity Command
Dignity for Colombia
Dima Halao Daoga (DHD)
Direct Action Against Drugs (DADD)
Dishmish Regiment
Diyala Salvation Council
Do-or-Die Corps - Abolition of Anti-Public Taxation
Systems
Dominican Popular Movement (MPD)
Down with Lubbers
Draa El Mizan Seriat
Dukhta-ran-e-Millat
Dynamic Youth Forum
Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution
Earth First!
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
Earth Night Action Group
East Asia Anti Japanese Armed Front
East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives
East Side Action Committee
East Turkistan Liberation Organization
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
Ecology and Antinuclear Revolutionary Party (CRAE)
Ed'daoua Es'salafia Lilqadha
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
Egbema National Front
Egbesu Youths of the Bayelsa
Egypt's Revolution
Egyptian Revolutionary Organization

DATES ACTIVE
1990
1984
1977 - 1978
1995 - 1996
1974 - 2011
2007 - 2010
2002
1995 - 2001

TOTAL
ATTACKS
3
2
3
2
49
30
1
21

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
2
19
68
234
0
49

2007
1981
2008
1992
1982 - 1991
1980 - 1982
1990 - 1997
2009
1990
1979 - 1996
1980 - 1982
1994 - 2009
1994
1995 - 1996
1999 - 2010
1995 - 1996
1984
2007

2
1
1
1
141
5
12
1
1
253
4
15
1
4
26
4
43
1

0
0
2
0
1,801
22
10
0
0
175
0
10
0
3
37
4
6
15

1990
1970 - 1974
1986
2002
1995
2010
1979 - 1989
1989 - 1994
1995 - 2011
1990
1975 - 1976
1970
1979
1999
2008
1979
2002
1986 - 1989
2003
1999
1985 - 1987
1980

1
2
2
2
1
2
9
3
78
1
12
2
1
1
4
1
1
7
1
2
3
1

0
0
0
5
1
0
3
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
9
0
5
60
0
44
2
0

432

GROUP
Egyptian Tawhid and Jihad
Ein Tyrol (One Tyrol)
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (Bolivia)
Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo (ERP) (Argentina)
Ejercito Revolucionario Guevarista
El Mico Rebel Gray
El Movimiento Revolucionario Independinista
El-Feth katibat
Elements Police Cobra Squadron
Emilio Recabarren Commando
Enedra (Greece)
Enraged Revolutionaries
Environmental Life Force
Enyele Militia
Eritrean Liberation Front
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
Erotic Anti-authority Cells
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
Etnocacerista Movement
Eva Peron Organization
Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy
Evangelical Christians
Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO)
Extreme Left
Extreme Right Commando Brigade
FACDM
Face to Face (Face-a-Face)
Faithful Resistance
Falange
Falangist Security Group
Falangist Vanguard
Fanmi Lavalas
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
Farighan
Farm Animal Revenge Militia (FARM)
Farmer's Movement of the Philippines (KMP)
Farzandan-e-Millat
Fatah al Islam
Fatah Hawks
Fatah Uprising
Father of the Poor
Fatherland
Fatherland and Liberty Nationalist Front
Fatherland for the Poor
February 27 Revolutionary Armed Forces
February 28 Popular League (El Salvador)
Fedayeen Imam Mahdi
Fedayeen Khalq (People's Commandos)
Fedayeen of the Imperial Iranian Monarchy
Federation of Students and Scholars of Cote d'Ivoire

DATES ACTIVE
2004 - 2006
1988
1970 - 1991
1970 - 1991
2000
1994
1986
2006
1991
1985
2008
2003
1977
2010
1970 - 1992
1989 - 1990
2000
1979 - 1992
2005
1990
1987 - 1989
1995
1970
1981
1980
1985
2002
1994
1977
1977
1978
2002
1978 - 1994
1992
1994
2008
2005
2007 - 2008
1994 - 2001
1986 - 1990
1989
1999
1999
1992
1992
1979 - 1980
2003
1987
1984
1992 - 2000

TOTAL
ATTACKS
4
5
3
85
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
21
4
1
5
1
2
5
1
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3,357
3
2
1
1
2
5
6
1
1
1
1
1
15
1
7
1
2

TOTAL
FATALITIES
147
0
0
19
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
32
2
0
241
4
0
0
8
0
0
6
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
8,508
0
0
1
0
3
5
1
0
0
0
0
0
41
5
0
0
0

433

GROUP
Feliciano Argueta Front
Fight Against Authority
Fighters for Communism
Fighters for the Liberation of the Turkish People
Fighters of the People
Fighting Communist Front
Fighting Communist Unit
Fighting Communists
Fighting Ecologist Movement
Fighting For Freedom Coalition (FFFC-Ottawa)
Fighting Guerrilla Formation
Fighting Guerrillas of May
Fighting Nucleus for Communism
Fighting Popular Rally
Fighting Proletarian Front
Fighting Proletarian Squads
Fighting Women
Fighting Workers for Communism
Filipino Soldiers for the Country
Fire Group
First Capital Command (PCC)
First May Movement
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)
Flower City Conspiracy
Flying Eagles (Vigilante Group)
Forbid the Evil Group (Moslem Militants)
Forbidden Blockade (Greece)
Force 17
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD)
Forces for the Unification of the Central African
Republic
Forces of the Free Arab
Forces of the Struggling Ranks
Forest Brothers
Former Interior Ministry Officers
Forqan Group
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya
Fourth Reich Skinheads
France's Honour
Francia
Francisco Villa People's Front
Fred Hampton Unit of the People's Forces
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
Free All Political Prisoners in Holland
Free Democratic People's Government of Laos
Free Fatherland
Free Fatherland Youth Guerrilla Army
Free Galician People's Guerrilla Army
Free Lebanon
Free Nasserite Revolutionaries

DATES ACTIVE
1986
1999
1977
1979
1980
1977
1979
1979
1985
2010
1996 - 1998
1998
1977
1977
1989
1977
1978
1977
1997
1979
2006
1990
1975 - 2000
1970
1989
1992
2008
1984 - 1990
2003

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
2
1
7
1
13
1
1
1
3
1
1
210
1
1
3
1
17
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
2
86
0
24
0
0
11
4

2008
1989
1980 - 1981
1998 - 2009
1994
1979 - 1981
1992 - 1997
1992
1989
1979
1994 - 1995
1976
1997 - 2005
1992
2003
1984 - 1985
1991
1987 - 1990
1979
1982

1
1
4
3
3
18
2
1
1
8
2
2
113
1
1
2
1
47
1
2

0
0
0
10
0
17
1
0
0
0
1
0
128
0
0
2
0
4
0
26

434

GROUP
Free Papua Movement
Free Revolutionaries Movement-The Giants
Free Syrian Army
Freedom Eagles of Africa
Freedom Party
French Armed Islamic Front
French Liberation Front
Friendly Company
Friends of Freedom
Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ)
Front for Armenian Liberation
Front for the Liberation of Cabinda
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners
Front For the Liberation of the Azores
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
Front for the Liberation of the French Somali Coast
Front for the National Liberation of Puerto Rico
Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy
Front Line Armed Nuclei (FLAN)
Front of French National Liberation
Front of Resistance and National Liberation of
Albanians
Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione (FPCL)
Fuerza Nueva
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN)
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP)
Fuerzas Autonómicas y Destructivas León Czolgoscz
Fuerzas Populares Jose Leonardo Chirinos
Furious Rebellion
Future movement (Lebanon)
GAC
Ganda Koi
Gangs of Conscience
Garo National Liberation Army
Gay Liberation Front
Gazteriak
Generation of Arab Fury
George Jackson Brigade
Gholam Yahya Akbar
Gilad Shalhevet Brigades
Global Intifada
GN-95
God our Father Cult
God's Army
God's Oppressed Army
Gono Bahini (GB)
GP II
Gracchus Babeuf
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)
Great Japan Patriotic Party

DATES ACTIVE
1990 - 2011
1980
2011
2009
1987 - 1989
2004
1980
1999
2010
1970
1973
1992
1980 - 1983
1977 - 1978
1977 - 2010
1975 - 1976
1978
1991 - 1992
1982
1978

TOTAL
ATTACKS
18
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
15
8
21
3
3
5
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
23
5
10
0
4
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
238
0
22
1
0
236
0
0

1991
1975
1978 - 1982
1970 - 1982
2000 - 2001
2006
1992
1994
2008
1970 - 1974
1994
2008 - 2009
2010 - 2011
1977
1999
1989
1975 - 1977
2009
2001
2005 - 2009
1996
1990
2000
1992
2009
1981
1989 - 1991
1994 - 2003
1992

1
1
5
123
3
1
1
1
2
7
1
2
24
2
1
2
19
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
5
34
1

0
0
1
7
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
17
0
0
1
1
0
3
0
0
5
6
0
4
0
0
38
0
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GROUP
Greek Anarchists' Union
Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (EAN)
Greek Bulgarian Armenian Front
Greek National Socialist Organization
Greek Popular Resistance
Green Rennet
Grey Wolves
Group for a Strong Revolutionary Movement
Group for Martyred Isam as-Sartawi
Group of Guerilla Combatants Jose Maria Morelos y
Pavon
Group Yuri Choukewitch
Grozny Jamaat
Grupo Armado de Liberacion Argentina (GALA)
Grupo de Combatientes Populares
Grupo Estrella
Grupo Libertad
Gruppe Haw Weg Den Scheiss
Guadalcanal Liberation Army
Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF)
Guadeloupe Liberation Army
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
Guards of the Fighting Proletariat
Guardsmen of Islam
Guatemalan Communist Party
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)
Guerilla Party of the Galician Poor
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Guerrilla Column 29 September
Guerrilla Command Force 97
Guerrilla Commando of the people
Guerrilla Forces for Liberation
Guerrilla Movement of the Poor (MGP)
Guerrillas of Christ the King
Gugama Youth Federation
Gulf Cartel
Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF)
Gutierrez Gomez Resistance Group
H-World/Heavenly Group
Habi's Er'roub seriat
Haika
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Hamawand Tribe
Hanchongryun
Haqqani Network
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)
Harakat ul-Mujahidin Al-Almi
Harakat-i-Inqilahi-i-Islami
Harkat ul Ansar

DATES ACTIVE
1992
1973
1986
1977 - 1978
1979
1999
1981 - 1998
1991
1983

TOTAL
ATTACKS
2
1
1
3
1
1
8
1
2

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0

2000
1980
2002
1983
1997
1980 - 1982
1992
1984 - 1985
1999
2002
1980 - 1983
1987
1979
1980 - 1984
1980 - 1983
1978 - 1990
1983 - 1996
1991
1975 - 1994
1982
1997
1981
1987
1991
1977 - 1979
2008
2008
1987 - 1989
1984
1995
2001
2001
1989 - 2008
1992
1996
2011
1999 - 2004
2002
1992
1994 - 2000

1
1
1
1
1
4
1
2
1
1
7
2
1
2
2
22
131
3
157
1
1
1
7
0
2
1
1
59
2
1
1
1
292
1
1
10
5
1
1
14

0
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
2
0
3
13
11
115
0
579
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
42
0
3
7
0
784
14
0
153
21
3
1
36
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GROUP
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami
Hasmoneans (Jewish Settler Group)
Hatikvah Leumi or National Hope
Hector Rio De Brigade
Hells Angels
Heroes of Canto Grande
Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan
Hill Students Council
Hiroyuki Jo
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT)
Hizb-I-Islami
Hizballah
Hizballah Palestine
Hizbul al Islam (Somalia)
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
Hmar People's Convention-Democracy (HPC-D)
Hofstad Network
Holders of the Black Banners
Holy Spirit Movement
Homeland and Freedom Group
Honour of the Police
Hoodie Wearers
Hotaru (Firefly)
Hubay Qah Group
Human Rights Defence Committee
Human Rights Renewal Movement
Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP)
Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)
Iberian Anarchist Federation
Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL)
Iconoclasts
Idealist Association
Idriss Miskine Group
Ikhwan Jammu and Kashmir
Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen
Illuminating Paths of Solidarity
Imam Hussein Brigade
Imperial Iranian Patriotic Organization
Independent Armed Revolutionary Commandos (CRIA)
Independent Nasserite Movement
Independent Peasants Union
Indian Mujahideen
Indian Tigers
Indigenous People's Federal Army (IPFA)
Indipendenza
Informal Anarchist Federation
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Insurgency Commune
Internal Front

DATES ACTIVE
1999 - 2011
1992
1980
1983
1999
1992
1992
1992
1995
2004 - 2007
1988 - 2010
1982 - 2008
1992
2008 - 2010
1990 - 2011
2008
2004
2004
1988 - 1990
1985
1979
2009
1988
1990
1994
1999
1995
2008
1978
1972 - 1974
2000
1978
1984
1996
1991
2009
2005
1981
1976 - 1977
1982 - 1986
1978
2008 - 2011
1996
2001
1992
2003 - 2011
1986 - 1996
1997
1987
1984

TOTAL
ATTACKS
21
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
6
30
366
2
27
84
1
1
1
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
3
10
1
3
1
2
3
6
1
1
18
2
5
13
1
1
10
23
49
14
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
285
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
1
7
57
1,189
3
38
352
0
1
0
80
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
4
1
0
1
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
64
0
0
0
0
331
100
1
0
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GROUP
International Anti-Communist Intelligence Service
International Committee Against Nazism
International Communist Brigade
International Communist Group
International Justice Group (Gama'a al-Adela alAlamiya)
International movement of the prolitariat(leftist)
International Proletarian Groups
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)
International Revolutionary Solidarity
International Solidarity
Internationalist Cells
Intifada Martyrs
Into the Blue Commando of the Revolutionary Cells
Iparretarrak (IK)
Iranian Revolution Organization
Iraq's Jihadist Leagues
Iraqi Democratic Front
Iraqi Islamic Vanguards for National Salvation (IIVNS)
Iraqi Liberation Army
Iraqi Mujahideen
Iraqi National Congress (INC)
Iraqi Revolutionary Forces
Iraqi Strugglers' Movement
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM)
Islam Liberation Front
Islambouli Brigades of al-Qa'ida
Islamic Action Organization
Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA)
Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaish al-Islami fi al-Iraq)
Islamic Brotherhood
Islamic Cause Organization
Islamic Companies
Islamic Courts Union (ICU)
Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI)
Islamic Fateh
Islamic Front
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (IFLP)
Islamic Golden Army
Islamic Holy Star
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)
Islamic Jihad Beit-al Maqdis Group
Islamic Jihad Brigades
Islamic Jihad Front
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)
Islamic Jihad Organization (Yemen)

DATES ACTIVE
1978
1979
1978
1984

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
5
1
2

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1
0
0
0

1995
1980
1981
1973 - 1977
1975 - 1988
2000
1988
2000
1986
1980 - 2005
1981
2008 - 2009
1982
1994 - 1999
1981
1980 - 1983
1994
1992
1980
1975 - 2007
1986 - 1992
1970 - 2011
2000
1992 - 1994
2004
1984
1994
2004 - 2009
1991
1983
2006
2005 - 2008
2006
2003
2002 - 2005
1996
1990
1992
1987
2002
1990
2005
2005
2004
1997 - 1998

1
1
1
25
6
1
3
1
2
57
1
3
2
2
1
9
2
4
1
123
21
2,674
1
7
5
1
2
9
1
2
1
12
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
1
0
0
1
41
24
0
4
0
105
16
1,792
0
4
120
0
60
24
0
0
5
8
0
1
14
0
0
0
0
129
0
0
4
7
3
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GROUP
Islamic Jihad Union (Uzbekistan)
Islamic Legion
Islamic Liberation Organization
Islamic Movement for Change
Islamic Movement of Martyrs
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Islamic Movement Organization
Islamic Party (Somalia)
Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK)
Islamic Renewal Movement
Islamic Revenge Organization
Islamic Revival Movement
Islamic Revolutionary Command
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
Islamic Salvation Front (Palestine)
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
Islamic Struggle Front
Islamic Swords of Justice in the Land of Ribat
Islamic Tendency
Islamic Unification Movement
Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front
Issui Kai
Italian Combatents for Alto Adige
Italian Extreme Nationalist Organization
Italian Social Movement (MSI)
Ittehad-i-Islami
Ivorian Popular Front
Jacinto Araujo Internationalist Rebel Insurrectionist
Brigade
Jacques de Molay Group
Jadid Al-Qa`idah Bangladesh (JAQB)
Jagrata Towhidi Janata (Rising Faithfuls)
Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC)
Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansura
Jaish Al-Umma (Army of the Nation)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (Iraq)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
Jamaa Al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya (World Islamist Group)
Jamaat-al-Fuqra
Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh)
Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan)
Jamaica Labor Party
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)
Jamiat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)
January 22nd Group
Japan National Youth Alliance

DATES ACTIVE
2009 - 2011
1990
1986
1996
1996
2000 - 2010
1990 - 1992
2009 - 2010
1992
1995
1991 - 1992
1995
1991
1991 - 1994
1995
2007 - 2011
1990
2006
2006
1985
1991
1991
1980
1979
1976 - 1979
1991 - 1994
1992

TOTAL
ATTACKS
3
1
1
1
1
6
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
153
1
187
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
17
2
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
23
14
0
15
1
12
1
3
0
0
1
2
0
210
0
1,921
0
0
2
21
100
0
0
0
10
0
0

2010
1987
2007
1996
1994 - 1999
2004 - 2005
2008
2006
2000 - 2006
2003 - 2010
2004
1983 - 1990
1991 - 2010
1992 - 2011
1980 - 1997
1996 - 2011
1992 - 1994
1995 - 1996
1984 - 1996
2006 - 2011
1979 - 1981
1992

1
1
3
1
6
2
1
1
32
20
2
5
14
11
2
18
3
3
55
60
2
1

0
0
0
0
1
4
0
0
108
38
36
1
27
12
10
97
5
21
53
29
1
0

439

GROUP
Japan Socialist Youth League Revolutionary Association
Japanese Independence Patriotic Party
Japanese Red Army (JRA)
Jarnail Khalsa
Jarrai
Jarrari
Javier Heraud Revolutionary Commando
Jaysh al-Muslimin (Army of the Muslims)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Jenin Martyrs Brigades
Jerusalem Groups Hebrew (Qvutzot Yerushalayim)
Jewish Action Movement
Jewish Armed Resistance
Jewish Combat Organization
Jewish Committee of Concern
Jewish Defenders
Jewish Defense League (JDL)
Jewish Defense Organization
Jewish Direct Action
Jewish Fighting Organization (Eyal)
Jewish Resistance Assault Team
Jewish Terror
Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT)
Jharkhand Tribal Forces
Jihad Brigades
Jihad Islamic League Front
Jihad Martyr's Companies in Iraq
Jihadi Movement of the Sunna People of Iran
Jonathan Jackson Brigade
Jordanian Islamic Resistance
Jordanian Masses Organization
Jordanian National Liberation Movement
Jordanian Revolutionary and Military Committee
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan Nationalist Movement
Jorge Martinez Association of Combatants
Jose Benito Escobar Workers Federation
Juan Antonio Lavalleja Command
Juan Rayo Guerilla Group
Juarez Cartel (Carrillo-Fuentes / Mexico)
July 14 Movement
July 20th Brigade
Junaid Jihadist Battalion
Jund al-Sahabah Group
Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad
Jund Al-Tawid
Jundallah
June 16 Organization
Just Punishment Brigades
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Justice and Liberty Warriors

DATES ACTIVE
1986
1987
1970 - 1988
1985
1999
1992
1985
2004
2000 - 2009
2004
2002
1979
1971 - 1982
1979
1978
1981
1970 - 1986
1988
1984
1995
1972
1983
2008 - 2011
1992
1987
1997
2004
2008
1970
1997 - 2000
1980
1972
1983
1988 - 1989
1991
1992
1992
1982
2008
1979
2005
2005
2006
2006 - 2008
2010
2006 - 2010
1989
2007
2006 - 2011
1990

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
9
1
1
1
1
1
79
1
1
5
18
1
3
1
81
1
1
1
1
10
5
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
7
1
16
1
1
12
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
3
1
33
2
0
0
0
0
346
0
3
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
1
0
0
8
0
0
2
8
12
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
31
6
0
190
0
1
251
0

440

GROUP
Justice Army for Defenseless Peoples
Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide
Justice Guerrillas
Justice Party
Kabataang Makabayan (KM)
Kach
Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
Kahane Chai
Kaitseliit Paramiltary Group
Kamal Boulander Group
Kamal Udwan Unit of Palestinians
Kampuchean Peoples National Liberation Army
Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO)
Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front
Kanakas
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)
Karabulak Gang
Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF)
Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front (KLNLF)
Karbi National Volunteers (KNV)
Karen National Union
Karenni National Progressive Party
Karnataka State Farmers Association
Kashmir Freedom Force
Kashmiri Hizballah
Kata'ib al-Khoul
Katsina Muslim Society
Katsuhisa Omori
Kawal ng Pilipinas (Soldier of the Philippines)
Kentavros
Kenya African National Union (KANU)
Keshet
Khalid ibn Walid
Khalid ibn Walid Brigade
Khalistan Commando Force
Khalistan Liberation Force
Khalistan Zindabad (Long Live Khalistan)
Khasi Students Union
Khatm-e-Nabuwat (KeN)
Khmer Rouge
Khmer Serei Guerrillas
Khristos Kasimis
Khun Sa Guerrillas
King Street
Kirat Janabadi Workers Party
Kisan Indian Organization
Kisar Liberation Movement
Koetoh Reh
Kokang

DATES ACTIVE
1997
1975 - 1986
1974
1979
1970
1988 - 2005
1988 - 1992
1992 - 1994
1992
1997
1981
1989
2004 - 2009
1984 - 1988
1984
2001 - 2010
2006 - 2011
2010
2007
2006 - 2009
2000
1979 - 2010
1991 - 2005
1996
2003
1991 - 1994
2006 - 2008
1991
1984
2006
1977
1992 - 1997
1988 - 1989
1985
2004
1987 - 1995
1986 - 1999
1994
1992
2010
1978 - 1999
1980
1977 - 1986
1995
1994
2008 - 2011
1986
1986
1984
2009

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
48
1
1
1
12
13
2
1
1
1
1
2
5
2
9
30
1
2
16
2
79
5
1
1
3
2
1
2
1
1
5
7
1
1
20
15
2
2
2
160
1
5
5
1
5
7
1
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
4
34
0
1
0
11
57
0
0
2
1
3
6
4
1
21
6
2
4
24
10
215
27
0
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
5
0
23
0
118
125
10
1
1
361
1
0
3
0
0
8
0
0
34

441

GROUP
Kolla Benjo Cruz Command
Komando Jihad (Indonesian)
Korean Youth League
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
Krause Group
Ku Klux Klan
Kuki Liberation Army (KLA)
Kuki National Army (KNA)
Kuki National Front (KNF)
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iran (KDP)
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP)
Kurdish Islamic Unity Party
Kurdistan Free Life Party
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)
Kurdistan National Union
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
La Paz peasants federation
Laiq Chanio Group of Dacoit Bandits
Landless Peasants' Movement (MST)
Lashkar-e-Balochistan
Lashkar-e-Fidayan-e-Islam
Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Lashkar-e-Omar
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
Lashkari-e-Adam (Army of Adam)
Laskar Jihad
Last Alternative Guerrilla Front
Last Generation
Latin America Anti-Communist Army (LAACA)
Latin American Anti-Fascist Command
Latvian Republic Volunteer Troops
Lavalas Supporters
League for National Democracy
League of Communists
League of French Fighters Against Jewish Occupation
League of the 18
Lebanese Arab Army
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)
Lebanese Free Will Movement
Lebanese Liberation Front
Lebanese National Resistance Front
Lebanese Secret Army
Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization
Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA)
Libardo Moratoro Front
Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac
Liberation Battalion
Liberation Commando Rudolf Hess

DATES ACTIVE
1992
1981
1974
1996 - 2008
1974
1970 - 2008
2003 - 2011
2007 - 2009
2003 - 2008
2002 - 2011
1989 - 1990
1976 - 1998
1995
2008 - 2011
2004 - 2006
1987
1984 - 2011
1984
1992
1991 - 1997
2009 - 2010
2003
2008 - 2011
1996 - 2011
2001 - 2002
1999 - 2011
1991
2002
1996
2000
1974 - 1978
1987
1992
1995
1989
1982
1979
1975
1982
1981 - 1985
1978
1986 - 1988
1983 - 1991
1987
1973 - 1974
1979 - 1988
1992
2001
1987
1986

TOTAL
ATTACKS
2
1
1
27
2
23
4
3
2
2
4
11
1
9
13
2
1,225
1
1
7
2
1
34
37
2
118
1
1
1
1
4
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
8
1
7
28
1
4
12
1
2
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
4
1
44
0
7
0
6
1
11
15
64
2
46
1
0
3,595
0
1
5
0
0
52
569
28
1,002
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
3
4
7
71
1
4
19
0
0
1
0

442

GROUP
Liberation Front of Southern Sudan
Liberation Front of the Senegalese People
Liberation Hawks
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Liberation Youth Coordinating Board
Liberia Peace Council
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
Libyan People's Bureau
Liga Agraria Campesina
Likud Political Party
Lithuanian Land Guard
Lolita Lebron Puerto Rican Liberation Command
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front (LZRF)
Los Barriales
Loyalist Action Force
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF)
Luis Boitel Commandos
LW
M-19 (Movement of April 19)
M-19 Splinter
M-5
M-7
M12J
Maccabee Squad and the Shield of David
Macetos (Paramilitary Group)
Macheteros
Madhesh Rastra Janatantrik Revolutionary - Nepal
Madhesi Liberation Front
Madhesi Mukti Tigers (MMT)
Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF)
Madhesi Virus Killers
Mahan Madhesh Janakantri Party (MMJP)- Nepal
Mahaz-e-Inquilab
Mahaz-e-Milli Islami Afghanistan
Mahdaviyat
Mahdi Army
Mahidi
Mahir Cayan Suicide Group
Major Muhammad Zuhnyn Group
Malaysian Communist Party
Manatari Brotherhood
Mandela Soccer Club
Mano Blanca
MANO-D
Manuel Ascencio Padilla Group
Manuel Gonzales Patriotic Front
Manuel Jose Arce Commando
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)
Maoist Communist Center (MCC)

DATES ACTIVE
1983
1988
1987
1975 - 2010
1991
1995
2002 - 2003
1985
1980
1992 - 1996
1992
1977
1994 - 2011
1980 - 1988
1985
2003
1997 - 2000
1977
2008
1997
1995
1984
1974
1974
1994
1995
1978 - 1998
2009 - 2011
2008
2008 - 2011
2007 - 2011
2008
2009 - 2011
2005
1991
1999
2004 - 2009
1999
1975
1986
1980 - 1988
1994
1989
1978 - 1988
1970
1992
1990
1988
1984 - 1997
1986 - 2009

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
1
1,600
1
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
211
40
1
1
26
9
1
564
1
2
2
1
2
1
37
3
1
6
3
1
4
3
1
1
20
1
1
1
2
1
1
5
1
1
2
6
830
32

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
1
10,838
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
2,049
20
0
0
10
0
0
1,402
0
0
0
0
0
7
6
3
3
0
5
0
0
60
2
1
60
1
0
0
3
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
93
214

443

GROUP
Maoist Communist Party (MKP)
Maoist Farm Laborers Struggle Committee (MXSS)
Mariano Moreno National Liberation Commando
Martyr Abu Ja'far Group
Martyr Ahmad Alishuay B Group
Martyr Ali Nasir group
Martyr Riyad Taha Group
Martyr Sami al-Ghul Brigades
Martyrs Halim Group
Martyrs of Baalbek
Martyrs of La Talanguera
Martyrs of Saad Sayel
Martyrs of Tell Al-Zaltar
Martyrs revenge organization
Maruseido (Marxist Youth League)
Marxist Peoples Fedayeen of Iran
Marxist Resistance Movement
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit
Masad Agents
Masada, Action and Defense Movement
Maskini Liberation Front
Massive escape
Matan Abdulle
Maximiliano Gomez Revolutionary Brigade
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade
May 15th Group
May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
May 19 Communist Order
May 36th Group
May 98th Group
Mazdoor Kisan Sangram Samiti (MKSS)
Medellin Drug Cartel
Meibion Glyndwr
Meinhof-Puig-Antich Group
Merille Militia
Mesopotamian Army (MEZOR)
Mexican Revolutionary Movement
Miguel Angel Cabrera Command
Miguel d'Escoto Brockman Community Movement
Mikhail Kaltezas Anarchist Organization
Milicias Rodriguistas
Militant Argentine Patriots
Militant Forces Against Huntingdon
Militant Movement for Madagascan Socialism
Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists
Militant Zionist Resistance Movement
Militants of the National Action Party
Military Council for the True Liberation of Albania
Military Liberation Front of Colombia
MILPAS Contras

DATES ACTIVE
2004
1994
2005
1980 - 1982
1989
1981
1989
2006
1984
1984
1981
1983
1985
1979
1974
1986
1978
1977 - 1980
1986
1972
1975
1997
1999
1987 - 1988
1980 - 1992
1998
1981 - 1984
1976 - 1985
1991
1998
1999
1991 - 1992
1988 - 1990
1975
2010
1994
1992
1978
1991
1990
1990
1984
2009
1992
2008
1980
1992
1976
1975
1981

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
31
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
6
1
1
3
1
1
14
7
1
3
18
1
2
1
3
31
5
2
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1
6
0
76
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
2
0
27
0
5
7
17
0
0
1
0
0
4
19
0
0
4
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
8
1
0
0
0
0
1
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GROUP
Minority Unity Forum
Minutemen American Defense
Miskito Indian Organization
Misurasata Indian Organization
Mizo National Front
MLA
Mlada Bosna
MNR of the Left
Mohajir National Movement
Mong Thai Army (MTA)
Mongolian Mukti Morcha
Montoneros (Argentina)
Montoneros Patria Libre
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Moro National Liberation Front Splinter group
Moslem Janbaz Force
Moslem Liberation Front
Motherland Party
Movement for Actualization of Biafra
Movement for Cuban Justice (Pragmatistas)
Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD)
Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
Movement for Dignity and Soverignty
Movement for Rebuilding Fatah
Movement for Self-Determination
Movement for the Actualization of Biafra
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
Movement for the Protection of Jerusalem
Movement for the Supremacy of Reason
Movement for Triqui Unification and Struggle
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
Movement of Islamic Action of Iraq
Movement of Niger People for Justice (MNJ)
Movement of the Islamic State (MEI)
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Bolivia)
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Chile)
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Peru)
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Venezuela)
Movement of the Third Reich
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR)
Muhammed Shuqayr Group
Mujahedeen Army
Mujahedeen Brigades
Mujahedeen Corps in Iraq
Mujahedeen Shura Council
Mujahedin Kompak

DATES ACTIVE
1994
2009
1985 - 1994
1983 - 1986
1979 - 1982
1984
2008
1982
1991 - 1995
1991 - 1995
2009
1970 - 1991
1986 - 1989
1983 - 1990
1986 - 2011
1975 - 2009
1992
1990
1979
1994
2001 - 2006
1975
1995
1999 - 2002
2002 - 2006
1994
1983
1995
2007
2006 - 2010
1991
1989
1991
1988 - 2010
1982
2007 - 2008
1994
1979
1976 - 1994
1975 - 1988
1971 - 1973
1981
1988 - 1992
1979 - 1991
1989
2004 - 2006
2004
2004 - 2009
2005 - 2006
2001

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
4
34
14
1
1
1
9
2
1
117
5
7
334
186
1
3
1
1
2
1
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
67
1
1
1
63
2
8
1
1
306
25
2
1
2
199
1
2
1
2
8
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1
2
13
270
24
0
0
0
31
13
1
212
0
31
715
296
1
4
1
1
2
1
0
77
0
0
1
1
14
256
0
0
4
163
1
35
11
0
45
2
0
1
50
2,443
0
3
0
2
67
0

445

GROUP
Mujahideen Islam Pattani
Mujahideen Kashmir
Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)
Mujahideen-I-Khalq (MK)
Mujahidin Ambon
Munadil al-Jumalyi Brigade
Musa Sudi Yalahow Militia
Muslim Brotherhood
Muslim Commando (Iraqi revolutionary brothers)
Muslim Mujahideen
Muslim United Army (MUA)
Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO)
Mustafa Aktas Fighting Unit
Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal
Mutassim Bellah Brigade
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)
Mwakenya Dissident Movement
Naga People’s Council (NPC)
Naga Students Federation
Nahzat e Eslami
Najib Watan Party Faction
Nara Red Army
National Accord Movement
National Alliance (Chad)
National Anti Communist Commando
National Anti-Corruption Front (FNA)
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)
National Awami Party
National Bolshevik Party
National Committee Against Independence (CNCI)
National Committee to Combat Fascism
National Congress for the Defense of the People
National Council for Defense of Democracy (NCDD)
National Council of Maubere Resistance
National Defense Youth Corps
National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
National Democratic Alliance of Sudan
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
National Democratic Front of Liberia
National Democratic Party
National Development Party (NDP)
National Front (Greece)
National Front Against Tigers (NFAT)
National Front for the Liberation of Belgium
National Front for the Liberation of Cuba (FLNC)
National Front for the Salvation of Libya
National Front Security Service
National Independent Committee for Political Prisoners
National Integration Front (FIN)
National League for Democracy (Burma / Myanmar)

DATES ACTIVE
2002 - 2004
1990
2007 - 2009
1972 - 2001
2005
2008
2001
1979 - 1992
1982
1996
2003
1998
1986
2006
2004
1990 - 2002
1989
2008
1994
1991
1992
1990
1995
2008
1984 - 1987
2005
1999
1975
2000
1984 - 1988
1970
2008
1996 - 2003
1996
1978
1995
1999
1992 - 2011
1992
1994
1997
1985
2000 - 2001
1983
1972 - 1976
1984
1992
1980
1972 - 1975
2010

TOTAL
ATTACKS
4
6
24
111
1
1
1
89
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
169
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
5
24
1
1
1
1
86
1
2
1
1
3
1
22
4
1
2
4
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
8
3
57
521
0
0
0
220
0
5
0
1
0
0
0
227
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
65
9
0
0
0
351
0
3
0
0
0
1
2
17
0
0
0
0

446

GROUP
National Liberation Alliance of Sa Kaeo
National Liberation Army (Ecuador)
National Liberation Army (El Salvador)
National Liberation Army (Nepal)
National Liberation Army (NLA) (Macedonia)
National Liberation Army (Peru)
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)
National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi)
National Liberation Front of Chad
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
National Liberation Movement Party
National Liberation People's Front (FPLN)
National Liberation Union
National Movement Against the Mahgreb Invasion
National Movement of Iranian Resistance
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
National People's Movement Coordination Committee
National People’s Party (Rashtriya Janata Dal - RJD)
National Redemption Front
National Renewal Party
National Republican Alliance Party
National Republican Democracy Movement
National Resistance Movement (NRM)
National Revolution
National Revolutionary Command (Umar al-Mukhtar)
National Revolutionary Front
National Salvation Forces Organization
National Socialist Civic Workers Movement
National Socialist Council of Nagaland
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
National Socialist Liberation Front

DATES ACTIVE
2006
1989
1980
2008
2001
1989 - 1990
1970 - 2011
2008 - 2010
1974
1992 - 2011
1980
1994
1989
1988
1984
1975 - 1999
1990 - 1994
1996
2000
2006
1996
1985
1992
1984 - 1985
1985
1986
1989
1981
1988
1984 - 1997
2008 - 2011
2008 - 2011
1975

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
2
1
1
35
2
1,315
26
1
40
1
1
2
1
1
6
16
3
1
1
1
1
1
4
3
3
1
1
2
16
34
16
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
0
17
6
1,700
27
0
207
1
0
0
1
2
3
196
0
0
0
0
6
0
228
0
0
2
1
21
136
28
13
0

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
National United Front of Democracy Against
Dictatorship
National Youth Resistance Organization
National Youth Service of Zimbabwe
Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI)
Nationalist Intervention Group
Nationalist Patriotic Alliance (APN)
Nationalsocialistisk front (NSF)
Nazi Boerestat Party
Nepal Defense Army
Nepal People's Army
Nepali Congress Party (NC)
Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ)
New Armenian Resistance

1978 - 2002

421

2,562

1996

2

0

2009
1973
2002
2005
1975
1984
1999
1990
2008 - 2009
2007
1997
1990
1978 - 1983

1
1
1
1
3
4
1
1
5
1
1
3
12

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
5
2
3
1
2

447

GROUP
New Indigenous Army
New Jewish Defense League
New Order
New Order- France
New Partisans Movement
New Patriotic Party (NPP)
New People's Army (NPA)
New Revolutionary Alternative (NRA)
New Revolutionary Popular Struggle (NELA)
New Ugandan Army
New World Liberation Front (NWLF)
New Year's Gang
Nicaraguan Democratic Anti-Communist Movement
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)
Nicaraguan Resistance
Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Force
Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDDF)
Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF)-Nigeria
Niger Delta Patriotic Force
Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV)
Nihilists Faction
Ninth of June Organzation
Nobles of Jordan
Nordisk Rikspartiet (Nordic National Party)
Northern Diriangen Front (FND)
Northern Epirus Liberation Front (MAVI)
Northern Terror Front
November 10 (Bolivia)
November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO)
November 21 Organization
Nuclear Liberation Front
Nuclei Communist Combattants
Nucleus of Fighting Communists
Nucleus of the Armed Struggle
Number Unobtainable Registered Society
NVF
OAS-MRP
October 11 Group
October Third Movement
October 1980 Group
Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC)
Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
Oglaigh na hEireann
Okinawa Liberation League
Omar Bin Khattab Group
Omar Torrijos Commando for Latin American Dignity
Omega-7
Opposition Jatiya Samajtantrik Del Party

DATES ACTIVE
1994
1978
1977 - 1984
1975 - 1977
1977
1992 - 1996
1970 - 2011
1999
2002
1986
1970 - 1978
1970
1981
1983 - 1987
1987 - 1990
1983 - 1984
2008
2010
2008
2005 - 2009
2006 - 2008
1996 - 2009
1981
2001
1991
1997
1983
1985 - 1986
1983
1975 - 2001
1984
1987
1994
1992
1977
1995
2009 - 2011
1988
1992
1980
1980 - 1981
2000 - 2001
1971 - 1979
2007 - 2009
2008 - 2010
1975
2005
1988 - 1990
1975 - 1983
1994

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
4
2
4
2
2
1,329
1
1
1
87
4
1
889
231
2
1
3
1
4
3
2
8
1
1
3
1
3
1
114
5
1
1
1
1
1
4
6
1
1
3
2
41
6
2
1
1
2
57
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
15
0
0
1
3,417
0
0
1
1
1
0
7,268
588
0
0
0
0
0
19
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
26
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
0
0
48
134
0
0
0
0
4
0

448

GROUP
OPR-33
Orange Volunteers (OV)
Orde Boerevoik
Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (ORDEN)
Organization 544
Organization Alliance of Cuban Intransigence
Organization for Preventing Spread of Nuclear
Weapons
Organization for Purging the Majlis (Parliament)
Organization for the Defense of Detainees Rights
Organization for Liberating France of Jewish
Occupation
Organization for the oppresed in Egypt's Prisons
Organization for Zionist Retribution
Organization of Anti-Fascist Students
Organization of Arab Fedayeen Cells
Organization of Avenging Palestinian Youth
Organization of Mauritanian Nationalists
Organization of Metropolitan Proletariat
Organization of Mujahadin of Islam
Organization of Soldiers of the Levant
Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories
Organization of Volunteers for Puerto Rican Revolution
Organized Comrades for Feminist Counter-Power
Organized Comrads for Communism
Organized Proletarian Communists
Orly Organization
Oromo Liberation Front
Otpor
P.R.E.
Pacific Popular Front
Pacifist and Ecologist Committee
Pakistan Muslim League (PML)
Pakistani People's Party (PPP)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Palestinian Islamic Revolutionary Army
Palestinian Liberation Command
Palestinian Revolution Forces
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)
Pan-Turkish Organization
Panama Defense Force
Panthic Committee
Paraguayan People's Army (EPP)
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity Bangladesh
Partisan Sharpshooters
Party for Democracy anti-nuclear-test protesters
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
Party of National Conciliation

DATES ACTIVE
1972
1998 - 2005
1990
1980
1996
1988

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
11
1
2
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
9
0
0

1981
1980
1991

2
1
1

0
0
0

1980
1990
1990
1976
1988
1979
1984
1989
1989
2005
1974 - 1979
1978 - 1986
1979 - 1981
1979
1977 - 1978
1981 - 1983
1992
1978 - 2000
1981
1995
1982
1997
1990 - 1997
1979 - 1990
1970 - 1985
1990 - 2011
1996
1991
1986
1979 - 1992
1985
1992
1991
2010 - 2011

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
24
3
1
3
9
11
4
1
1
2
1
7
7
179
187
1
1
6
5
1
3
1
7

0
11
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
2
0
1
0
1
0
1
282
4
0
0
0
5
5
13
182
299
4
0
0
6
0
0
0
3

2009
1998
1995
1992 - 2008
1980

1
1
1
39
1

0
0
0
233
1

449

GROUP
Party Unity
Patria Nueva (New Country)
Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty)
Patriotic Command San Jose
Patriotic Liberation Front
Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL)
Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM)
Patriotic Moroccan Front
Patriotic Resistance Army (ERP)
Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI)
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)
Paupa New Guinea Troops
Peace Conquerors
Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU)
Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces
Pedro Leon Arboleda (PLA)
Pemuda Pancasila
Pentagon Kidnap Group
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
People's Alliance
People's Armed Revolutionary Branch
People's Army (Myanmar)
People's Army (Nicaragua)
People's Army's Pioneers
People's Combatants’ Group
People's Command
People's Committee against Police Atrocities
People's Democratic Army
People's Democratic Party (PDP)
People's Democratic Struggle Movement
People's Fatherland Movement
People's Guerrilla Front
People's Guerrilla Movement
People's Information Group
People's Liberation Army
People's Liberation Army (India)
People's Liberation Army (Mexico)
People's Liberation Army (Northern Ireland)
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
People's Liberation Army (United States)
People's Liberation Force
People's Liberation Forces (FPL)
People's Liberation Front (JVP)
People's Liberation Front of India
People's Liberation Front of Niger
People's Liberation Movement
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
People's Military Organization (OMP)
People's Militia of Dagestan

DATES ACTIVE
1997
1980 - 1981
1986
1984
1990
1979
1988 - 1995
1979
1990
2005
1981 - 1997
1977 - 2006
1994
1985
1995 - 1998
1988 - 1990
1977 - 1980
1999
2002
1999 - 2000
1995 - 1996
1978
1979
1979
2001
2000
1986
2009 - 2011
1992
2001 - 2006
2010
1992
1992
1991
1991
1990
1979 - 1997
1974
1975
1999 - 2010
1972
1991
1976 - 1980
1990
2008 - 2011
1985
1981
1988 - 1999
1979
1997

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
3
1
1
5
1
27
1
1
1
7
31
1
1
27
7
7
1
1
9
2
1
6
1
1
1
1
28
4
2
1
8
1
1
1
1
12
1
1
6
1
1
167
434
13
1
3
4
1
2

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
1
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
1
128
29
0
0
302
0
0
0
3
2
0
0
25
1
0
0
0
14
0
1
0
0
8
0
0
2
29
1
1
12
0
0
124
891
12
3
0
15
3
0

450

GROUP
People's National Liberation Movement
People's Rebellion
People's Resistance Organized Army
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) (El Salvador)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) (Mexico)
People's Revolutionary Command (CRP)
People's Revolutionary Militias (MRP)
People's Revolutionary Organization
People's Revolutionary Organization- Colombia (ORP)
People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
People's Revolutionary Union
People's Revoultionary Party
People's Sovereignty Party (PDR)
People's Tamil Organization
People's Temple
People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO)
People's United Liberation Front (PULF)
People's War Group (PWG)
Peoples' Brigade For A Healthy Genetic Future
Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)
Personnel of the National Information Center
Peru's Anti-Terrorist Command
Peruvian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAP)
Pessach Group
Peykar
Phalange
Plowshares
Policarpa Salauarpieta (Women's Command)
Polisario Front
Polish Revolutionary Home Army
Political Military Organization of Paraguay
Politico-Military Revolutionary Command
Poor People's Party
Popular Anti-Communist Militias
Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy
Popular Army Vanguards- Battalions of Return
Popular Democratic Movement (MPD)
Popular Forces of April 25
Popular Front for Justice in the Congo
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Gen Cmd
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Sahara
Popular Leberation Front Urban Commando
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)
Popular Liberation Army (Puerto Rico)
Popular Liberation Front
Popular Liberation Resistance Force
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

DATES ACTIVE
1994
1991
1974
1997 - 2005
1974 - 1979
1998 - 2007
1978 - 1986
1983 - 1984
1992 - 1996
1983 - 1984
1975
2003 - 2010
1980
1971
1999
2006
1978
2006
2008 - 2011
1989 - 1993
1981
1970 - 1974
1979
1991
1978
1981
1982
1978 - 1992
1983
1979
1976 - 1987
1982
1976
1978
1985 - 1990
1980
2007
2001
1992
1980 - 1986
2009
1970 - 2011
1970 - 2008
1994
1994
1973 - 2005
1991
1981
1989
1989 - 1996

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
1
9
65
4
10
2
14
2
1
10
1
1
1
2
1
1
7
93
1
9
1
1
1
2
1
4
1
1
19
1
1
1
2
3
1
2
1
47
5
146
6
1
1
261
4
1
6
9

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
2
1
48
3
0
3
1
3
0
1
0
0
0
6
5
0
5
392
0
6
0
17
0
0
0
5
0
0
220
0
0
0
0
3
1
1
0
10
1
186
156
40
0
524
0
0
0
54

451

GROUP
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda
Popular Rage
Popular Resistance (Laiki Antistasi)
Popular Resistance Army (PRA)
Popular Resistance Committees
Popular Resistance Front (FPR)
Popular Resistance Sabotage Group
Popular Revolutionary Action
Popular Revolutionary Army
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR)
Popular Revolutionary Commandos
Popular Revolutionary Movement (Colombia)
Popular Revolutionary Movement (Italy)
Popular Revolutionary Resistance Group
Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR)
Popular Will (Greece)
Porattom
PORE
Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement
Portuguese Liberation Army
Posse Comitatus
Poverty Brigade
Praveen Dalam
Presidential Movement (MP) Militiamen
Prima Linea
Prisoner Gourgen Yanikian Group
Prisoner's Action Force
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Proletarian Action Group
Proletarian Armed Squads
Proletarian Combatants for Communism
Proletarian communist commandos
Proletarian Division - Army of Communist Liberation
Proletarian Fighting Brigades
Proletarian Fighting Patrol
Proletarian Initiative and Offensive for W. Europe
Proletarian Nuclei for Communism
Proletarian Nucleus
Proletarian Patrols
Proletarian Resistance Movement
Proletarian Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP)
Prolitarian Internationalism
Protectors of Islam Brigade
Protestant Action Group
Provisional Coordinating Committee - Defense of Labor
Puerto Rican Armed Resistance
Puerto Rican Liberation Front
Puerto Rican Resistance Movement
Puerto Rican Revolutionary Movement
Puka Inti Maoist Communist Party

DATES ACTIVE
1979
1990
2002
1981
2000 - 2011
1989
1974
2003
1996 - 1997
1978 - 1982
1991
1977
1979
1972
1970 - 1976
2008 -2010
2002
1977
1976
1975
1983
1986
2003
1994
1977 - 1981
1975
1980
2008
1973 - 1985
1977
1978
1980
1979
1977
1979
1985
2003 - 2004
1978
1977 - 1980
1976
1985
1976
2005
1974 - 1975
1982
1980 - 1981
1971
1970 - 1971
1972
1994

TOTAL
ATTACKS
2
4
2
1
50
1
2
1
17
38
2
1
2
1
5
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
58
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
7
1
2
1
10
1
2
1
1
5
4
5
2
3
5
2

TOTAL
FATALITIES
18
0
0
5
28
25
0
0
20
39
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
1
2
16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
6
0
1
0
0
0
0

452

GROUP
Punitive Leftist Front
Purbo Banglar Communist Party
Quartermoon society
Quintin Lame
Rabbi Rahane Group
Rabid Brothers of Giuliani
Radical Communist Armed Nucleus
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA)
Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement
Rajneeshees
Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD)
Ramzi Nahra Martyr Organization
Ranbir Sena
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
Rastriya Janashakti Party (RJP)
Raul Sendic International Brigade
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)
Real Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) - Northern Ireland
Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR)
Rebellious Group Lambros Foundas
Red Army Faction (RAF)
Red Army for the Liberation of Catalonia
Red Brigades
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC)
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Union (BR-UCC)
Red Cell
Red Commandos
Red Dawn Front (Frente Amanecer Rojo)
Red Flag
Red Flag (Venezuela)
Red Flying Squad
Red Guard
Red Guerilla Family
Red Guerrilla
Red Hand Commandos
Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Red June
Red June of 14 June
Red Line
Red Patriots Group
Red Resistance Front
Red Revolutionary Front
Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO)
Red Tribune
Reform of the Armed Forces Movement
Regulators
Republic of New Afrika
Republic of Texas
Republican Action Force
Republican Anticlerical Group

DATES ACTIVE
1992
1995 - 2011
1970 - 1971
1985 - 1989
1982
2002
1977
1997
2005
1984
2006
2002
1996 - 2009
2003 - 2009
2008
1974
1998 - 2011
2010
1970 - 1989
2010
1978 - 1991
1987
1974 - 2002
1983 - 2003
1986
1973 - 1978
1992
1992
1974
1972 - 1996
1978 - 1980
1978
1975 - 1976
1977 - 1979
1972 - 1995
1999 - 2003
1980
1973
1999
1984
1978
1985 - 1986
2008 - 2010
1978
1989 - 1991
1971
1972 - 1973
1997
1975 - 1977
1997

TOTAL
ATTACKS
5
19
2
15
1
1
1
6
3
4
1
1
15
3
1
1
41
3
36
1
68
2
221
7
1
5
1
2
1
25
3
3
4
7
10
19
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
9
1
2
1
6
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1
46
0
58
0
0
0
84
9
0
0
0
95
1
1
1
33
0
43
1
19
1
79
4
0
0
1
0
1
47
1
0
0
0
10
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
0
0
0
10
0
24
0

453

GROUP
Republican People's Party
Resistance Cell
Resistance Movement
Resistance Movement of the Union of Revolt Workers
Resistance, Liberation and Independence Organisation
Resistenza
Resistenza Corsa
Revenge of the Trees
Revolted Persons of the Polytech School
Revolutionaries of the Streets
Revolutionary Action
Revolutionary Action Front
Revolutionary Action Groups
Revolutionary Action of Liberation
Revolutionary Action Organization Arab Resistance
Front
Revolutionary Action Party
Revolutionary Anarchist Armed Terrorist Movement
Revolutionary Anti-Capitalist Initiative
Revolutionary Anti-Racist Action
Revolutionary Arab Youth Organization
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)
Revolutionary Armed Forces for Liberation of Colombia
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Nicaragua (FARN)
Revolutionary Armed Forces- Argentina (FAR-A)
Revolutionary Armed Organization
Revolutionary Army
Revolutionary Autonomous Group
Revolutionary Bolivariano Movement 200
Revolutionary Cells
Revolutionary Cells (Argentina)
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade
Revolutionary Christians of the Cedars
Revolutionary Combat Brigades
Revolutionary Commandos of Solidarity
Revolutionary Commandos of the People (CRP)
Revolutionary Committee for Counter Force
Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO)
Revolutionary Communist Armed Nuclei
Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) (Spain)
Revolutionary Communist Party
Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade (RCYB)
Revolutionary Continuity
Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses
Revolutionary Eelam Organization (EROS)
Revolutionary Fighting Group 80
Revolutionary Flames
Revolutionary Force
Revolutionary Force 26

DATES ACTIVE
1979
2004
1990
1990
1972
1990 - 1996
2003
2000
1996
2000
1977
1977
1980
2006 - 2007

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
1
1
1
73
4
1
1
1
7
2
1
4

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1990
1970
1978
1981
1990 - 1991
1974
1983 - 1986
1984
1975 - 2011
1981 - 1983
1970 - 1973
1988
1978
1985
1992 - 1996
1973 - 1992
2009 - 2010
2003 - 2007
1985
1997
1977
1977 - 1980
1980
1971
1981
1971 - 1973
1978
1981
2010
1980
1986 - 1988
1980
1990
2002
1970

2
2
1
2
3
1
2
1
1,984
6
5
3
1
1
2
59
2
2
1
1
3
10
1
1
1
9
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2

0
0
0
0
0
0
31
0
5,032
100
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
44
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

454

GROUP
Revolutionary Force 9
Revolutionary Force Seven
Revolutionary Forces for the Liberation of Iraq
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
Revolutionary Front Hatian Advancement and Progress
Revolutionary Front for National Liberation
Revolutionary Headquarters (Turkey)
Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity
Revolutionary Labor Commandos
Revolutionary Labor Organization
Revolutionary Leninist Brigades
Revolutionary Liberation Action (Epanastatiki
Apelevtherotiki Drasi) - Greece
Revolutionary Liberation Cells
Revolutionary Militant Left organization
Revolutionary Military Council
Revolutionary Movement
Revolutionary Movement of People in Arms
Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
Revolutionary Nuclei
Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA)
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems
Revolutionary Patriotic Anti-Fascist Front (FRAP)
Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)
Revolutionary Peoples Army
Revolutionary Perspective
Revolutionary Popular Left
Revolutionary Proletarian Army
Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)
Revolutionary Road
Revolutionary Security Apparatus
Revolutionary Solidarity
Revolutionary Struggle
Revolutionary Student Brigade
Revolutionary Student Front
Revolutionary Student Movement (MER)
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Revolutionary United Front Movement
Revolutionary Vanguard
Revolutionary Violence Units
Revolutionary Voice of the People (VPR)
Revolutionary Worker Clandestine Union Peoples Party
Revolutionary Workers Party
Revolutionary Workers Party of Bolivia (PRTB)
Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo)
Rezi Rezai International Brigades
Ricardo Franco Front (Dissident FARC)
RIF Popular Front
Right Wing National Youth Front
Rightist supporters of Democratic Alliance

DATES ACTIVE
1970
1970
1980
1989 - 2007
1994
1983
2009
1975
1982
1990
2000

TOTAL
ATTACKS
3
5
1
12
4
6
1
3
1
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
112
39
0
3
0
0
0
0

2009 - 2010
1986
1985
1997
1989
1989
1980
1996 - 2009
1979 - 1990
1984 - 1985
1973 - 1978
1976 - 1995
1973
2001 - 2011
1980 - 1996
1997
2000 - 2001
1979
1992
1983 - 1990
1997 - 2010
1980
1973
1979
1994 - 2000
1989
1974 - 1975
2001
1995
1990 - 1991
1977 - 1985
1978 - 1980
1978 - 2003
1976
1984 - 1988
1979
1980
1980

3
1
1
1
1
1
1
13
117
5
49
90
2
3
7
1
2
1
2
4
23
1
3
1
57
1
2
1
2
3
10
3
24
1
63
1
1
1

0
25
0
0
0
1
0
1
287
2
7
2
0
0
0
1
0
1
4
1
1
0
1
0
507
0
0
0
0
2
4
0
7
0
69
0
0
0

455

GROUP
Rival Bangledesh Chhatra League Faction
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage
Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
Rizvon Sadirov Group
Roberto Santucho Revolutionary Group
Robin Food
Robin Garcia Student Front
Rodrigo Franco Command
Rohingya Solidarity Organization
Roque Dalton Commando
ROSADO-SOTO Command
Rote Zora
Ruminahui Front
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)
RVA
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)
Rwenzururu Rebels
RYF
S. O. S. France
Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF)
Saffron Tigers
Sagrado Corazon Fanatic Group
Saharan Revolutionary Armed Front (FARS)
Saif-ul-Muslimeen
SAIOA
Salafi Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq Army
Salafi Daawa Group
Salafia Jihadia
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)
Salah al-Din Squad
Sammilito Sangskritik Jote (Alliance of Cultural Forums)
Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
Sandinist People's Army (EPS)
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
Sandval (union) Movement
Sanidila Secessionist Movement
Saor Eire (Irish Republican Group)
Sardinian Autonomy Movement
Saudi Hizballah
Save Kashmir Movement
Save Our Israel Land
Save Uganda Movement
Scheutzen group
Schiedam Youth Front
Scottish National Liberation Army
Scottish Socialist Republican League
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society
Seattle Liberation Front
Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA)
Secret Army Organization

DATES ACTIVE
1995

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1

2002 - 2011
1997
1976
1998 - 1999
1982
1988 - 1991
1992
1981
1979
1977 - 1995
1983
2008 - 2011
1974
1992 - 1995
1990
1971
1986
2007 - 2008
1985
1985
1997
2003
1973
2006 - 2010
2004
2003
1998 - 2007
1986
1994
2008 - 2011
1983 - 1985
1970 1994
1977 - 1978
1970 - 1971
2002
1996
2002 - 2004
1976
1979
1984
1986
1983 - 2002
1981
1986
1970
1978 - 1989
1972

10
2
1
4
1
15
1
1
1
2
1
24
1
11
2
3
1
4
1
1
3
1
1
2
1
5
214
1
1
11
4
209
1
2
2
1
1
3
3
3
1
1
7
2
1
1
19
3

497
1
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
153
11
0
4
19
2
4
32
0
0
3
1
43
594
0
0
2
1
228
0
0
2
0
19
10
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
11
0

456

GROUP
Secret Cuban Government
Secret Organization of al-Qa’ida in Europe
Secret Organization Zero
Sect of Revolutionaries (Greece)
Seiji Kesha Kokuyukai
Seikijuku
Sekihotai
Self Defense Forces
Self-Defense Against All Authority
Senki ("Battle Flag")
September 11th Group
September 11 Commandos
September 17 Organization
Serb Radical Party
Servants of Islam Organization
SFT
Shahid Khalsa Force
Shahin (Falcon)
Sham 'unite
Shan State Army
Shan State Progressive Party
Shan United Revolutionary Army
Shanti Bahini - Peace Force
Sharivad 17 Tal-Al-Za'atar(Sept 17 Tal-Al-Za'atar)
Sharp Sword Organization
Shaykh Hassan Khalid Forces
Shaykh Subhi Al-Salih Forces
Shield of Islam Brigade
Shining Path (SL)
Shinwari Tribe
Shonkonjuku Group
Siah KAL
Sicarii
Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB)
Sindho Desh Liberation Army (SDLA)
Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
Sipah-I-Mohammed
Sirri Powz
Sisters in Arms
Sixth of March Group
SKIF Detachment
Social Christian Party (PSC)
Social Resistance
Socialist Chhatra League
Socialist Labor Party of Lebanon
Socialist Patients' Collective (SPK)
Socialist Recovery Movement
Socialist Revolutionary Brigade
Socialist-Nationalist Front (SNF)
Soldiers of the Algerian Opposition

DATES ACTIVE
1971 - 1973
2005
1974 - 1975
2009 - 2010
1990
1990 - 1991
1988 - 1990
1996
1980
1983 - 1986
2001 - 2003
1986 - 1990
1984
2000
1992
1970
1997
1992
1980
1989 - 2008
1979
2003
1986 - 1997
1979
1984
1989
1988 - 1989
2010
1979 - 2010
1996
1991
1970
1989
1986 - 2003
2010 - 2011
1990 - 2006
1996 - 2004
2007
2010
1975
1999
1996
1988 - 1990
1994
1976
1970 - 1975
1992
1989
1988
1975

TOTAL
ATTACKS
8
4
2
3
1
3
2
1
1
8
4
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
6
11
5
99
1
1
1
18
2
4,518
1
1
1
4
206
6
18
2
1
1
1
2
1
9
1
1
3
1
1
1
3

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
56
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
16
34
12
436
0
0
0
4
0
11,665
15
0
0
1
379
0
55
41
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
0
0
0
0

457

GROUP
Soldiers of Truth
Solidarist Resistance Movement
Solidarity with imprisoned members of Action Directe
Somali Islamic Front
Somali National Alliance
Somali National Movement
Somali Patriotic Movement
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
Somali Salvation Front (SSF)
Sons of Liberty
Sons of the Gestapo
Sons of the South
Sons of the South (Shiite Muslim Group)
South African Liberation Support Cadre (SALSC)
South Lebanon Army
South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV)
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
South Sudan Liberation Army
Southern Mobility Movement (Yemen)
Southern Nucleus of Communist Counterpower
Southern Sierra Peasant Organization
Sovereign Panama Patriotic Front
Spanish Armed Group
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist)
Spanish Falange
Spanish International Communist Party
Spanish National Action
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
Squadrons of Terror (Katibat El Ahoual)
St. Kitts Nevis Labor Party
State Council of Indian and Peasant Organization
Stop the War Coalition
Struggle Against Misery and Exploitation of Peasants
Student Front of the People
Student Revolutionary Front (FER)
Students for a Democratic Society
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (German)
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)
Sudan Alliance Forces
Sudan Liberation Movement
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)
Sudanese Alliance Forces
Sudanese People's Liberation Forces
Sudtiroler Volkspartei-south tyrol people's party
Suicide Squad
Sungu
Sunni Supporters
Support for Refugees (Appui aux Refugies)
Support of Ocalan-The Hawks of Thrace
Supporters of leftist Gana-Oikya Front

DATES ACTIVE
1988 - 1989
1977
2006
2008 - 2009
1992 - 1994
1988 - 1991
1991
1983
1981
1971
1995
1984
1980
1981
1991
2001
1975 - 1988
2011
2010
1978
1994 - 1995
1992
1979 - 1980
1978 - 1982
1980
1979
1979
2001 - 2002
2000
1995
1995
1970
1989
1981
1980
1971
1970
2001 - 2010
1996 - 1997
2007 - 2010
1996 - 2011
1996
1988 - 1989
1988
1986
2007
2006 - 2011
1979
1999
1992

TOTAL
ATTACKS
7
2
2
3
2
6
1
1
8
2
1
1
1
3
1
1
63
3
11
1
2
1
4
11
1
1
5
3
2
1
1
1
2
4
1
1
1
15
3
8
42
1
5
4
3
1
3
1
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
1
0
31
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
92
20
9
0
0
0
1
13
1
0
2
143
7
0
2
0
2
4
0
0
0
104
24
17
187
15
32
0
0
5
79
0
0
2

458

GROUP
Supporters of Right and Freedom
Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Supreme Islamic Council
Suriname Liberation Front
Survivors of Golfech
Survivors of Hama
Swatantra Nepal Dal
Swaziland Youth Congress (Swayoco)
Sword of Islam
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA)
Sympathizers of Al-Qa`ida Organization
Syndicalist Action Groups
Syrian Battle Front
Syrian Mujahideen
Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Syrian Terror
SYS
Taihikai (Great Sadness)
Taikosha, right wing group
Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus)
Taliban
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)
Tamil Liberation Army
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)
Tamil Nadu Liberation Army
Tanyus Shanin Armed Unit
Tanzim
Tawhid and Jihad
Tayeb Al-Afghani's Islamist Group
Tehreek-e-Jehad-e-Islami
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
Tehrik al-Mojahedin
Tehrik-e-Galba Islam
Tehrik-e-Tuhafaz (Pakistan)
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Temple Mount Faithful Movement
Terai Army
Terai Cobra
Terai Janatantrik Madhes Party
Terai Janatantrik Party
Terai Rastriya Mukti Sena (TRMS)
Terra Lliure
Territorial Anti-Fascist Patrols
Territorial Armed Groups for Communism
Territorial Cells for Boycotting the Elections
Territorial Communist Command
Territorial Communist Units
Territorial Patrols of Anti-Fascist Vigilance
Territorial Resistance Army

DATES ACTIVE
1986
2009
1992 - 2005
1986
1994
1981 - 1982
1989
2010
2003
1999
1973 - 1975
2002
1978
1983
1987
1979 - 2008
1981
1986
1994
1991
2000 - 2005
1995 - 2011
1984 - 1989
1997
2008
1995
1987
2001 - 2005
2004 - 2011
1991
2003
2007 - 2008
1997 - 2003
2009 - 2010
2010
2007 - 2011
1991
2007 - 2009
2008
2010
2010
2009
1991 - 1992
1980
1980
1979
1979
1977
1980
1979

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
2
10
1
1
7
1
1
1
1
7
4
2
1
1
7
1
2
1
1
5
2,049
9
2
2
2
1
5
19
1
1
2
2
2
2
208
1
9
2
1
1
1
62
1
1
1
1
1
1
3

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
31
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
22
0
33
0
0
49
5,673
158
0
3
0
2
4
159
15
3
1
2
2
0
1,636
0
8
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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GROUP
Terror Against Terror
Terrorists Guerrilla Group
Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee (TJSC)
The al-Aqsa-Group
The Aref Boluki Dynamite group
The Armed Secret Organization
The Black Sun
The Call of Jesus Christ
The Eradication of Evil
The Extraditables
The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave
The Great Serpent
The Husayn Ubayyat Martyrs’ Brigades
The Illegal Fisherman of the Night
The Inevitables
The Islamic Movement
The Islamic Revolution to Liberate Palestine
The Jean Marc Rouillan Armed and Heartless Columns
The Jewish Execution with Silence
The Joint Revolutionary Council
The Justice Department
The Mukti Bahini
The Nation's Army
The Northern Alliance of Afghanistan
The Order (Silent Brotherhood)
The Order II (Bruder Schweigen Strike Force II)
The Ordinary Men
The Organization for the Return of Legality
The Scorpion
The Unit of the Chemical Weapons Martyrs
The United Revolutionary Front of Bhutan
The United Southern Front
The War That Was Never Declared
The World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI)
Thomas Muenzer Wild Band
Three Stars Autonomous Commando
Thunder of Zion
Tigers
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)
Tonino Micciche Workers Nucleus
Tontons Macoutes
Tony El Pelou Band
Tribal Battlefront
Tribal Thumb
Trinitarians
Tripoli Martyrs Battalion
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)
Tritiya Prastuti Committee (India)
Tulawie Clan
Tunisian Armed Resistance

DATES ACTIVE
1983 - 1984
2010
2009
1982
1983
1981
2009
1986
1982
1988 - 1999
1999 - 2002
1979
2000
1986
2003
1994
2000
2008
1979
2006 - 2010
1999 - 2010
1981
2008
1999
1983 - 1984
1986
1985
1996
1975
1989
2008
1981
2003
1970
1991
1981
1981
1998
1976 - 1990
1977
1991
1971
1977 - 1978
1975
1978
1989
1984 - 1988
2009 - 2011
1995
1980

TOTAL
ATTACKS
7
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
110
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
15
1
1
4
8
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
1
1
2
6
1
1
2
29
9
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
182
21
3
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
14
0
6
0
4
1
0
0
0
0
6
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
317
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
149
3
6
41

460

GROUP
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)
Tupamaro Revolutionary Movement
Tupamaros (Uruguay)
Turkestan Islamic Party
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)
Turkish Communist Workers Party
Turkish Hizballah
Turkish Islamic Commandos
Turkish Islamic Jihad
Turkish Marxist Workers Party
Turkish National Intelligence Organization
Turkish People's Liberation Army
Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF)(THKP-C)
Turkish Revenge Brigade
Turks of Western Thrace
Tyrolean Defense League
Uganda Democratic Christian Army (UDCA)
Uganda Federal Army
Uganda Federal Democratic Alliance (UFEDA)
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM)
Uganda People's Army
Ugandan People's Democratic Army
Uighur Liberation Organization
Ukrainian Liberation Front
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Umar al-Mukhtar Martyr Forces
Umbane People's Liberation Army (Swaziland)
Ummah Liberation Army
Unidad Militar Bolivariana
Unified Kurdish Socialist Party
Unified Workers Command
Union Du People Corse
Union Guerrera Blanca (UGB)
Union of Chadian Forces (UFNT)
Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)
Union of Democratic Forces
Union of Forces for Democracy and Development
Union of Galilee Christians
Union of Peaceful Citizens of Algeria
Union of Revolutionary Communists in Turkey (TIKB)
Union of the People (UDP)
Union of the Peoples of the Arabian Peninsula
Union of Young Kurdish Revolutionaries
Union Parishad
Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC)
United Action Council
United Arab Revolution
United Democratic Front (UDF)

DATES ACTIVE
1984 - 1997
1991 - 1992
1999 - 2001
1970 -1971
2008
1990 - 2003
1991 - 1992
1992 - 2001
1990
1991
1987
1994
1971 - 1980
1970 - 1991
1996
1994
1979
1994
1988
1996
1981 - 1985
1985 - 1990
1989
2000 - 2011
1980
1974 - 2007
1974 - 2005
2000
2008
1999
1989
1981
1978
1980
1976 - 1980
2007
2003
1998
2006 - 2009
1986
1994
1999
1977 - 1978
1979
1992
2007
1980
1994
1986
1985 - 1986

TOTAL
ATTACKS
561
22
4
41
2
29
3
6
1
2
1
1
69
36
1
1
1
1
1
1
19
15
1
4
1
252
261
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
14
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
21
1
1
1
1
3
1
2

TOTAL
FATALITIES
560
5
0
4
3
19
2
9
2
1
0
1
17
27
1
0
0
2
1
1
44
136
28
21
0
147
363
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18
17
0
0
103
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
0
0
6

461

GROUP
United Democratic Liberation Army (UDLA)
United Democratic Terai Liberation Front (UDTLF)
United Freedom Front (UFF)
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship
United Front for Democratic Change (FUC)
United Front for Nigeria's Liberation (UFNL)
United Jewish Underground
United Jihad Council
United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) - India
United Liberation Front for the New Algeria
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
United Liberation Front of Barak Valley - India
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
United Liberation Torchbearers Forces
United Nasirite Organizaiton
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
United National Party
United Nicaraguan Opposition
United People's Democratic Front Bangladesh
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
United People's Front
United Popular Action Front (FAPU)
United Popular Action Movement
United Popular Liberation Army of America
United Revolutionary Front
United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC)
United Somali Congress
United Students Forum
United Wa State Army
Universal Liberation Front
Universal Proutist Revolutionary Federation
UNLF (Uganda National Liberation Front)
Up the IRS, Inc
Urhobo Revolutionary Army
Usbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans)
Valais Group Against Hydro-Rhone
Vandalicia Teodoro Suarez
Vanguard of Red Youth (AKM)
Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF)
Venezuela Cartel
Vengence Party
Vietnamese Organization to Exterminate Communists
Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors
Village League
Vincente Mecha Revolutionary Christians
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
Viviana Gallardo Command
Volunteers of Innocent People of Nagas (VIPN)
Vyborg Brigade
Wahhabi Movement

DATES ACTIVE
2011
2008
1975 - 1984
2010
2006
1996
1982
2005
2010
1976
1988 - 2011
2010
1994
1985
1986
2003 - 2010
1994 - 1997
1986
2009
2000 - 2006
1992
1978 - 1980
1983 - 1994
1974
1989
1999 - 2009
1990 - 1992
1994
1995
1977
1977
1981
1986 - 1991
2009
2000
1985
2010
2003
1996
1991
1985
1981 - 1987
1999 - 2004
1982
1981
1999 - 2001
1996
2010
1977
2010

TOTAL
ATTACKS
3
1
29
21
4
1
1
1
3
1
244
1
2
5
1
7
2
5
1
6
1
13
109
1
2
41
1
1
1
2
2
1
8
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
4
2
1
1
5
1
1
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
3
0
0
0
0
14
0
15
1
0
599
0
0
6
0
9
2
8
0
15
0
13
19
0
0
170
2
6
6
0
0
4
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
23
1
4
1
0
0
3
0
0
0
1

462

GROUP
Waltraud Boock Group
We Who Built Sweden
Weather Underground, Weathermen
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)
West Side Boys
Western Somalia Liberation Front
White Guard
White Legion (Ecuador)
White Legion (Georgia)
White Liberation Army
White Panther Party
White Wolves
White Wolves (UK)
Wild Cats
Wild Geese of the Cities
Wit Kommando
Wolves of Islam
Worker Autonomy, Continuous Struggle
Worker Counterpower
Worker's Brigade
Workers Brigade for Communism
Workers Power
Workers' Forces of Liberation
Workers' Organization for Communism
Workers' Revolutionary Party
Workers' Self-Defense Movement (MAO)
Working People's Alliance (WPA)
World Church of the Creator
World Punishment Organization
Yamaguchi-Gumi Gang
Yatama
Yazbik Revolutionary Organization
Yellow Organization of Air Force Officers
Yich Telga
Yokoku Seiwa-Kai
Young Brigade of Navarro
Young Communist League
Young Cuba
Young Liberators of Pattani
Young Officer Union Reformist Armed Forces Philippines
Young Pioneers
Youth Action Group
Youth for Revolution
Youth of Islamic Awakening
Youths of Ali Movement
Zairean Socialist Party
Zapatista National Liberation Army
Zarate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation
Zebra killers

DATES ACTIVE
1976 - 1977
1997
1970 - 1975
1995 - 1996
2000
1983
1994
2003
1997 - 1998
1990
1970
1988 - 1992
1999
1979
1985
1980
1998
1977
1977
1985
1981
1976
1989
1978 - 1980
1988
1978 - 1981
1980
1999
1982
1983
1992
1984
1984
1992
1992
1977
2007 - 2009
1972
2002

TOTAL
ATTACKS
3
1
45
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
11
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
6
1
1
2
1
15
1
6
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
11
2
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1
0
0
10
0
0
1
0
18
0
0
7
2
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
3
1
3
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

2006
1992
1974 - 1976
1992
1999
1986
1984
1988 - 2010
1988 - 1990
1973 - 1974

1
1
6
1
1
2
2
24
5
20

0
2
0
0
0
1
2
91
2
15

463

GROUP
Zemun Clan
Zero Point
Zero Tolerance
Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)
Zimbabwe African People's Union
Zimbabwe Patriotic Front
Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)
Zionist Resistance Fighters
Zviadists

DATES ACTIVE
2003
1973
2009 - 2010
1978 - 2002
1978 - 1983
1978 - 1980
1978 - 1979
1999
1998

TOTAL
ATTACKS
1
1
2
21
13
9
2
1
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
0
0
0
26
143
15
0
1
0

Summary of yearly statistics in mass-casualty and suicide terrorist attacks: 1972 – 2011

Appendix C:

This Appendix summarises the yearly statistics in mass-casualty and suicide attacks by terrorist groups between 1972 and 2011. The two tables
summarise the total yearly number of attacks, the numbers of mass casualty attacks resulting in over 50 fatalities, the numbers of major mass
casualty attacks resulting in over 100 fatalities, the total number of fatalities per year and a summary of the locations of such attacks for each year.
All statistics in this Appendix have been derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and exclude attacks where the GTD listed the
perpetrator as ‘Unknown’. Complete details of the statistics summarised below are held on file by the author.

Table 1:

Summary of yearly statistics in non-suicide mass-casualty attacks: 1972 - 2011

YEAR
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

TOTAL MASS
CASUALTY
NON SUICIDE
ATTACKS
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
3
6
8
13

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 50
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
3
5
8
10

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 100
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
3

TOTAL
FATALITIES
81
0
88
92
73
100
430
208
618
635
1,138

1983

35

24

11

3,242

LOCATIONS OF ATTACKS
South Vietnam (1)
0
Greece (1)
Argentina (1)
Barbados (1)
Malaysia (1)
Iran (1)
Ethiopia (1), Rhodesia (1), Syria (1)
El Salvador (4), Colombia (1), Italy (1)
El Salvador (3), Guatemala (2), Egypt (1), Iran (1), Syria (1)
El Salvador (7), Guatemala (2), Nicaragua (2), Iran (1), Iraq (1)
Nicaragua (17), Peru (5), El Salvador (4), Angola (3), Peru (1), Uganda (1), United Arab Emirates
(1)

465

YEAR

TOTAL MASS
CASUALTY
NON SUICIDE
ATTACKS

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 50

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 100

TOTAL
FATALITIES

1984

28

17

11

3,268

1985
1986

19
7

16
4

3
3

1,679
856

1987
1988
1989
1990

14
4
11
10

10
3
9
8

4
1
2
2

1,442
477
840
817

1991

13

11

2

1,067

1992
1993

16
0

11
0

5
0

1,415
0

1994

16

13

3

2,558

1995
1996
1997

10
11
20

6
8
13

4
3
7

937
1,500
2,326

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

13
10
3
4
5
2
9
3

5
9
2
2
0
2
6
2

8
1
1
2
5
0
3
1

1,874
755
334
510
660
170
1,365
268

LOCATIONS OF ATTACKS
Nicaragua (14), El Salvador (4), Sri Lanka (3), Peru (2), Angola (1), Ethiopia (1), Philippines (1),
Sudan (1), Uganda (1)
Nicaragua (7), Lebanon (3), El Salvador (2), Mozambique (2), Sri Lanka (2), Canada (1), Colombia
(1), Greece (1), Namibia (1), Peru (1)
Mozambique (2), Nicaragua (2), Angola (1), El Salvador (1), Saudi Arabia (1)
Sri Lanka (3), India (2), Mozambique (2), El Salvador (1), Guatemala (1), Lebanon (1), Pakistan
(1), Myanmar (1)
Angola (1), Great Britain (1), Lebanon (1), Peru (1)
Sri Lanka (4), Mozambique (2), Peru (2), Colombia (1), Indonesia (1), Niger (1)
Sri Lanka (4), Peru (2), El Salvador (1), Mozambique (1)
Peru (4), Sri Lanka (3), Ethiopia (2), Croatia (1), Angola (1), Burundi (1), Haiti (1), India (1), Sierra
Leone (1)
Djbouti (2), Ethiopia (2), Sri Lanka (2), Turkey (2), India (2), Burundi (1), Chad (1), Djibouti (1),
Iraq (1), Kenya (1), Nigeria (1)
AS NOTED IN [2.5], THE GTD DOES NOT HOLD STATISTICS ON TERRORIST ATTACKS FOR 1993
Burundi (3), Rwanda (2), Turkey (2), Algeria (1), India (1), Iran (1), Iraq (1), Liberia (1), Mexico
(1), Sierra Leone (1), South Africa (1)
Burundi (1), Colombia (1), Iraq (1), Philippines (1), Russia (1), Rwanda (1), Sri Lanka (2), Uganda
(1), USA (1)
Burundi (5), Sri Lanka (2), Uganda (2), Congo (1), Pakistan (1)
Algeria (10), Rwanda (4), Burundi (1), Egypt (1), India (1), Iraq (1), Uganda (1)
Colombia (2), Kenya (2), Sierra Leone (2), Algeria (1), Angola (1), Burundi (1), Rwanda (1), Sri
Lanka (1)
Russia (4), Angola (1), Chad (1), Congo (1), Nigeria (1), Russia (1), Sri Lanka (1)
Colombia (1), Guinea (1), Uganda (1)
Angola (3), Philippines (1)
Nepal (3), Colombia (1), Russia (1)
Congo (1), Iraq (1)
Spain (2), Nepal (1), Philippines (1), Russia (1), Uganda (1)
Iraq (4), India (1), Nepal (1)
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YEAR
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
TOTALS

Table 2:

YEAR
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

TOTAL MASS
CASUALTY
NON SUICIDE
ATTACKS
15
18
8
10
5
3
358

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 50
12
14
7
8
4
2
259

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 100
3
4
1
2
1
1
99

TOTAL
FATALITIES
1,385
1,636
600
919
400
338
37,101

LOCATIONS OF ATTACKS
Iraq (6), Sri Lanka (4), Sudan (3), India (2), Nigeria (1)
Iraq (7), India (2), Pakistan (2), Ethiopia (2), Chad (1), Sri Lanka (1), Sudan (1), Algeria (1)
Congo (2), India (2), Iraq (2), Afghanistan (1), Sudan (1)
Nigeria (4), Congo (2), Iraq (1), Iraq (1), Pakistan (2), China (1)
Congo (1), India (2), Uganda (1), Yemen (1)
Afghanistan (1), Sudan (1)

Summary of yearly statistics in suicide attacks: 1981 – 2011
TOTAL
SUICIDE
ATTACKS
1
0
5
2
15
3
2
1
2
2
2
2
0
11

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 50
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 100
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

TOTAL
FATALITIES
41
0
348
23
163
6
12
7
2
8
71
25
0
247

LOCATIONS OF ATTACKS
Lebanon (1)
Lebanon (4), Kuwait (1)
Lebanon (2)
Lebanon (15)
Lebanon (3)
Lebanon (2)
Lebanon (1)
Israel (1), South Africa (1)
Lebanon (1), Sri Lanka (1)
Sri Lanka (2)
Argentina (1), Sri Lanka (1)
AS NOTED IN [2.5], THE GTD DOES NOT HOLD STATISTICS ON TERRORIST ATTACKS FOR 1993
Israel (4), Sri Lanka (3), West Bank / Gaza (2), Argentina (1), Panama (1)
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YEAR
1995
1996
1997

TOTAL
SUICIDE
ATTACKS
20
16
12

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 50
1
1
1

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 100
0
0
1

TOTAL
FATALITIES
289
235
258

1998
1999

25
29

0
0

0
0

216
92

2000

39

0

0

290

2001

51

0

3

3,246

2002

78

1

2

680

LOCATIONS OF ATTACKS
Sri Lanka (11), West Bank / Gaza (3), Algeria (2), Pakistan (2), Croatia (1), Israel (1)
Sri Lanka (7), Israel (4), Turkey (3), Lebanon (2)
Sri Lanka (5), Israel (2), West Bank / Gaza (2), China (1), Iraq (1), Lebanon (1)
Sri Lanka (9), Pakistan (3), Turkey (3), Algeria (2), India (2), West Bank / Gaza (2), Hungary (1),
Lebanon (1), Northern Ireland (1), Israel (1)
Turkey (12), Sri Lanka (10), Iraq (2), Greece (1), India (1), Lebanon (1), Russia (1), USA (1)
Sri Lanka (15), Russia (11), Philippines (3), West Bank / Gaza (3), Algeria (1), China (1), India (1),
Lebanon (1), Pakistan (1), Turkey (1), Yemen (1)
Israel (21), Sri Lanka (6), India (4), USA (4), West Bank / Gaza (3), Russia (2), Turkey (2), Afghanistan
(1), Bangladesh (1), China (1), France (1), Germany (1), Indonesia (1), Macedonia (1), Nepal (1),
Sudan (1)
Israel (42), West Bank / Gaza (15), India (6), Indonesia (3), Russia (3), Afghanistan (2), Pakistan (2),
Colombia (1), Iran (1), Kenya (1), Tunisia (1), Yemen (1)

2003

85

3

0

774

Israel (18), Iraq (15), West Bank / Gaza (13), Russia (11), Morocco (5), Saudi Arabia (5), Pakistan (3),
Colombia (3), India (3), Turkey (3), Afghanistan (2), Philippines (2), Indonesia (1), Sri Lanka (1)

2004

115

3

1

1,270

2005

215

7

1

2,281

2006

174

5

1

1,170

2007

362

10

5

4,581

2008

249

6

1

2,367

Iraq (70), West Bank / Gaza (8), Israel (7), Pakistan (5), Russia (5), Uzbekistan (5), Afghanistan (4),
India (3), Saudi Arabia (2), China (1), Colombia (1), Indonesia (1), Italy (1), Sri Lanka (1), Turkey (1)
Iraq (162), Afghanistan (14), Pakistan (6), Bangladesh (6), Israel (6), Great Britain (4), India (3),
Jordan (3), Indonesia (2), Egypt (2), Qatar (1), Turkey (1), Uzbekistan (1), West Bank / Gaza (1),
China (1), Qatar (1), Turkey (1), Uzbekistan (1)
Iraq (95), Afghanistan (49), Sri Lanka (9), Pakistan (6), Israel (4), Russia (2), Somalia (2), West Bank /
Gaza (2), Turkey (1), Yemen (1), India (1), Indonesia (1), Saudi Arabia (1)
Iraq (204), Afghanistan (75), Pakistan (55), Sri Lanka (5), Algeria (5), Morocco (5), Somalia (3), India
(3), Russia (2), Finland (1), Great Britain (1), Iran (1), Kenya (1), Yemen (1)
Iraq (106), Afghanistan (56), Pakistan (37), Algeria (14), Sri Lanka (13), Somalia (3), France (3),
Lebanon (3), China (2), Israel (2), Georgia (1), Greece (1), India (1), India (1), Iran (1), Mexico (1),
Russia (1), Syria (1), Turkey (1), West Bank / Gaza (1), Yemen (1)
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YEAR

TOTAL
SUICIDE
ATTACKS

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 50

ATTACKS
WITH
FATALITIES
> 100

TOTAL
FATALITIES

2009

177

6

1

2,277

LOCATIONS OF ATTACKS
Iraq (53), Afghanistan (44), Pakistan (44), Sri Lanka (11), Russia (5), Algeria (2), China (2), India (2),
Indonesia (2), Iran (2), Somalia (2), Yemen (2), Mauritania (1), Philippines (1), Saudi Arabia (1),
Turkey (1), Uzbekistan (1), USA (1)

2010

163

6

1

2,237

Iraq (51), Afghanistan (46), Pakistan (34), Russia (11), Yemen (8), Somalia (3), Sweden (1),
Bangladesh (1), Denmark (1), USA (1), Iran (1), Israel (1), Myanmar (1), Philippines (1), Tajikistan (1)

2011
TOTALS

202
2,060

7
62

0
18

1,988
25,204

Afghanistan (78), Iraq (45), Pakistan (39), Somalia (8), Russia (7), Yemen (7), Nigeria (5), Egypt (2),
Indonesia (2), Kazakhstan (2), Syria (2), Algeria (1), Mauritania (1), Turkey (1), Israel (1), Tunisia (1)
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Appendix D:

Summary of aviation bombings: 1970 - 2012

This Appendix summarises the recorded bombings of aircraft by terrorist groups between 1970 and 2012. For each bombing it records the date,
location, flight that was bombed, the attack method, the perpetrating terrorist group and the fatalities resulting. The statistics in this Appendix have
been derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and from the RAND Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. Complete details of
the statistics summarised below are held on file by the author.
DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

ATTACK METHOD

PERPETRATOR

FATALITIES

SOURCE

21-February-1970

Frankfurt - Vienna

Austrian Airlines Caravelle

Bomb in baggage compartment

PFLP - GC

0

RDWTI

21-February-1970

Switzerland Israel

Swissair Flight 330

Bomb in baggage compartment

PFLP - GC

47

RDWTI

14-March-1970

Athens - Cairo

United Arab Airlines
Antonov 24

Bomb in landing gear

Unknown

0

RDWTI

21-April-1970

Manila

Philippines Airlines Flight

Bomb in baggage compartment

Unknown

25

GTD

10-May-1970

Geneva Airport

Iberian Air Lines DC9

Bomb in baggage compartment

Unknown

0

RDWTI

20-November-1971

Taipei - Hong
Kong

China Airlines Caravelle

Bomb on board

Unknown

25

GTD

26-January-1972

Stockholm Belgrade

Airliner

Bomb on board

Croation émigrés

26

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

88

RDWTI

16-August-1972

Rome

El Al Israel Airlines plane

Bomb in baggage compartment

Nationalist Group for
the Liberation of
Palestine

08-September-1974

Greece - Athens

TWA - Tel Aviv to New York

Bomb in baggage compartment

PFLP - GC
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

ATTACK METHOD

PERPETRATOR

FATALITIES

SOURCE

01-January-1976

Beirut - Dubai

Middle East Airlines Flight
438

Bomb in forward cargo
compartment

Unknown

82

RDWTI

06-October-1976

Barbados Jamaica

Cubana Flight 455

Time bombs

Anti-Castro Cubans

78

RDWTI

15-December-1976

Damascus Baghdad

Egyptian Airlines plane

Bomb on board

Unknown

40

RDWTI

04-September-1978

Kariba, Rhodesia

Air Rhodesia Flight 825

Attacked by shoulder-launched
aircraft missiles after take-off

Zimbabwean African
Peoples Union

48

GTD

12-February-1979

Kariba, Rhodesia

Air Rhodesia Flight 827

Attacked by shoulder-launched
aircraft missiles after take-off

Zimbabwean African
Peoples Union

54

GTD

15-November-1979

Chicago Washington

American Airlines jetliner

Bomb in baggage compartment

Iranian student
group

0

RDWTI

12-December-1981

Mexico City
Airport

Aeronica Boeing 727

Exploded at airport

Unknown

0

RDWTI

11-August-1982

Narita - Honolulu

Pan Am Flight 830

Onboard explosion

Mohammed Rashed

1

RDWTI

23-September-1983

Approach to Abu
Dhabi

Gulf Air Flight 771

Bomb in baggage compartment

Abu Nidal

111

GTD

10-September-1984

Chad

French Airliner

Bomb on board

Libyan agents

0

GTD

23-June-1985

In Flight Transatlantic

Air India Flight 182

Bomb in baggage - passenger did
not board

Sikh Separatists

329

RDWTI

Abu Nidal

16

RDWTI

Arab Revolutionary
Cells / Abu Nidal

4

RDWTI

27-December-1985

Rome Airport

El Al Check in counter

Coordinated with attack on
Vienna Airport - Killed 3; Injured
39

02-April-1986

Rome - Athens

TWA Flight 840

Onboard explosion
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

ATTACK METHOD

PERPETRATOR

FATALITIES

SOURCE

03-May-1986

Colombo Airport

Sri Lankan airliner

Bomb on board - delayed
departure

LTTE

21

RDWTI

27-May-1986

Pakistan

Saudi Arabian National
Airline & PanAm Offices

3 coordinated bombings - within
20 minutes of others

Abu Nidal

1

RDWTI

29-November-1987

Thailand

Korean Air Flight 858

Bomb on board

North Korean agents

115

RDWTI

11-April-1988

Afghanistan

Soviet passenger plane

Surface to Air Missile

Afghan guerrillas

29

RDWTI

21-December-1988

Lockerbie

Pan Am Flight 103

Bomb on board

Libyan agents

270

RDWTI

28-June-1989

Mogadishu Hargesia, Somalia

Somali Airlines Fokker 27

Rocket attack on plane

Somali National
Movement

30

GTD

19-September-1989

Chad

UTA Flight 772

Bomb in cargo compartment

Hezbollah

171

RDWTI

27-November-1989

Colombia

Avianca Flight 203

Bomb on board

Medellin drug cartel
/ The Extraditables

110

RDWTI

19-July-1994

Panama

Panamanian commuter
airplane

Suspected suicide bombing

Ansar Allah Lebanese group

21

RDWTI

11-December-1994

Philippines Japan

Philippines Airlines Flight
434

Bomb on board - Test run for the
1995 Bojinka Plot (discussed in
[2.5.2])

Ramzi Yousef / Abu
Sayyaf Group

1

RDWTI

22-December-2001

Paris - Miami

American Airlines Flight 63

Attempted suicide bombing by
explosives concealed in his shoe

Al Qaeda-trained
Richard Reid

0

GTD

Russia

Volga-Avia Express Flight
1303; Siberia Airlines Flight
1047

Detonation of suicide bombs on
both flights

Islambouli Brigades /
Riyad us-Saliheyn
Martyrs' Brigade

89

RDWTI

24-August-2004
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

ATTACK METHOD

PERPETRATOR

FATALITIES

SOURCE

25-December-2009

USA

Northwest flight 253

Attempted detonation of bomb

Al Qaeda

1

RDWTI

1,833

Appendix E:

Summary of aviation hijackings: 1968 - 2012

This Appendix summarises the recorded hijackings of aircraft by terrorist groups between 1968 and 2012. For each hijacking it records the date,
location, flight that was hijacked, the perpetrating terrorist group, a summary of the hijack and the fatalities resulting. The statistics in this Appendix
have been derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the RAND Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) and from various
media sources. Complete details of the statistics summarised below are held on file by the author.

DATE

05-March-1968

19-June-1968

LOCATION
Riohacha Barranquilla,
Colombia
Santo
Domingo Curacao

22-July-1968

Rome - Tel
Aviv

11-September1968

St. John Toronto

04-November1968

New Orleans
- Miami

FLIGHT
Colombian
Avianca Airlines
DC-4
Venezuelan
VIASA Airlines
DC9

El Al Flight 426
Air Canada
Viscount fourengine turboprop
National
Airlines Flight
186

PERPETRATOR
Ejercito de
Liberacion
Nacional

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Three hijackers diverted the aircraft to Cuba, where the aircraft and all
passengers were returned to Colombia the next day

0

RDWTI

Dominican
leftists

Aircraft hijacked to Cuba by three Dominican leftists

0

RDWTI

Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine General
Command

Hijackers demanded the release of Palestinians being held in Israeli jails. The
aircraft was diverted to Algiers. Following negotiations, all passengers were
progressively released over five weeks in exchange for the release of 16
Palestinians held in Israeli jails

0

RDWTI

US Black
Power group

Aircraft hijacked to Cuba

0

RDWTI

Black Panthers

Aircraft hijacked to Cuba where hijackers were arrested

0

RDWTI
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DATE
08-November1968
02-January-1969

08-June-1969

LOCATION

FLIGHT

Paris - Athens
Crete Athens

Olympic
Airways aircraft
Olympic
Airways aircraft

17-June-1969

Angola
Oakland,
California New York

18-August-1969

Cairo - Aswan

29-August-1969

Portuguese
Airliner

TWA Flight 154
Egyptian
Misrair Anatov2

Paris - Athens

TWA Flight 840

06-September1969

Ecuador

Two
Ecuadorean Air
Force transport
aircraft

13-September1969

Addis Ababa Djibouti

Ethiopian
Airlines DC-6

12-December1969

Madrid Addis Ababa

Ethiopian
Airlines jet

PERPETRATOR
Opponents of
Greek military
Junta

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Hijackers threatened passengers and crew, but were arrested upon landing

0

RDWTI

Lone hijacker
2 Africans dressed as
Portuguese
Mil Officers

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Cairo

0

RDWTI

Hijackers diverted the aircraft to Pointe-Noire in Congo where the aircraft and
passengers were released

0

RDWTI

Black Panthers

Aircraft diverted to Cuba

0

RDWTI

6 hijackers

Aircraft diverted to an airstrip near Jidda in Saudi Arabia

0

RDWTI

Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine

Aircraft was diverted to Damascus in Syria - where all passengers escaped
before the aircraft exploded. The hijackers released all but six Israeli
passengers and demanded release of Syrians in Israeli custody. Hijackers
were arrested by Syrian authorities

0

RDWTI

Opponents of
Ecuadorian
government
Eritrean
Liberation
Front
Eritrean
Liberation
Front

13 individuals hijacked the two aircraft to Cuba, in apparent protests against
the deaths of protestors against the Ecuadorian government. During a
refuelling stop in Colombia a shoot-out ensued, with two crew killed

2

RDWTI

Hijackers forced aircraft to land at Aden in South Yemen - where they were
arrested

0

RDWTI

An attempt by two armed individuals to hijack the aircraft was foiled when
the hijackers were shot by on-board security guards

0

RDWTI
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine

Three armed individuals were arrested at Athens Airport, and later admitted
plans to hijack the aircraft to Tunis, disembark passengers and then detonate
aircraft in protesting against US support for Israel

0

RDWTI

Hijackers demanded aircraft divert to Cuba. Aircraft was diverted to Lima,
then Panama City and then arrived in Havana two days later. Hijackers stated
their actions were intended to pay homage to the dead guerrilla leader Che
Guevara

0

RDWTI

Hijacker diverted aircraft to Lebanon, where he was arrested

0

GTD

Hijackers demanded aircraft divert to Pyongyang in North Korea. Passengers
allowed to disembark at Seoul Airport before aircraft continued on to
Pyongyang

0

RDWTI

Aircraft was diverted to Cuba after passengers were disembarked in Guyana

0

RDWTI

Aircraft hijacked by 4 individuals demanded release of Cuban political
prisoners. The aircraft was stormed by Brazilian forces and the hijackers were
arrested

0

RDWTI

One individual attempted to hijack the aircraft, demanding the release of
political prisoners; however he was over-powered and arrested

0

RDWTI

21-December1969

Athens Rome

TWA aircraft

01-January-1970

Montevideo Rio de
Janeiro

Cruzeiro do Sul
Sud Aviation SE210 Caravelle VI
R

09-January-1970

Paris - Rome

TWA 707

31-March-1970

Tokyo Fukuoka

26-April-1970

Brazil

01-July-1970

Rio de
Janeiro - São
Paulo

Japan Airlines
Flight 351
Brazilian VASP
airliner
Cruzeiro do Sul
Sud Aviation SE210 Caravelle VI
R

12-July-1970

Brazil

Commercial
airliner

Alianca
Libertadora
Nacional
Vanguardia
Popular
Revolucionaria

Olympic
Airways 727

Palestinian
Popular
Struggle Front

Six individuals hijacked the aircraft and demanded the release of seven Arab
prisoners in Greek jails. After Greek authorities agreed to this request all
passengers were released

0

RDWTI

Pan Am 747

Puerto Rican
individual

Hijacker diverted aircraft to Cuba. The hijacker was arrested upon landing in
Cuba, and all passengers were released

0

RDWTI

22-July-1970

02-August-1970

Beirut Athens
New York to
San Juan,
Puerto Rico

VAR-Palmares
Lone anti-US
individual

Japanese Red
Army
Left wing
individuals
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

Four
coordinated
hijackings

Pan Am Flight
93; Swissair
Flight 100; TWA
Flight 741;
BOAC Flight 775

Athens
New York
City, United
States

Ethiopian
airliner
United Arab
Republic
airliner

Iran

Iranian airliner

22-October1970

Costa Rica

Costa Rican
airliner

22-January-1971

Ethiopia

Ethiopian
airliner

06-September1970
08-September1970
27-September1970
09-October1970

PERPETRATOR

Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine
Eritrean
Liberation
Front
Jewish
Defense
League
Iranian
terrorists
Nicaraguan
guerrillas FSLN
Eritrean
Liberation
Front

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

On 6 September 1970 the PFLP hijacked three airliners bound for New York
from locations in Europe, and diverted them to various locations in the
Middle East. Pan Am Flight 93 from Brussels was first hijacked to Beirut, then
to Cairo - where it was detonated after passengers and crew were evacuated.
Swissair Flight 100 from Zurich and TWA Flight 741 from Frankfurt, were
flown to a landing strip at Dawson Field in the Jordanian desert. The PFLP also
attempted to hijack El Al Flight 219 after take-off from Amsterdam – but this
attempt was foiled by an on-board security guard. The PFLP stated the
hijackings were in retaliation for US support of Israel; and demanded the
release of Arab prisoners in Switzerland, the UK, and West Germany. On 9
September 1970, the PFLP hijacked a BOAC Flight 775 out of Bahrain to
Dawson’s Field, bringing the total number of hostages to over 300. On 11
September 1970 the hijackers freed majority of hostages, and on 12
September 1970, detonated the hijacked aircraft. Following negotiations all
remaining hostages were released unharmed over the following two weeks.

0

RDWTI

An attempted hijacking was foiled by security guards aboard the aircraft

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available
Aircraft hijacked to Baghdad by Iranian terrorists seeking release of 21
prisoners held in Iran

0

GTD

0

RDWTI

Hijackers demanded the release of Nicaraguan guerrillas being held in Costa
Rica. Once released the prisoners were flown to Cuba aboard the hijacked
aircraft

0

RDWTI

Airliner hijacked to Libya

0

RDWTI
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

South Korea

South Korean
airliner

South Korean
individual

A South Korean individual attempted to hijack the aircraft to North Korea. A
sky marshal aboard the aircraft fired at the hijacker, causing his grenade to
explode, killing the hijacker and another passenger

2

RDWTI

India

Indian Airlines
aircraft

Two hijackers demanded the Indian government release prisoners that were
being held in Kashmir. After the Indian government rejected their demands
the hijackers detonated the aircraft after releasing all passengers and crew

0

RDWTI

30-March-1971
08-September1971

Philippines
Beirut Amman

Philippines
Airlines flight
Jordanian Alia
airliner

Kashmiri
nationalists
Kabataang
Makabayan
Youth
Organization

Aircraft hijacked by six students opposed to the Marcos regime. The aircraft
was flown to China where they were granted asylum, with the aircraft being
returned to the Philippines

0

RDWTI

Aircraft hijacked to Libya

0

RDWTI

04-October1971

Beirut Amman

Alia Caravelle

Al Fatah members attempted to hijack aircraft, demanding passage to Iraq;
however they were over-powered by the crew

0

RDWTI

27-November1971

USA

TWA 727

Hijackers diverted a TWA 727 to Cuba

0

RDWTI

19-February1972

Cairo Amman

Alia Caravelle

22-February1972

New Delhi Athens

03-May-1972

Turkey Bulgaria

23-January-1971

02-February1971

Al Fatah

Hijackers attempted to divert aircraft to Libya, however they were overpowered by on-board security guards

0

RDWTI

Lufthansa
airliner

Al Fatah
Republic of
New Africa
movement
Jordanian
National
Liberation
Movement
Organization
for Victims of
Zionist
Occupation

Hijackers demanded the release of Arab prisoners being held in Germany and
Egypt. All passengers and crew were released upon the payment of $5 million
ransom

0

RDWTI

Turkish airliner

Turkish
People's

Hijackers demanded the release of prisoners being held in Turkey. They later
surrendered to Bulgarian authorities

0

RDWTI
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR
Liberation
Army

08-May-1972

Vienna - Tel
Aviv

Sabena Belgian
World Airlines

24-May-1972

Salisbury Johannesburg

South African
Airways 727

31-July-1972

Detroit Miami

22-August-1972

Beirut - Cairo

15-September1972

Sweden

Delta Air Lines
Flight 841
Southern
Yemen DC-6
aircraft
Scandinavian
Airlines System
airliner

22-October1972

Turkey

Turkish airliner

Beirut Ankara

Lufthansa
German Airlines
727

29-October1972

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Black
September

Hijackers demanded the release of 317 Palestinians being held in Israeli jails.
Israeli troops disguised as mechanics stormed the aircraft, with the hijackers
being detained after a fire fight

1

RDWTI

Lebanese
individuals

Hijackers demanded money from the Anglo-American Mining Company and
threatened to detonate the aircraft. After releasing some passengers at a
refuelling stop, they diverted to Malawi - where troops freed all remaining
passengers and crew

0

RDWTI

Black Panthers
Eagles of
National Unity
- Anti Saudi
Croation
Separatists
Turkish
People's
Liberation
Army

Black
September

Five members of the Black Liberation Army hijacked aircraft. They released all
passengers in exchange for a $1M payment in Miami and then flew to Algeria

RDWTI

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Libya where they were granted asylum

0

RDWTI

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Madrid and demanded the release of Croation
terrorists held in Swedish jails. They later surrendered to Spanish authorities

0

RDWTI

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Bulgaria, demanding the release of prisoners in
Turkey. They later surrendered to Bulgarian authorities

0

RDWTI

Hijackers demanded the release of Black September terrorists in custody and
threatened to detonate the aircraft. After the West German government
released the Black September prisoners to Yugoslavia, the aircraft was flown
to Libya where all passengers and crew were released

0

RDWTI
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DATE

08-November1972

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Mexican airliner

Armed
Communist
League

Hijackers demanded release of imprisoned guerrillas, arms and $330,000.
After the Mexican government complied, the aircraft was flown to Cuba
where all passengers were released

0

RDWTI

Air Canada DC8

Czech
individual

Hijacker demanded the release of Czech prisoners being held by West
Germany. He was killed by police aboard the aircraft

1

RDWTI

In an unsuccessful hijacking, the hijackers were killed after the explosion of
one of their hand grenades in a fire fight with police at an airport
In an unsuccessful hijacking attempt, the hijacker was shot dead after taking
five hostages

6

RDWTI

1

RDWTI

24-November1972

Mexico
Frankfurt Montreal Toronto

08-December1972

Ethiopia

Ethiopian
Airlines airliner

26-January-1973

France

French airliner

Ethiopian
students
French
Legionnaire

Venezuela Mexico

Venezuelan
Avensa airliner

Zero Point People's
Revolutionary
Army

4 persons hijacked aircraft to Caracas, Panama City, then Mexico City;
Demanded release of Venezuelan prisoners; Mexican government persuaded
hijackers to fly to Cuba - where they were arrested; All passengers and crew
released back to Caracas

0

RDWTI

Irkutsk - Chita
Pereira,
Colombia
Buenos Aires,
Argentina

Aeroflot Tu-104
Colombian
aircraft
Aerolineas
Argentinas 737

Russian
individual

A bomb carried by an individual Russian hijacker demanding passage to China
exploded, causing the aircraft to crash near Lake Baikal, killing all 82 on board

82

See below1

Unknown

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Unknown

No further information readily available

0

GTD

18-May-1973

18-May-1973
30-May-1973
04-July-1973

1

Hijacking description: Tupolev 104B 18 May 1973. Aviation Safety Network

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19730518-0
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DATE

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

20-July-1973

After take-off
from
Amsterdam

Japan Air Lines
Flight 404

Organization
of the Sons of
Occupied
Territories - in
cooperation
with Japanese
Red Army

Hijackers attempted to land in Lebanon and then Bahrain - where authorities
prevented it from landing. The aircraft then landed in Dubai, then flew to
Damascus, and finally to Libya - where the hijackers released all passengers
and crew and destroyed the aircraft

0

RDWTI

20-October1973

Buenos Aires
- Salta

Argentine
Airlines 737

Tupamaros
(Uruguay)

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Yacuibam, Bolivia - where all passengers and
crew were released in return for safe passage to Cuba

0

RDWTI

KLM 747

Arab
Nationalist
Youth for the
Liberation of
Palestine

Hijacked by 3 men over Iraq - who threatened to blow up aircraft when no
country allowed aircraft to land; Landed in Malta; Departed for Dubai after
negotiations - incident ended without fatalities

0

RDWTI

Five Arab guerrillas staged an armed assault on a Pan Am airliner at Rome
Airport. They then hijacked a Lufthansa aircraft to Athens and then flew to
Kuwait. They had demanded the release of Palestinians held by Greece, but
later surrendered in Kuwait

32

RDWTI

Hijackers detonated aircraft after releasing all passengers and crew at
Amsterdam, where they were later apprehended. The Palestinian Liberation
Organisation denied responsibility for the hijacking

0

RDWTI

A planned hijacking was thwarted when police arrested six persons
attempting to smuggle arms and explosives onto the aircraft in Beirut

0

RDWTI

Hijacker demanded the release of an imprisoned JRA member and passage to
North Korea. The hijacker was arrested while the aircraft refuelled in Nagoya

0

RDWTI

25-November1973

LOCATION

Beirut Tokyo

17-December1973

Rome

Lufthansa
airliner

03-March-1974

Beirut London

British Airways
VC-10

15-March-1974

Amsterdam Tokyo via
Beirut

KLM 747

5 Arab
guerrillas
Arab
Nationalist
Youth for the
Liberation of
Palestine
Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine

15-July-1974

Japan

Japan Airlines
airliner

Japanese Red
Army

481

DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

06-November1974

Amman Aqaba

Dubai

21-November1974
01-December1974
25-December1974

01-March-1975

07-April-1976

21-May-1976

27-June-1976

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Royal Jordanian
Airlines airliner

PERPETRATOR
Jordanian Free
Officers
Movement

Hijackers diverted the aircraft to Libya - where the aircraft, passengers and
crew were returned to Jordan

0

RDWTI

British Airways
VC-10

Palestinian
terrorists

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Libya, then Tunisia - demanding Egypt and the
Netherlands release Palestinian prisoners. The hijackers were granted asylum
in Tunisia and the passengers were released

1

RDWTI

Bombay Karachi
BombayBeirut-RomeNew York

Swissair DC8

Pakistani
terrorist

A hijacker demanded passage to Libya or Lebanon was over-powered by the
crew and arrested upon landing in Karachi

0

RDWTI

Air India B0747

Czech
individual

A Czech individual attempted to hijack the aircraft after taking off from
Beirut; but was over-powered by crew and arrested upon landing

0

RDWTI

Iraq

Iraqi Airlines
Boeing 737

Kurdish rebels

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Iran, demanding the release of 85 Kurdish rebels
and $5 million. They surrendered to Iranian authorities and were later
executed

2

RDWTI

Philippines

Philippine
Airline BAC-111

Moro National
Liberation
Front

Hijackers demanded the release of political prisoners. After refuelling in
Manila, the aircraft flew via Bangkok to Libya where the hijackers were
granted asylum and the passengers and crew were released. This is the
longest distance hijacking

0

RDWTI

Philippines

Philippine
Airline BAC-111

Moro National
Liberation
Front

Hijackers demanded passage to Libya and $375,000 ransom. The hijackers
were killed in a shoot-out with security forces at Zamboanga airport on
Eastern Mindanao Island

10

RDWTI

Air France Flight
139

Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine General
Command

Aircraft hijacked to Libya, after refuelling it was flown to Entebbe in Uganda.
The hijackers demanded the release of 53 Palestinian prisoners in Israel,
Kenya and Europe. Israel mounted a long distance commando raid and
rescued the majority of passengers and crew

25

RDWTI

Athens - Paris
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

23-August-1976

Cairo - Luxor

Egyptian Boeing
7

05-September1976

France

KLM airliner

PERPETRATOR
Libyan
Revolutionary
Command
Council
Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Hijackers demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners. Egyptian forces
stormed the aircraft and the hijackers were arrested

0

RDWTI

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Cyprus, then Israel, then Cyprus, demanding the
release of Palestinian prisoners. The hijackers were arrested in Greece

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

10-September1976

New York Chicago

TWA Flight 355

Croation
Separatists

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Canada, then to Iceland, and then to France.
Passengers were progressively released by the hijackers who also claimed
that bombs would be detonated within the United States unless newspapers
publicised the case for Croatian independence from Yugoslavia. The hijackers
surrendered to authorities in France

10-September1976

New Delhi Bombay

Indian Airlines
B0737

Libyan
individuals

Hijackers sought to divert aircraft to Mecca. During re refuelling in Pakistan,
Police drugged the water on board - allowing all passengers to be evacuated
and for the hijackers to be arrested

Turkish Airlines
flight

Turkish
students

Polish TU134

08-May-1977

Diyarbakir to
Ankara
Poland Nuremburg
Makale and
Gonder,
Ethiopia
Tokyo Honolulu

Ethiopian
Airlines flight
Northwest
Orient 747

Polish soldier
Eritrean
Liberation
Front
American
individual

21-June-1977

Chile

LAN Airways
flight

Chilean
individual

19-March-1977
24-April-1977

26-April-1977

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Beirut and demanded to visit a Palestinian
refugee camp before surrendering to authorities
Solider attempted to hijack aircraft to escape Poland, but was apprehended
by Polish authorities
Hijackers attempted to divert aircraft to Saudi Arabia or Sudan, but were
killed by security forces upon landing
Individual attempted to hijack aircraft to Moscow but was over-powered by
crew
Hijackers diverted aircraft to Argentina; then demanded a larger aircraft to
Algeria where he surrendered
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DATE

29-June-1977

05-July-1977
08-July-1977

12-August-1977

28-September1977

LOCATION

Dubai Muscat,
Oman

Arica Santiago,
Chile
Beirut Kuwait

FLIGHT

Gulf Air flight

LADECO Airliner
Kuwait Airways
aircraft

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Lebanese
individual

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Doha, Qatar. They were protesting about the
political situation in South Lebanon, and demanded intervention from Qatar
government, $12,000 ransom for and the release of political passengers.
Upon landing the hijackers released all passengers and crew and were
arrested

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

7 Palestinians

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Lima, demanding the release of political
prisoners and free passage to Caracas; However the Venezuelan government
refused to grant asylum - so the aircraft was diverted aircraft to Cuba instead
Hijackers diverted aircraft to Kuwait and then on to Syria where they
surrendered

0

RDWTI

Chilean
individuals

Paris - Cairo

Air France
aircraft

Egyptian
individual

An individual attempting to hijack the aircraft (supposedly to bring together
Egypt and Libya after recent fighting) was pushed out of the aircraft by
passengers and crew

India

Japan Airlines
airliner

Japanese Red
Army

Aircraft diverted to Dacca, Bangladesh where hijackers demanded the release
of Japanese prisoners and $6 million. The aircraft then headed to Algeria via
Kuwait and Syria, with all passengers being progressively released

0

RDWTI

Hijackers diverted aircraft via Rome, Cyprus, Bahrain, Dubai, and Aden to
Mogadishu in Somalia. They demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners in
West Germany and $15 million ransom. One of the pilots was killed in Aden.
A joint raid by the West German GSG 9 and British SAS resulted in all
passengers being freed in Mogadishu after the six day hijacking.

1

RDWTI

Aircraft diverted to Libya where the hijackers were granted asylum and all
passengers and crew were released

0

RDWTI

13-October1977

Palma de
Mallorca Frankfurt

Lufthansa Flight
181

06-November1977

Amman Aqaba

Royal Jordanian
Airlines aircraft

Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine
Jordanian Free
Officers
Movement
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

04-December1977
03-February1978

Penang Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia
Airlines Flight
653

Pakistan

12-January-1979

Tunisia

16-January-1979
27-February1979
08-March-1979

Lebanon
Oslo Moscow
Managua,
Nicaragua

04-April-1979

Sydney
Airport

20-June-1979

United States

24-August-1979

Tripoli, Libya

07-September1979

Iran - Italy via
Beirut

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Pakistani 747

Japanese Red
Army claimed
to have been
responsible
Pakistani
individual

Aircraft hijacked shortly after take-off from Penang, with hijackers attempting
to divert it to Singapore. The aircraft crashed in the Straits of Johor, with
unconfirmed reports of shootings and explosions aboard the aircraft before it
crashed
An attempted hijacking failed after the hijacker's grenade exploded - with the
hijacker being arrested

100

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

Tunis-Air
Boeing 707

Tunisian
individuals

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Libya. They demanded the release of Tunisian
opposition politicians, but were apprehended by Libyan authorities

0

RDWTI

Middle East
Airlines jet

Amal Lebanese
group

0

RDWTI

Ananda Marga

Aircraft diverted to Amman, then Cyprus, then back to Beirut. Hijackers
demanded release of their religious leader, and surrendered to authorities in
Beirut
Hijackers seeking to escape the USSR diverted aircraft to Stockholm where
they surrendered

Soviet airliner

0

RDWTI

Executive jet

Unknown

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Pan Am 747

Italian
individual

Individual attempted to divert aircraft to Moscow via Singapore and Rome,
but was over-powered by police

0

RDWTI

Serbian
nationalist

Hijackers diverted aircraft to New York, then switched aircrafts and flew to
Ireland with a small number of hostages, demanding the release of a Serbian
prisoner. Hijackers were arrested upon arrival in Ireland

0

RDWTI

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Imam Sadr
movement Shiia

Aircraft hijacked after a stopover in Beirut. The hijackers demanded the
release of their religious leader. After being denied permission to land in
France, a siege ensued in Rome - after which the aircraft flew to Iran where
they surrendered

0

RDWTI

American
Airlines jet
Libyan Airlines
727

Alitalia jet
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DATE

12-September1979
16-October1979
23-November1979

15-January-1980

LOCATION
Frankfurt Cologne,
West
Germany

Khoms, Libya
Japan

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Lufthansa 727
Arab Airways,
Fokker
Friendship
Japan Air Lines
DC-10

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

3 individuals
Japanese
individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Hijackers demanded passage to the USSR, but were over-powered by crew

0

RDWTI

Tunisian
individual

Hijackers demanded release of jailed trade union leaders. They attempted to
divert the aircraft to Libya - but airports there were closed due to inclement
weather. Hijackers surrendered upon landing in Sicily

0

RDWTI

Hijacker seeking to publicise the disappearance of a Shiite religious leader
demanded the aircraft return to Beirut to refuel, and surrendered in Beirut

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available
Similarly to the 18 January 1980 incident, the hijacker was seeking to
publicise the disappearance of a Shiite religious leader, but surrendered in
Beirut

0

GTD

0

RDWTI

Planned hijacking - individuals apprehended whilst boarding aircraft

0

RDWTI

Shiite Muslims

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Amal Lebanese
group
International
Movement of
the Proletariat

Hijackers demanded passage to Iran. Aircraft was diverted to Diyarbakir,
Turkey to refuel. All passengers were released when Turkish forces stormed
the aircraft

1

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

18-January-1980

Rome - Tunis
Beirut Larnaca,
Cyprus

25-January-1980

Atlanta,
United States

28-January-1980

Baghdad Beirut

31-January-1980

Beirut Airport

10-March-1980

Beirut

Alitalia DC-9
Middle East
Airline Boeing
720B
Delta Airlines,
Lockheed LA1011
Middle East
Airlines Boeing
707
Air France
aircraft
Middle Eastern
Airlines aircraft

13-October1980

Istanbul Ankara

Turkish Airlines
Boeing 727

06-November1980

Caracas,
Venezuela

Avensa Airlines
DC-9

Lebanese
individual
Black
American
Moslems
Lebanese
individual
Lebanese
individuals
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DATE

LOCATION

05-December1980

Magarita,
Venezuela

15-December1980
06-February1981

02-March-1981

FLIGHT
DC-9 Domestic
Airline
Aeropostal

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

4 individuals

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Movement of
April 19
Colombian
individuals

Hijacked diverted aircraft to Cuba where they surrendered to Cuban
authorities. Their reported objective was to disrupt a 9 nation Latin American
summit being held in Colombia
Hijackers demanded passage to Mexico or Panama, but surrendered after
releasing several hostages

0

RDWTI

Colombia

Colombian
Avianca airliner
Colombian
airliner

0

RDWTI

Karachi Peshawar,
Pakistan

Pakistan
International
Airlines 720

Al Zulfikar Pro Bhutto
extremists

Aircraft hijacked to Kabul where a Pakistani diplomat was killed. The hijackers
demanded Pakistan release left wing political prisoners. After seven days the
aircraft was diverted to Syria where following negotiations passengers were
released when Pakistani government released 50 political prisoners.

1

RDWTI

Honduran
airliner

Cinchonero
Popular
Liberation
Front Honduran
leftist group

Hijacked diverted aircraft to Nicaragua, demanding the release of Salvadoran
leftists from Honduran prisons. The Honduran government agreed to release
the prisoners if passengers and crew were released to Panamanians. The
hijackers then surrendered to Panamanian authorities

0

RDWTI

Commando
Jihad

Hijackers demanded the release of 20 political prisoners in Indonesia, and the
expulsion of Israeli militants. They attempted to proceed to Colombo but had
insufficient fuel. After refuelled in Penang the aircraft proceeded to Don
Muang in Thailand where it was stormed by Thai commandos

0

RDWTI

Dev Sol

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Bulgaria. They demanded release of Turkish
prisoners and $500,000, but Turkey refused to negotiate. As two hijackers
were lured from the aircraft to make a press statement, the remaining
hijackers were over-powered by passengers and crew

0

RDWTI

Colombia

27-March-1981

Honduras New Orleans

28-March-1981

Palembang Medan,
Indonesia

24-May-1981

Istanbul Ankara

Garuda GA 206

Turkish Airlines
DC-9

487

DATE
26-September1981

29-September1981
30-September1981

29-October1981

26-November1981
07-December1981

07-December1981

07-December1981

LOCATION
Dubrovnik Belgrade,
Yugoslavia

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Yugoslav
Airlines flight

Croatians

No further information readily available

4

GTD

India
Medellin,
Colombia

Indian Airlines
aircraft
Areopesca
cargo aircraft

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Lahore, Pakistan, demanding the release of Sikh
separatists from Indian prisons. Pakistani commandos disguised as cleaners
stormed the aircraft

0

RDWTI

Costa Rica
Zimbabwe Bombay
Victoria,
Seychelles

Costa Rican
aircraft

Sikh
separatists
Movement of
April 19
Nicaraguan
AntiCommunist
Democratic
Movement

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Hijackers diverted aircraft to El Salvador, demanding the release of prisoners.
They were arrested upon arrival in El Salvador

0

RDWTI

Air India 707
Libyan Airlines
jet

Mercenaries

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Shiite Muslims

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Zurich Tripoli

Libyan Airlines
jet

Amal Lebanese
group

Aircraft diverted to Athens, Rome, Tehran and Beirut (twice). Hijackers
demanded the release of Shiite religious leader Imam Musa Sadr, claiming he
had been kidnapped by Libya

0

RDWTI

Venezuela

Three
Venezuelan
airliners Coordinated
hijackings

El Salvadorian
leftist
guerrillas

Aircraft were hijacked from Venezuela to Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia
and Panama. Hijackers made various demands to Venezuelan government. All
passengers were later released

0

RDWTI

Milan, Italy
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DATE

LOCATION

27-January-1982

Bogota Pereira,
Colombia

Colombian 727
airliner

25-February1982

Kuwait Beirut - Libya

Kuwait Airways
KU 561

Tanzania

Air Tanzanian
airline Boeing
737

26-February1982

FLIGHT

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Hijackers issued various demands to the Colombian government and
threatened to detonate the aircraft if the army moved in. After reaching a
deal with the Colombian government hijackers released passengers and were
provided passage to Cuba

0

RDWTI

Aircraft hijacked on the ground in Beirut, with hijackers demanded the
release of an Islamic terrorist leader

0

RDWTI

Tanzanian
individuals

Aircraft hijacked to Nairobi, then elsewhere in Kenya; then Jidda, Saudi
Arabia, then Athens; and finally to Stansted, England. Hijackers demanded
the resignation of the Tanzanian President, but after three days surrendered
to British police

0

RDWTI

Honduras Dash7 SAHSA

Lorenzo
Zelaya
People's
Revolutionary
Forces

Hijackers demanded the release of political prisoners, $150,000 ransom and
the publication of a manifesto. All passengers and crew were released and
the hijackers were provided free passage to Cuba

0

RDWTI

Air Maroc jet

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Moroccan
religious
fanatic
Kenyan Air
Force
personnel

Aircraft diverted to Tunisia, where hijacker surrendered after reciting
religious precepts urging governments and citizens to abide by Islamic
principles

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

1
2

RDWTI
GTD

27-May-1982

La Ceiba Tegucigalpa,
Honduras
Damascus,
Syria

28-May-1982

Athens Morocco

Air Maroc jet

Nairobi - Dar
es Salaam
Mumbai Delhi
South Yemen

Kenyan Air
Force aircraft
Indian Airlines
flight
Al Yanda 707

28-April-1982

01-August-1982
22-August-1982
20-January-1983

PERPETRATOR

Movement of
April 19
Amal Lebanese
group

Sikh militant
Palestinians

Two Kenyan Army officers hijacked a military aircraft to Tanzania
Hijackers attempted to divert aircraft - but were killed by Indian security
forces
No further information readily available
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

16-April-1983

Turkey

Turkish airliner

Dev Sol

Aircraft hijacked to Greece. Hijackers demanded passage to Australia but
later surrendered to Turkish authorities

0

RDWTI

Greece

Libyan Boeing
707

Amal Lebanese
Group

Aircraft hijacked over Mediterranean and diverted to another Greek Airport
where all passengers were released. Hijackers were motivated to locate their
religious leader, Imam Musa Sadr presumed to be held in Libya

0

RDWTI

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Kuwait, then to France where they surrendered,
stating they wished to publicise political abuses in Iran

0

RDWTI

Aircraft hijacked to Costa Rica, and then to Honduras where the hijackers
escaped

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Cuba, where passengers were released

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

2

GTD

Hijackers took over aircraft at an airport. They demanded weapons, a
helicopter and $5 million. They were apprehended when the aircraft was
stormed by commandos

0

RDWTI

23-June-1983

06-July-1983

Iran

14-July-1983

Nicaragua

27-August-1983

Austria

Nicaraguan
aircraft
Air France
aircraft

25-March-1984

United States

Piedmont flight

28-March-1984

New Orleans,
United States

Delta flight 327

05-July-1984

Srinagar Delhi, India

Indian Airlines
flight

Iraqi Moslems
Black
Liberation
Army
Black
Liberation
Army
All India Sikh
Students
Federation

Venezuela

Venezuelan
airliner

Opponents of
Haitian
President

29-July-1984

Iranian airliner

Moujahideen
guerrillas
opposed to
Ayatollah
Khomeini
Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force - FDN /
AntiSandinistas

490

DATE

31-July-1984
08-August-1984

10-August-1984
24-August-1984
08-September1984
12-September1984
15-September1984
08-October1984

LOCATION

West
Germany
Iran
Bangalore Mangalore,
India
Delhi Srinagar
SE Iran Tehran
TeheranShiraz, Iran

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Air France 737
Iranian airliner

Guardsmen of
Islam
2 individuals

Aircraft diverted to Iran, with hijackers demanding the release of Iranian
prisoners being held in France. All passengers were released in Iran - after
which the aircraft was detonated
No further information readily available

0
0

RDWTI
GTD

No further information readily available
Hijackers demanded passage to the United Arab - where all passengers were
released

0

GTD

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Indian Airlines
flight
Indian Airlines
flight

Iranian airliner

7 Sikhs
Iranian
Monarchists
Mujahideen-IKhalq (MK)

Iraqi Airways
737

Armed
individuals

Individuals attempted a hijacking over Jordan; however this was thwarted by
on-board security guards

0

RDWTI

Iranian airliner

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Saudi Airlines
flight

Yemenis

No further information readily available

1

GTD

5 Somalis

Aircraft hijacked to Addis Ababa, with hijackers demanding the release of
political prisoners held by the Somali government. The hijackers surrendered
in exchange for safe passage out of the country

0

RDWTI

Hezbollah

Aircraft diverted to Iran. Hijackers demanded the release of prisoners in
Kuwaiti jails. After the hijackers killed two American passengers, the aircraft
was stormed by Iranian commandos

2

RDWTI

Iranian airliner

06-November1984

Cyprus Baghdad
Mashhad Tehran, Iran
Jeddah Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia

17-November1984

Mogadishu Saudi Arabia

Somali Airliner

Pakistan

Kuwait Airways
Flight 221

04-December1984

Individual

491

DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

07-February1985

Lebanon

Cyprus Airways
airliner

02-March-1985

Ethiopia

17-March-1985

27-March-1985

07-June-1985

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Hijackers demanded the release of prisoners held in Cyprus jails - with all
passengers and crew being released after these prisoners were freed

0

RDWTI

French disaster
relief aircraft

Black Brigade
Tigray Peoples
Liberation
Front

Aircraft hijacked by a group demanding regional autonomy. All passengers
were released by hijackers

0

RDWTI

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabian
airliner

Arab
individual

Attempted hijacking which failed after a hijacker's grenade exploded when
the aircraft was stormed by Saudi forces, with all passengers and crew being
freed

0

RDWTI

Munich Athens

Lufthansa
airliner

Libyan
hijacker

Aircraft diverted to Istanbul by hijackers demanding passage to Libya;
However hijackers surrendered to Turkish authorities

0

RDWTI

Hezbollah

Aircraft hijacked to Beirut, with hijackers demanding the release of prisoners
being held in Kuwait, Israel and Spain. After one American passenger was
killed, remaining hostages were released 23 days later following mediation
efforts by Shi'ite Amal leader Nabih Berri and Syrian government

1

RDWTI

Amal

Aircraft diverted to Beirut, then Cyprus, then Sicily, and finally Beirut. After
releasing passengers the hijackers (who claimed to be acting on behalf of
Lebanese government) detonated the aircraft

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available
Hijackers held passengers hostage for 17 days
East German authorities foiled a planned hijacking when arresting two
persons carrying explosives

0
0

GTD
GTD

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Athens Rome

TWA Boeing
727

Jordanian
Boeing 727
Middle East
Airlines 707
TWA Flight 827

Palestinians
Hizballah

US Airliner

East Germans

11-June-1985

Lebanon

12-June-1985
14-June-1985

Beirut
Athens

15-June-1985
26-October1985

East Berlin
Medellin - El
Bagre,
Colombia

Colombian
aircraft

10-November1985

Kampala,
Uganda

Uganda Airlines
aircraft

2 individuals
National
Resistance
Movement
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

23-November1985
19-December1985

Athens Cairo

Egypt Air Flight
648

Aircraft hijacked to Malta. 60 passengers were killed when Egyptian
commandos stormed the aircraft

60

RDWTI

USSR

0

RDWTI

29-April-1986

Kuwait
Mumbai Karachi Frankfurt New York
Baghdad Amman,
Jordan

Antonov 24
Kuwait Airways
747

Abu Nidal
Organisation
Russian
individuals

0

RDWTI

05-September1986
25-December1986

19-May-1987

24-July-1987
30-September1987
22-February1988

12-March-1988

Fiji

12 Kuwaitis

Aircraft was hijacked to China - where all passengers were released
A plan to hijack a Kuwaiti Airliner to an east Asian country was foiled by
Kuwaiti authorities

Pan Am Flight
73

Abu Nidal
Organization

Hijackers sought the release of prisoners being held in Cyprus. After a 16 hour
siege, Pakistani security forces stormed aircraft which resulted in the deaths
of 22 passengers

22

RDWTI

Iraqi Airways
Flight 163

Hezbollah /
Islamic Jihad

The grenades of the hijackers accidently detonated, causing the aircraft to
crash, killing 63 of the 106 passengers

63

RDWTI

Fijian Indian

An individual stormed the aircraft upon arrival from Japan, demanding the
release of members of overthrown government; however he was overpowered by the crew

0

RDWTI

1

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

A hijacking attempt by an individual wishing for the reunification of China was
over-powered by the crew

0

RDWTI

An attempted hijacking was foiled when the hijacker (who wanted to fly to
Afghanistan or India) was over-powered by crew and on-board security

0

RDWTI

Air New
Zealand 747

Peru

Air Afrique DC
10
Soviet Aeroflot
aircraft

Taiwan

China Airlines
aircraft

Pakistan

Pakistan
International
Airlines flight

Congo - Italy

Hezbollah
Peruvian
Pro-China
Taiwanese
individual
Suspected
member of
Afghan secret
police

Hijackers diverted aircraft to Geneva, then demanded passage to Beirut. The
hijackers killed a French passenger, but the other passengers escaped when
the aircraft was stormed by commandos
An attempted hijacking was foiled when the hijacker was over-powered by
passengers and crew
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

05-April-1988

Bangkok to
Kuwait

Kuwaiti Airlines
flight

Hezbollah

Aircraft diverted to Iran, then Algeria. Hijackers demanded the release of proIranian prisoners being held by Kuwait, with two passengers being killed

2

RDWTI

Belo
Horizonte
Pampulha Rio, Brazil
Njoeng
Jacobkondre,
Suriname

VASP Flight 375

Brazilian
individual
Brunswijk
Jungle
Commando

The hijacker tried to force a crash into the Palacio do Planalto (Presidential
office), however he was over-powered and the aircraft landed safely

1

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Activist hijacked the aircraft after take-off and demanded passage to Miami;
however he was over-powered by the crew and arrested

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

US aircraft

Miskito Indian
activist
Two
individuals
Two
individuals

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Cacc flight

Chinese
individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

ANC-chartered
Aeroflot flight

South African
agent

The South African agent's attempt to hijack an aircraft with African National
Congress members aboard was foiled by the crew

0

RDWTI

ALM jet

Two Haitian
individuals

Two individuals attempted to hijack aircraft to New York; but were arrested
when the aircraft landed at Curacao

0

RDWTI

29-September1988
22-December1988

30-January-1989
22-March-1989
10-April-1989

24-April-1989

18-May-1989

01-June-1989

2

Colombia
Prague Frankfurt
Cap Haitien,
Haiti
Ningbo Xiamen,
China
Angola Tanzania
Port-auPrince Curacao, Haiti

Nomad aircraft
Colombian
airliner
Hungarian
Airlines aircraft

Hijacking description: Boeing 737-317 29 September 1988. Aviation Safety Network http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19880929-0

See below2
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DATE

18-June-1989

19-September1989

06-October1989
16-December1989

25-January-1990
05-July-1990
16-August-1990
02-October1990
05-October1990
01-November1990

3

LOCATION
Kabul Zaranj,
Afghanistan

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Afghan
domestic flight

Afghan
individuals

Aircraft hijacked to Iran

0

RDWTI

Morocco

Moroccan
passenger
aircraft

Individual

The Moroccan aircraft was hijacked in connection with a dispute about the
status of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara territory, however the
incident was resolved peacefully

0

RDWTI

Myanmar
domestic
airliner
Air China
Boeing 747

Myanmar
students
Chinese
individual

The aircraft was hijacked by students demanding the release of all political
prisoners in Myanmar, an end to martial law and an end to night curfews. The
hijackers later surrendered and released all passengers and crew

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

1

GTD

0

GTD

0

RDWTI

Myanmar
Beijing, China
Shiraz Bandar
Abbas, Iran
Panama
Colon,
Panama

Iran Air Flight
133
Panamanian
airliner
Panamanian
aircraft

Iranian
individuals
FARC

No further information readily available
Aircraft hijacked by members of FARC who intended to use aircraft to
transport the FARC founder to Cuba

5 individuals

No further information readily available

0

GTD

From China
Novgorod Petrozavodsk,
Soviet Union

Xiamen Airlines
Flight 8301

Chinese
individual

The aircraft was hijacked by a Chinese individual seeking asylum in Taiwan. It
crashed in Guangzhou while attempting a landing, Killing all 128 on board

128

See below3

Aeroflot aircraft

Unknown

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Brazil

Brazilian airliner

Individual

After aircraft hijacked, pilot made an emergency landing in the Canary Islands

0

RDWTI

Nicholas Kristof 'Hijacking Prompts Beijing Shake-Up' New York Times 10 October 1990, p. 3 http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/10/world/hijacking-prompts-beijingshake-up.html
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

09-November1990

Bangkok Rangoon

Thai Airways
Flight TG305

07-January-1991

Trujillo, Peru
Burgas,
Bulgaria Odessa,
Soviet Union

21-January-1991

01-February1991
13-February1991

Faucett Airlines
DC8

Aeroflot aircraft

ACES Airline
aircraft
Aeroflot
Tupalov 154 Jet

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Justice and
Liberty
Warriors
Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary
Movement

Aircraft diverted to Calcutta, where the hijackers (who wished to draw
international attention to the plight of the pro-democracy movement in
Burma), surrendered

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

2

GTD

Individual
National
Liberation
Army of
Colombia

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

01-March-1991

Turbo,
Colombia
Tbilisi, Soviet
Union
Archangel Leningrad

Aeroflot aircraft

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

05-March-1991

Leningrad
Airport, USSR

Domestic USSR
flight

Soviet
individual

Hijacker attempted to divert the domestic flight to Sweden with an anti-tank
grenade; however the hijacker was killed during this attempt

1

RDWTI

Singapore
Airlines Flight
117

Pakistan
People’s Party

Aircraft hijacked by a team of four demanding the release of members of
Pakistan People’s Party. All hijackers were killed and all hostages freed by
Singaporean special forces in an operation lasting 30 seconds

0

RDWTI

31-March-1991

Kuala Lumpur
- Singapore
Bechar Algiers,
Algeria

Air Algerie flight

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

13-June-1991

Georgia,
USSR

Domestic USSR
flight

Georgian
individual

Hijacker attempted to divert domestic flight to Iran or Iraq; however hijacker
was over-powered by Soviet troops

0

RDWTI

26-March-1991
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DATE
20-August-1991
19-September1991

16-October1991
27-October1991

27-October1991
09-November1991

LOCATION
Yaguara,
Colombia
Rome - Tunis
Debre
Markos Bahir,
Ethiopia
Trujillo Tocache,
Peru

Quito,
Ecuador

13-November1991

USSR
Siberia - St.
Petersburg,
Russia

25-November1991

Dire Dawa,
Ethiopia

31-January-1992
01-February1992

El Porvenir,
Panama
Chimkent,
Kazakhstan

FLIGHT
LIK-3453
Aircraft
Alitalia Fight AZ
864

PERPETRATOR
Two
individuals

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

NarcoTerrorists

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Transportes
Aereos
Ejecutivos Aero
Commander 690 Turboprop

Revolutionary
Armed Forces
of Colombia
(FARC),
Shining Path

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Domestic USSR
flight

Chechen
separatists

Aircraft diverted to Turkey, with hijackers protesting against Russia's policy
towards Chechnya. Upon landing all passengers and crew were released

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Ethiopian
Airlines 737
Juan Leguia
Jimenez Airline
Company

Aeroflot aircraft

Ethiopian
Airlines 737
Aerotaxi
Internacion
aircraft
Kazakhstani
Airliner

Russian
individual
Former
Ethiopian
government
officials
Four
individuals
Two
individuals

497

DATE
05-February1992

LOCATION

30-March-1992

Djibouti
Tunis Madrid

12-April-1992

Ethiopia

13-April-1992

Somalia

25-April-1992

Carti, Panama
Grozny Moscow
Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia

08-June-1992
28-August-1992
04-September1992
30-September1992
29-December1992
06-February1993

28-March-1993

Vietnam
Islamabad Saudi Arabia
Havana Varadero,
Cuba

FLIGHT
Ethiopian
Airliner

PERPETRATOR
Two
individuals

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Tunis Air flight

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Ethiopian
airliner
Chartered
Cessna 402
Aerotaxi
Airlines Cessna
Caravan

Ethiopian
individuals
Somali
individuals

Aircraft diverted to Nairobi, where all passengers and crew were released and
the hijackers were arrested
Aircraft hijacked by five Somalis who were taken to Djibouti, where the
incident ended peacefully

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

NarcoTerrorists

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aeroflot TV-154
Ethiopian
Airlines flight
Vietnam
Airlines Airbus
300
Pakistani
Airliner

Unknown

No further information readily available

0

GTD

5 individuals
Antigovernment
individual
Three
individuals

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aircraft hijacked and forced to fly at low altitudes so the hijacker could
distribute anti-government leaflets, before parachuting from the aircraft

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aero Caribbean

Venezuela

Tourist aircraft

Individual
Suspected
Narcoguerillas

India

Indian Airlines
aircraft

Indian Hindu
individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aircraft hijacked for use in drug operations

0

RDWTI

Aircraft was hijacked to Pakistan. After being denied permission to land it was
diverted back to India. The hijackers were protesting against Hindu- Muslim
violence in India and surrendered upon return to India

0

RDWTI
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DATE

LOCATION

04-July-1993

Mozambique

16-August-1993

Tunis Amsterdam

16-September1993

Germany

10-December1993

13-January-1994
23-January-1994
18-February1994
28-February1994

08-March-1994

06-April-1994

Paris - Nice
Madras Calcutta,
India
Dakar - Addis
Ababa
Chengdu Fuzhou,
China
Oran Annaba,
Algeria
Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia - Addis
Ababa,
Ethiopia
Khartoum Dongola,
Sudan

FLIGHT
Mozambique
commuter
aircraft

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Mozambiquan
man

The hijacker, who demanded passage to Australia, diverted the aircraft to
Johannesburg - where it was stormed by special forces

0

RDWTI

Egyptian
individual

Aircraft diverted to Dusseldorf where the hijackers demanded passage to
New York and the release of Omar Abel-Rahman (an Egyptian cleric involved
with 1993 WTC bombing). The aircraft was stormed by German police

0

RDWTI

Turkish
individual

Aircraft hijacked to Turkey

0

RDWTI

Algerian
individual

Aircraft hijacked by Algerian individual demanding passage to Libya. Upon
landing at Nice the passengers were released and the hijacker was disabled
by police

0

RDWTI

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

Aircraft diverted to Rome

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Air Algerie 727

Three
individuals

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Saudi Airliner

Two
individuals

Aircraft was diverted to Nairobi where all passengers were released

0

GTD

Sudan Air 737

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

KLM airliner
German
transport
aircraft

Air France flight
Indian Airlines
flight
Ethiopian
Airlines flight
China
Southwest
Airlines
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DATE

07-April-1994
25-April-1994

06-June-1994
07-August-1994
14-September1994
25-October1994
27-October1994
03-November1994

LOCATION
Memphis San Jose,
California
Jeddah Addis Ababa
Fuzhou Guangzhou,
China
Guatemala Panama
Aden - Sanaa,
Yemen
Makhachkala,
Russia
Moscow Mineralniye
Vody, Russia

08-November1994

Norway
Greece /
Germany Dusseldorf

14-November1994
23-November1994

Algiers Ouargla,
Algeria
Syktyvkar,
Russia

4

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

FedEx Flight
705
Ethiopian
Airlines flight

Disgruntled
employee
Ethiopian
individual

Hijacked by disgruntled employee Auburn Calloway who had planned to crash
it into Fed Ex Headquarters. Calloway was overpowered by flight crew and
aircraft landed safely
Hijacker diverted aircraft to London - where he released passengers and crew
after negotiations

0

See below4

0

RDWTI

China Southern
Airlines 737

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

COPA B-737
Yemeni
Alyemda
Airlines 737
Aeroflot Yak-40
Jetliner

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aeroflot TU-154
Airliner

Two
individuals

0

GTD

SAS aircraft

Bosnian
refugee

No further information readily available
Aircraft hijacked by Bosnian refugee wanting to highlight international
attention on the need for aid to Bosnia; Hijacker surrendered after
negotiations

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aircraft diverted to Majorca, where hijackers demanded the release of
political prisoners in Algeria, upholding of the 1991 elections and passage to
Marseille; Hijackers then surrendered

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Olympic
Airways Airliner

Algerian aircraft
Russian TU-134

Individual
Union of
Peaceful
Citizens of
Algeria
Three
individuals

Dave Hirschman Hijacked: The True Story of the Heroes of Flight 705 (William Morrow, 1997)
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DATE
23-November1994
05-December1994
15-December1994

23-December1994

24-December1994
04-January-1995
17-March-1995

21-June-1995
01-July-1995
02-July-1995
30-July-1995

02-August-1995

LOCATION
Stavropol,
Russia
Berbera,
Somalia
Catavari,
Brazil
Fuzhov,
Fujian
Province,
China

Algiers - Paris
Khartoum,
Sudan
Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia
Tokyo Hakodatr,
Japan
Norihsk,
Russia
Sanaa,
Yemen
Managua,
Nicaragua
Shanghai Guangzhou,
China

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Russian Airliner
Air Djibouti
Airliner
Brazilian
Airliner

Individual
Somali
individuals
Two
individuals

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Chinese
regional airliner

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aircraft hijacked by four members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), who had
planned to crash the aircraft into the Eiffel Tower. After the hijackers killed 3
passengers, French special forces stormed the aircraft in Marseilles where all
four hijackers were killed and the remaining hostages were freed

8

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

2 Russians

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Air France 8969
Sudanese
Airliner
Ethiopian
Airliner
All Nippon
Airways aircraft
Russian Airliner
Ethiopian
Airliner
La Costena
Airliner
China Eastern
Flight MU5379

Armed Islamic
Group (GIA)
Two Sudanese
individuals
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DATE

03-August-1995
15-August-1995
03-September1995
21-September1995
09-November1995
26-December1995

06-January-1996

08-March-1996
24-March-1996

27-March-1996

LOCATION
Kandahar,
Afghanistan
Cape Town,
South Africa
Palma de
Mallorca,
Spain
Kandahar,
Afghanistan
Athens,
Greece
Asmara,
United Arab
Emirates
Between
Taipei and
Tainan,
Taiwan
Ercan,
Northern
Cyprus Istanbul
Khartoum,
Sudan

04-April-1996

Egypt
Dhaka Barisal,
Bangladesh

25-July-1996

Oran, Algeria

FLIGHT
Trans Avia
Russian Il-76
Cargo Aircraft
South African
airliner

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Taliban

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

French airbus R300
Ariana Airline
727
Olympic
Airways airliner

Anti-Nuclear
Group

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Taliban
Ethiopian
individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Saudi Airliner

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Trans Asia
Airways Airbus
321

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aircraft diverted to Sofia then to Munich. The hijacker made a statement to
media regarding the Chechen situation and then surrendered

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aircraft diverted to Libya, with hijackers demanded the lifting of the siege of
Palestine. All passengers and crew released in Libya

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Egypt Air Airbus
A320

Turkish
Chechen
sympathisers
Two
individuals
Members of
Bani Hilal
Tribe

Y-12 aircraft
Air Algeria B767

Individual
Algerian
individual

Turkish Airlines
Boeing 727
Sudanese
airliner

502

DATE

LOCATION

26-July-1996

Madrid, Spain

08-August-1996

Mauritania
Khartoum,
Sudan
Beirut,
Lebanon
Herat Kandahar,
Afghanistan
Guangzhou Xiamen,
China

26-August-1996
03-September1996
24-September1996
15-November1996

23-November1996

07-January-1997
10-February1997
27-February1997

Addis Ababa Nairobi
Aranquita,
Aravea,
Colombia
Vienna,
Austria
Guangzhou,
China
New Delhi Jammu

10-March-1997

Kaohsiung,
Taiwan

00-January-1900

FLIGHT
Iberia Airlines
DC-10
Air Mauritania
flight
Sudan Airways
Airbus 310

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

No further information readily available
Hijackers demanded passage to Morocco, but were overpowered by crew and
arrested on landing

0

GTD

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Charter aircraft

Iraqis
Bulgarian
individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Aircraft carrying
Taliban militia

Pakistani
individuals

Aircraft hijacked to Bagram Air Base. Hijackers wanted to expose Pakistani
support for the Taliban

0

RDWTI

Chinese airliner

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Ethiopian
Airlines Flight
961
Piper Seneca
twin engine
aircraft
Austrian
Airlines aircraft
Domestic
airliner

Ethiopian
prison
escapees

Aircraft was hijacked by three prison escapees demanding passage to
Australia to seek political asylum. Aircraft crashed into the Indian Ocean after
hijackers attempted to stop the pilot landing on Comoros Island. 127 of the
175 passengers on-board were killed - the third deadliest aerial hijacking

125

RDWTI

Individual
Bosnian
refugee

No further information readily available

0

GTD

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Individual

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Alliance Airline
Far Eastern Air
Transport
aircraft

PERPETRATOR
Lebanese
male
Mauritanian
individual
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Malta Turkey
La Paragua Las Minas,
Venezuela

Air Malta Flight
830

Turkish
individuals

Aircraft hijacked by individuals demanding the release of a prisoner jailed for
attempting to assassinate Pope John Paul in 1981; Hijackers surrendered to
Police in Cologne

0

RDWTI

No further information readily available

0

GTD

Russia

Russian airliner

Individual
Chechen
rebels

No further information readily available

0

GTD

31-January-1998

Nicaragua

Nicaraguan
aircraft

Nicaraguan
individuals

Aircraft diverted to Costa Rica where hijackers demanded political asylum.
They were arrested upon landing

0

RDWTI

18-February1998

Russia

Russian
terrorist

An attempted hijacking by an individual demanding passage out of Russia was
foiled when the hijacker was over-powered by police

0

RDWTI

Hijackers attempted to divert aircraft to Rajasthan Province in India; however
the aircraft was forced to land at a Pakistani Air Force Base where the
hijackers were arrested

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

0

RDWTI

1

GTD

0

GTD

09-June-1997
09-November1997
10-December1997

Aeroselva light
aircraft

23-June-1998

Pakistan
Seville Barcelona

Russian aircraft
Pakistan
International
Airlines Fokker
flight PK554
Iberian Airlines
aircraft

09-August-1998

Russia

TU-154 aircraft

Turkey

Turkish Airlines
Flight 145

Turkey
Marseille Paris

Turkish Airlines
flight 487
Air France
aircraft

24-May-1998

14-September1998
29-October1998
02-March-1999

Pakistani
individuals
Mentally ill
individual
Russian
individual

Turkish
individual
Kurdistan
Workers Party
(PKK)
Individual

Hijacker demanded passage to Israel, but later surrendered to authorities
Hijacker demanded $100, 00 and passage to a third country. All passengers
were freed from the aircraft
Aircraft hijacked by an individual protesting about a ban on wearing
headscarves in Turkish universities and public offices. Hijacker surrendered
after three hours
One hijacker attempted to divert aircraft to Switzerland. Upon landing in
Ankara, the hijacker was killed by Police in a rescue operation
Former police officer seeking greater European unity hijacked aircraft,
surrendered after three hours
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DATE

12-March-1999

LOCATION
Bucaramanga
- Bogota,
Colombia

Avianca Airlines

12-April-1999

Colombia

24-December1999

Kathmandu Delhi

06-February2000

14-September2000
17-September2000

14-October2000

Moscow Essex

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Aircraft hijacked, and passengers released after a ransom was paid

0

GTD

Colombian
Avianca airliner

Narcoterrorists
ELN- Army of
National
Liberation

Aircraft hijacked to a remote landing strip. Some passengers were held
hostage for 20 months. Hijackers were later arrested

0

GTD

Indian Airlines
Flight 814

Harakat ulMujahidin

Aircraft was diverted to Amritsar, Lahore, Dubai and then Kandahar. After
one week India released three jailed Pakistani terrorists in exchange for the
hostages - one of whom was killed

1

GTD

Anti-Taliban
Group

Hijackers demanded the release of Ismail Khan (an opponent of the Taliban
regime). Aircraft was diverted first to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, then to
Aktyubinsk, Kazakhstan, then to Moscow and finally to London - with
passengers being progressively released. All hostages were released after a
four day standoff

0

GTD

Afghan Ariana
Airlines aircraft

Doha, Qatar Amman,
Jordan
Guadalcanal,
Solomon
Islands

Solomon
Airlines aircraft

Jeddah London

Saudi Arabian
Airlines Flight
115

Qatar Airways
aircraft

Iraqi individual
Isatabu
Freedom
Movement

Aircraft hijacked by an Iraqi individual seeking asylum from persecution in
Iraq. Aircraft was diverted to Saudi Arabia where the hijacker was detained

0

GTD

Solomon Island militants hijacked aircraft, released passengers after payment
of ransom

0

GTD

Four Saudi
nationals

Hijackers demanded passage to Damascus, Syria - although Syria gave
permission for aircraft to land, the aircraft instead landed in Baghdad. The
hijackers demanded the Saudi Royal family leave power. Following three
hours of negotiations, the hostages were freed and the hijackers arrested

0

GTD

505

DATE

23-January-2001

LOCATION

15-March-2001
11-September2001
20-February2002

United States

11-May-2002

China

Yemeni aircraft
Gulf Air Flight
153
Russian Tu-154
passenger
aircraft
Four US
airliners
Colombian
aircraft
Xiamen Airlines
Flight MF8336

09-September2002

Bombay Seychelles

15-October2002

28-January-2001

Yemen
Bangkok Abu Dhabi

FLIGHT

Yemeni - pro
Iraqi
Iraqi individual

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Aircraft hijacked by an individual wanting to show support for Saddam
Hussein by flying to Baghdad airport as a challenge to Iraq's international
isolation; However hijacker was over-powered by crew
Iraqi individual attempted to divert aircraft divert to Europe; but was overpowered by crew

0

GTD

0

GTD

2

RDWTI

2,996

GTD

0

GTD

0

GTD

GTD

FARC
Chinese
individual

Air Seychelles
Boeing 737

Indian
individual

An armed Indian man attempted to hijack the aircraft shortly after take-off;
he was over-powered by the crew and arrested on landing

0

Sudan

Saudi aircraft

Saudi
individuals

Two Saudi nationals hijacked the aircraft and demanded to fly to the United
States; however they were overpowered by the crew and arrested on landing

0

07-February2003

Istanbul,
Turkey

aircraft on
tarmac

Individual

A Turkish man wanting to travel to Russia to see his former girlfriend
attempted to hijack the aircraft before take-off; however he was overpowered and arrested

0

GTD

03-October2006

Tirana Istanbul

Turkish Airlines
Flight 1476

Greek
individual

Aircraft hijacked by a man demanding to speak to the Pope. After the pilot
transmitted a 7500 hijack message, the aircraft was intercepted by the Greek
Air Force; and landed safely in Italy

0

See below5

Colombia

Chechen
individuals

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

Hijackers demanded the end of hostilities in Chechnya; Russian military
stormed aircraft upon landing
Four aircraft hijacked, with three being crashed into high profile - See Table 6
in Chapter 2
Aircraft was forced to land on a road; with the hijackers abducting a
Colombian politician on-board
A mentally ill Chinese man attempted to hijack the aircraft; however he was
over-powered by the crew

5

Istanbul Moscow

PERPETRATOR

Al Qaeda

Turkish jet hijacker surrenders' BBC Online 3 October 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5403976.stm

506

DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

22-January-2007

Botswana South Africa

Unspecified
aircraft

Suspected Al
Qaeda
member

A passenger threatened to detonate an explosive device aboard the aircraft.
The aircraft landed, and the hijacker released passengers and crew and was
arrested

0

RDWTI

24-January-2007

Khartoum,
Sudan

Air West Flight
612

Individual

Aircraft was hijacked and diverted to Chadian capital of N'Djamena where the
hijacker surrendered

0

GTD

15-February2007

Nouakchott Las Palmas

Air Mauritania
737

Individual

Aircraft hijacked by a Moroccan man seeking political asylum in France. The
aircraft landed at a Las Palmas Air Force Base where the hijacker was arrested

0

See below6

30-March-2007

Libya - Sudan

Sudan Airways
aircraft

Individual

Aircraft was hijacked by an armed assailant. The aircraft landed safely in
Khartoum where the hijacker was arrested

0

GTD

10-April-2007

Ankara,
Turkey

A man claiming to have explosives hijacked the aircraft - which landed safely
in Ankara, where the hijacker was arrested
Two attackers attempted to hijack aircraft; but were over-powered and
arrested upon landing

GTD

Havana, Cuba

Individual
Renegade
soldiers

0

03-May-2007

Turkish aircraft
Aircraft leaving
Cuba

0

GTD

19-August-2007

Nicosia Istanbul

Atlas jet MD-80

Arab students

Aircraft was hijacked by two Arab students claiming to be Al Qaeda
operatives and demanding passage to Tehran. The aircraft landed in Antalya where the passengers escaped and the hijackers were arrested

0

See below7

18-April-2008

Arequipa Lima, Peru

Aero condor
aircraft

Individual

Individual demanding to speak to the Peruvian President attempted to hijack
aircraft - but was over-powered by crew before landing

0

GTD

6

Passengers overpower aircraft hijacker in Spain's Canary Islands, suspect arrested' USA Today 15 February 2007 http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-0215-air-mauritania_x.htm
7
Pilots and passengers foil hijacking of Turkish jet' International Herald Tribune 20 August 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/world/europe/19ihtturkey.1.7168816.html
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

26-August-2008

Nyala, Sudan

Boeing 737

26-August-2008

Libya - Sudan

Sun Air flight
611

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

Sudanese
individuals
Sudan
Liberation
Movement

Hijacked by two individuals seeking to flee Sudan. Aircraft was diverted from
landing at Khartoum to and proceeded to south-eastern Libya - where the
hijackers surrendered to Libyan authorities after a gunfight

0

GTD

Aircraft hijacked by three armed attackers - who surrendered upon landing in
Libya

0

GTD

0

See below8

19-April-2009

Montego Bay
- Canada

CanJet Flight
918

Jamaican
individual

An armed individual stormed the aircraft past airport security and demanded
passage to Cuba. Most passengers paid their way off the aircraft. Six crew
members were held hostage for several hours. The hijacker was later
disarmed and arrested

09-September2009

Cancun Mexico City

Aero México
Flight 576

Bolivian
individual

Hijacker claimed to have a bomb and demanded to speak to the Mexican
president. The aircraft landed at Mexico City where the passengers and crew
were released when the aircraft was stormed by police

0

See below9

02-November2009

Daallo Airlines
aircraft

Al-Shabaab

Two armed assailants hijacked aircraft, which landed safely. After exchanging
gunfire with police they were over-powered and arrested

0

GTD

29-July-2010

Bossaso,
Somalia
Mineralniye
Vody Moscow

Kavminvodyavia
Airline aircraft

Individual

Individual attempted to hijacked aircraft upon landing. He demanded a
meeting with police, but was over-powered and arrested

0

GTD

05-January-2011

Oslo Istanbul

Turkish Airlines
Flight 1754

Individual

A man who claimed to have a bomb demanded the aircraft return to Norway.
The passengers overpowered him and the aircraft landed safely at Atatürk
Airport where the hijacker was arrested

0

GTD

‘Incident: Canjet B738 at Montego Bay on April 19th 2009, hijacker on board' The Aviation Herald, 20 April 2009 http://avherald.com/h?article=41859361&opt=0
Bolivian man acted alone in Mexico hijacking, official says' CNN.com.world 10 September 2009
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/09/09/mexico.hijacking/index.html
8
9
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DATE

LOCATION

FLIGHT

PERPETRATOR

SUMMARY OF HIJACK

FATALITIES

SOURCE

24-April-2011

Paris - Rome

Alitalia Flight
329

Individual

A man attempted to divert the aircraft to Libya, but was subdued by crew and
passengers, and arrested upon landing in Rome

0

See below10

29-June-2012

Hotan Urumqi,
Xinjiang
region in
China

Tianjin Airlines
Flight 7554

Six individuals

Individuals attempted a hijacking; however this was thwarted by police
officers and other passengers

0

See below11

10
11

Accident: Alitalia A321 en route on Apr 24th 2011, attempted hijack' Aviation Herald 25 April 2011 http://avherald.com/h?article=43b7e3ef&opt=1
China's first plane hijacking in 22 years foiled' International Business Times 29 June 2012 http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-first-plane-hijacking-22-years-foiled-704930
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Summary of yearly trends in barricade terrorist incidents: 1970 – 2011

Appendix F:

This Appendix summarises the yearly patterns in barricade terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2011. For each year it records the total number of
incidents globally, the total fatalities resulting and also includes a breakdown of the locations at which the barricade incidents occurred during
each year, noting significant incidents. The statistics in this Appendix have been derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), with complete
details of the statistics summarised below held on file by the author. As [2.5] noted, the GTD defines ‘barricade terrorist incidents as ‘’[acts] whose
primary objective is to take control of a vehicle such as an aircraft, boat, bus, etc. for the purpose of diverting it to an un-programmed destination,
obtain payment of a ransom, force the release of prisoners, or some other political objective. Hijackings are distinct from Hostage Taking because
the target is a vehicle, regardless of whether there are people/passengers in the vehicle.’

Year
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007

Total
Incidents
5
12
11
7
14

Total
Fatalities
40
107
36
51
26

2006

17

28

2005

100

154

Locations of barricade incidents
India (1) - 50 fatalities, Afghanistan (1), Turkey (1), Yemen (1), Paraguay (1)
Iraq (1) - 58 fatalities, Afghanistan (3), Pakistan (2) - 27 fatalities, Sudan (2), Yemen (1), United States (1)
Pakistan (4), Philippines (2), India (1), Afghanistan (1), Yemen (1), Congo (1), Sri Lanka (1)
Pakistan (2), Philippines (2), Afghanistan (1), Iraq (1), Kenya (1)
Pakistan (3), PNG (1), Iraq (1), Iran (1), Nigeria (2), Niger (1), West Bank / Gaza (2), Congo (1), Afghanistan (1)
Algeria (1) - Hostage-taking by Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting - 21 fatalities, Afghanistan (2), Nigeria
(2), Philippines (1), Chad (3), India (1), Turkey (1), Corsica (2), West Bank / Gaza (2), Sri Lanka (1)
Iraq (34) - 1 attack ending in 36 fatalities; Afghanistan (14), Yemen (2), Nepal (16), Colombia (4), Somalia (1),
Russia (1), Thailand (1), Algeria (2), India (4), West Bank / Gaza (3), Philippines (1), Sudan (1), Peru (1), Nigeria (2),
Senegal (1), Georgia (1)

510

Year

Total
Incidents

Total
Fatalities

2004
2003

5
3

371
10

2002
2001
2000

5
5
6

131
19
8

1999
1998
1997

11
0
3

14
0
4

1996

14

23

1995

6

236

1994
1993

25
0

60
0

1992

22

5

1991
1990
1989
1988

16
17
18
16

11
0
21
1

Locations of barricade incidents
Russia (1) - Beslan School Siege by Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
(344 fatalities); Saudi Arabia (1) - Al-Khubar Oil Complex Siege by Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (22 fatalities),
India (1), Iraq (1), West Bank and Gaza (1)
India (1), Saudi Arabia (1), Philippines (1)
Russia (1) - Moscow Theatre Siege by Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen
Martyrs and Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) and Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB) demanded complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya - Russian special forces stormed theatre resulting in 129 fatalities; Philippines (1), Germany (1), Turkey (1), Nepal (1)
Philippines (1) - Abu Sayyaf Group (16 fatalities), Nigeria (1), Colombia (1), Macedonia (1), Turkey (1)
Latvia (1), Bangladesh (1), Philippines (1), Nigeria (1), Thailand (1), Colombia (1), Bangladesh (1)
Colombia (3), Armenia (1), Philippines (1), Uzbekistan (1), Nigeria (1); Between 16 - 19 February, closely
coordinated hostage takings at embassies by supporters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) occurred in
Switzerland (1), Germany (1), Netherlands (1) - all resolved with no fatalities
Nil recorded
Colombia (2), Brazil (1)
Russia (1) - Nicaragua (2), Somalia (2), Algeria (1), Tajikistan (1), Yemen (1), Vanuatu (1), Mexico (1), PNG (1), Sri
Lanka (1), Philippines (1)
Russia (1) - Hostage-taking by Chechen separatists (121 fatalities), Philippines (1) - Hostage-taking by Abu Sayyaf
Group (114 fatalities), El Salvador (1), Turkey (1), Chile (1), Indonesia (1)
Cambodia (1) - Hostage taking by Khmer Rouge (50 fatalities), Nicaragua (4), Guatemala (2), Northern Ireland (2),
Russia (2), Brazil (1), United States (1), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1), Australia (1), Afghanistan (1), France (1),
Venezuela (1), Mozambique (1), Cuba (1), Japan (1), Suriname (1), Cameroon (1)
GTD has no records for 1993
Peru (5), Nicaragua (3), West Bank / Gaza (2), Afghanistan (2), Venezuela (1), Cambodia (1), Turkey (1), Colombia
(1), Algeria (1), Bolivia (1), Bangladesh (1), Israel (1), United States (1), Yemen (1)
Peru (4), Corsica (2), El Salvador (2), Colombia (2), Ecuador (1), Japan (1), Philippines (1), Great Britain (1), Chile
(1), Argentina (1)
Peru (5), El Salvador (3), Chile (3), Colombia (2), Zambia (1), Sri Lanka (1), Corsica (1), Philippines (1)
Chile (6), El Salvador (4), Nicaragua (2), Turkey (2), Philippines (1), Suriname (1), Zambia (1), Zimbabwe (1)
Peru (4), Colombia (3), El Salvador (2), Chile (2), Ecuador (2), Philippines (2), United States (1)
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Year
1987
1986

Total
Incidents
26
27

Total
Fatalities
6
2

1985

55

20

1984
1983

25
21

201
0

1982

47

25

1981

28

7

1980

49

9

1979

75

20

1978
1977
1976

42
10
6

51
1
16

1975

11

35

1974

5

35

1973
1972
1971
1970

6
2
0
3

36
0
0
0

TOTALS

771

1780

Locations of barricade incidents
Peru (9), Chile (7), Philippines (4), Colombia (2), Turkey (2), El Salvador (1), Honduras (1)
Peru (16), Colombia (6), Chile (4), Lebanon (1)
El Salvador (16), Colombia (11), Peru (9), Guatemala (5), Ecuador (3), Philippines (2), Nicaragua (2), Greece (2),
Chile (1), Mozambique (1), France (1), Angola (1), Canada (1)
Ethiopia (1) - Hostage-taking by Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (200 fatalities), Colombia (8), Chile (6), Peru (5),
Greece (1), Ecuador (1), Sri Lanka (1), Honduras (1) El Salvador (1)
Peru (7), Colombia (6), El Salvador (3), Belgium (1), Bolivia (1), France (1), Ecuador (1)
Guatemala (19), El Salvador (8), Peru (5), Colombia (3), Northern Ireland (3), Nicaragua (2), USA (1), Netherlands
(1), West Germany (1), Ireland (1), Switzerland (1), Honduras (1), Lebanon (1)
Guatemala (6), France (3), Colombia (3), Peru (3), El Salvador (2), Mexico (2), Philippines (2), Northern Ireland (1),
Norway (1), Thailand (1), Costa Rica (1), Bolivia (1), Chile (1), Brazil (1)
El Salvador (31), Colombia (8), Bolivia (4), Puerto Rico (1), Peru (1), Venezuela (1), Chile (1), Italy (1), Northern
Ireland (1)
El Salvador (38), Colombia (11), Nicaragua (8), Italy (5), Guatemala (4), Iran (2), Spain (2), Puerto Rico (1),
Rhodesia (1), Argentina (1), Turkey (1), Philippines (1), France (1), Israel (1)
Israel - Hostage-taking by Al Fatah in Haifa - 41 fatalities, Colombia (17), Spain (7), El Salvador (4), Puerto Rico (2),
Nicaragua (2), Italy (6), Netherlands (1), France (1), USA (1)
Italy (4), USA (2), West Germany (1), Spain (1), Colombia (1), Guatemala (1)
Italy (2), Jordan (1), Syria (1), Corsica (1), Northern Ireland (1)
El Salvador (2), Austria (1), Netherlands (1), Argentina (1), Spain (1), Nicaragua (1), Malaysia (1), Sweden (1),
Israel (1), France (1)
Israel (2) - Hostage-taking by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command - 21 fatalities,
Netherlands (1), Argentina (1), Dominican Republic (1)
Italy - Hostage-taking by Black September - 30 fatalities, Argentina (1), Lebanon (1), France (1), USA (1), Great
Britain (1)
Argentina (1), Thailand (1)
Jordan (2), Uruguay (1)

Appendix G:

Chronology of successful maritime terrorism attacks: 1961 – 2013

This Appendix summarises the all recorded successful maritime terrorist attacks between 1961 and 2013. For each attack it records the date; the
location of the attack and the navigational status of the attacked vessel (Underway (U), In port (P), At anchor (A), or Offshore platform (OP));
the perpetrators of the attack; the attacked vessel; the method of attack and its effects; the Maritime Terrorism Threat Matrix incident category;
the injuries resulting from the attack; the fatalities resulting from the attack; and the source from which the information about the attack was
derived – which include the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the RAND Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) and other
sources as listed below.

Date

30-May-1968

Southern
Caribbean - U
25 NM from Key
West, United
States - U
Near Tampa,
United States U

01-June-1968

Galveston,
United States - P

22-January-1961

24-May-1968

1
2

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators
Portuguese and
Spanish rebels
Anti-Castro
Cubans - El
Poder Cubano
Anti-Castro
Cubans - El
Poder Cubano
Anti-Castro
Cubans - El
Poder Cubano

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

Target: From
inside vessel

0

0

Chalk1

Attacked vessel
Portuguese
cruise ship
Santa Maria

Method and effect of
attack
Hijacking of vessel 600 passengers
released after 11 days

British cargo
ship Granwood

Explosives on vessel

Target: From
inside vessel

0

0

RDWTI2

Explosives on vessel

Target: From
inside vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Explosives on vessel

Target: From
inside vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Japanese ship
Asaka Maru
Japanese ship
Mikagasan
Maru

Peter Chalk The Maritime Dimension of International Security Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States (RAND Corporation, 2008), 48
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php
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08-August-1968

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel
300 miles east
of Miami,
Florida - U
Biscayne Bay,
Miami, Florida A

03-September1968

Miami Harbour P

16-September1968

Miami Harbour P
Off the
Mozambique
coast - U

Date

01-August-1968

26-April-1971

04-June-1971
12-November1971

04-March-1973
27-March-1973
3

Strait of Bab el
Mandeb at Red
Sea entrance - U
Belfast,
Northern
Ireland

Beirut, Lebanon
-P
Key Biscayne,
Florida - P

Perpetrators

Method and effect of
attack

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

Attacked vessel
British freighter
Lancastrian
Prince
British freighter
Caribbean
Venture

Explosives on vessel

Target: From
inside vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Underwater explosion

Target: From
underwater

0

0

RDWTI

Yugoslavian ship
Kupres

Explosives on vessel

Target: From
inside vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Polish vessel
Polancia

Vessel fired upon

Target: From
the land

0

0

RDWTI

Portuguese ship

Explosives on vessel

Target: From
inside vessel

0

23

RDWTI

Liberian Oil
Tanker Coral
Sea

Ten bazooka shells
fired from speedboat

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Irish Republican
Extremists

Dutch ship

Vessel fired upon from
shore

Target: From
the land

0

1

GTD3

Black
September
Cuban Group
JCN

Greek charter
ship Sanya carrying 250 US
tourists to Haifa
Israel
Soviet research
ship

Bomb placed below
waterline; Ship sank
Ship bombed whilst
alongside

Target: From
underwater
Target: From
the land

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

Unknown
Anti-Castro
Cubans - El
Poder Cubano
Croation
terrorists
Anti-Castro
Cubans - El
Poder Cubano
Armed
Revolutionary
Action
Popular Front
for the
Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP)

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
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Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

30-December1973

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel
Miami river at
dock whilst
awaiting cargo P

Cuban National
Liberation Front

573-ton
Mereghan cargo
vessel

31-January-1974

Singapore Connected to 6
February 1974
incident - U

Japanese Red
Army and PLFP

Ferry boat

02-February-1974

Karachi port,
Pakistan - P

Moslem
International
Guerrillas

Greek freighter

06-February-1974

Kuwait Connected to 31
January 1974
incident

PLFP

Japanese
embassy in
Kuwait

Date

Method and effect of
attack

Two grenades fired at
vessel
Eight passengers
aboard a ferry boat
were taken hostage –
with the hijackers
demanding safe
passage to an Arab
country
Hijackers threatened
to kill crew members
unless the Greek
government released
two Arab terrorists
sentenced to death.
The hijackers’
demands were met
and the hostages were
released
Twelve persons were
taken hostage.
Hijackers demanded
safe passage for the 31
January 1974 hijackers
and their hostages. A
Japanese Airlines flight
to transport the 31

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

Target: From
the land

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

RDWTI; Lehr4

Target: From
the land

0

0

RDWTI

Maritimerelated

0

0

RDWTI

Peter Lehr ‘Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors and Capabilities’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds) Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime
Security (CRC Press, 2008), 59
4
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

01-May-1974

Los Angeles
Harbour - P

01-August-1974

1 November 1974

Tigre boat dock,
Argentina – P

Montoneros

28-December1974

San Juan, Puerto
Rico - P

Anti-Castro
Cubans

Okinawa
Harbour - P
Miami Harbour P
Santiago
shipyard – P

Radical
Japanese leftists

23-July-1975
04-August-1975
27 August 1975

6

Jewish Defense
League
Suspected AntiDuvalier Haitian
exiles

Ryder Yacht
Basin, Miami - P
Port Suez, Egypt
-P

05-June-1974

5

Perpetrators

Lehr, above n 4, 63
Lehr, above n 4, 62 - 63

Unknown

Jaws
Montoneros

Attacked vessel

Ferry Caribe Star
Haitian patrol
boat in dry dock
Singapore vessel
Alcazar
Argentine
federal police
chief’s yacht
Soviet cruise
vessel Maxim
Gorki
Chilean training
vessel and
Japanese
University ship
Bahamian vessel
Goldfinger II
Argentine Navy
destroyer

Method and effect of
attack
January 1974 hijackers
from Singapore to
Kuwait, and then onto
South Yemen – where
the hijackers released
the hostages.
Detonation of
explosives aboard the
ferry – which sank

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

Target: From
inside vessel

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

A grenade was thrown
onto the boat
Explosives attached to
the vessel’s hull

Target: From
the land
Target: From
underwater

Explosives placed on
the yacht

Target: From
inside vessel

0

2

Lehr5

Hand grenade thrown
onto vessel

Target: From
the land

2

0

RDWTI

Molotov cocktails
thrown at vessels
Explosives attached to
the vessel’s hull
Frogmen attached
170kg of underwater

Target: From
the land
Target: From
underwater
Target: from
underwater

2

0

RDWTI

1

0

RDWTI

0

0

Lehr6
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Date

Perpetrators

Manila,
Philippines - P
San Juan, Puerto
Rico

02-November1975
07-November1975

San Juan, Puerto
Rico - P
Off Basilan
Island,
Philippines - U

Moro National
Liberation Front

14 December
1975

Argentinian port
–P

Montoneros

28-December1975

San Juan, Puerto
Rico - P

Anti-Castro
Cuban exiles
Anti-Communist
Action Front

12-February-1976

Oporto,
Portugal - P
5 NM off
Anguilla Cays
island of Cay
Salbank - A

Japanese fishing
vessel
Argentine Navy
Commander-inchief’s yacht
Russian cruise
vessel S.S.
Maksim Gorky
Russian vessel
Nadya
Ribakovatye

05-April-1976

Straits of Florida

Anti-Castro
Cuban exiles
Anti-Castro
Cuban exiles

Soviet ship
Dzhordano
Bruno
Two Cuban
fishing vessels

Lehr, above n 4, 63

Moro National
Liberation Front

Attacked vessel
Santisima
Trinadad

26-September1975
01-November1975

16-January-1976

7

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Unknown

Unknown

Japanese
freighter
Soviet cruise
ship
Russian cruise
vessel S.S.
Maksim Gorky

Method and effect of
attack
demolition charges to
destroyer’s hull
Freighter with 27 crew
was hijacked; later
released after
$133,000 ransom paid
Explosives on vessel

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Target: From
the land
Target: From
inside vessel

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

GTD

Explosives attached to
the vessel’s hull
Six crew aboard vessel
taken hostage; later
released
Yacht struck sea mines
and sustained serious
damage

Target: From
underwater

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
underwater

0

0

Lehr7

Bomb thrown onto
vessel

Target: From
the land

1

0

RDWTI

Two grenades thrown
at vessel

Target: From
the land

0

0

RDWTI

Gunfire from small
boat
Machine gun attack
from small boat

Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel

0

0

RDWTI

0

1

RDWTI
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Date
01-June-1976

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel
Off the coast of
Cuba

Perpetrators
Anti-Castro
Cuban exiles

Attacked vessel

01-August-1976

10 NM off
Colombian coast
-A
Beirut, Lebanon
-P

09-August-1976

Tyre, Lebanon P

16-September1976

Port Elizabeth,
New Jersey - P

Unknown
Cuban antiCommunist
group, Omega 7

23-October-1976

Beirut, Lebanon
-P

Lebanese
Christian Group

Three Greek
vessels Eko, Riri,
and Spiro

22-July-1977

Lima, Peru - P

International
Commandos of
Zone 6 of CORU

Cuban fishing
vessel

14-November1977

Off Algerian
coast - U

Algerian-backed
Polisario Front

Spanish fishing
trawler

Shelling attack
Spanish-speaking men
boarded vessel at
anchor and attacked
crew
Vessel struck limpet
mines , later sank
Explosion on board
vessel - which later
sank
Bomb placed on the
hull of the ship by a
frogman
Limpet mines placed
under vessels by
frogmen - All three
vessels sank
Vessel struck two
magnetic explosive
mines; Vessel was a
total loss
Trawler attacked with
mortars and machine
guns from a
speedboat. Three crew
were taken hostage
and later released

21-April-1978

Western Sahara

Polisario Front

Spanish fishing
vessel

Hijacking

18-July-1976

Unknown
Lebanese
Christian Group

Soviet ship

Method and effect of
attack

Sloop Feisty
Greek vessel
Tina
Greek Cypriot
cargo ship
Athena
Soviet cargo
ship

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target: From
the land

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

RDWTI

0

2

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
inside vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
underwater

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
underwater

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
underwater

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

GTD

Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
underwater

Target: From
other vessel
Target:
Unknown
source
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Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

13-August-1978

Santa Cruz
Island,
Philippines - U
Zamboanga,
Philippines

Muslim
Separatist rebel
group
Moro National
Liberation Front

Don Carlos
cargo vessel
Philippines ferry
boat Vinirose

01-January-1979

Off Portuguese
coast - U

Fund for the
Animals; Green
Peace

13-May-1979

Pangutaran,
Philippines

Moro National
Liberation Front

13-May-1979

Tapul,
Philippines

24-June-1979

Pasajes, Spain

Moro National
Liberation Front
Basque
Fatherland and
Freedom (ETA)

Date

30-April-1978

09-August-1979

Khorramshahr,
Iran
Belfast,
Northern
Ireland

6 February 1980

Lisbon port,
Portugal – P

09-July-1979

8
9

Lehr, above n 4, 66
Lehr, above n 4, 64

Method and effect of
attack
Vessel attacked by
four speedboats and
crew were taken
hostage

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Black
Wednesday

French cargo
ship Monterey
Iranian
government
vessel

Guerrillas

Commercial ship

Bombing

Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
the land
Kinetic
weapon:
Against other
vessel
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Sea Shepherds

Whaling vessel
Sierra

Vessel struck a limpet
mine and sank

Target: From
underwater

Whaling vessel
Sierra
Philippines
commercial
vessel
Philippines
fishing boat

Armed assault
Protest vessel Sea
Shepherd rammed a
whaling vessel

Armed assault

Bombing

Bombing

Bombing

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

RDWTI

8

5

GTD

0

0

RDWTI; Lehr8

0

2

GTD

0

3

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

Lehr9
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

04-June-1980

Off Spanish
coast - U
Off the coast of
Western Sahara
-U

02-July-1980

Off the coast of
Morocco - U

29-September1980
29-September1980

Off the coast of
Mauritania - U
Off the coast of
Mauritania - U

29-October-1980

Genoa port - P

31-May-1980

Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

Algerian
Polisario Front

Spanish fishing
trawler
Portuguese
fishing trawler
Rio Vouga
Moroccan
fishing trawler
Cap Juby II
Spanish fishing
trawler Costa de
Terranova
Spanish fishing
vessel Sarita

Polisario Front

Polisario Front

Polisario Front
Polisario Front

22-March-1981

Off the coast of
Spain - U

Maltese
Liberation Front
Iranian
monarchists
opposed to the
Khomeini
regime

26-September1981

Off the Western
Sahara coast - U

Polisario Front

Iranian warship
Tarbarzin
purchased from
France
Portuguese
fishing vessel
Porto Ceu

02-November1981

Nantes Harbour,
France - P

Irish National
Liberation Army

Royal Navy
hydrographic
vessel Hecate

Libyan gunboat

Method and effect of
attack
Vessel was hijacked
and later sunk
Vessel was hijacked
and later sunk
Trawler was
bombarded

Vessel hijacked
Vessel hijacked
Bomb placed on
gunboat's hull by
frogmen

Hijacking by a 25
former members of
the Shah's Navy
Fishing vessel fired
upon by speedboat
Divers located a bomb
with 2.2 pounds of
explosives on the
ship's hull below
waterline

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target:
Unknown
source

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
underwater

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
other vessel

3

1

RDWTI

Target: From
underwater

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
other vessel
Target:
Unknown
source
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
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Date

13-November1981
09-March-1982
26-December1982

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Port of Beira,
Mozambique
Port of Tyre,
Lebanon - P
Pagadian city
harbor,
Philippines

23-February-1983

Irish sea inlet - U

05-August-1983

Port Stanley,
Falkland Islands
-U

21-October-1983

Puerto Cabezas,
Nicaragua

24-February-1984

El Bluff,
Nicaragua

24-February-1984

El Bluff,
Nicaragua

25-February-1984

El Bluff,
Nicaragua

Perpetrators
Mozambique
National
Resistance
Movement
Unknown
Moro National
Liberation Front
Provisional Irish
Republican
Army
Ultra-nationalist
Argentine group
Artigas-Giachino
Command
Misurasata
Indian
Organization
Democratic
Revolutionary
Alliance
Democratic
Revolutionary
Alliance
Democratic
Revolutionary
Alliance

Attacked vessel

Harbour
entrance buoys
Lebanese cargo
ship
Ferries MV Lady
Ruth and Santa
Lucia

Method and effect of
attack
Infrastructure attack harbour entrance
buoys were attacked
Explosives on vessel
caused her to sink

British cargo
ship

Both ferries bombed
at quayside
12 attackers seized the
ship, cast its crew
adrift in a life raft and
blew up the ship

Danish ship
Kraka

Explosives on vessel

Nicaraguan
vessel
Nicaraguan
fishing boat
Pescasa 15
Nicaraguan
fishing boat
Aldo Chauarria
Nicaraguan
fishing boat
Pescasa 23

Armed Assault

Armed Assault

Armed Assault

Bombing

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Disruption
Tool:
Navigation
chokepoint
Target: From
inside vessel

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

GTD

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
inside vessel

70

6

GTD

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

RDWTI

10

0

RDWTI; GTD

10

1

GTD

2

6

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

Target: From
inside vessel
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

14-March-1984

Corinto,
Nicaragua

20-March-1984

Puerto Sandino,
Nicaragua - U

21-March-1984

Puerto Corinto,
Nicaragua

28-March-1984

Corinto,
Nicaragua

29-March-1984

Corinto,
Nicaragua

29-March-1984

Corinto,
Nicaragua

Method and effect of
attack

Perpetrators
Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force

Attacked vessel
Panamanian
Ship - Los
Caribes
Entrance to Port
of Sandino
Soviet tanker
Lugansk

Bombing

Liberian
freighter

Bombing

Nicaraguan
cargo ship

Bombing

30-March-1984

Corinto,
Nicaragua

US-backed
mercenaries
Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force
Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force
Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force
Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force
Democratic
Revolutionary
Alliance

Bombing
Explosive device
placed at entrance to
harbour

31-March-1984

Nicaragua Corinto,
Bluefields, El
Bluff, Puerto
Sandino - U

Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force; and
Democratic
Revolutionary
Alliance

10-April-1984

El Cardon Island,
Nicaragua

Unknown

Nicaraguan
cargo ship
Nicaraguan
fishing vessel
AIMA Sultana
Eleven Soviet,
Panamanian,
Dutch, Liberian
and Nicaraguan
ships
Nicaraguan
fishing vessel El
Cardon

Bombing

Bombing

Sea mines placed by
CIA-backed operatives
caused the vessels to
sink

Bombing

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target:
Unknown
source
Target: From
underwater
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Target: From
underwater
Target:
Unknown
source

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

GTD

5

0

RDWTI

5

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

3

0

GTD

0

0

RDWTI; GTD

3

0

GTD
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

01-May-1984

21-May-1984

05-June-1984

Corinto,
Nicaragua

Perpetrators
Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force

Attacked vessel
Japanese ship
Taushiro
Mahuro

Guadeloupe

Unknown

French yacht

Nicaragua - P

Nicaraguan
counterrevolutionaries

09-July-1984

Buenos Aires,
Argentina - P
Suez Canal,
Egypt

30-July-1984

Luanda, Angola A

31-July-1984

Angola

01-August-1984

Luanda Harbour
Angola - A

10-January-1985

Wawa,
Nicaragua

28-June-1984

Bombing

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Vessel hijacked by
seven counterrevolutionaries

Target: From
the land

Method and effect of
attack

Bombing

Sargento
Cisneros
Commandos

Nicaraguan boat
Two Shell Oil
tankers - the
Perito Moreno
the Belgrano

Hizballah

US Warship

Vessels blown up
Warship damaged by
floating sea mines

Unknown

Angolan ship
Lundoge

Bombing

Soviet Ship

Bombing

UNITA
National Union
for the Total
Independence
of Angola
Nicaraguan
Democratic
Force

2 freighters
anchored
Nicaraguan
government
fishing boat

Sea mines

Armed Assault

Target: From
the land
Target: From
underwater
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Target: From
underwater
Target:
Unknown
source

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

4

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

RDWTI

10
missing

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

GTD

523

Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

25-June-1985

Lekeitio, Spain

22-August-1985
21-September1985
25-September1985
27-September1985

Off Moroccan
coast - U
Off Moroccan
coast - U
Larnaca Cyprus U
Red Sea - U

Perpetrators
Basque
Fatherland and
Freedom (ETA)

Attacked vessel
Spanish fishing
vessel Javier
Ester

Polisario Front

Small boat
Spanish fishing
boat
Israeli yacht The
First

Machine gun attack
Three crew members
taken hostage

Cypriot vessel

Sea mines

Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
underwater

Cruise Liner hijacked
by four PLF members
after crew discovered
them with weapons.
After killing one Jewish
passenger. Following
negotiations, hijackers
abandoned vessel in
exchange for safe
passage to Tunisia

Target: From
inside vessel

Bomb placed on ship's
keel - Vessel sunk
Sea mines - Vessel
sunk

Target: From
underwater
Target: From
underwater

Hijacking

Target: From
other vessel

Polisario Front
Al-Fatah - PLO/
Force 17
Islamic Jihad /
Hezbollah

Unknown

Italian cruise
liner Achille
Lauro
Two 135-ton
Cypriot
hydrofoil boats
Small Greek
cargo ship

New People's
Army

Philippines MV
Fatima

07-October-1985

Off Egyptian
coast - U

Palestinian
Liberation Front

30-January-1986

Messina port,
Italy - P

Unknown

08-April-1986

22-July-1986

Gulf of Suez - U
Mangkaan,
Tagbina Island,
Philippines

Method and effect of
attack

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target:
Unknown
source

Armed Assault
Two crew aboard the
boat were taken
hostage and later
released

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

1

GTD

0

0

RDWTI

2

1

RDWTI

0

3

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

0

1

RDWTI; GTD

0

0

RDWTI

0

2

RDWTI

0

15

GTD
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

22-July-1986

Off Moroccan
coast - U

Polisario Front

10-September1986
14-September1986

Off coast of
Western Sahara
Off Moroccan
coast - U

27-November1986

Off the Saharan
coast - U

Unknown

23-January-1987

Off the coast of
Mauritania - U

Polisario Front

01-February-1987

Beirut, Lebanon
-P

Unknown

Polisario Front
Polisario Front

Attacked vessel
One Spanish
and one Soviet
fishing trawlers
Spanish
merchant ship
Spanish
merchant ship
Spanish fishing
boat
Panamanian
bulk carrier
Maritime King

27-August-1987

Kobe, Japan

Unknown

Egyptian ship
Fast Carrier
Construction
ship - New
Kansai Intl
Airport

08-November1987

Off the coast of
the Gaza Strip U

Abu Nidal
Organisation

Frenchregistered yacht

Method and effect of
attack
Trawlers fired upon
from a speedboat

Armed assault
Gunfire and mortars
from speedboat
Boat fired upon from a
motorised rubber
dinghy
Rocket and machine
gun fire
Two limpet mines
placed below
waterline; Carrier
damaged

Armed assault
Eight crew taken
hostage by ANO
members opposed to
King Hussein of
Jordan; All crew
released one month
later

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

1

1

RDWTI

0

1

GTD

0

1

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
underwater

0

0

RDWTI

Target:
Unknown
source

0

0

GTD

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
other vessel
Target:
Unknown
source
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
Target:
Unknown
source
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

01-December1987

Off Sidon,
Lebanon - U

14-February-1988

Limassol port,
Cyprus - P

Hamas
Israeli extremist
organization
KACH
International

24-February-1988

Trincomalee, Sri
Lanka
Crete, Greece P

Unknown
Greek
protestors

11-July-1988

Trocadero
Marina, Greece

Abu Nidal
Organisation
(ANO)

01-August-1988

South-eastern
Nicaragua - U

Nicaraguan
Resistance

24-February-1989

Barmouth,
Wales

Meibion
Glyndwr
Mozambique
National
Resistance
Movement

22-February-1988

10-November1989

10

Quelimane,
Mozambique

Perpetrators

Israeli Daboor
patrol craft

Method and effect of
attack
Fast boat emerged
from behind a fishing
vessel, fired on Patrol
Craft

Ferry boat

Sea mine connected to
time fuse

Attacked vessel

Sri Lankan
fishing vessel
USNS Saturn

Passenger ferry
City of Poros - U
Ferry boat
carrying a 10person
American
delegation

Yacht in harbour

Spanish Ocean
Tug Cauderan

Armed assault
Molotov cocktails
thrown at vessel
Machine gun attack
from ANO members
aboard vessel; Vessel
earlier bombed in port

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

Target: From
other vessel

0

1

Murphy10

0

0

RDWTI

0

5

GTD

6

0

RDWTI

98

11

RDWTI

27

2

RDWTI; GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

Target: From
underwater
Target:
Unknown
source
Target: From
the land
Target: From
the land and
from inside
vessel

Armed assault

Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Armed assault

Target:
Unknown
source

Armed Assault

Martin Murphy Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (2009), 295

526

Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

Method and effect of
attack

18-November1989

Zamboanga city,
Philippines

Unknown

Philippines
fishing boat

Armed assault

20-November1989

Zamboanga city,
Philippines

Moro National
Liberation Front

Fishing boat
Celeste

Fishing boat’s crew
taken hostage

30-November1989

Conwy, Britain

Meibion
Glyndwr

Yacht in harbour

Armed assault

Unknown

Fishing boat

Bombing

19-December1989

24-February-1990

Bosporus Strait,
Turkey
Off the coast of
Juniyah,
Lebanon - U

25-February-1990

Off the coast of
Cyprus - U

07-April-1990

Karaingar, Sri
Lanka

Tamils

01-April-1991

Gulf of Aden,
Somalia

Somali National
Movement

24-April-1991

Kismayo,
Somalia

26-April-1991

Perama, Greece

Islamic
Terrorists
November 17
Revolutionary
Organisation

Unknown

Syrians

Greek-owned
ferry
Cypriot
passenger
vessel
Indian fishing
boat
Polish Cargo
ship Wladyslaw
Lokietek
Italian ship
carrying Relief
Supplies
Greek Tug Boat
Karapiperis 6

Shelling attack
Gunfire from small
boat

Hijacking

Hijacking

Hijacking

Bombing

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target: From
other vessel
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

4

GTD

15

1

RDWTI

25

1

RDWTI

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

29-April-1991

Gulf of Aden - U

Perpetrators
National
Liberation Front
of Somalia

21-June-1991

Guanabo, Cuba

Anti-Castro
Cubans

04-August-1991

Mergui,
Myanmar

Karen
Insurgents

11-August-1991

Zamboanga,
Philippines - P

Abu Sayyaf
Group

07-November1991

Saint Marc, Haiti

Drug-Related
Terrorists

11-December1991

Mogadishu,
Somalia

Unknown

US Freight
Vessel
Saudi Arabian
Tanker Sea
Skipper

08-January-1992

Baku, Azerbaijan

Unknown

Ferry boat

Explosion on vessel

17-February-1992

Red Sea,
Ethiopia

Eritrean
Liberation Front

British sailing
boat

Armed assault

11

Attacked vessel

Polish cargo ship
Cuban fishing
vessel
Veneciana
Burmese Fishing
Vessel
Christian
missionary
vessel MV
Doulous

Method and effect of
attack

Hijacking
Vessel hijacked by
Cuban escapees

Armed assault
Grenade attack whilst
the vessel was
alongside in port

Hijacking

Hijacking

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target: From
other vessel
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Target: From
the land
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target: From
inside the
vessel
Target:
Unknown
source

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

RAND

0

0

GTD

0

12

GTD

0

0

Banaloi 200511

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

20

12

GTD

0

0

GTD

Rommel Banlaoi ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat’ (Autumn 2005) 58(4) Naval War College Review, 69
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

Method and effect of
attack

13-June-1992

Mogadishu,
Somalia

Aidid Militia

Cargo ship

Hijacking

01-August-1992

Karachi,
Pakistan

Unknown

Kemari Boating
Basin

Bombing

28-August-1992

Istanbul, Turkey

Kurdistan
Workers' Party

Intra-island
ferry

Bombing

10-September1992

Koddiyar Bay,
Sri Lanka

LTTE

Ferry boat

Bombing

17-November1992

Port Sudan,
Sudan

Unknown

US merchant
vessel

Armed assault

25-December1993

Port of Eilat,
Israel - P

Palestine
National
Liberation
Movement, AlFatah

Israeli ship,
Jrush Shalom

Bombing whilst
docked in port

02-July-1994

Cado Gracios a
Dios, Nicaragua

Hijacking
Armed assault
Ship was boarding and
the crew attacked

Hijacking

08-July-1994

Jen, Algeria
Port of Jijel,
Algeria - P

Miskito Indian
Organization
Muslim
Fundamentalists
Armed Islamic
Group

05-August-1994

Havana, Cuba

Unknown

Fishing Boat
Italian ship
Luciana
Italian cargo
ship
Tug boat Dos
Rios

12-August-1994

Cuba

Unknown

Fishing Boat

07-July-1994

Hijacking

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Target: From
the land
Target:
Unknown
source
Target: From
the land
Target: From
the land
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

GTD

43

3

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

30

GTD

0

0

GTD

11

0

RDWTI

1

1

GTD

0

7

GTD

0

7

RDWTI

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD
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Date

09-October-1994

16-October-1994
19 April 1995
04-June-1995

29-August-1995

16-January-1996

19-January-1996

12 April 1996

07-August-1996
12
13

Lehr, above n 4, 63
Lehr, above n 4, 63

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel
Off Vetlilaikerni
Bead, Sri Lanka U
Papua New
Guinea
Trincomalee, Sri
Lanka – P
Kankesanturai,
Sri Lanka - U
Off Northeast
coast, Sri Lanka U

Trabzon, Turkey
-P
Between
Baucaut and
Kisar I,
Indonesia
Colombo, Sri
Lanka – P
Pethalai,
Batticuloa, Sri
Lanka

Perpetrators

LTTE
Bougainville
Revolutionary
Army

Attacked vessel

Method and effect of
attack

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Cargo vessel
Ocean Trader

Attack on vessel,
which later sank

Target: From
other vessel

LTTE

Club Med II
cruise ship
Two Sri Lankan
Navy gunboats

LTTE

MV Sea Dancer

LTTE

Passenger ferry
Irish Mona

Armed Assault
Scuba diving attack;
both vessels destroyed
Attack on vessel Destroyed
Ferry hijacked with
144 passengers held
hostage for 8 days

Panamanian
Arasya

50 hijackers stormed
vessel in port before
sailing; All hostages
later released

LTTE

Fishing boat
Three Sri Lankan
navy supply
ships

Crew of fishing boat
taken hostage
Explosives attached to
the vessels; causing
significant damage

LTTE

Sri Lankan
fishing vessel

Hijacking

TurkishAbkhazian
supporters of
Chechen
separatists

East Timorese
Activists

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

0

Lehr12

3

1

GTD

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

GTD

Target: From
the land

1

0

RDWTI

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

GTD

0

0

Lehr13

0

0

GTD

Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
underwater
Target: From
other vessel

Target: From
underwater
Target:
Unknown
source
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

09-August-1996

Pulmiddai, Sri
Lanka - P

LTTE

03-December1996

Nice, France

Unknown

Attacked vessel
Philippines
cargo vessel
Princess Wave
French
government
vessel

28-March-1997

South Coast,
Vietnam

Unknown

Danish
container ship

21-June-1997

Santa Marta,
Colombia

Unknown

Fishing vessel

LTTE

Ferry
North Korean
MV Morang
Bong
Cargo ship
Miguel Lujan
and Ferry
Leonara

01-July-1997

07-July-1997

23-July-1997
01-September1997
09-September1997

14

Sri Lanka - U
Sri Lankan North
coast near Point
Pedro - U

Isabela,
Philippines - P
Sri Lanka - U
Pulmoddai, Sri
Lanka - U

Murphy, above n 10, 338

LTTE

MILF
LTTE
LTTE

Chinese ship
Chinese ship MV
Cordiality

Method and effect of
attack
Bombed from beneath
waterline

Bombing

Armed Assault

Armed Assault
Ferry hijacked;
Passengers and crew later released,
hijackers then
destroyed the ferry
Hijacking of crew later released

Attacked with gunfire
Attack on vessel
Rocket-propelled
grenades

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target: From
underwater
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source
Target:
Unknown
source

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

9

5

RDWTI; GTD

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

0

1

GTD

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

RDWTI

Target: From
other vessel

0

1

RDWTI

5

0

Murphy14

0

0

RDWTI

10

37

RDWTI; GTD

Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
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Date

20-June-1999

25-July-1999

10-August-1999

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Osoko, Nigeria OP
Port of
Trincomalee, Sri
Lanka - P

Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

Armed
individuals

Royal Dutch
Shell oil rig

LTTE

Vessel Neuuco
Endurance

Armed
individuals

US-operated oil
rig

LTTE

MILF

Dubai cargo ship
Chinese cargo
vessel MV Yugi
Our Lady
Mediatrix

25-February-2000

Niger Delta - OP
Sri Lanka, Off
Northeast coast
-U
Northeast coast
of Sri Lanka - U
Ozamis City,
Philippines

20-September2000

Zamboagna,
Philippines - U

Abu Sayyaf
Group

Passenger ferry

12-October-2000

Aden, Yemen - P

Al Qaeda

USS Cole

14-August-1999
26-September1999

LTTE

Method and effect of
attack

64 workers were held
hostage for two days;
then released
Suicide bombing
attack on vessel whilst
in port

Three workers taken
hostage for one day
and then released
Vessel hijacked, with
crew being released
on the same day
Rocket attack by 12
LTTE boats
Bomb on bus driven
onto ferry
Suicide bombing by
passenger aboard
ferry
Suicide detonation of
small boat alongside

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Target: From
the land
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
inside vessel
Target: From
inside vessel
Target: From
other vessel

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

Kashubsky15

0

2

GTD

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

30

40

GTD
Campbell and
Gunaratna16

9

1

GTD

39

17

RDWTI; GTD

Mikhail Kashubsky ‘A Chronology of Attacks on and Unlawful Interferences with, Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, 1975 – 2010’ (2011) 5(5-6) Perspectives on
Terrorism, 139. All references to Kashubsky in this Appendix are to this source.
16
Tanner Campbell and Rohan Gunaratna ‘Maritime Terrorism, Piracy and Crime’ in Rohan Gunaratna (ed) Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response (Eastern
University Press 2003), 71
15
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Date
02-November2000

30-October-2001
22-December2001
03-July-2002

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel
Madras to
Colombo - U

Point Pedro, Sri
Lanka - U
Off Ambon
Island,
Indonesia - U
Malacca Straits U

20-March-2003

Mina al-Dubah,
Yemen - U
Off East coast of
Sri Lanka near
Chundikulam - U

01-April-2003

Davao City - P

06-October-2002

Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

LTTE

Russian vessel

LTTE

Sri Lankan Navy
oil tanker Silk
Pride

Al Qaeda-linked
group
Free Aceh
Movement

Ferry Kalifornia
Indonesian
supply ship

Aden Islamic
Army; Al Qaeda

French MV
Limburg

LTTE

Moro Islamic
Liberation Front

Chinese fishing
vessel
Passenger
ferries Filipina
Princess and
Super Ferry 15

Method and effect of
attack
Vessel hijacked and
crew taken hostage
Several speedboats
detonated next to the
Silk Pride in a
coordinated suicide
attack
Explosion onboard
vessel
Hijacking of vessel
Suicide detonation of
a small boat alongside;
Caused significant
disruption to the
Yemeni economy and
to marine insurance
premiums
Rocket attack on
fishing vessel which
later sunk

Bomb on port

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target: From
other vessel

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

GTD

0

10

RDWTI; GTD

0

10

Bradford17

0

0

Sinai18

Target: From
other vessel

12

1

RDWTI; GTD

Target: From
other vessel

1

14

GTD

Target: From
the land

30

16

Murphy19

Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
inside vessel
Target: From
other vessel

John Bradford ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’(Summer 2005) 58(3) Naval War College Review, 67
Joshua Sinai ‘Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism (March 2004) 3(1) The Quarterly Journal, 55
19
Murphy, above n 10, 326
17
18
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27-February-2004

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel
Malacca Straits U
Off Corregidor
Island,
Philippines - U

14-March-2004

Port of Ashdod,
Israel

Hamas, al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade

24-April-2004

Khor al-Amaya
and Al-Basra
offshore oil
terminals, Iraq OP

Jamaat alTawhid/Tawhid
and Jihad

Offshore oil
terminals

Bomb inside ferry Sunk
Two suicide bombers
detonated themselves
within shipping
container
Two coordinated
suicide attack using
dhows, fishing boats
and speed boats. This
incident caused
significant interruption
to oil production from
these terminals

02-September2004

Red Sea off
Yemen - OP

Yemeni
insurgents

Oil platforms

Workers taken
hostage; later released

Date
10-August-2003

20

Perpetrators
Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka

Attacked vessel
Malaysian MV
Penrider

Abu Sayyaf
Group

Super Ferry 14

Port of Ashdod,
Israel

Method and effect of
attack
Crew taken hostagetaking; later released

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target: From
other vessel

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

Chalk20

Target: From
inside vessel

200

116

RDWTI; GTD

Land-based
attack on port
facility21

20

12

Chalk;22 GTD

5

6

Chalk23; GTD

0

0

Kashubsky

Floating bomb:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform

Chalk, above n 1, 50
Although as [1.5] explained, this Study does not examine terrorist attacks on port facilities perpetrated from the landward (as opposed to seaward) side, this attack is
included to illustrate the vulnerabilities of shipping containers to terrorist infiltration. For a discussion of this incident, see [7.3.1.2] ‘The vessel as a means: Transporting
terrorist-connected persons’
22
Chalk, above n 1, 51
23
Chalk, above n 1, 50
21
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Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

28-August-2005

Niger Delta - OP
Lamitan,
Philippines - P

Armed
individuals
Abu Sayyaf
Group

Attacked vessel
Floating
Production,
Storage and
Offloading
(FPSO) ship
Jamestown
Passenger ferry
Dona Ramona

22-September2005

South Niger
Delta - OP

Militants

Chevron oil
platform Idama

Hostage-taking

Niger Delta - OP

Movement for
the
Emancipation of
the Niger Delta
(MEND)

Shell oil
platform

Attack on oil platform;
Workers taken
hostage and later
released

MEND

Shell Benisede
flow stations

Speed boat attack on
flow station, which
caused damage and
disrupted production

MEND

Forcados
offshore oil
loading terminal

Speed boat attack;
Nine workers
abducted and later
released

Date

12-June-2005

10-January-2006

15-January-2006

18-February-2006

Niger Delta - OP

Escravos, Niger
Delta - OP

Method and effect of
attack

45 workers taken
hostage; later released
Bomb inside ferry

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Target: From
inside vessel
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

Kashubsky

30

0

RDWTI

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky

0

16

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

11-May-2006

Off Jaffna, Sri
Lanka - U

LTTE

Attacked vessel
Sri Lankan troop
ship Pearl Cruise
II

02-June-2006

65NM offshore
in Niger Delta OP

MEND

Semisubmersible rig
Bulford Dolphin

17-July-2006

100NM north of
Colombo, Sri
Lanka - U
10NM off
Lebanon - U

Hezbollah

Several Sri
Lankan Naval
vessels
Israeli corvette
INS Ah Hanit

18-October-2006

Port of Galle, Sri
Lanka - U

LTTE

Dakshina Naval
Base and fishing
harbor

22-November2006

Port Harcourt,
Nigeria - A

Armed
individuals

FPSO Mystras

29-June-2006

24

LTTE

Method and effect of
attack
15 small boats
attacked troop ship,
which later sank
Speed boat attack by
30 armed militants.
Eight workers
abducted and oil
production
interrupted
Naval vessels attacked
by 20 small boats
hiding amongst fishing
vessels
Missile attack from
shore
Attackers disguised as
fishermen on five
explosives-laden
vessels approached
naval base. Three
boats were destroyed
and two exploded at
the entrance to the
harbour27
Speed boat attack.
Crew abducted and
later released

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target: From
other vessel
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform

Injuries

0

Source

17

Murphy24

0

Kashubsky

17

Murphy25

Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
the land

0

4

Lorenz26

Floating bomb:
Against land
targets

14

16

GTD

Target: From
other vessel

1

1

Kashubsky

Murphy, above n 10, 317
Murphy, above n 10, 317 - 318
26
Akiva Lorenz The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel (International Institute for Counter Terrorism) 24 September 2007, 25
27
This incident is recorded as both a successful and an attempted suicide attack
25

Fatalities
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

22-December2006

Off Sri Lankan
coast - U

LTTE

Attacked vessel
Jordanian
transport ship
Farah III

21-January-2007

Point Pedro, Sri
Lanka - U

LTTE

Foreign
commercial ship

31-March-2007

65NM offshore
in Niger Delta OP

MEND

Niger Delta - U

Armed
individuals

Semisubmersible rig
Bulford Dolphin
Security vessel
supporting
Trident VIII
drilling rig

MEND

Chevron
Floating Storage
and Offloading
ship Olobiri

MEND

FPSO Mystras

Speed boat attack;
Crew abducted and
later released
Speed boat attack;
Crew abducted and
later released

Armed
individuals

Trident VIII
offshore drilling
rig

Speed boat attack;
Crew member
abducted

19-April-2007

03-May-2007

Pennington
field, Niger
Delta - OP
55NM offshore
in Niger Delta A

05-May-2007

Brass Oil Export
Terminal, Niger
Delta - OP

01-May-2007

Method and effect of
attack
Ship hijacked, with the
crew being released
the next day
Ship hit by explosivesladen boat in a suicide
attack

Speed boat attack;
One worker abducted
Speed boat attack on
vessel; One Nigerian
sailor abducted

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel;
Floating bomb
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform

Target: From
other vessel
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Target: From
other vessel
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

1

0

RDWTI; GTD

0

0

RDWTI

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky

0

1

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

20-October-2007

15NM offshore
in Niger Delta OP

Armed
individuals

Attacked vessel

Method and effect of
attack

FPSO Sea Eagle

Speed boat attack;
Seven workers
abducted and later
released

16-January-2008

85NM offshore
in Niger Delta OP
Off Onne,
Nigeria - U
Aker base,
Nigeria - U

22-March-2008

Sri Lanka - U

12-May-2008

Trincomalee, Sri
Lanka - P

LTTE

09-June-2008

Niger Delta - U

MEND

10-June-2008

Niger Delta - U
Bonny Channel,
Nigeria - U

MEND

Sri Lankan
Supply Ship
Invincible
Nigerian
security vessel
Adax Petroleum
vessel

MEND

Chevron vessel

26-October-2007
04-December2007

19-June-2008
28

Perpetrators

Murphy, above n 10, 319

MEND
MEND
MEND

LTTE

FPSO Mystras
Exxon Mobil
boat
Merchant vessel
Sri Lankan Navy
Super Dvora
craft

Speed boat attack; Six
workers abducted
Speed boat attack on
vessel
Speed boat attack on
vessel
Suicide attack using
explosives-laden
vessel
Supply ship attacked
by diver rigged with
explosive in a suicide
attack; Ship sank
Speed boat attack on
vessel
Speed boat attack on
vessel
Vessel hijacked, Crew
later released

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky

1

1

GTD

2

0

GTD

14

Murphy28

Target: From
other vessel

Target: From
underwater
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel

RDWTI
4

1

GTD

4

9

GTD

0

0

GTD
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

19-June-2008

Niger Delta

MEND

Bonga Offshore
Oil Platform

31 June 2008

Niger Delta - OP
Bonny Channel,
Nigeria - U

24-August-2008

13-November2008

21-January-2009

09-March-2009

Off Porbandar,
India - U
Port Bonny,
Niger Delta,
Nigeria - U
Mullaittivu,
Puthumatalan,
Sri Lanka - U

Armed
individuals
MEND

Two oil
platforms
Nigerian ship
The Benue

Hijacking

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Target: From
other vessel

Target: From
other vessel;
then as a
means of
transporting
terrorist
operatives

0

5

RDWTI

Method and effect of
attack
Speed boat attack on
offshore platform. This
attack reduced
Nigeria's oil
production capacity by
one tenth

165 workers taken
hostage; later released

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

0

GTD

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

GTD

Lashkar-e-Taiba;
Deccan
Mujahideen

Fishing trawler
Kuber

Boarding; Killing of 5
crew; Hijacked fishing
vessel later used to
transport attackers to
Mumbai - where they
perpetrated 8 attacks
between 26 - 29 Nov
2008 - killing 171 and
injuring 250

MEND

MT Meredith

Speed boat attack on
vessel

Target: From
other vessel

0

0

GTD

LTTE

Cargo ship MV
Bintan Hinders

Artillery attack on
vessel

Target: From
the land

0

0

GTD
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

13-May-2009

Chanomi Creek,
Delta, Nigeria U

MEND

Attacked vessel
Cargo ship MV
Spirit and Oil
tanker MT
Chikana

MEND

Afremo oil field
offshore
platform

Bomb attached to
platform by speed
boat

MEND

Forcados
offshore oil
loading terminal

Speed boat attack

Speed boat attack

21-June-2009

26-June-2009

Niger Delta - OP

Niger Delta - OP

29-June-2009

Niger Delta - OP

MEND

Forcados
offshore oil
loading terminal

05-July-2009

Niger Delta - OP
20NM from
Escravos,
Nigeria - U

MEND

Shell Well Head
20 Platform

MEND

Chemical tanker
Siehem Peace

05-July-2009

Method and effect of
attack

Vessel hijacked; crew
later released

Speed boat attack disrupted production
Crew of chemical
tanker taken hostage;
Later released

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category

Target: From
other vessel
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Target: From
other vessel

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

6

0

GTD

0

0

Kashubsky

0

20

Kashubsky

0

25

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

GTD
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Date

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

Perpetrators

Attacked vessel

Method and effect of
attack

MEND

Oil offloading
facility

Armed raid

28-March-2010

Lagos, Nigeria P
Off Bakassi
peninsula SW
Cameroon - U
Off Cameroon
coast - U

Africa Marine
Commando
Africa Marine
Commando

Nigerian vessel

27-July-2010

Strait of Hormuz
near Oman - U

Unknown

Japanese tanker
MV M Star

Hijacking / hostage
taking
Hijacking / hostage
taking
Explosives packed
Speed boat - Suicide
attack

07-November2010

12NM off Niger
Delta - OP

MEND

High Island VII
offshore drilling
jack-up rig

19 crew abducted;
Released 10 days later

08-November2010

11NM off Niger
Delta - OP

MEND

Offshore rig

Crew of rig taken
hostage; later released

15-November2010

Off Southeast
coast of Nigeria
- OP

Niger Delta
Liberation Force

ExxonMobil Oso
offshore
platform

Crew of offshore
platform taken
hostage; later released

12-July-2009

12-March-2010

Two fishing
vessels

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against land
targets
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
Target: From
other vessel
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

5

Kashubsky

2

0

GTD

0

0

GTD

1

0

DiPaola29

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky

0

0

Kashubsky

Anthony DiPaola ‘UAE Confirms Terror Attack on Japan Tanker in Persian Gulf Last Month’ Bloomberg 7 August 2010 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-06/ua-e-confirms-terror-attack-on-japan-tanker-in-persian-gulf-last-month.html
29
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Date

17-November2010

Location and
Status of
Attacked Vessel

50NM off
Cameroon coast
- OP

Perpetrators

Africa Marine
Commando

Attacked vessel

Moudi oil
terminal

Method and effect of
attack

Speed boat attack

Maritime
Terrorism
Threat Matrix
Category
offshore
platform
Weaponslaunching
platform:
Against
offshore
platform

Injuries

Fatalities

Source

0

6

Kashubsky
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Appendix H:

Status of international agreements as at 1 October 2013

This Appendix summarises the status of the international agreements, and for the PSI
Interdiction Principles, the States currently listed as “participants” as at 1 October 2013, with

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

PSI "Participants"

x
x
x
x

2005 SUA Platforms Protocol

1988 SUA Platforms Protocol

x
x

2005 SUA Convention

1988 SUA Convention

x
x

2003 SID Convention

1982 UNCLOS

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic

1974 SOLAS Convention

the sources for these statuses being noted at the end of this appendix.

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

PSI "Participants"

2005 SUA Platforms Protocol

x
x

2005 SUA Convention

x
x

2003 SID Convention

1988 SUA Platforms Protocol

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

1988 SUA Convention

Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Dem. People's Rep. Korea
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Holy See

1982 UNCLOS

1974 SOLAS Convention
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x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x

Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia (Fed. States of)
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

PSI "Participants"

x

2005 SUA Platforms Protocol

x
x
x
x

2005 SUA Convention

x
x
x
x

2003 SID Convention

1988 SUA Platforms Protocol

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

1988 SUA Convention

Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lao People's Dem. Rep.

1982 UNCLOS

1974 SOLAS Convention
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x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

PSI "Participants"

x
x
x
x

2005 SUA Platforms Protocol

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

2005 SUA Convention

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

2003 SID Convention

1988 SUA Platforms Protocol

Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Niue
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
St. Vincent & Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tome & Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia

1982 UNCLOS

x
x
x
x
x

1974 SOLAS Convention

1988 SUA Convention
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x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x
X
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

PSI "Participants"

x
x
x
x

2005 SUA Platforms Protocol

x

2005 SUA Convention

x

2003 SID Convention

1988 SUA Platforms Protocol

x
x

1988 SUA Convention

Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Thailand
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Togo
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Rep. of Tanzania
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
IMO ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
Hong Kong, China
Macao, China
Faroe Islands
European Union

1982 UNCLOS

1974 SOLAS Convention
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x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
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Sources for the status of the above international agreements:

1974 SOLAS Convention, 1988 SUA Convention, 1988 SUA Platforms Protocol, 2005
SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Platforms Protocol:
International Maritime Organisation – Status of convention (SOLAS, SUA treaties)
‘Summary status of conventions’ as at 31 July 2013
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx; Accessed
1 October 2013

1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention:
United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea
‘Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the
related Agreements as at 20 September 2013’
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Accessed 1 October 2013

2003 SID Convention:
International Labour Organisation ‘Ratifications of C185 – Seafarers’ Identity Documents
Convention (Revised), 2003 (No. 185)’
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUM
ENT_ID:312330; Accessed 1 October 2013
PSI “Participants":
US State Department Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation ‘Proliferation
Security Initiative Participants’, 21 May 2013
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm; Accessed 1 October 2013
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Appendix I:

Effectiveness of preventative security measures against piracy and armed robbery against ships: 2005– 2012

This Appendix summarises the effectiveness of ISPS Code and other security measures in deterring pirate attacks on vessels between 2005 and
2012. For each attempted attack it includes the date; the location and navigational status of the attacked vessel (Underway (U), In port (P), At
anchor (A), or Offshore platform (OP)); the name and nationality of the attacked vessel; details of the attack including the number of attackers,
their weapons and means of transport; details of security measures taken by the targeted vessel; the effect of the security measures taken by the
targeted vessel; and references to the Annual Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships from which these reports of attempted attacks
were derived.

DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

30-March-2005

Sebuku Anchorage, East
Kalimantan, Indonesia - A

Hong Kong bulk
carrier Darya
Rani

Armed robbers
boarded carrier and
robbed vessel

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
"Alert crew and
armed security
guard rushed
forward"

Armed robbers
boarded tanker,
attacked master and
robbed vessel
Three armed pirates
boarded carrier,
attacked crew and
robbed vessel

After robbers left
vessel - SSAS
activated and
Mayday message
sent
After pirates left
vessel - SSAS
activated and
authorities notified

31-May-2005

10 NM South of Basra Oil
Terminal, Iraq - A

Cyprus tanker
MT
Nordmillennium

19-November2005

Umm Qasr anchorage,
Iraq - A

Panamanian bulk
carrier Alexandra
I

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Robbers stole ship's stores
and escaped in speedboat

2005, 36

Coalition warship
subsequently arrived on
scene to investigate

2005, 19, 22, 59

Coalition warship
subsequently arrived on
scene to investigate

2005, 27, 60
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

13-January-2006

Tg Priok Anchorage,
Indonesia - A

Panamanian
container vessel
Iberian Express

Two robbers armed
with knives boarded
ship

27-January-2006

Off Somalia - U

22-May-2006

10.5NM South East of
Mogadishu, Somalia - U

21-August-2006

Santos Anchorage, Brazil A

Turkish bulk
carrier MV
Osman Mete
St Vincent and
Grenadines
general cargo
ship MV
Torgelow
Antigua and
Barbuda
container vessel
MSC Manaus

19-September2006

Santos Anchorage, Brazil A

Marshall Islands
container vessel
Zim Sao Paulo II

24-September2006

Dar Es Salaam Anchorage,
Tanzania - A

Panamanian LPG
tanker Rio Gracia

Five pirates in
speedboat armed
with machine guns
and RPGs, fired
upon vessel

Pirates in speedboat
opened fire on
tanker
Seven robbers
armed with guns
boarded vessel and
took hostages
Seven robbers
armed with guns
boarded vessel and
took hostages
Five robbers
boarded vessel and
stole goods from
tanker

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Robbers aborted attack

2006, 29

Pirate vessel ceased
attack upon seeing
coalition naval helicopter
and vessel arriving on
scene approximately one
hour later

2006, 18, 56

Pirate speedboat ceased
firing and moved away

2006, 19, 56

SSAS activated; Port
authorities notified

Robbers escaped

2006, 42

SSAS activated; Port
authorities notified

Robbers escaped

2006, 42

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised; Local
authorities notified

Robbers escaped

2006, 46-47

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
Armed shore
security guards
pointed their guns
at the robbers
SSAS activated;
Evasive
manoeuvres taken;
Fire hoses
activated; Coalition
naval forces
notified
Armed security
guards aboard
vessel returned fire
on pirate
speedboat
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

18-December-2006

Belawan Anchorage,
Indonesia - A

08-January-2007

Lagos Roads, Nigeria - A

09-January-2007

Lagos Roads, Nigeria - A

29-January-2007

Bahia De Pozuelos La
Cruz, Venezuela - A

08-February-2007

11-March-2007

12-March-2007

1.5NM off Mogadishu,
Somalia - A

Red Sea - U

Red Sea - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

Isle of Man
chemical tanker
Kristina Theresa
Danish product
tanker Trom
Estrid

Liberian tanker
Bow Bahia
Liberian
container vessel
Maersk Roubaix

Panamanian
Product tanker
MT Sea Energy
Panamanian
research vessel
MV Northern
Explorer
Panamanian
research vessel
MV Northern
Explorer

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK
Robbers boarded
vessel and
attempted to access
storage
compartments
Robbers boarded
tanker, attacked and
robbed crew
Three robbers
boarded vessel;
assaulted Master
whilst escaping
Two robbers
accessed vessel with
intent to rob it
Five pirates armed
with guns
approached, fired
upon and attempted
to board tanker
15 pirates in
wooden boat armed
with AK47s fired on
vessel
Three pirates in
speed boat fired
upon the vessel

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Alarm raised; Ship's
whistle sounded;
Fire hose activated;
Locked down ship

Robbers aborted attack;
Escaped in waiting boat

2006, 35

Alarm raised

Robbers escaped vessel

2007, 63

Upon seeing the crew
approach, the robbers
escaped overboard

2007, 65

Robbers aborted attack

2007, 57

Pirates aborted attack;
Local authorities arrived
on scene 1 hour later

2007, 26 , 81

Alarm raised; Crew
notified
Alarm raised;
search conducted
by crew
Alarm raised; Fire
hoses activated;
Local authorities
notified
SSAS activated;
Sudanese
authorities notified

No information
provided

Vessel cleared the area
Sudanese naval vessel
responded; Pirates
apprehended but later
released

2007, 27, 86

2007, 28
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

12-March-2007

40 NM off Freetown,
Sierra Leone - U

06-April-2007

Dumai Anchorage,
Indonesia - A

Liberian product
tanker Atropos
Panamanian
Chemical Tanker
Shimakaze

08-May-2007

Visakhapatnam
Anchorage, India - A

Liberian tanker
Onozo

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK
Pirates armed with
machine guns and
knives boarded and
robbed crew
Two robbers
accessed vessel with
intent to rob it
Seven robbers
armed with knives
boarded tanker

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
Master unable to
activate SSAS due
to close attention
of pirates

14-May-2007

180NM off Somalia - U

Qatar Cargo
vessel IBN
Younos

19-May-2007

Port Harcourt, Nigeria alongside

Refrigerated
cargo ship Silver
Cape

13-July-2007

Santos, Brazil - A

Liberian
container vessel
HS Discoverer

Pirates armed with
machine guns and
RPGs approached
and fired on tanker causing fire onboard
Armed pirates in
military fatigues
boarded vessel and
assaulted crew
Four robbers armed
with guns and
knives boarded
vessel

21-July-2007

11NM off Santos, Brazil A

24-October-2007

Off Lagos, Nigeria - A

Liberian
container vessel
HS Berlioz
Panama product
tanker BW
Danube

Two robbers
accessed vessel with
intent to rob it
Two robbers
boarded tanker and
robbed crew

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Pirates later departed
Robbers aborted attack,
assaulted crew upon
leaving

2007, 65 - 66

Robbers escaped

2007, 54

SSAS activated;
Evasive
manoeuvres taken;
Rocket parachute
signals fired

Pirates aborted attack
after one hour due to
evasive manoeuvres

2007, 82

Alarm raised

Pirates aborted attack

2007, 28

Robbers escaped vessel

2007, 58

Robbers escaped vessel
Not specified - but
appears robbers later
departed

2007, 58

Alarm raised
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised; Port
authorities notified

ISPS Code security
plans activated;
Police notified
"Security
procedures
followed"; Security
message broadcast
SSAS activated;
Local authorities
notified

2007, 43-44

2007, p 71-72
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

11-November2007

Phu My Port, Vietnam alongside

TARGETED
VESSEL
Dutch Cargo
Vessel Marinus
Green

24-December-2007

Lagos Port, Nigeria - A

Maltese bulk
carrier Althea

Four robbers armed
with knives

03-February-2008

Dar Es Salaam anchorage,
Tanzania - A

Panama cargo
vessel

12 armed robbers in
speedboat

Indian bulk
carrier
Murshidabad
Bahamas tanker
Tristar Kuwait

15-20 speedboats at
30-40 knots began
circling the bulk
carrier - as close as
5 metres to the
stern
Three robbers
boarded tanker

French
passenger vessel
Le Ponant
Marshall Islands
tanker MT
Genmar George
T

Ten pirates armed
with AK47s and RPG
in two speed boats
took the crew of 30
hostage
Unlit speedboat
approached from
tanker's stern; fired
automatic weapons

04-March-2008
23-March-2008

Indonesian waters - U
Tema Anchorage, Ghana A

04-April-2008

Gulf of Aden - U

06-April-2008

Nigerian waters

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK
Robbers armed with
knives boarded
vessel

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
Vessel contacted
port security
authorities

Crew patrols
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised; Crew
took anti-piracy
measures
Increased speed;
Evasive
manoeuvres; "Antipiracy measures";
Broadcast security
message via VHF
channel 16

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

Robbers escaped vessel
"Upon seeing the alert
crew the robbers
escaped"

Pirates aborted attack and
escaped

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

2007, 53

2007, 74

2008, 63

Alarm raised

"Seeing the crew's
vigilance, the speedboats
moved away and regrouped near a fishing
trawler in the vicinity"
Robbers jumped
overboard and escaped

SSAS activated,
Yemeni authorities
and coalition naval
forces informed

Crew and vessel released
unharmed on 11 April
2008 – apparently ransom
was paid

2008, 29, 57

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised

Pirates unsuccessful in
boarding tanker

2008, 34

2008, 71
2008, 64
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

Attack aborted
Pirates departed ship
after 50 minutes; Ships in
vicinity alerted

2008, 86

12 pirates in
speedboat

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised; Fire
hoses activated

Norwegian bulk
carrier Spar
Gemeni

Ten militants
boarded vessel a
barge, incapacitated
local security
guards, robbed ship

SSAS activated

No information specified

2008, 66

Gulf of Aden - U

Panamanian bulk
carrier MV Stella
Maris

Ship hijacked, sailed
to Eyl, anchored and
demanded ransom
for release of crew
and ship

SSAS activated,
contacted coalition
naval forces

2008, p 30, 57

Gulf of Aden - U

Thai general
cargo ship MV
Thor Star

28 crew taken
hostage

SSAS activated

No information specified
Ship hijacked, sailed to
Eyl, anchored and
demanded ransom for
release of crew and ship

SSAS activated

Ship hijacked, sailed to
Eyl, anchored and
demanded ransom for
release of crew and ship –
released on 29 September
2008

Off Escravos, Nigeria - U

13-April-2008

12NM off Mangkai Island,
Indonesia

16-July-2008

20-July-2008

12-August-2008

19-August-2008

Bonny River Anchorage,
Nigeria - A

Gulf of Aden - U

Marshall Islands
tanker Genmar
George T
Norwegian bulk
carrier Spar
Cetus

Malaysian
chemical tanker
MT Bunga Melati
Dua

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

06-April-2008

TARGETED
VESSEL

Speed boat
approached tanker
from stern and
opened fire with
automatic weapons

Pirates in two
speedboats

2008, 44

2008, p 30, 57

2008, 30
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

06-September2008

33 NM south of Yemeni
coast

Singaporean LPG
tanker Sigloo
Discovery

Six pirates in
speedboat armed
with RPG

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Foghorn sounded;
Fire hoses
activated; Increased
speed; Evasive
manoeuvres
undertaken;
Coalition naval
vessels notified

Two pirate boats
approached tanker
aggressively

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Increased speed;
Coalition naval
forces notified

18-September2008

25-October-2008

28-October-2008

40NM south of Al
Mukalla, Gulf of Aden

Doula Port, Cameroon - B

Gulf of Aden - U

Norwegian
Chemical Tanker
Jo Oak
Bahamas
offshore supply
ship Dynamic
Installer

St Vincent and
Grenadines
Cargo vessel
Aquilo

Robbers boarded
ship berthed
alongside

Five pirates in a
speed boat fired on
tanker with
automatic weapons

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Evasive
manoeuvres
undertaken; Fire
hoses activated;
Coalition naval
forces notified

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Pirates aborted attack

2008, 79

Pirates aborted attack

2008, 80

Apprehended by alert
shore security personnel

2008, 69

Coalition naval vessel
responded and escorted
the tanker to safety

2008, 82
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DATE

28-October-2008

06-December-2008

14-January-2009

29-January-2009

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

Gulf of Aden - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

Panamanian
tanker Leander

Off Southern Somalia - U

Hong Kong
container
Maersk
Regensburg

Gulf of Aden - U

Maltese tanker
Daylam

Gulf of Aden - U

Maltese bulk
carrier Eleni G

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

12 pirates in three
fast attack boats
operating from a
fishing vessel as
mother ship; fired
on tanker
Two pirate skiffs
approached; fired
on ship with guns
and RPG; possible
fishing vessel
mother ship 10NM
away

Two pirate boats

Six speedboats

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

SSAS activated;
Mayday messages
sent; Evasive
manoeuvres
undertaken;
Coalition naval
forces notified naval vessel and
helicopter arrived
on scene shortly

Pirates aborted attack coalition naval aircraft
dropped ordinance in the
vicinity of pirates

2008, 92

Pirates aborted attack

2008, 74

Pirates aborted attack;
Coalition helicopter and
warship responded

2009, 86

“Seeing the alert crew and
the aggressive
manoeuvres, the pirates
abandoned the attack”

2009, 86

SSAS activated;
Increased speed;
fire hoses activated.
Fire broke out on
ship due to RPG and
gunfire
Master raised
alarm, took evasive
manoeuvres and
increased speed
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Evasive
manoeuvres taken;
Fire hoses
activated; coalition
forces notified and
arrived on scene 50
minutes later
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

29-January-2009

Balongan Anchorage,
Indonesia - A

29-March-2009

Gulf of Aden - U

25-April-2009

27-June-2009

04-August-2009

645 NM SE of Mogadishu,
Somalia

South China Sea

Gulf of Aden - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

Greek chemical
tanker Elka
Athina
German Naval
Supply Ship FGS
Spessart

Panamanian
passenger ship
Melody

Singaporean LPG
Tanker Sigloo
Discovery

Bahamas general
cargo ship MV
Notos Scan

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Four pirates

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
Audible alarm
activated; Master
sent security alert
to all ships in
vicinity

Pirates fled after hearing
audible alarm; but no
response from local
authorities

2009, 45

Fired upon

Onboard security
team returned fire

Pirates apprehended and
detained

2009, 88

Fired upon by
pirates

Evasive
manoeuvres
undertaken; Other
measures
undertaken

Pirates aborted attack

2009, 79

Pirate attack whilst
U

SSAS activated

No details provided re
response to SSAS
activation; Crew
negotiated with attackers
– who stole goods and
then escaped

2009, 51

Pirates in a 7-8
metre long wooden
boat – shots fired

SSAS activated; Ship
increased speed
and took evasive
manoeuvres ;
coalition naval
helicopter arrived
on scene in 30
minutes

Pirates aborted attack

2009, 28

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

17-August-2009

At the Bonny Offshore Oil
terminal, Nigeria

23-August-2009

Haiphong Anchorage,
Vietnam

20-September2009

20 NM off Bonny River
Fairway Buoy - U

26-September2009

04-October-2009

Gulf of Aden - U

Off coast of Somalia

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

Bahamas Crude
Oil Tanker MT
Front Chief

Not specified

SSAS activated;
Crew barricaded
themselves in the
engine room for
safety; Terminal
officials notified

Antigua and
Barbuda cargo
vessel Ellen S
Antigua and
Barbuda cargo
vessel Nova
Galicia

Boarded by eight
pirates
Pirates stole
property, no
injuries, departed
after one hour

Panamanian bulk
carrier Handy V

Singaporean
vehicle carrier
Hoegh Pusan

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Alarm activated

No response from local
authorities
Pirates fled after hearing
audible alarm; but no
response from local
authorities

SSAS activated, no
details of response

No details provided re
response to SSAS
activation

2009, 70

Two speedboats

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised,
Evasive
manoeuvres taken;
Parachute signals
fired; Coalition
warships notified

Pirates aborted attack
once coalition warship
sighted

2009, 97

Fired upon by two
pirate boats

SSAS activated;
initiated evasive
measures, started
fire pump and
switched on deck
lights; coalition
forces notified

Pirates aborted attack
after 10 minutes

2009, 80

2009, 31

2009, 52
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

05-October-2009

Gulf of Aden - U

Panamanian bulk
carrier Seagreen

24-October-2009

18.5 nm off coast of Benin
-U

Liberian Tanker
MT Cancale Star

Off coast of Somalia

French fishing
vessel Cap Saint
Vincent

27-October-2009

30-October-2009

18-November2009

26-November2009

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

Two speedboats;
RPGs fired

Not specified

Fired upon by
pirates

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
Alarm activated;
Evasive
manoeuvres
undertaken;
Parachute signals
fired

SSAS activated
Alarm raised; Ship’s
armed security
team fired warning
shots; Coalition
naval forces
notified

Near East Lagos port,
Nigeria

Malta Chemicals
Tanker MT
Mykines

Not specified

600 nm off Mogadishu

US container
vessel Maersk
Alabama

Chased and fired
upon

SSAS activated,
crew utilised fire
hoses
Ship’s security team
returned fire and
other anti-piracy
measures taken

Attacked by two
pirate vessels

SSAS activated, no
details of response;
Alarm activated,
increased speed;
evasive
manoeuvres taken

470 nm southwest of
Mogadishu

Antigua and
Barbuda cargo
vessel Delmas
Nacala

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES
Pirates aborted attack;
Coalition warship and
aircraft arrived and
chased the pirate boats
away
Pirates panicked and
escaped; later
apprehended and money
recovered

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

2009, 97

2009, 25

Pirates aborted attack;
Coalition helicopter and
warship arrived and
boarded pirate boats

2009, 81

Pirates assaulted crew,
damaged ship’s
communications
equipment, locked crew in
a cabin and escaped

2009, 32

Pirates aborted attack

2009, 82

Pirates abandoned attack
after three hours

2009, 82 - 83
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DATE

02-December-2009

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

Gulf of Aden - U

Antigua and
Barbuda cargo
vessel BBC Togo

Two boats launched
from a mother ship

05-March-2010

300 NM S of Mogadishu,
Somalia - U

Seychelles fishing
vessel Intertuna
Dos

11-March-2010

1050nm E of Mogadishu,
Somalia - U

Liberian
container ER
Lubeck

20-March-2010

26-March-2010

Calabar, Nigeria - U

Gulf of Aden - U

Singapore Tug
Pacific Supplier

Liberian tanker
Stolt Capability

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Evasive
manoeuvres taken;
Increased speed;
Coalition warships
notified

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Pirates aborted attack
after 10 minutes

2009, 99

Maritime patrol aircraft
and two naval helicopters
arrived on scene; pirates
aborted attack

2010, 76

Due to ship's increased
speed attack aborted

2010, 76

Armed pirates in
two skiffs
attempted to attack
the fishing vessel
Pirates in two skiffs
chased and fired on
vessel

Alarm raised;
Coalition naval
forces contacted;
Ship's security team
assumed defensive
positions
SSAS sent;
Increased speed
and took evasive
manoeuvres

Three pirates armed
with machine guns
approached vessel

Alarm sounded;
Crew locked down;
SSAS sent; Local
authorities
contacted

Pirates fired warning
shots, Unable to reach
crew; Stole property and
escaped

2010, 26, 65

Pirates in a skiff
approached tanker

Onboard security
team fired warning
shots; Notified
coalition naval
forces

Pirate skiffs backed off

2010, 90
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

02-April-2010

Gulf of Aden - U

11-April-2010

882nm East of
Mogadishu, Somalia - U

25-April-2010

Bab El Mandeb - U

05-May-2010

Off Somali coast - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

Italian chemical
tanker Valle Di
Castiglia
Antigua and
Barbuda
container City of
Guangzhou

Yemeni chemical
tanker Al Masilah
South Korean
bulk carrier
Ocean Trader

08-May-2010

20 NM off Pulau Mangki,
South China Sea - A

25-May-2010

Off Madagascar Island,
Mozambique - U

Hong Kong
carrier Star Sea
Rainbow
Spanish fishing
vessel
CampolibreAlai

12-June-2010

20nm off Palau Mangkai,
Indonesia S China Sea - U

Cyprus container
Iller Trader

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

Four pirates in a
skiff armed with
machine guns fired
upon the tanker
Three speed boats
closed offensively
on ship at a distance
of 3.5 NM
Eight skiffs carrying
armed pirates
closed in at high
speed
Pirates in skiff
chased and fired
upon carrier

Six pirates
attempted to board
ship
Skiff approached at
high speed - was not
deterred by flares
12 pirates armed
with knives

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised; Took
evasive
manoeuvres;
Coalition warships
contacted - arrived
40 mins later
SSAS sent;
Increased speed
and took evasive
manoeuvres

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Tanker evaded attack
Skiffs aborted attack after
closing to 1.6 NM due to
increased speed of
container

2010, 90

Onboard security
team fired warning
shots near skiffs

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 91

Ship's security team
returned fire

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 79

Alarm raised; Deck
lights activated;
Security message
sent to ships in the
vicinity

"Pirates aborted the
attempted attack upon
seeing the crew alertness"

2010, 73

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 80

N/A - activated after the
attack

2010, 46

Ship's security team
fired upon the skiff
SSAS alert sent
activated after
pirates had escaped

2010, 78

551

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

Gulf of Aden - U

Marshall Islands
chemical tanker
Meriom Iris

Pirates in a skiff
chased and
attempted to board
tanker

23-June-2010

Bab El Mandeb - U

Marshall Islands
chemical tanker
Diplomat

27-June-2010

Bab El Mandeb - U

DATE

13-June-2010

02-July-2010

Off Port Bonny, Nigeria - U

Maltese
container Kergi
Antigua and
Barbuda general
cargo vessel MV
BBC Polonia

04-July-2010

Red Sea - U

Greek tanker
Hellas Symphony

Five skiffs each with
armed pirates
chased tanker
Armed pirates in
skiffs chased and
fired on ship
12 pirates in two
boats; Crew of 12
kidnapped
Two boats with 6 - 7
persons each
approached tanker

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
SSAS activated;
Took evasive
manoeuvres;
Contacted
authorities for
assistance
SSAS activated;
Took evasive
manoeuvres;
Increased speed;
Switched on deck
lights; Started fire
pump; Contacted
coalition naval
forces

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Tanker evaded the
boarding

2010, 92

Pirates aborted attack
after 15 minutes

2010, 93

Onboard security
team returned fire
Alarm raised; SSAS
activated; Distress
message sent; Crew
mustered

Pirates aborted attack
Nigerian navy boarded
vessel after crew departed
& sailed to port; Crew
later released

2010, 93

Alarm raised; LRAD
activated

Boats aborted chase

2010, 93

2010, 27, 67
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

03-August-2010

Hanish Al Kubra Island,
Red Sea - U

Marshall Islands
chemical tanker
Songa Sapphire

Three skiffs chased
tanker whilst
underway

Red Sea - U

Liberian bulk
carrier London
2012

Seven pirates in 2
skiffs chased carrier

Red Sea - U

Antigua and
Barbuda cargo
vessel Aniek

Four skiffs closed in
on vessel

Gulf of Aden - U

Antigua and
Barbuda cargo
vessel Beluga
Family

Pirates armed with
automatic weapons
chased vessel

03-August-2010

11-August-2010

22-August-2010

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
SSAS activated;
Took evasive
manoeuvres;
Increased speed;
Activated foam
hoses; Sent distress
message; Contacted
authorities
SSAS activated;
Took evasive
manoeuvres;
Activated foam
hoses; Sent distress
message; Contacted
authorities
Alarm raised; Flares
deployed; Coalition
warships contacted
SSAS activated;
Took evasive
manoeuvres;
Increased speed;
Activated water
hoses; Contacted
authorities

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 94

Skiffs aborted attack
"A military helicopter
arrived and upon seeing
the helicopter the skiffs
aborted"

2010, 94

Skiff aborted attack

2010, 95

2010, 95
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

28-August-2010

Gulf of Aden - U

28-September2010

Off Somali coast - U

29-September2010

Off Somali coast - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

Panamanian
cement carrier
Caribbean
Carrier
Panamanian
tanker MT
Asphalt Venture

Eight pirates armed
with automatic guns
chased carrier in a
high speed boat

US container
Maersk Alabama

02-October-2010

Off Somalia - U

15-October-2010

Vila Do Conde anchorage,
Brazil - A

Panamanian bulk
carrier Amira S
Bahamas cargo
vessel Bergen
Arrow

15nm South of Tin Can
Island - Lagos, Nigeria

Hong Kong
container
Marianne
Schulte

20-October-2010

Tanker hijacked

Five pirates armed
with AK 47s in a skiff
closed offensively
on ship
Three pirates armed
with automatic
weapons
approached carrier
Three robbers
boarded ship via
anchor chain

Eight pirates armed
with guns

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
SSAS activated;
Took evasive
manoeuvres;
Increased speed;
Activated fire
hoses; Contacted
coalition naval
forces for
assistance

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 95-96

SSAS activated
SSAS activated;
Warning shots
fired; LRAD
sounded; Evasive
manoeuvres; Alarm
sounded

Not specified

2010, 29

Alarm raised;
Increased speed;
Fire hoses activated
Security watchmen
raised alarm
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Second Officer
attempted to
contact port control

"The pirates quickly
retreated and aborted the
attempted attack"
"Action taken by the
security team onboard
resulted in pirates
aborting the attack"
"Hearing the alarm the
robbers escaped emptyhanded"
No response from port
authorities; Pirates
robbed ship and then
escaped

2010, 81

2010, 81

2010, 55

2010, 69
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

23-October-2010

Gulf of Aden - U

TARGETED
VESSEL
Bahamas cargo
vessel Merlin
Arrow

29-October-2010

Off Kenya - U

Liberian tanker
Moscow Sea

02-November2010

150 NM East of Mombasa,
Kenya - U

Panamanian
carrier Majestic

02-November2010

Off Somalia - U

Liberian tanker
Batavia

09-November2010

Off Somalia - U

Panamanian
tanker Floyen

Seven pirates in two
skiffs chased and
fired upon carrier
Seven pirates in two
skiffs launched from
a mother ship which closed on
tanker
Armed pirates in
two skiffs chased
and fired on the
tanker

Gulf of Aden - U

Gibraltar
chemical tanker
Valerie

Six armed pirates on
a skiff closed in on
tanker, shots fired

15-November2010

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK
Five armed pirates
chased and fired
upon tanker

Armed pirates fired
upon the tanker

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
Alarm raised;
Rocket flares fired
towards skiff
Security team on
board took
"preventative
measures"
Alarm raised;
Rocket flares fired;
Armed security
team took
preventative
measures

Ships security team
fired hand flares
and warning shots
Distress signal sent;
Ship's security team
exchanged fire with
pirates
Onboard security
team took
preventative
measures

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 96

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 82

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 82

Pirate skiffs backed off

2010, 83

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 83

Pirates aborted attack

2010, 96 - 97
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DATE

22-November2010

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

Off Somali coast near
Oman - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Norwegian bulk
carrier
Carmencita

Ten armed pirates in
two skiffs chased
and fired upon ship;
attempted boarding
several times

SSAS activated;
Alarm sounded;
Increased speed;
Contacted coalition
warship for
assistance

"The pirates aborted the
attack upon seeing the
presence of a warship and
two helicopters"

2010, 85

SSAS activated;
Increased speed;
Took evasive
manoeuvres;
Activated foam and
fire hoses; Alarm
sounded
SSAS activated;
Increased speed;
Took evasive
manoeuvres

"Due to the water-jets
and zig-zag manoeuvring
the attempted boarding
was prevented"

2010, 86

Off Somali coast - U

United Arab
Emirates tanker
D&K1

10-December-2010

Off Somali coast - U

Liberian tanker
United Star

Two skiffs from a
mother ship closed
in on, fired upon
and attempted to
board tanker
Armed pirates in
two skiffs chased
and fired upon the
tanker

13-December-2010

Off Pemba Island,
Tanzania - U

Liberian tanker
SCF Alpine

Two speed boats
approached and
fired upon tanker

16-December-2010

300 NM South-west of
Mumbai, India - U

Marshall Islands
tanker
Hellespont
Trinity

Pirates in a skiff
armed with machine
guns and RPG
approached and
fired upon tanker

24-December-2010

60 NM South-west of
Lagos, Nigeria - A

Italian chemical
tanker MT Valle
Di Cordoba

15 robbers armed
with guns & knives

27-November2010

Alarm raised; Speed
increased; Nearby
warship contacted
SSAS activated;
Took evasive
manoeuvres;
Activated fire
hoses; Fired rocket
flares
Attackers switched
off communications
equipment including SSAS

Tanker escaped attack,
but sustained some
damage from the attack
"When the warship
arrived at the location,
the skiffs aborted the
attack"

2010, 87

2010, 87

Pirates aborted the
attempted boarding after
several attempts

2010, 87

N/A - switched off. Pirates
robbed ship and left it 3
days later

2010, 27
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

24-December-2010

115 NM South-east of
Macalonga Point,
Mozambique - U

Liberian tanker
NS Africa

01-January-2011

Off Somalia - U

UAE Tug Tiba
Folk

14-January-2011

Off Socotra Island, Yemen
-U

Chinese Cargo
Vessel Le Li

18-January-2011

Off Somalia - U

US Cargo Vessel
Advantage

Armed pirates
attempted to board
vessel
Armed pirated
chased & fired upon
vessel

26-January-2011

490 NM East of Socotra
Island, Yemen - U

Ethiopian Cargo
Vessel Andinet

Two skiffs chased
and fired upon
vessel

SSAS activated;
Distress message
sent; Increased
speed; Activated
water jets
Increased speed,
Onboard security
fired flares
Onboard security
team took
preventative
measures
Onboard armed
security fired
warning shots
Onboard security
team opened fire;
15 minute fire fight
ensued

Bahamas
Container Vessel
CMA CGM Verdi

Two pirate speed
boats approached
the ship at around
20 knots

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Increased speed;
Sent mayday
message

28-January-2011

65 NM North of Minicoy
Island, India off Somalia U

Two skiffs launched
from a mother ship
chased tanker
Armed pirates
chased the tug
towing a barge

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Skiffs aborted the chase
after 50 minutes

2010, 88

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 78

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 79

Pirated aborted attack

2011, 80

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 80

Indian coastguard
responded; Pirates
aborted attack

2011, p 80 - 81
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

28-January-2011

560 NM East of Socotra
Island, Yemen - U

01-February-2011

105 NM South of Salalah U

01-February-2011

10-February-2011

16-February-2011

123 NM South-east of
Socotra Island, Yemen - U

50 NM off Lagos, Nigeria U

40 NM South of
Porbandar Island, India - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

Liberian Tanker
New York Star
Singaporean
Tanker Maersk
Phoenix

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Four pirate skiffs
launched from
mother ship
attacked and
boarded tanker
Two skiffs fired on
tanker with machine
guns

Onboard security
fired rocket flare did not deter
boarding; Crew
barricaded in
citadel; Contacted
ship's owners
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Increased speed

Dutch warship arrived to
assist 2 hours later Pirates had vacated
tanker

2011, 62 - 63

Skiffs eventually backed
off

2011, 97

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 81

Pirates aborted attack
after one hour

2011, 107

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 82

Singapore Tanker
Kara Sea

Pirates in a dhow
and a skiff closed in
on vessel

Liberian
Chemical Tanker
Elbtank Germany

Eight armed pirates
in a fishing boat
approached the
stern and opened
fire

Liberian Tanker
NS Century

Three skiffs closed
in on tanker from a
mother ship - which
had no AIS signal

Alarm raised;
Increased speed;
Warning flares
fired; Onboard
security team fired
warning shots
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Increased speed;
Implemented
evasive
manoeuvres
Evasive
manoeuvres
implemented;
Onboard armed
security team fired
warning shots
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
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When the vessel with
armed security personnel
approached, the pirates
abandoned the yacht

2011, 33

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 84

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 84

2011, 85

2011, 86

US Container
Vessel Maersk
Alabama

Four pirates in a
dhow approached
tanker
Skiff launched from
mother ship
approached tanker
at speed
Four pirates in a
skiff travelling at 25
knots attempted to
board vessel

Bahamas Tanker
Asian Progress IV

Eight armed pirates
approached tanker
at high speed

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised

Pirates aborted attack
"Upon seeing the crew
alertness, the pirates
aborted the attempted
attack"

One mother ship
and two skiffs
closed in on vessel

SSAS activated;
Increased speed;
Crew barricaded in
citadel; Evasive
manoeuvres
implemented; Ship
steered into swell

Pirates aborted attack

550 NM East of Socotra,
Yemen - U

Belgian Yacht
Capricorn

03-March-2011

205 NM off Salahah,
Oman - U

UAE Product
Tanker D&K 1

03-March-2011

260 NM East of Socotra
Island, Yemen - U

Liberian
Chemical Tanker
Voge Dignity

08-March-2011

390 NM North-east of
Mogadishu, Somalia - U

12-March-2011

14.5 NM off Pulau
Mangkai, South China Sea
-U

19-March-2011

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
Armed security
personnel on a
nearby vessel
approached to
render assistance
SSAS activated;
Increased speed;
Implemented
evasive
manoeuvres
Onboard armed
security team fired
warning shots; brief
firefight ensued
SSAS activated;
Armed security on
board fired warning
shots

02-March-2011

190 NM North-east of
Pemba Island, Tanzania U

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

German
Container Vessel
E.R. Copenhagen

Six armed pirates
hijacked the yacht

2011, 76
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DATE

21-March-2011

21-March-2011

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

495 NM North-east of
Mogadishu, Somalia - U
45 NM North-east of
Horsborough Lighthouse,
South China Sea - U

27-March-2011

122 NM South-east of
Salalah, Oman - U

13-April-2011

67 NM South-west of
Cotonou, Benin - A

20-April-2011

85 NM South of Lagos
Port, Nigeria - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

Liberian Tanker
Al-Nouf
Malaysian Cargo
Vessel Rena

Liberian Tanker
NS Asia
Italian Chemical
Tanker
Alessandra
Bottiglieri

Marshall Islands
Bulk Carrier Star
Gamma

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

One mother ship
and 2 skiffs fired
RPG and guns at
tanker
Eight armed pirates
attempted to board
tanker

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
SSAS activated;
Increased speed;
Implemented
evasive
manoeuvres; Crew
mustered in
tanker's citadel

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

2011, p 34, 86

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised

Tanker evaded the
attempted boarding; But
injuries and damage
sustained
"The pirates aborted the
attempted attack upon
seeing the crew alertness"

Skiff launched from
mother ship
approached tanker
at speed

SSAS activated;
Alarm sounded;
Crew mustered in
citadel; Speed
increased; Coalition
naval forces
contacted; Onboard
security team fired
at skiff

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 87

Ten armed robbers
boarded tanker

SSAS activated

Robbers left tanker next
day - all crew safe

2011, 69 - 70

Skiff approached
and fired upon
carrier

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Distress message
sent; Increased
speed

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 107

2011, p 76 - 77
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

07-May-2011

Guayaquil Inner
Anchorage, Ecuador - A

Marshall Islands
Container Ship
Wehr Kolenz

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK
12 robbers in two
boats boarded ship,
stole cargoes and
escaped

235 NM East of Salalah,
Oman - U

Italian Bulk
Carrier MBA
Liberty

Two skiffs fired
upon ship with guns
and RPG

10-May-2011

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN
SSAS activated;
Crew barricaded in
accommodation
spaces
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised;
Increased speed;
Implemented
evasive
manoeuvres;
Contacted coalition
warships for
assistance

14-May-2011

220 NM East-north-east of
Socotra Island, Yemen - U

Maltese Cargo
Vessel Merle

One skiff launched
from a mother ship

22-May-2011

Jakarta Anchorage,
Indonesia - A

Liberian
Container Vessel
CMA CGM

Two robbers
boarded tanker
from stern

SSAS activated;
Increased speed;
Fired rocket flares
and then warning
shots
Crew detected the
robbers and
informed
authorities

Six armed pirates
hijacked the barge

SSAS activated which was relayed
to Indonesian
authorities

29-May-2011

20 NM W of Muara
Jankut, Pontianak,
Indonesia - U

Tugboat towing a
barge carrying
palm oil

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Coastguard and harbour
officials attended to
investigate

2011, 58

"Due to the aggressive
manoeuvres the pirates
aborted the attempted
attack"

2011, 89

Pirates aborted attack and
moved back towards
mother ship

2011, 90

"Robbers jumped into the
water after being noticed
by the ship's crew"

2011, 47

Three days later an
Indonesian patrol boat
intercepted the hijacked
boat and detained the
pirates

2011, 47 - 48
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DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Two skiffs fired
upon the bulk
carrier

SSAS activated;
Alarm raised; Crew
mustered in citadel;
"Enforced antipiracy measures"

Pirates aborted attack

2011, 100 - 101

Tanker evaded the skiff
Robbers left tanker; But
no response from port
control

2011, 92

29-May-2011

In Red Sea - U

18-June-2011

20 NM North-west of
Trivandrum, India - U

24-June-2011

8 NM off Fairway Buoy
Cotonou, Benin - A

01-August-2011

Mombasa Port, Kenya - P

03-August-2011

Chittagong Anchorage,
Bangladesh - A

Marshall Islands
Bulk Carrier
Hawk I
Panamanian
Chemical Tanker
Pacific
Marchioness
Marshall Islands
Tanker SP
Atlanta
Liberian
Container Hansa
Ravensburg
Antigua and
Barbudan
Container
Francoise Gilot

26-August-2011

Jose Port Anchorage,
Venezuela - A

Greek Bulk
Carrier Maria L

Two armed robbers
boarded vessel
Robber boarded
ship via stern,
attempted to steal
goods aboard
Two skiffs with 12
robbers approached
carrier

10-September2011

4 NM off Jazirat Jabal
Zuqar Island, Yemen - U

Greek Tanker MT
United Emblem

Pirates in three
skiffs boarded
tanker

Pirates in a skiff
chased tanker
Ten robbers
boarded tanker;
Assaulted crew

SSAS activated;
Implemented antipiracy measures
SSAS activated;
Alarm raised; Port
control contacted
Onboard security
spotted robbers
and raise alarm
"Alert security
guard spotted
robber and raised
alarm"
Onboard armed
security opened fire
SSAS activated;
Company Security
Officer (CSO)
contacted;
Increased speed
and implemented
evasive
manoeuvres

2011, 71 - 72

Robbers escaped from
vessel

2011, 73

"Seeing crew alertness the
robber jumped overboard
and escaped

2011, 57

Robbers abandoned
attack

2011, 77

Nearby warship
responded - confirmed
pirates had left the tanker

2011, 30, 68
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DATE

13-September2011

02-October-2011

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

62 NM South-west of
Cotonou, Benin - A

650 NM North-east of
Mogadishu, Somalia - U

TARGETED
VESSEL

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

Norwegian
Product Tanker
MT Northern Bell

Armed pirates
attacked tanker
during ship to ship
transfer operations

SSAS activated; CSO
contacted; Crew
barricaded
themselves in
tanker's citadel

Pirates left the vessel
after several hours

2011, 27, 73

Liberian
Chemical Tanker
UACC Shams

Two skiffs launched
from mother ship 8
NM from tanker;
Fired RPG at tanker

Armed security
team onboard fired
warning shots;
Crew barricaded in
citadel

Skiff aborted attack after
warning shots fired

2011, 36

Skiff ignored flares and
first warning shots;
Retreated after second
round of warning shots
fired
NATO warship arrived on
scene within a few hours;
Freed crew members and
detained pirates

02-October-2011

500 NM East of Salalah,
Oman - U

Liberian Cargo
Ship Lara
Rickmers

Skiff approached
and fired upon ship
with guns and RPG

10-October-2011

430 NM East of Socotra
Island, Yemen - U

Italian Bulk
Carrier MV
Montecristo

Attacked and
boarded by 11
armed pirates

Armed security
team onboard fired
flares; then warning
shots twice Crew
barricaded in
citadel
All crew retreated
to citadel; Sent
request for
assistance

16-October-2011

10 NM East of Pemba
Island, Tanzania - U

Indonesian LPG
Tanker Gas Bali

Pirate skiff fired
upon tanker with
RPG and guns

Alarm raised; Crew
retreated to citadel;
Armed security
team onboard fired
warning shots

06-April-2012

16 NM off Iranian coast U

Panamanian
cargo ship MV
Xiang Hua Men

Armed pirates
attacked and
boarded vessel

Alarm raised,
activated alert

Pirates aborted attack
after exchanging fire for
around 3 minutes
Iranian warship
responded, following
gunfire exchange rescued
crew and detained pirates

2011, 36

2011, 36

2011, 37

2012, 31

563

DATE

LOCATION AND
NAVIGATIONAL STATUS
OF TARGETED VESSEL

28-August-2012

Lome Anchorage, Togo - A

05-September2012

09-September2012

DETAILS OF
ATTTACK

SECURITY
MEASURES TAKEN

Attacked by armed
pirates

Distress call made
to Togo Navy

Off Nigerian coast - U

TARGETED
VESSEL
Isle of Man
product tanker
MT Energy
Centurion
Singaporean
chemical tanker
MT Abu Dhabi
Star

Off Nigerian coast - U

Danish tanker
MT Torm
Gertrud

Pirate vessels
approached and
fired upon tanker

Attacked by armed
pirates

11-December-2012

3 NM South of Johor,
Malaysia - A

St Kitts and Nevis
tanker MT
Merlion Dua

Attacked by armed
pirates

15-December-2012

80nm NW off Muscat,
Oman - U

Danish tanker
MT Torm Kristina

Attacked by armed
pirates

Sent distress
message, contacted
owners and CSO
Raised alarm,
increased speed
and implemented
evasive
manoeuvres

Activated SSAS,
Informed CSO
Raised alarm,
activated SSAS, sent
distress alerts via
VHF, implemented
evasive
manoeuvres

EFFECT OF SECURITY
MEASURES
Togo Navy responded,
gunfire exchange with
pirates ensued, pirates
later released tanker
Nigerian warship and
helicopter arrived on
scene and rescued all
crew

IMB ANNUAL
REPORT
REFERENCE

2012, 33

2012, 29 - 30

Pirates aborted attack

2012, 30

Local authorities and
Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency
patrol boats responded,
pirates detained

2012, 28

Coalition naval forces
responded, pirates had
abandoned tanker

2012, 31 - 32

